A Postcolonial Theory of Recognition: Honneth and Fanon on Violence and Mutual Recognition

Abstract

Frantz Fanon provides a rough sketch of what mutual recognition might look like within the postcolonial situation in the penultimate chapter of Black Skin, White Masks (1952). He gives three basic aspects that form his characterisation of humanity: firstly, the integral role of humane action as it relates to the formation of subjectivity; secondly, the basic values of humanity; and thirdly, the importance of acknowledging differences but also shared aims among people. In other words, he is speaking about a sense of reciprocity which is key to recognising the humanity of the other. Fanon’s rough sketch is a (post)colonial translation of the idea of mutual recognition and there are interesting overlaps with Axel Honneth’s more recent and influential theory of mutual recognition in The Struggle for Recognition (1995). The focus of Honneth’s theory is on three modes: emotional support, cognitive respect and social esteem. These modes of mutual recognition provide the conditions for a just society, namely love/friendship, rights and solidarity. This link between Honneth and Fanon’s work extends to the issue of misrecognition. The forms of disrespect that Honneth provides for each mode of recognition correlates with the various forms of violence that Fanon identifies within colonial and decolonising societies: The physical violence of abuse and rape, the structural violence of exclusion and the denial or rights, and the psychological violence of denigration and insult. Honneth’s theory can be translated via Fanon’s ideas to a postcolonial theory of recognition that could help with an understanding of the post-Apartheid situation. This theory shows how mutual recognition is problematised within the postcolony by various Fanonian forms of violence and by the lack of Honneth’s preconditions concerning universal access to education and economic security.

1 Introduction

The aim of this chapter is to develop a postcolonial theory of recognition considering the problematic of violence and its relation to the ideal of mutual recognition. The hope is that the theory could provide a framework, or a set of tools, with which to understand various postcolonial (but also colonial and neocolonial) contexts and situations if the framework is applied to certain case studies (in the case of this chapter, the case study of South Africa). The starting point for such a theory will be the well-known theory of recognition provided by Axel Honneth, a key figure in the third generation of the Frankfurt School, which appears in his book The Struggle for Recognition. His theory sketches the general outline of the structure of relations of mutual recognition with the focus on three forms of recognition, namely love, rights and solidarity.

I suggest a Fanonian reading of Honneth’s theory that will point to links with Fanon’s own clues about mutual recognition, in the process developing a hybrid theory that considers the postcolonial problematic. This hybrid theory will be two-fold in considering the overlaps between the work of Honneth and Fanon, i.e., Fanon’s clues on mutual recognition and his analysis of violence. Honneth himself also includes violence (forms of disrespect) in his theory as a key impediment to mutual recognition, and Fanon shows how it manifests in the (post)colonial context.

My turn to Honneth’s theory to better understand the South African situation takes its cue from Gail Presbey’s study that makes this link. Presbey (2003: 538) mentions the benefit of Honneth’s theory to understand the South African situation:

Honneth’s account of the moral motivation of struggle for recognition (with its concomitant struggle for economic justice) is a more accurate account of the struggle against apartheid in South Africa than a Marxist or purely egoist economic interpretation would be. Indeed, Sartre and Fanon as well understood the importance of recognition in struggles against racism and colonialism.

Presbey’s study was conducted during the first decade beyond Apartheid in relating Thabo Mbeki’s idea of an African Rennaisance to Honneth’s theory. Work on my chapter was conducted during the second and third decades beyond Apartheid and its focus is on the problem of violence unlike that of Presbey, who highlights the economic problem. The two problems are however not mutually exclusive and are in fact entwined as part of the social fabric of South African society (which is rife with various forms of violence and a big gulf of economic inequality). This then, is why I turn to Axel Honneth’s influential theory of recognition, which I will do by way of a Fanonian entrance and reading of his theory. The focus is therefore on the politics of recognition, but it could also be on the politics of identity. Recognition is crucial for the formation of identities and there is an interplay (or overlap) between the various political debates that centres around issues of recognition and identity. The politics of identity in South Africa is split between questions on an individual and a group level. The recognition of individual and group identity is intertwined but it is complicated by questions on a wide range of issues such as culture, religion, gender, minorities, inequality and so forth. The alignment of individual identity with group identity is an important one to consider within a postcolonial setting such as South Africa (i.e., the debate regarding the multicultural salad bowl or melting pot). These issues appear indirectly in this chapter although it is not the focus of the chapter.

The second section of the chapter will consist of a close Fanonian reading of Honneth’s theory of recognition. Section three will take this Fanonian reading further by explicitly connecting his work on violence to Honneth’s theory regarding violations (i.e., forms of disrespect) that leads to misrecognition and closes off the possibility of mutual recognition. The building blocks for a postcolonial theory of recognition will be gathered from the work of both thinkers: This starts with the clues that Fanon provides for the possibility of mutual recognition, and it provides two important overlaps with Honneth’s work. The first is its correlation to love, rights and solidarity in Honneth’s model, and the second is the correlation between Honneth’s forms of disrespect and the three forms of violence that can be identified in Fanon’s work (following Jinadu, 1986).

For the purposes of clarity and at the onset, I need to define what exactly I mean when I speak about violence in the following analysis and discussion. A distinction will be made between violence in general and the kind of violence that is the focus of this chapter (although not explicitly stated as such but to be read in-between the lines). When we think of violence, what usually comes to mind is physical or actual violence. This form of violence is included in Fanon’s work but he also sees other forms of violence at work in colonial and decolonising societies. This form of violence is certainly also considered in this chapter (especially in the discussions of Honneth and Fanon where it is at issue), but it is not the main concern of the focus on violence. What I am more concerned about (i.e., a real worry) is the violence that is at issue with regards to current debates on decolonisation, namely epistemic violence. In other words, the violence found in epistemic terms and systems that aims at knowledge about the other (but also the self). This kind of violence is certainly the mainspring of physical violence, but it’s more insidious because it is found on an institutional and psychological level. Fanon was certainly also concerned with violence on these levels, as is Honneth’s analysis regarding the possibility of mutual recognition.

2 Creolising Honneth’s Theory of Recognition (Via Fanon)

Honneth’s theory of mutual recognition provides a phenomenologically oriented typology of three patterns of recognition: Love, rights and solidarity (1995, 93). His three-part systematic structure is based on differentiations in the work of other philosophers, who distinguish different forms of recognition in separate spheres of the reproduction of society. He finds this to be quite significant in terms of the way that we also need to think about recognition.

Honneth (1995, 94) mentions a number of the social philosophers who conceptualise a three-part division and identify different forms of recognition in separate spheres of the reproduction of society: Hegel differentiates between family, civil society and the State; Scheler between life-community, society and community of persons; Plessner between primary bonds, commerce with society and the community of shared aims; and Mead between primary relationships to concrete others, legal relations and the sphere of work. The common thread that can be drawn here is three spheres that concern familial and friendly relations, institutional relations, and identifying group relations. Honneth builds on Hegel’s work to refine these spheres to relations of love, rights and solidarity and how recognition functions in terms of each of these relations.

There also seems to be a Fanonian overlap in this respect and Fanon provides an outline of what mutual recognition might look like in face of the levels of violence that he observed within the colonial and decolonising context. The key to him is that mutual recognition must in some way affirm the infinite value of humanity. He provides three aspects in this regard:

Firstly, the acknowledgement of difference (1986, 221–22). This is meant to provide an awareness that despite the shared values regarding our own humanity (such as rights) and the values that constitute this humanity as well as the actions that violate this humanity (what is called crimes against humanity), there are cultural, ethnic and racial differences that constitute our identities. The key for Fanon was that we don’t focus only on differences or only on shared values (and disavow any differences). An exclusive focus on differences leads easily to oppression and discrimination exactly with the motivation of the differences as a sign of inferiority. An exclusive focus on shared values can easily lead to a tendency to avoid or deny any differences with the consequence that a culture or group are forced to conform to some form of normativity, or that previous crimes against a cultural or racial group is disavowed in the name of equality. The latter was a very real fear of Fanon (1986: 220–21), where whites would give blacks freedom and declare everyone to be equal in exchange for past crimes to be forgiven and forgotten.

Secondly, Fanon (1986, 222) emphasises that action should be a key component in the formation of our identities. He cautions against lip service to the acknowledgement of differences and/or shared values, which simply become empty pronouncements if they are not acted upon to transform society. The key here is humane action that is revealed in our daily interaction with others: In other words, action that shows humanity in how we treat others; action that treats others with respect based exactly on the experience of our shared humanity; but also treating others with respect regarding the differences that arise from the contingencies of different contexts.

Thirdly, Fanon (1986, 222) urges us to focus on the basic values of humanity. To recap and revisit his words from the penultimate chapter of Black Skin, White Masks, he says that “man is a yes. I will never stop reiterating that. Yes to life. Yes to love. Yes to generosity … but man is also a no. No to scorn of man. No to degradation of man. No to exploitation of man. No to the butchery of what is most human in man: freedom” (1986, 222). Fanon (1986, 217–18) asserts the primal value of humanity in terms of an affirmation of the basic values that he lists here (as the supreme good) but also that which endangers humanity. Humanity (or man, in Fanon’s vocabulary) is made up of certain values and the transgression of these must be fought: The basic value of life or livelihood and humane life, threatened by actual violence. The values of love and generosity, which gives us the opportunity to share in the experience of humanity but also the ability to put ourselves in the shoes of those other to ourselves. These values are rooted in our freedom to give meaning to our life-world and form our own identities, but this freedom is violated through scorn, degradation and exploitation in human relations.

Fanon thus provides three basic aspects to mutual recognition: Acknowledgement of differences, humane action and the basic values or experience of humanity. I suggest that these aspects overlap with the three patterns of recognition (love, rights and solidarity) identified by Honneth in Hegel’s early Jena writings, specifically with the three spheres of interaction regarding emotional bonds, granting of rights and a shared orientation to values (1995, 93). This is an important overlap to identify because it provides an opportunity to fill out the outline for mutual recognition provided by Fanon. As will be seen in the next section, there is also an important overlap between Fanon’s ideas on violence and Honneth’s ideas on disrespect. We can now use the links to fill out a picture of mutual recognition following Honneth’s very complete theory that also provides an alternative to the master-slave dialectic (widespread during colonialism) in terms of the culmination of the struggle for recognition.¹

Honneth provides his theory of mutual recognition in the fifth chapter of The Struggle for Recognition entitled Patterns of Intersubjective Recognition: Love, Rights, and Solidarity. He refers to his three-part division of mutual recognition as “the structure of relations of recognition” (1995, 129), centred around the three forms of love/friendship, rights and solidarity. His theory is based in “the idea that the young Hegel outlined in his Jena writings with such brilliant rudimentariness … [in order to] make it the guiding thread of a social theory with normative content”. He further says that “[t]he intention of this is to explain processes of social change by referring to the normative demands that are, structurally speaking, internal to the relationship of mutual recognition” (1995, 92). Taken together, the three patterns of recognition of love, rights, and solidarity constitute the necessary aspects for mutual recognition. Honneth sees each of these patterns as an expansion (different stages) of mutual recognition along the “species-historical process of individuation” (ibid., 93) according to which love is involved with homonisation (thus the first experience of humanity), rights as recent historical development involving modern societies and solidarity as an extension of rights into various societal spheres. Love involves relations with specific others close to you, rights with a generalised other, and solidarity combines the two in a sense by relating oneself to those with whom you share a certain group identity. Love therefore has to do with interpersonal recognition, rights with legal and structural recognition, and solidarity with personal recognition via identity or group.

I would like to suggest here that there are specific links and overlaps between Honneth and Fanon, which can help to give us an idea of the picture of mutual recognition that Fanon might’ve had in mind: Love/friendship resembles humane action, rights refers to the basic and shared values of humanity, and solidarity has to with fleshing out differences regarding our identities. Honneth provides a neat model (at the end of the chapter on intersubjective recognition) for his picture of mutual recognition (1995, 129) which I will use to unpack the three patterns of recognition inherent to his theory of mutual recognition. This model is important to keep in mind in the section still to follow on violence:

Honneth’s theory provides a breakdown of not only mutual recognition but also of recognition as a process, both personal and historical, that can be identified in society. Honneth begins in rooting the process in a mode of recognition that is some vital need (to use Charles Taylor’s words (1994: 26)) in the person and also has to do with the formation of personal identity. This recognition is focused on a specific dimension of personality in the person that is formed through a form of recognition (i.e. recognition gives form to the person) and which holds a developmental potential for personhood. The main contribution of a form of recognition is that it assists a person’s practical relation-to-self. Honneth significantly also points out the dangers to recognition, in other words forms of misrecognition that stunt or damage the vital need required for the developmental potential and practical relation-to-self. Honneth refers to these as forms of disrespect which threaten a component of the person’s personality (here we find the other overlap between Honneth and Fanon, which will be discussed further below).

2.1 Emotional Support: The Primary Relationships of Love and Friendship

The first form of recognition that appears in Honneth’s theory is that of the primary relationships of love and friendship (refer to Table 10.1). This is recognition in the mode of emotional support, hence the focus on both love and friendship. Love in this regard does not refer to intimate relationships as such (although that is also relevant) but also to relations between the parent (mother) and child as well as friendship (1995, 95). The dimension of personality that is the focus of this recognition is that of needs and emotions, namely the needs and emotions of the child, friend, lover or spouse and so on. Honneth does not qualify the developmental potential of this form of recognition simply because it does not take place in the formalised manner as is the case with rights and solidarity. Nevertheless, the simple satisfaction of the needs and emotions of a child lays the groundwork for development potential at this primary level. The lack of any attention will obviously have far-reaching consequences for the development potential of the child and future adult. The same can be said for intimate relationships and friendships, which will also be affected if needs and emotions are neglected. The practical relation-to-self that takes hold is that of basic self-confidence, very much a prerequisite for various relationship types. In this regard, the forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies are that of abuse and rape which threatens the physical integrity of the person. Therefore, what is at issue here in terms of misrecognition is actual physical violence and the somatic violation of someone’s physical (bodily) integrity. Violence on this primary level is the most basic form of misrecognition but also the type of misrecognition that can be total in its damage if someone is assaulted or killed.

Table 10.1 Honneth’s theory of recognition

Honneth (1995, 96) notes that Hegel formulates love as “being oneself in another” and that Hegel considers love as the first stage of reciprocal recognition in which subjects “confirm each other with regard to the concrete nature of their needs” and “so recognize each other as needy creatures” (1995, 95). Honneth considers love to be a form of recognition because of “the specific way in which it makes the success of affectional bonds dependent on the capacity, acquired in early childhood, to strike a balance between symbiosis and self-assertion” (1995, 98). This is the key aspect regarding this form of recognition and the development that it kickstarts in the child to have healthy and constructive relationships later on life. Honneth also notes that recognition at this early stage provides the first scene of various processes of recognition that are repeated later in life if they develop in an ideal manner:

• 1. Recognition, as “the capacity for cognitive differentiation”, between oneself and the environment (ibid., 100).

• 2. Recognition of the freedom of others as independent persons, which the child experiences in learning that her mother is a distinct person (ibid., 98).

• 3. The establishment of boundaries within relationships (ibid., 105).

• 4. A process of disillusionment because others (in this case the mother) will not always be at one’s disposal (ibid., 100).

• 5. Acceptance of others as entities in their own right (ibid., 100–101).

• 6. Recognition of the unique value of others and one’s unique value to them (ibid., 104).

As can be seen, love is the primary source or level of recognition. As the basis of recognition, it puts into place the requirements for development in the individual but at the same time, injury on this level can have far-reaching consequences later on in life. Honneth (ibid, 107) says as much when he asserts that “the fundamental level of emotional confidence – not only in the experience of needs and feelings but also in their expression – which the intersubjective experience of love helps to bring about, constitutes the psychological precondition for the development of all further attitudes of self-respect.”

2.2 Cognitive Respect: Legal Relations and Rights

The second form of recognition in Honneth’s theory is that of rights as it is entrenched through legal relations (refer again to Table 10.1). This is recognition in the mode of cognitive respect, in other words the (cognitive) recognition of humanity in others and the values that accompany respect of humanity. The dimension of personality involved here is that of moral responsibility and developing the person to put oneself in the shoes of others, so to speak, namely to take on “the perspective of the ‘generalised other’” (ibid., 108) and hence to generalise the way in which one treats others. This should still take place in everyday contact and although it is a form of normative behaviour, it does not necessarily happen in a formal manner (hence it is deformalized) but nevertheless prescribed by formal institutions within society (government and civil society) and it becomes generalized in this way. The practical relation-with-self that takes hold is self-respect, in other words respect for one’s own humanity but by proxy also the humanity of others. The forms of disrespect that threatens the person’s self-respect is the denial of rights (and hence the denial of someone’s humanity) but also exclusion from being regarding by certain institutions as someone who deserves rights and humane treatment. In this respect, this form of disrespect threatens the social integrity of the person as someone who is excluded from certain spheres in society and treated in an inhumane manner due to their identity. The emphasis of Honneth’s discussion here is primarily on individual rights that facilitates the development of personhood and helps to characterise good citizenship, i.e., universal human rights (ibid., 119). This does not mean that Honneth is not concerned with group rights per se (such as minority rights), but he sees the development of (collective) group rights as arising from the concerns of individuals regarding the denial of their basic rights on a personal level (ibid., 120–121). What comes to the fore in this approach by Honneth (according to Habermas, 1994: 108) is that “struggles for recognition” articulate collective experiences of violated integrity, but the question that lingers is whether “these phenomena [can] be reconciled with a theory of rights that is individualistically designed?”

Honneth (ibid., 108) sees rights as “the particular form of reciprocity found in legal recognition [that] can emerge only in the course of a historical development”. This means that rights are not a form of recognition that arises as spontaneously as is the case with love. This is also then why Hegel saw that “this type of universal respect is not conceived as an affective attitude but rather only as a purely cognitive accomplishment of comprehension” (ibid., 110), hence the result of a process of moral learning focused on the general values that constitute humanity, regardless of the cultural and ethnic differences that there may be. This should lead to a certain form of freedom and equality between persons. This type of “legal recognition” (ibid., 111) is enforced by formal institutions but embodied in everyday contact between persons. In this regard, Honneth (ibid., 112–113) says something quite significant about legal recognition:

In legal recognition, two operations of consciousness flow together, so to speak, since, on the one hand, it presupposes moral knowledge of the legal obligations that we must keep vis-à-vis autonomous persons, while, on the other hand, it is only an empirical interpretation of the situation that can inform us whether, in the case of a given concrete other, we are dealing with an entity possessed of the quality that makes these obligations applicable.

The key here regards the “given concrete other”, that is the embodied person who is encountered in everyday interactions, and how they are cognitively understood to be human and to be treated humanely in line with our legal obligations enshrined in rights. This person may be someone specific I know or just a stranger in general, but all rights apply to them equally. They key here is that legal recognition works on two levels: An institutional level with regards to the source of the legal obligations and moral knowledge, but also on an intersubjective level with regards to the situation of concrete interaction with an other in which the recognition of the quality that confers these obligations arises. The empirical interpretation of this situation refers to the above mentioned cognitive nature of this form of recognition. This recognition as an “accomplishment of comprehension” reflects how it is an actual accomplishment to shed the prejudices accompanying forms of discrimination such as racism and sexism.

Honneth (ibid., 115) notes that there are three types of rights, namely civil rights that guarantees the liberty of individuals, political rights that guarantees individual participation, and social rights guaranteeing basic welfare. Civil rights are “negative rights that protect a person’s life, liberty, and property from unauthorized state interference” (ibid.). Political rights are “positive rights guaranteeing a person the opportunity to participate in processes of public will-formation” (ibid.). Social rights are also “positive rights that ensure a person’s fair share in the distribution of basic goods” (ibid.). What these rights have in common is “a general principle of equality” and the requirement of a legal order that does not allow any exceptions of privileges (ibid.) except those based on the rights themselves. This legal order needs to be attuned to the differences that exist between the situations of individuals and the opportunity they have for realising the freedoms afforded by rights, whilst the legal relations between persons must nevertheless be universal by including those who might have been previously excluded or disadvantaged (ibid., 118).

The significance of rights is that it has been a historical development that has gradually expanded in society to include “an ever-increasing number of members of society” (ibid.). Honneth notes that Hegel (and Mead) were both convinced that the “struggle for recognition” continues within the legal sphere, which is a development we see as rights are introduced into a society. The outcome of this struggle is ultimately for all members within a society to view others as morally responsible persons (ibid.), i.e. to be universally recognised as someone who has rights and who can also recognise others as having the same rights, and hence as someone who is deserving of treatment that is humane and respectful.

2.3 Social Esteem: Community of Value and Solidarity

The third form of recognition in Honneth’s theory is that of a solidarity as it is found through a community of value (refer again to Table 10.1). This is recognition in the mode of social esteem, and so what matters is the worth that persons see in identities and ways of life found in society. The dimension of personality involved here are the traits and abilities that individuals have, in other words their identity and their way of life. This includes the values and goals that root their livelihood and also what they do for a living. The practical relation-to-self involved here is that of self-esteem, thus respect for oneself, which is based on the esteem that one receives from society. This means that one’s own identity and way of life is valued according to the significance that society sees in the identity and way of life as it is based in a certain worldview. The forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies here are denigration and insult, in this case the consideration of certain identities or ways of life as less important or even as inferior. In this respect, these forms of disrespect threaten the sense of ‘honour’ attached to a person’s place and status within society, which translates into a loss of dignity with regards to their identity and livelihood.

Honneth (ibid., 121) says that solidarity, although related to legal recognition, stands apart from rights in the sense that it has to do with “the forms of social regard in which subjects are recognised according to the socially defined worth of their concrete characteristics.” What is important to take into account here is that whereas rights concern the status of sameness and hence shared similarities between persons, solidarity with a community of value concerns the differences between people, and more specifically groups of people with regards to identity and ways of life (or life-worlds). Honneth (ibid., 122) says that the focus of modern law is on “universal features of human subjects” whilst the focus of social esteem is on “characteristic differences between human subjects” and further that social esteem is directed “at the particular qualities that characterise people in their personal difference.” This does not mean though that differences are positive at face value but rather that respect for differences is an outcome of the “struggle for recognition.” The necessary respect for this form of recognition would be mutual esteem that would support ‘ethical life’, a term used by Hegel himself (ibid., 121). Honneth (ibid.) describes this mutuality as follows:

For self and other can mutually esteem each other as individualised persons only on the condition that they share an orientation to those values and goals that indicate to each other the significance or contribution of their qualities for the life of the other.

The identity and way of life of a person is therefore respected because it demonstrates some kind of significance or contribution to the lives of other people and especially to “the realisation of societal goals” (ibid.). This has a normative ring to it and Honneth (ibid., 122) says as much in viewing this as “a particularly demanding type of value-community.” This value-community involves the cultural self-understanding of a society (ibid.) and therefore it does not involve the “biographically individuated subject but rather those of a culturally typified status group” (ibid., 123). This means that individuals are therefore esteemed in the way in which they take on an identity associated with a cultural group and hence take on the characteristics and traits of that cultural group. A cultural group in this sense can be loosely or specifically defined on a continuum, e.g. South African, white or Afrikaner, etc.

What this means is that although social esteem applies “to those traits and abilities with regard to which members of society differ from one another” (ibid., 125), members still align themselves with a cultural group based on the values they share with others within that group and hence for a certain sense of sameness that exists within the group itself. The field of social esteem is a contested field (ibid.) exactly because different groups, consisting of individuals who share in the cultural values and life-world of the group, compete for esteem from other groups. In this context, an individual enters this contested field of cultural groupings as someone who has been formed by a “particular life-history” who has interactions, exchanges and conflicts with the different collectivities.

The important thing for Honneth (ibid., 125–26) to take into account in this regard, as is the case with rights, is that social esteem has evolved historically. The older forms of honour as “standing or prestige” were attached to a “status group or estate, thus one’s societal class in the former instance or one’s place in society by virtue of bloodline, property and family association in the latter instance. The historical development in this respect is that the function and meaning of honour has shifted in regarding the worth of a person, with its universalisation into “dignity” and its privatisation into “integrity” (ibid., 126). Dignity is something that has come to be considered as a given when humanity is involved, whilst integrity to a large extent has a taken on a moral meaning. Standing and prestige has left behind its legal and moral connotations and now it “only signifies the degree of social recognition the individual earns for his or her form of self-realisation by thus contributing, to a certain extent, to the practical realisation of society’s abstractly defined goals” (ibid.).

The outcome of this historical development is ambivalent. On the one hand, “because it is no longer to be determined in advance which ways of leading one’s life are considered ethically admissible, social esteem begins to be oriented not towards collective traits [such as family, bloodline, estate, clan] but towards the capacities developed in the course of his or her life” (ibid.). This means that individual achievements receive recognition as such, whilst a “general value-horizon” (ibid., 126) opens up regarding “differing forms of personal self-realisation” (ibid.) that leads to a form of “value pluralism” (ibid.). On the other hand, recognition is still subject to terms that are class and gender-specific (and here Honneth omits race, a crucial aspect within the South African context) and esteem remains a group-based issue. “A feeling of group-pride or collective honour” (ibid., 128) remains significant because the accomplishments of an individual still relates to a collective that considers these accomplishments to be worthy. This is of course where the sense of solidarity comes from, the solidarity one feels with a social group or collective by whom one is recognised and with whom one associates. However, Honneth clearly views the most important development (and achievement) in this respect to be the ability of individuals to view their own accomplishments as valuable and worthy. This provides a feeling of self-worth, i.e. self-esteem (ibid., 129).

Due to the ambivalence between individual and group recognition, the field of social esteem is always in a state of constant contestation and cultural conflict (ibid., 126). At the heart of this contestation and conflict is what Honneth calls “a need for a secondary interpretive practice” (ibid.), i.e. a subjective process of cultural evaluation according to which the worth of a culture is determined within a specific historical context. Honneth says that this practice itself is part of “an on-going cultural conflict” (ibid.). This conflict is exactly the reason why there is an expansion regarding the different identities and ways of life that are recognised as making a valuable contribution to society, as it is part of a historical process that advances to include ever more cultural life-worlds. There is thus an “opening of societal value” and of “ideas for differing forms of self-realisation” (ibid., 125), thus an ever-expanding spectrum of identities and opportunities for individuals to form their identities and seek out solidarity with groups centred around these identities.

2.4 Disrespect and the Denial of Recognition

Honneth brings together his discussion of mutual recognition in the chapter following the one on love, rights and solidarity (chapter six entitled Personal Identity and Disrespect: The Violation of the Body, the Denial of Rights, and the Denigration of Ways of Life). In this chapter, he looks at the forms of disrespect that does violence to personal identity: The violation of the body, the denial of rights, and the denigration of ways of life. Honneth (ibid., 131) says that each of these “forms of disrespect” is a “denial of recognition” against persons that injures “the positive understanding of themselves.” Disrespect is a key term for Honneth (ibid.) referring to the “specific vulnerability of humans resulting from the internal interdependence of individualisation and recognition”. Honneth (ibid., 132) makes it clear though that the injury caused by disrespect involves varying degrees of harm, so one term would not suffice and therefore one needs to distinguish between these harms. He says the following regarding this distinction (ibid.):

But even just the fact that we have been able to identify systematic gradations for the complementary concept of ‘recognition’ points to the existence of internal differences between individual forms of disrespect. If it is the case that the experience of disrespect signals the withholding or withdrawing of recognition, then the same distinctions would have to be found within the field of negative phenomena as was met with in the field of positive phenomena. In this sense, the distinctions between three patterns of recognition gives us a theoretical key with which to separate out just as many kinds of disrespect.

Honneth is pointing here towards a similar three-part division regarding disrespect than the one he sets up for mutual recognition (refer to Table 10.1). This division demonstrates the different aspects of disrespect and also shows the different forms of recognition are problematised and importantly, how mutual recognition is problematised if one or all three forms of disrespect are present. Disrespect as “the withholding or withdrawing of recognition” means that it leads to an absence of recognition and the empty space is filled by various forms of insult and injury. What is of key importance here for Honneth (ibid.) is to answer a question that Hegel could not answer, namely how disrespect can motivate people to turn to resistance and conflict. In other words, how does disrespect motivate the struggle for recognition? He attempts to answer this in analysing the three forms of disrespect: Abuse and rape (problematising love and friendship), denial of rights (problematising rights), and denigration and insult (problematising solidarity).

The first form of disrespect is the most basic but also most visceral form because it threatens the physical integrity of a person. This then is violence as we know it, for instance in the forms of physical injury that leads others to suffer physical pain. The disrespect that is abuse and rape is also the only form of disrespect that is not historically contingent and linked to processes of historical change (ibid., 133) but rather to basic human relations on the level of primary relationships as it relates to the relationship between parent and child. Honneth (ibid.) says that “[t]he forms of practical maltreatment in which a person is forcibly deprived of any opportunity freely to dispose over his or her own body represent the most fundamental sort of personal degradation”, hence this form of disrespect is the most destructive (in case of torture, rape or murder). This destruction for Honneth (ibid.) is found in the practical relation-to-self that one has because a threat to one’s physical integrity is accompanied by a shattering “feeling of being defencelessly at the mercy of another subject”. This does lasting damage to the basic confidence learned and acquired through love, leading to shame and humiliation as well as “the loss of trust in oneself and the world” (ibid., 132–33). The end result is “a dramatic breakdown in one’s trust in the reliability of the social world and hence by a collapse in one’s own basic self-confidence” (ibid., 133).

The second form of disrespect that threatens the social integrity of a person is the denial of rights, which impacts the moral self-respect of a person. Honneth (ibid.) says that denial of rights “refers to those forms of personal disrespect to which an individual is subjected by being structurally excluded from the possession of certain rights within a society”. This results in a person “not being accorded the same degree of moral responsibility as other members of society” (ibid.) and being incapable of making correct moral judgments (or being allowed to make those judgments), hence they are socially ostracised. This exclusion leads people to miss out on the “cognitive regard for the status of moral responsibility that had to be so painstakingly acquired in the interactive processes of socialisation” (ibid., 134). This form of disrespect is contingent to historical processes and developments, which means that it can become negligible depending on the development of legal relations within a specific historical phase. This historical aspect also means that “the semantic content of what counts as a morally responsible agent” (ibid.), and hence that which counts as rights and also the denial of rights, also depends on the specific historical phase within a society.

The third form of disrespect threatens the dignity or ‘honour’ of a person in the form of the “denigration of individual or collective ways of life” (ibid.). This impacts the solidarity that individuals or groups might have, also with consequences to the value that society sees in their way of life. This comes in the form of the devaluation of a group’s way of life according to a hierarchy of values within society, which finds individual expression in the form of insult. Honneth (ibid.) provides a striking description of the far-reaching impact of this form of disrespect:

If this hierarchy of values is so constituted as to downgrade individual forms of life and manners of belief as inferior or deficient, then it robs the subjects in question of every opportunity to attribute social value to their own abilities. For those engaged in them, the result of the evaluative degradation of certain patterns of self-realisation is that they cannot relate to their mode of life as something of positive significance within their community.

Here Honneth is talking about the way in which ways of life, e.g. cultural groups, ethnic traditions, are viewed as inferior, in other words uncivilised, uncultured, immoral, etc. This leads to a loss of personal self-esteem for those people who belong to the culture because their way of life is not deemed to be of value to society and worse, even eradicated by the society within which they live. This removes the possibility in the life of an individual to gain social approval by way of group solidarity, an important means through which self-realisation can take place (ibid.). Denigration of ways of life is also a historically contingent form of disrespect and is therefore linked to a process of historical change (ibid.), which also means that certain forms of disrespect can disappear in time as ways of life are accepted as valuable within society. Two things are important here with regards to reaching such a historical moment: Firstly, the institutional entrenchment of the acceptance of ways of life and their value for society. Secondly, and following on institutional entrenchment, self-esteem becomes a case of the evaluation of “individual abilities instead of collective traits” (ibid.).

The experience of disrespect leads to personal after-effects that are described in various metaphors (ibid., 135) such as “psychological death” (in the case of torture or rape), “social death” (in the case of denial of rights), or “scars and injuries” (in the case of cultural denigration), demonstrating that these forms of disrespect have a direct socio-somatic impact on the individual. Honneth says that “the negative emotional reactions accompanying the experience of disrespect could represent precisely the affective motivational basis in which the struggled-for recognition is anchored” (ibid.). This is a significant point in terms of how misrecognition is a motivational factor for the continued struggle for recognition, and that the presence of these forms of disrespect in a society means that mutual recognition is problematised or inadequate at a given historical juncture.

The impact of disrespect on the individual is the mainspring of the epistemic violence that leads to misrecognition, and here Honneth’s theory of mutual recognition has something important in common with the politics of recognition of Charles Taylor. Taylor (ibid.: 25–26) identifies five characteristics to misrecognition and his definition of misrecognition is helpful when it comes to the consideration of violence and the way in which it makes mutual recognition impossible: firstly, it inflicts harm on the misrecognised. Secondly, it is form of oppression. Thirdly, misrecognition provides the other with “a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being”. Fourthly, misrecognition reveals a lack of due respect. In the fifth place, misrecognition leads to self-hatred. Taylor (ibid., 26) says that misrecognition leads to low self-esteem and a self-depreciation of the image on the part of the oppressed and colonised, in other words a sense of inferiority, and he asserts that “[t]he first task ought to be to purge themselves of this imposed and destructive identity.” In other words, misrecognition and the sense of inferiority that it engenders motivates people to the actual struggle for recognition (as will be seen in the discussion below of Fanon, who saw violence as one way to achieve this purge).

Honneth further expands on this point by defending a crucial thesis (ibid., 135–136), which is an important connection with the work of Fanon:

Neither in Hegel nor in Mead did we find any indication as to how experiencing social disrespect can motivate a subject to enter a practical struggle or conflict. There was, as it were, a missing psychological link that would lead from mere suffering to action by cognitively informing the person in question of his or her social situation. I would defend the thesis that this function can be performed by negative emotional reactions, such as being ashamed or enraged or indignant. These comprise the psychological symptoms on the basis of which one can come to realise that one is being illegitimately denied social recognition. … Hence the experience of disrespect is always accompanied by affective sensations that are, in principle, capable of revealing to individuals the fact that certain forms of recognition are being withheld from them.

Honneth turns to Dewey to demonstrate his thesis regarding the “motivational impetus for a struggle for recognition” that motivates active conduct and a praxis that opens up political resistance” (ibid., 138). This conduct and praxis is made possible by the realisation of the denial of recognition, what Honneth also calls the “opportunity for moral insights inherent in these negative emotions, as their cognitive content” (ibid.). This is the missing psychological link that Honneth refers to above, namely the link from disrespect (i.e. misrecognition) to moral and political action. Honneth says though that crucial to this link are the right conditions within society for political action (ibid., 138–39):

Empirically, whether the cognitive potential inherent in feeling hurt or ashamed becomes a moral-political conviction depends above all on how the affected subject’s cultural-political environment is constructed: only if the means of articulation of a social movement are available can the experience of disrespect become a source of motivation for acts of political resistance. The developmental logic of such collective movements can, however, only be discovered via an analysis that attempts to explain social struggles on the basis of the dynamics of moral experiences.

There are two issues to point out here: Firstly, that the conditions within a society must be such that it is possible for people to develop a moral-political conviction based on the awareness of the impact that disrespect has on their lives. Secondly, that the formation of social movements is a necessity for the possibility of any kind of political action and resistance. What does this mean? In short, that there must be some inclination towards (or possibility of) democracy or rights within the society in question if the affects or emotions associated with the experience of disrespect (shame, rage, indignation) are to find expression as acts of political resistance. For instance, Apartheid South Africa had neither but there was an understanding of what democracy and rights could achieve and this is what motivated the Struggle. South Africa beyond Apartheid is a democratic state with rights enshrined in the democracy but the struggle for recognition is still on-going through various political and social movements. The recent calls for decolonisation shows that this process did not finish when Apartheid came to an end.

The buzzword in South Africa with regards to political action and resistance is decolonisation and it garnered currency internationally in a wider sense, but the question is why this word has become so influential. In a way, it is a continuation of both identity politics and the politics of difference as a response by groups of people to the denial of the recognition of that which makes them either distinctively unique or that which binds them to others. The denial of uniqueness (i.e. what makes us different from others) or of shared aims (i.e. the identity we share with others) usually happens when there is a one-sided emphasis on only one at the expense of the other. In other words, that there are only (sometimes irreconcilable) differences between us or that we are all the same (with the differences swept under the rug). Such an outlook has been the main driver in the past, but also the present, of collective identities that manifest as nationalism and politicised religion (Fukuyama, 2018: 56–57). Fukuyama (ibid.: 115) asserts that identity politics is “a natural and inevitable response to injustice” (an outcome of the denial of recognition), but it “becomes problematic when identity is interpreted or asserted in certain specific ways” such as in the overemphasis of either difference or sameness. So, identity is a key factor in recognition, but it can also become the source of the denial of recognition. In the case of South Africa, this problematic remains pertinent in various sectors of society, and it is the mainspring of the denial of recognition due to the overemphasis of either identity or difference. Fanon also highlights this problematic when he looks at the question on mutual recognition (as discussed above in Sect. 1).

There are two further points that are crucial going forward in terms of looking at the problematisation of mutual recognition within the South African context. I aim to take Honneth’s points further in the postcolonial context but with a somewhat different point of entry. Firstly, Honneth refers to a “developmental logic of collective movements” that requires analysis. In the following section I will look at a key factor that problematises this developmental logic, namely violence. In this respect, the work of Fanon provides the necessary theoretical grid through which to analyse this problematic as he gives us a description of Honneth’s disrespect in the colonial and decolonising context.

3 Violence and the Non-rational Challenge to Mutual Recognition

An important observation needs to be made at this juncture before I discuss the extension of the proposed postcolonial theory of recognition. Honneth’s theory of recognition as it is linked to Fanon’s version of recognition above gives us a strictly rational picture of recognition. In other words, it describes recognition as founded on deliberate actions and a framework that will help us out of the situation of radical misrecognition. This is not the only means by which to face and take on radical misrecognition and Honneth also recognises this in his discussion about forms of disrespect (as pointed out above). There are non-rational elements that are part of the process in overcoming misrecognition. In this respect, Fanon clearly recognized the inherent violence that accompanies the colonial system and the decolonial process. In my view, Fanon did not favour violence for the sake of violence, but he saw few alternatives in the cases where the systemic violence of colonialism is not acknowledged. Violence provides the oppressed and colonised with a means of overcoming their inferior status in society. In this sense, violence serves as an intermediate stage where the old system is undone, which clears the way for the conditions that could make rational recognition a possibility. This is a key qualification to be made because the question on violence stands quite central in the postcolony on the back of a history of colonial violence and this is also the case in South Africa (where Apartheid was built on a system of violence that persists in other forms post-Apartheid). Honneth further provides a place in his theory that is occupied by violent practices (the forms of disrespect) although he looks at violence as violation rather than violence as resistance. This aspect of his theory as it regards violations of the various elements of mutual recognition nevertheless provides more links and overlaps with Fanon’s work.

What can be gathered from Honneth’s theory of mutual recognition is that forms of disrespect (i.e. misrecognition) threatens mutual recognition in various ways: Abuse and rape in primary relationships threatens the physical integrity of a person in violating their due emotional support; denial of rights and exclusion threatens the social integrity of a person in violating due cognitive respect; denigration and insult threatens the honour and dignity of a person in violating due social esteem. These forms of disrespect compromise various components of the self, namely basic self-confidence, self-respect and self-esteem. The important consideration in this regard is that within Honneth’s schema, the three modes of recognition contribute to mutual recognition and a violation of one of these modes problematises mutual recognition.

This, then, is the point of entry for looking at the colonial and decolonising situation, also as it relates to South Africa. The forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies are each a form of violence within different levels of society, i.e. a personal level (abuse and rape), an institutional level (denial of rights and exclusion), and a social / psychological level (denigration and insult). Violence, as a transgression committed against the humanity of a fellow human being, is an inescapable truth within the colonial and postcolonial context. Fanon saw colonialism but also decolonisation as violent phenomena, in a normative sense but also as a description of how these processes work. Colonialism is the attempt to gain mastery over another and decolonisation is the attempt by the colonised to undo that mastery, which almost inevitably takes place through violent means of some sort. The problem is that the postcolonial situation is one of perpetual or episodic decolonisation and hence violence is an inescapable reality in this respect. Ongoing violence implies the perpetuation of misrecognition and hence various obstacles problematize mutual recognition within the postcolonial context.

In this respect, on a theoretical level, the work of Fanon is informative for a constructive understanding of this situation. Fanon’s work incorporates an analysis of violence in the colonial context but also within a context of decolonisation, a process that he saw as inevitably violent. Fanon’s outline of violence will be informative here for two reasons:

Firstly, his work was done within a colonial context that carries striking similarities with South Africa. Black Skin, White Masks still reflected on his native Martinique in the Caribbean, but the rest of his work focused on the resistance and revolution taking place in Algeria. The former French colony had the largest white population (around one million) in Africa outside of South Africa (three million at the time) before they were evacuated in 1962 as the revolution came to an end with Algeria’s independence. The revolution in Algeria was one of total war and not a peaceful transition. The situation in South Africa in the 1980’s was volatile and bordered on civil war in the early 1990’s but it never came to that. That said, the country has been in a postcolonial phase since 1994 and levels of violence have remained high whilst the need for decolonisation demonstrates why violence has remained as a mark of social life. The persistence of violence and narrative of decolonisation is therefore a link with that which happened in Algeria and Fanon’s work on violence carries a certain manner of relevance for the South African situation (which has already been demonstrated by a whole body of scholarship in the country that enlists Fanon’s work to make sense of the post-Apartheid situation).

Secondly, there is the link between Fanon’s work and that of Honneth suggested by this study (and established above). The link between the structures of mutual recognition in three and different modes seems quite obvious: Fanon’s humane action overlaps with Honneth’s emotional support as the foundation of the primary relationships of love and friendship; Fanon’s basic and shared values of humanity overlaps with Honneth’s cognitive respect as the foundation of the legal relations established by rights; and Fanon’s acknowledgement of differences overlaps with Honneth’s social esteem as the foundation for a community of value where solidarity is formed.

This overlap extends further in terms of the different forms of disrespect that Honneth qualifies for each form of recognition, i.e. abuse and rape as disrespect of love/friendship; denial of rights and exclusion as disrespect of rights; and denigration and insult as disrespect of solidarity. The threatened component with abuse and rape is physical integrity; with denial of rights and exclusion it is social integrity that is threatened; and with denigration and insult it is one’s honour and dignity that is at issue. I would suggest that these threats and components overlap with the different forms of violence that is identified by Jinadu (1986) in the work of Fanon: Abuse and rape (physical integrity) with physical violence; denial of rights and exclusion (social integrity) with structural violence, and denigration and insult with psychological violence. These forms of violence provide an explanation and fuller understanding of the ways in which mutual recognition is problematised within the postcolonial context.

3.1 Jinadu: Forms of Violence in the Work of Fanon

Adele Jinadu provides a “three-fold categorisation of violence” in his book Fanon: In Search of the African Revolution (1986, 44–52). Fanon himself did not necessarily analyse the colonial situation explicitly by distinguishing these forms of violence although he did sometimes make use of these terms or similiar concepts in other words. Jinadu’s argument is thus his own regarding these forms of violence, although the grid of analysis that he provides is based on Fanon’s work. The important thing to take into account here is the continuation of these forms of violence within the context of post-Apartheid South Africa.

The first form of violence is physical, i.e. “somatic injury inflicted on human beings”. In its most radical form this form of violence results in the murder of an individual (ibid., 44–45) but it can also include assault and rape. Thus, here we are talking about violence per se. Fanon (1967, 31) says that this form of violence is where colonialism started when “the foreigner who came from another country imposed his rule by means of guns and machines”. This form of violence puts into place the Manichean relation between coloniser and colonised (ibid., 46), i.e. the dialectic between master and slave as white settler and black native.

The second form of violence is structural, in the sense that violence serves as a condition for social injustice, which is kept in place by necessary institutions (ibid., 46) and which aims to keep in place the Manichean dialectic between settler and native. Jinadu (ibid.) says that “the abject poverty of the colonised is in stark contrast to the superfluity of the coloniser”, which speaks to the former and current situation in South Africa as it regards the relation between white and black but also rich and poor. A good example of such violence would thus be that of the Apartheid-system and Fanon also says as much (1967: 29):

The colonial world is a world divided into compartments. It is probably unnecessary to recall the existence of native quarters and European quarters, of schools for natives and schools for Europeans: in the same way we need not recall apartheid in South Africa.

What this form of violence does is to divide society into the different worlds inhabited by the conquered natives and the European settlers by way of institutions that keep these worlds separate. These institutions could make use of physical violence to uphold this separation and more often than not this is the case. Fanon’s notion of compartmentalisation is significant here because it demonstrates why one finds different forms of violence in society: A form of violence centres around a specific function and aim that it has in ordering and structuring society into compartments for the colonizer and colonized. In other words, the division of violence at work here (albeit interrelated) also leads to the division of society into different types of societies that exist problematically apart from each other, but also next to each other. Keeping these compartments apart from each other, i.e., keeping apartheid in place, is only possible if the relevant forms of violence remain present in society and it becomes more complicated as internal resistance and protest builds within a society.

The third form of violence is psychological, i.e. injury or harm done to the human psyche. Here cultural imperialism, once in place through the various institutions, has a role to play in the guise of propaganda, indoctrination, brainwashing and threats (Jinadu, 1986, 47–48). The aim of psychological violence is quite significant in the way that it changes the perspective and life-world of the native (ibid.):

This psychological violence represents the attempt, conscious or unconscious, by the coloniser to create alienated colonised individuals who reject indigenous values and institutions because they are deceived or brainwashed into believing that those values and institutions are inferior to those of the coloniser.

This form of violence is the cause of the inferiority complex that Fanon analyses in Black Skin, White Masks. This leads the colonised’s attempt to be as white as possible as he or she “apes the language and social mannerisms of the coloniser” (ibid., 48), hence the “white masks” that Fanon speaks about. Here one could also think about the way in which whitely ways of being (and the invisibility of whiteness) extends to rich ways of being (and the invisibility of affluence) in the postcolonial context. This relates to the view of Charles Taylor (1994: 25–26) that the purge of imposed and destructive identities (as a picture of their own inferiority) should be the first task of oppressed and colonised people. Taylor mentions how in Fanon’s case (with regards to the colonial context) what is at issue are depreciated self-images (ibid.: 65) and to purge them, Fanon recommends violence as a way of attaining freedom to match the “original violence” of the coloniser (i.e., the “alien imposition” that is the depreciated self-image). Taylor (ibid.) refers to this as “a struggle for a changed self-image” and it encapsulates how epistemic violence remains as the last hurdle in the struggle to overcome misrecognition. This violence is the bedrock of the structural and institutional violence that follows the original violence of the coloniser and keeps the inferiority of the colonised and the superiority of the coloniser in place. Fanon’s notion of the inferiority/superiority complex comes into play here because it functions as a major motivational factor in the struggle for recognition and the turn to violence that seeks to purge these depreciated self-images. Fanon might rather have provided a more descriptive rather than a normative account of violence, and we could question whether he recommended it as such. What can be said in this regard is that the continuation of the inferiority/superiority complex keeps violence in whatever form in place, especially with regards to epistemic violence (in the absence of physical violence). This complex roots violence as central factor in society and situates the blame (unfairly) with the black person, who is the one that turns to violence in order to attempt the purge of the complex itself (whether in relation to whites or fellow blacks).

The different forms of violence are interconnected and contribute to a cycle of violence (following a loose interpretation of Jinadu): Physical violence in early colonialism results in the pacification of ‘natives’ by settlers (ibid., 45). Once the natives have been pacified, institutions are established to ensure the superiority of the settlers through structural violence. This can be done through various institutions, systems and ideologies, such as apartheid. In this situation, one finds the development of violent resistance by the colonised natives in response to their oppression. In reaction to this resistance (such as The Struggle against Apartheid), one finds systemic reinforcement by the colonising settlers and hence the continuation of physical violence in various forms. This cycle of violence can be summed up as follows in the Fig. 10.1 below:

Fig. 10.1

The cycle of violence in the colonial and postcolonial context

The institutions and systems of violence focus on keeping the natives “in their place” and do so through the active oppression and intimidation of the natives, i.e. psychological violence in various guises. The underlying assumption of these institutions and systems is the superiority of the settlers (ibid.: 49), which is actively enforced by these institutions and systems by way of indoctrination, threats and brain washing. The natives develop an inferiority complex as a consequence of psychological violence, which becomes the location of settler racism and alienation as well as resentment for the native. Ultimately, the ‘natives’ both rid themselves of this inferiority complex and acquire the superiority of the settlers by a return to physical violence through revolution or protest, leading to decolonization. The problematic regarding the reversion to physical violence is that there could simply be an inversion of power relations, where the slave of old becomes the new master and hence the dialectic continues as before with a master and slave.

Jinadu’s analysis of violence in the work of Fanon can be summarised in the Table 10.2 below (the table is my summation of Jinadu’s analysis). Important to note here is that these forms of violence overlap with each other exactly because of the above-mentioned cycle of violence. Note further how each form of violence, also in terms of the examples provided, is misrecognition of a certain sort and how it corresponds with the forms of disrespect that Honneth identifies. The full picture will be sketched shortly.

Table 10.2 Fanon’s three-fold categorization of violence (Jinadu, 1986)

3.2 Fanonian Forms of Violence in Post-Apartheid South Africa

Within the postcolonial space one will find that (Fanonian) violence in each of these three guises is still prevalent. The situation in post-Apartheid South Africa, preceded by decades of oppression and violence exercised by the Apartheid regime, includes each of these forms of violence. The system of organised and de jure Apartheid came to an end with the first democratic elections in 1994. The political mastery of whites was undone but this did not mean that the process of decolonisation has come to an end. Various socio-economic challenges remain, many of which has just become more acute beyond Apartheid. The current situation in South Africa demonstrates the Fanonian dynamic according to which violence does not disappear from the colonial to the decolonising context but rather remains, taking on new and old forms.

The levels of crime in the country since the end of Apartheid are well-known, both in terms of petty and violent crime. Black on white crime has become the focus of public discussion in the media, but the crime affects all people in country and the hardest hit are the black poor who cannot afford any form of sophisticated defence against criminal activity. Suburban crime (house break-ins and vehicle hijacking) are also endemic as are farm attacks that involve grievous harm and murder. Suburban crime is however only a part of the problem as the township reality of the black poor sees violence being a daily reality or at least a daily possibility for most.

This situation is even more problematic if one views the full landscape of violence in the country. Racism on various levels and in various sectors of society remains a systemic problem, whether it be explicit or casual white racism, new forms of reverse racism that still keep the racial categories of Apartheid in place, as well as xenophobia on an institutional and communal level. The xenophobic outbursts over the past decade demonstrates this new form of racism that targets the nationality of individuals but where the outbursts simply brought the problem to the public eye, it remains a daily reality for many foreign nationals who reside in townships, work in corporate environments and deal with the government bureaucracy.

The problem of institutional violence, which is very much the form of violence that Apartheid exercised, remains as a systemic problem that has grown in prominence, giving way to new forms of apartheid whilst keeping certain old forms in place. Relationships of technical servitude and labour domination remain in place, between white and black but also between rich and poor. On an institutional level, growing state securitisation during President Jacob Zuma’s tenure of 9 years has led to police militarisation. This has led to forms of political gangsterism: Intimidation of the political opposition and media, corruption on various levels of government and violent reactions to protest movements against the government (exemplified by the violence that characterised the Fees Must Fall movement over the last 3 years). These protest movements do not only involve governmental violence but also violence from the movements themselves and service delivery protests, continuous post-Apartheid, more often than not involve violence. The power dynamic in this regard is asymmetrical as these movements face a militarised police and government rhetoric that proclaims itself as aligned with the plight of the poor, but then follows neoliberal policies that simply lead to a greater divide between rich and poor. In the last place, a language of violence pervades public discourse as it relates to various protest movements, political parties and action groups as well as certain sectors within government itself.

The problematic of violence demonstrates the continuity that exists in South African society between Apartheid and the new dispensation since 1994. As previously mentioned, there is a view that 1994 is a disjuncture or rupture that wipes the slate clean, leading to a change in the levels of violence and racism that characterised Apartheid. This was the view that accompanied the idea of the Rainbow Nation, but the reality in the two decades beyond 1994 has simply seen a continuation of various forms of violence and racism. This study has been at pains to investigate why this is the case and how this situation problematises mutual recognition.

The struggle for mutual recognition in post-Apartheid South Africa is ongoing and the end of Apartheid with democratic elections of 1994, although a very significant historical event, was simply the start of the next chapter of decolonisation. Forms of de facto apartheid is making this ideal difficult and, at worse, even impossible to attain. The picture by which mutual recognition is problematised can be summarised in the table below by joining the links between Honneth’s theory of mutual recognition and Fanon’s analysis of violence (via Jinadu’s three-fold categorisation), which provides a picture of the problematic that violence poses to mutual recognition. The examples and results of violence are amended to the current South African context (see below).

This picture already gives us a good idea about the way according to which mutual recognition is problematised in its various forms within the postcolonial context with reference to post-Apartheid South Africa, especially as it regards the rationale behind various forms of violence. Physical violence results in the pacification of protest or actual criminal activity. Structural violence results in the monopoly of governmental and corporate institutions, such as a kleptocratic state and captured intuitions (both state and private). Psychological violence results in the nervous conditions of both white and black as well as rich and poor, which is motivated by so-called fake news and institutional threats. The picture this provides, is one where mutual recognition is frustrated, short-changed or simply impossible (Table 10.3).

Table 10.3 A postcolonial theory of recognition (Honneth and Fanon)

This situation is amplified, and indeed also caused to a large extent, by the great economic inequality that characterises South African society and leads many to live in some manner of poverty. Whereas Honneth provides an explicit discussion of violence (regarding the forms of disrespect) in his theory of recognition, he provides more of a piecemeal discussion regarding economic issues and its impact on recognition. This is a significant gap in his work that has received attention by, among others, Nancy Fraser and she engaged in a lively debate with him about the importance of economic redistribution for the possibility of mutual recognition (Fraser and Honneth, 2003). In this respect one could even go so far as distinguishing a fourth mode of recognition, i.e., redistribution, that could extend Honneth’s theory beyond the parameters that he envisioned. This provides grounds for further research on how to approach Honneth’s theory in the postcolonial context where widespread poverty remains front and centre. Fraser’s work on redistribution could be instructive in the expansion of the model to include the role of economic inequality in the frustration of mutual recognition.

4 Conclusion

The struggle for recognition was apparent during Apartheid in South Africa, and The Struggle exemplified this battle for recognition and equality. The different modes of recognition that Honneth includes in his theory were all left damaged or completely absent in the Apartheid state. Relations of love and friendship were severely hampered, not just between white and black but also within the segregated groups themselves, whilst rights were completely absent for the great majority of people and solidarity either remained a question of identifying with people of your own colour or otherwise to risk your life in showing solidarity across the colour line. If we think about this in Fanon’s vocabulary, then differences became absolute in the absence of shared aims whilst humane action became more exceptional in face of the violation of basic human values.

The new democratic regime has entrenched human rights and equality in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, but for many they remain simply on paper. Mutual recognition is still problematised despite processes of reconciliation and redress. My postcolonial theory of recognition is an attempt to understand the situation beyond Apartheid in the light of violence as highlighted in the work of Fanon. The fusion of Fanon with Honneth’s theory gives us some clarity about how the different modes of recognition are impacted by various forms of violence that are linked to Honneth’s forms of disrespect although it extends well beyond what he imagined. Vast economic inequality together with resurgent forms of racism and violence brings urgency to mutual recognition as an ethico-political task in South Africa beyond Apartheid, and my theory is a modest attempt at making a contribution to this task.