CHAPTER 6 THE CHALLENGE OF UNDERSTANDING THE RUSSIAN NAVY Mikhail Tsypkin* PUTIN’S NAVY The Russian naval tradition is torn between the desire of Russian politicians to project the image of a great naval power and the reality of Russia as a great land power. In the course of the 20th century, Russia and the Soviet Union tried three times to build a true blue water navy—before World War I, in the late 1930s before World War II, and during the second half of the Cold War (from the 1960s until the late 1980s). In each case, these plans had to be abandoned because a blue water navy turned out to be not crucial for the nation’s survival. In both world wars, the Russian Navy—with the exception of its ballistic missile submarine leet, a part of the strategic triad—was useful on the lanks of the great land battles of the Eastern Front, but did not play an independent role. In the irst decade after the Soviet collapse, the real—as opposed to the declaratory—missions of the armed forces were to maintain Russia’s sovereignty, to preserve its status as a nuclear superpower, to deal with the brushire wars in * Mikhail Tsypkin is associate professor of national security affairs at the Naval Postgraduate School. The author would like to express his gratitude to Captain Christopher Bott, U.S. Navy (ret.), for providing a valuable critique of the draft. The views expressed in this paper are the author’s, and do not represent the view of the Dept. of the Navy or any other agency of the U.S. Government. 331 the post-Soviet space and in the North Caucasus and, in a political crisis, to defend the current occupant of the Kremlin from challengers. None of these missions required a blue water navy; accordingly, the Russian Navy, despite regular outbursts of soaring rhetoric from Russian politicians, was allowed to stagnate and deteriorate. The arrival of Vladimir Putin to the Kremlin, in 2000, appeared to open a new and more ambitious era for the Russian Navy (Voyenno-morskoi lot [VMF]). Since then, the Navy has been showered with political attention, received several new ships, sent its ships on global cruises for the irst time since the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), heard promises to build several aircraft carriers, saw combat in the Black Sea, and has sent its attack submarines, for the irst time in more than a decade, to the shores of the United States. At the same time, the Russian Navy suffered disasters, including the catastrophic sinking of the Kursk nuclear attack submarine, was ordered to remove its main staff from the Russian capital of Moscow to the relative backwater of St. Petersburg, has been downgraded in the plans of military reform, and has fallen behind on the plans to modernize the seaborne leg of the nuclear triad. What does this contradictory record tell us about the future of VMF? Under Putin, the Russian Navy received a lot of political attention. Within days of assuming the ofice of the president (on April 3, 2000), Putin signed a detailed document entitled the Foundations of the Russian Federation’s Naval Policy until the Year 2010. A year later (on July 21, 2001), he approved another major document, the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation until the Year 2020.1 In 2007, the Russian government adopted the Strategy for the Development of the Shipbuilding In332 dustry until the Year 2020 and Beyond.2 The interagency Maritime College (Council) has produced voluminous documentation regarding future plans for the Russian Navy. Russian Navy oficers have illed the pages of the Naval Digest, their professional journal, with detailed and passionate arguments about the future of the Russian Navy. In the Soviet era, such abundance of oficial pronouncements would have been suficient for a reasonably conident forecast of naval developments. The Soviets had a well-established (however wrongheaded) worldview and goals in international politics; their policy debates were for the most part conducted in secrecy (and thus did not confuse Western analysts) and resulted in settlements that would then be revealed to the world; they also had a mechanism for mobilizing resources that could turn, however imperfectly, intentions into capabilities. Russia, in contrast, is still seeking its position in the world, luctuating between loud hostility to the West and demands to be accepted as its partner. Russia’s policy process is opaque and informal: the highest authority, especially in matters of national security, is theoretically vested in the president. The current incumbent (Dmitri Medvedev) however, appears to play second iddle to the strongman prime minister (Vladimir Putin), who skillfully balances interests of powerful inancial-industrial clans closely connected to the machinery of the Russian state. This political system produces endless intrigue and policy debates, often without an obvious resolution and execution. Finally, Russia’s economy is much smaller than the Soviet one, and it no longer has the mobilization mechanisms, such as all-encompassing economic planning and disregard for the consumers’ well-being, that allowed the USSR to compete in the 333 military ield with more advanced and wealthy countries. Proit seeking has become perhaps the strongest motive in the activities of Russian elites. Another dificulty in forecasting Russian naval developments stems from the fact that the current naval force is a product of the Soviet era. Recently we have witnessed an increased level of activity by the Russian Navy. One should not, however, make projections on the basis of what we see today. One has strong reasons to doubt that Russian industry will be able to replace the retiring ships. Former Navy commanderin-chief retired Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov recently observed that the Russian shipbuilding industry has been unable to build new ships in a timely fashion, while research, development, and design of new ships capable of deploying far from Russia’s shores have been chronically underinanced.3 Russia’s unsettled vision of its place in the world had a direct impact on its naval policy. Putin has promoted the image of Russia as a “great power,” erasing the “humiliations” of the 1990s. The Kremlin’s vision is rooted in the Soviet past: being a great power means being taken as an equal by the United States. This vision is irrational, given the economic and demographic realities, but it is driven by a veritable hostile obsession with the United States among the Russian elites and public. Russian politicians discovered in the 1990s that the Russian public, while reluctant to have their children drafted for military service, associate patriotism with military power. The Russian Navy represents a particularly tempting subject for public relations games. Big ships look even more impressive than marching infantrymen and rolling tanks. Construction of a capital ship can be rightfully presented as a national achievement. The Russian na334 val tradition is rhetorically linked to one of the few relatively positive igures in Russian history, Peter the Great. The Navy can provide visible proof of Russia’s resurgence and growing international activism by its presence in various areas of the world and through port calls. The Russian Navy also includes the platforms of the sea-based leg of the Russian nuclear triad, which is extolled by Russian leaders and media as the key to national defense and to keeping the status of a great power. In the realm of naval policy, being a great power requires having aircraft carriers to match the United States. VIRTUAL AIRCRAFT CARRIERS The subject of aircraft carriers surfaced in a very tentative fashion in the Foundations of Naval Policy (March 2000). At that time, however, Putin was very concerned about inding ways to ill Russia’s treasury by using its natural resources. In response to this imperative, the then Navy commander-in-chief Admiral Vladimir Kuroedov (1997-2005) appealed to Putin’s obvious interest in the economic dimension of Russia’s maritime policies, especially in the exploration and extraction of Russia’s natural resources from the seabed, as relected in the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation (approved in 2001). Both the Foundations . . . of Naval Policy and the Maritime Doctrine put emphasis on the defense of Russia’s sovereignty over mineral and biological resources of the ocean. As far as the Navy’s priorities, these documents stress the traditional importance of ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), as the sea-based leg of Russia’s nuclear triad. According to some reports, in 2004, the Ministry of Defense prepared a plan of naval development until 335 the years 2040-50, which put emphasis on defense of Russia’s territorial and contiguous waters, projecting naval power for about 500 kilometers (km) from the shore—an antithesis of a blue water navy equipped with aircraft carriers.4 The issue of a blue water navy complete with aircraft carriers was not to be raised prominently until 2005, by which time the Russian inancial situation began to improve drastically, and relations with the United States, which had seemed to have picked up after September 11, 2001 (9/11), began to deteriorate again as a result of Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” of 2004. On March 25, 2005, the Kuznetsov Naval Academy in St. Petersburg hosted a conference on the “History, Prospects of Development and Combat Employment of Aircraft Carriers in The Russian Navy.” Speakers included industry executives and prominent retired admirals, who were all in favor of equipping the Russian Navy with carriers. Сarrier enthusiasts argued that Russia needed these ships in order to repulse attacks with cruise missiles—presumably, by the U.S. Navy—against Russia’s heartland from the Arctic and Paciic oceans. The likely cost of this undertaking met resistance from the inluential Finance Minister Aleksei Kudrin.5 On August 25, 2005, Putin, while on board the heavy missile cruiser Peter the Great, stated that it was time to start long-term planning (beyond 2020) for new weapon systems, reiterated his view that the Navy was critically important for extracting resources from the seabed, and said that the Navy’s inancing had been increased to 30 percent of the defense budget.6 Still, there was no apparent rush to build carriers. In early 2006, Minister of Defense Sergei Ivanov said that it was a bit too early to discuss building aircraft carriers, although he recognized that the Russian 336 Navy would need them. Further, he explained that until 2015, the armaments program treated the Navy as being equally important to the strategic nuclear forces; 25 percent of the weapons acquisition budget in the course of this program would go to the Navy. (Of course, Ivanov neglected to mention the overlap between the budgets of the Strategic Nuclear Forces and the Navy because of the need to build new nuclear submarines carrying SSBNs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles [SLBMs].) The new Navy commander-in-chief Admiral Vladimir Masorin said at the time that the construction of aircraft carriers would not begin before 2015, and until then the shipbuilding program would focus on smaller ships that could escort carriers.7 Masorin stated that the Russian Navy, given the budget constraints, could not afford any of the fashionable doctrines that their American counterparts implemented. Instead, the Russian Navy would devise an asymmetrical strategy to deter use of force. The strategy should enable the Russian Navy to prevent a potential adversary from dominating the theater of naval operations and guarantee unacceptable damage to the adversary. In the next 10 years (until 2015), he said, the main task would be to maintain the existing ships in the state of readiness, and prepare ideas and plans for a new generation of navy ships and an adequate support and logistics system for them.8 Even conceptual work on the design of aircraft carriers was reportedly not included in the 2006-15 armaments plan.9 As oil prices climbed throughout 2007 and the irst half of 2008, and relations with the West deteriorated even further, the rhetoric about aircraft carriers escalated. In May 2007, a meeting of top Navy brass and 337 leaders of the shipbuilding industry considered the issue of aircraft carriers. A spokesman for the Navy said that the participants believed that Russia needed carriers and that “building a ship of this class would increase the status of Russia as a maritime power. . . .”10 Admiral Masorin commented in June 2007, that the new Russian carriers would be relatively small (50,000 tons), nuclear powered, and would have about 30 aircraft (ixed wing and helicopters). The beginning of their construction had been originally planned for 2016-17, but may be undertaken earlier, added the admiral.11 A year later, his successor, Admiral Vladimir Vysotsky, announced that beginning in 2012-13 Russia would start building “ive or six” aircraft carriers for its Northern and Paciic leets.12 On October 11, 2008, President Dmitri Medvedev visited the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier and conirmed that Russia indeed would build aircraft carriers, the irst one to be completed by 2013-15.13 In November 2008, the media reported that the shipbuilding company Sevmash in Arkhangelsk was selected to build the new carriers and its general manager was already discussing with journalists the upgrades that his shipyard would require to accommodate the construction of carriers.14 But a sudden rhetorical turnaround was executed in June 2009, when Deputy Minister of Defense for Armaments Vladimir Popovkin stated that the plans to begin building aircraft carriers in 2012 would be postponed indeinitely.15 There is likely no single explanation for the sudden blooming and withering of the enthusiasm for carriers. The most apparent reason—the rise and fall of the Russian economy is obvious. The rapid growth of the Russian economy during Vladimir Putin’s second term as president (2004-08) produced euphoria 338 among the Russian elite. It is possible that the Russian policymakers, schooled in inance, but not in management of manufacturing industries, failed to appreciate the enormous complexity of building aircraft carriers. They may have seen suficient inancing as the only major condition for such an undertaking. It is likely that the shipbuilding industry encouraged this kind of thinking out of an obvious self-interest, without pointing out to the political leaders that the problems of Russian industry’s—an outdated capital plant and a depleted, rapidly aging work force—could not be solved in the short and even medium term simply by an infusion of money.16 As the realities of the economic crisis set in and forced a sober survey of Russia’s economy among the policymakers, the improbability of the aircraft carrier project became obvious to the Kremlin. It appears that the Russian high command did not have real—rather than rhetorical—plans for building aircraft carriers. In various oficial pronouncements, the number of carriers luctuated from “a couple” to ive “or” six. This “or” suggests that no plan had ever been approved. Moreover, Admiral Vysotsky, when explaining the Navy’s future to journalists of the military daily, Krasnaya Zvezda, in February 2009, named the Navy’s priorities as; building SSBNs, attack submarines, multipurpose surface ships, strike and reconnaissance systems, command and control, and navigation systems.17 Carriers were not mentioned. This is a very traditional emphasis (except for SSBNs, which are a part of Russia’s strategic nuclear forces) on ships that can defend Russia’s contiguous waters. At his June 5, 2009, press conference the Chief of General Staff Army General Nikolai Makarov warned that rearming the Navy would take a longer time than 339 the other services because of the huge cost: a capital ship, he said, would cost as much as a fully armed division of the ground forces.18 Several days later, Deputy Minister of Defense Popovkin observed that the Russian high command still had to decide, “[why] do we need these carrier groups? What are our strategic interests in the [distant] regions, what do we have to defend far away [from home].”19 If the Russian leaders need proof that building carriers would be extremely dificult, the saga of overhauling and upgrading the former Admiral Gorshkov for the Indian Navy has deinitely provided one. On July 1, 2009, Medvedev visited the Sevmash shipyard, and warned the shipbuilders that they could no longer drag out the Gorshkov project, which had commenced in 2004 with the initial completion date of 2008; after huge cost overruns the completion date has been postponed until 2012-13.20 All of the above suggests that the discussion of aircraft carriers had no concrete plans behind it. The discussion of carriers, however, relected certain realities of Russian politics and economy. One was likely a carryover from Putin’s successful PR campaign of 2007-08: portraying Russia as a great power was one of its central elements. Another factor behind the aircraft carrier hullabaloo may have been purely commercial. One of the main trends of Putin’s industrial policy has been formation of state-controlled giant industrial holdings (which include privately owned enterprises in which the government owns shares) headed by government oficials close to Putin. On March 21, 2007, the Russian government created the United Shipbuilding Corporation (USC), to put under the same roof the research and development (R&D) and shipyards involved in design and production of naval ships and weapon systems.21 The irst 340 chairman of the board of the USC was the head of the administration (chief of staff) of the Cabinet of Ministers Sergei Naryshkin, appointed in September 2007.22 In May 2008, soon after Putin had moved to the post of prime minister, the USC top job went to one of the most powerful igures in Russian business and politics, Deputy Prime Minister Igor Sechin.23 Sechin reportedly played the central role in the imprisonment of then Russia’s wealthiest man, Mikhail Khorodkovsky, and has been accused of proiting immensely from the destruction of Khodorkovsky’s oil company YUKOS.24 One of the most important holdings of the USC is the shareholder-owned Sevmash Shipyard in Arkhangelsk. These shareholders could have proited from stories persistently leaked to the media that Sevmash had already been selected to become the prime contractor to build new aircraft carriers.25 THE “NEW LOOK” AND THE RUSSIAN NAVY The real priorities for the Russian Navy should be viewed in the light of the latest military reform, to which the Russians call “the new look” of the armed forces, probably because all the previous military reforms undertaken since 1991 changed virtually nothing. The decision to seek the new look for the Russian military followed the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008, which demonstrated that the Russian armed forces suffered from numerous serious deiciencies. The essence of the new look is a transformation of the hollow Soviet-type military, which would need to mobilize millions of conscripts to ight, into a much smaller force ready to ight on a short notice. Its structure is also to change, with divisions replaced by brigades, and operational commands (partially mod341 eled on American combatant commands) established in conjunction with existing military districts. This is a step away from preparations to ight an all out war against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) towards plans to be ready for regional conlicts along Russia’s periphery. This realistic approach recognizes that a large-scale conlict with NATO (or, for that matter, China), is highly unlikely, especially in view of Russia’s nuclear arsenal. Russian experts have had relatively little speciic to say about the impact of the new look on the Navy. According to Admiral Vysotskiy, the Navy’s missions under the new look have not changed. They include the paramount one of strategic deterrence, plus various missions to defend Russia’s interests in the contiguous seas, as well as participation in international United Nations (UN)-sanctioned forces. The priorities in procurement, according to Vysotsky, include SSBNs, multipurpose attack submarines, multipurpose surface ships, as well as reconnaissance; target acquisition; command, control, and communications (C3); and navigation systems.26 This suggests that the future Russian Navy is supposed to operate with conidence in adjacent seas and embark on selected missions further away from home, such as distant port calls and participation in international efforts against piracy, smuggling, etc. A practical demonstration of what awaits the Navy under the new look has been provided by the recent decision to operationally subordinate the Black Sea Fleet and the Caspian Flotilla to the commander of the North Caucasus military district/operationalstrategic command, a Ground Forces oficer. This decision was reportedly prompted by the inability of the amphibious assault ships of the Black Sea Fleet to pro342 vide support in a timely fashion to the Russian ground forces ighting Georgian troops along the Inguri River and the Kodori Gorge.27 The Northern and Baltic leets will be similarly subordinated to the commander of the Leningrad military district/operational-strategic command, while the Paciic Fleet will be subordinated to the commander of the Far Eastern military district/ operational-strategic command.28 This approach is a nightmare for the proponents of a Russian blue water navy. The tension between them and the authors of the military reform was expressed in an unprecedentedly shrill article in the August 2009 issue of the Naval Digest authored by the retired Navy commander-in-chief Admiral Kuroedov and two other Navy oficers. Tellingly entitled, “We Should Continue to Fight for the Russian Navy,” the article blames the decline of the Russian Navy squarely on the domination of the military by the Ground Forces: “The main cause of this situation is the navy’s complete dependence upon the army’s decisionmaking mechanism which has resulted in a low level of inancing for the navy.” Further, the authors claim that the during the Putin era the Navy received only 12 to 14 percent of the overall military budget, a igure much lower than the 30 percent cited in the past by Putin and Sergei Ivanov. Kuroedov et al., accuse the “hidebound” resistance of failing to recognize the Navy’s independence “in any sphere of its current existence,” which has resulted in a “tragedy” for the Russian Navy.29 It appears that the minister of defense Anatoliy Serdyukov wants to make it very dificult for the Navy to lobby for its interests in Moscow. He ordered the main staff of the Navy to move from Moscow to St. Petersburg, a decision met with a howl of protests. 343 High-ranking Navy retirees made open protests and active duty naval oficers made organized leaks. A move of a government agency from Moscow to St. Petersburg gets the agency in question away from the center of power and makes it less relevant. This is what has happened to the Constitutional Court, a body whose importance in Russia is quite minimal. Moving the main staff from Moscow to St. Petersburg would mean rebuilding the C3 system, reserve wartime command facilities for the Navy, etc. There is no military utility whatsoever in the move—but it certainly puts the Navy brass further away from Putin, Medvedev, and their staffs. It also frees up valuable real estate in the center of Moscow, which the Ministry of Defense can sell, and creates new business in St. Petersburg, the home of both Putin and Serdyukov. As mentioned earlier, the most signiicant missions of the Russian Navy are strategic deterrence and projecting power in the contiguous seas. The allimportant strategic deterrence mission has suffered a series of signiicant setbacks. Currently, the Navy is responsible for 172 SLBMs and 612 nuclear warheads (based on 13 SSBNs) out of the total 634 strategic delivery platforms and 2,825 nuclear warheads of the Strategic Nuclear Forces (SNF).30 If a new arms control treaty between Russia and the United States is signed, the total number of delivery vehicles and warheads of each side will go down to 500—1,100 and 1,500-1,675, respectively, the Russian Navy’s share of delivery vehicles may go up to nearly one-half, and the warheads to about one-third of the total. The future of the seabased leg of the nuclear triad is uncertain because of continuing failures of the Bulava R-30 SLBM. At issue is not just the solid-propellant missile itself, but also the Borey-class SSBN specially built to carry it. If the 344 Bulava has to be replaced by the existing liquid-propellant Sineva SS-N-23 SLBM, the Borey design will have to be changed to accommodate a large missile. This would be very costly, and will make resources available to the general-purpose naval forces even more scarce. The cost of the sea-based leg of the strategic triad probably explains the huge discrepancy between the Navy’s budget igures cited by Kuroedov (12-14 percent of the overall military budget) and the 25-30 percent cited by Putin and Sergei Ivanov. Resource allocation for the Navy is a dificult process because of the conlicting priorities when it comes to Russia’s four leets and one lotilla. The geography makes such decisions nearly a zero-sum game, since one Russian leet cannot easily reinforce another in an emergency, and an emergency can easily arise, since three leets (Northern, Black Sea, and Paciic) and the Caspian lotilla operate in areas with potential for border and other conlicts. The main competition for resources is likely to arise between the Northern and the Black Sea leets. The Russians have said much about the importance of the Arctic and the Northern Fleets. The Arctic is the home of the majority of Russian SSBNs. The Northern Fleet is the least geographically constrained of all the Russian leets, providing a relatively easy access to the Atlantic Ocean. The economic potential of the Arctic is deemed to be very considerable: the ice melting may lead to new possibilities for extraction of oil and gas, as well as for opening of regular navigation from Europe to the Far East along the northern edge of Russia. The Northern Sea Route (as the Russian call it) can favorably change Russia’s strategic situation by improving the tenuous transportation link of European Russia with the Far East, as well as strengthening Russia’s position as the 345 transportation link between Europe, Asia, and North America. There is potential for conlict over Russia’s claims regarding the seabed in the Arctic and the demarcation of the sea border with Norway. Reading the comments made by Russian naval experts, one may conclude that the militarization of the Arctic is inevitable.31 This is hardly surprising given the self-interest of the Navy, the antagonistic views of the West that have become politically correct in Russia since the late 1990s, and the fact that the Arctic is a hiding place of the Russian strategic deterrent, the SSBNs based in the Kola peninsula.32 At the same time, as Katarzyna Zyśk observes, the Russian Arctic policy so far has been quite pragmatic.33 While the Russians created enormous publicity around the stunt of putting the Russian lag on the bottom of the Arctic Ocean, they have not followed through on their rhetoric by unilaterally claiming a large sector of the Arctic. Russia is strategically isolated in the Arctic region and NATO naval forces have easy access there. While the Russians have shown a willingness to demonstrate that their Navy is “back,” avoiding direct confrontations with NATO has, so far, been as much the heritage of the Soviet era as the dream of a blue water navy. One of the highest priorities of Russia’s foreign policy under Putin has been creating an exclusive sphere of inluence in the post-Soviet states.34 The Black Sea region has seen the sharpest conlict resulting from Moscow’s attempts to implement this policy priority. The prime example was the Russo-Georgian war of 2008, in which the Black Sea leet saw action. The tensions between Russia and Georgia have been intertwined with the tensions between Russia and Ukraine (Russia has been incensed by Ukraine’s sup346 port for Georgia), and with the fate of the Black Sea leet that may lose its base in Sevastopol after 2017. The Russians would like to keep NATO naval forces out of the Black Sea; Admiral Vysotskiy stated that “the non-Black Sea nations have no business in the Black Sea.” He emphasized naval cooperation with Turkey (which controls access to the Black Sea) and which goes hand-in-hand with the Kremlin’s wooing of Ankara on various energy projects.35 Unlike in the Arctic, the Russians have more hope of keeping the NATO navies (primarily the U.S. Navy) out, thanks in part to various provisions of the Montreux Convention. Russia’s decision in August 2008 to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia guaranteed continuing tension in the Black Sea area for years, if not for decades. The temptation to use force in the Black Sea is much greater for Russia than in the Arctic, since during the Russo-Georgian war NATO demonstrated that it would not defend countries that are not its members, and also because NATO naval deployments to the Black Sea are limited, because of the Montreux Convention preventing aircraft carriers of the Western nations from entering the Black Sea. Recent interceptions of Abkhazia-bound ships by Georgia, and Abkhazian threats to destroy the Georgian ships taking part in such operations raise the specter of a naval conlict involving Russia. The possibility of a conlict with Ukraine over the fate of Sevastopol and the Crimea cannot be completely discounted. In view of this, it is logical that the Kremlin has recently stressed the importance of building up the military infrastructure and buying new ships for the Black Sea leet.36 The neighboring Caspian Sea is important for Russia’s energy interests and for its inluence both in Central Asia 347 and the Caucasus. Thus, the southern lank may very well siphon off resources from the Northern Fleet. An important recent development indicates the growing interest in littoral operations to support Russia’s goals vis-à-vis other post-Soviet nations. While attending a EURONAVAL-2008 exhibition in Paris in October 2008, Admiral Vysotsky expressed open interest in purchasing a Mistral-Class Force Projection and Command Ship, built by the French THALES Corp.37 Secret negotiations with the French company began at about the same time.38 On June 24, 2009, Admiral Vysotsky said that Russia might start buying ships abroad.39 Soon the media began to cite rumors of Russia negotiating a purchase of an aircraft carrier with a French company.40 In late August 2008, Chief of the General Staff General Makarov conirmed that Russia had indeed entered negotiations with the French company to buy a Mistral-class ship, and hoped to have a contract by the end of 2009.41 The Mistral-class are “all-electric ships with an overall length of 199 meters and a displacement of 21,300 tons.” The . . . concept combines a landing helicopter dock, a loating hospital, an amphibious assault ship, troop transport and a command vessel in a single platform. . . . They have a crew of 160, plus 450 troops, endurance of 45 days, and maximum range of 11,000nm at 15 knots. . . . It can carry up to 16 heavy helicopters and one-third of a mechanized regiment, plus two . . . hovercraft or four . . . landing craft. A high-performance communications suite makes the Mistral ideal as a command vessel. The 750-sq.m hospital features two operating theatres and offers 69 beds. If additional hospital/medevac space is required, the hangar can be converted into a modular ield hospital.42 348 Thus, a Mistral-class ship is a potent asset for operations in the post-Soviet region, enabling Russia to carry out amphibious landings and serving as an instrument of psychological pressure: this ship is large, and with its ability to project power on land, any small country would feel threatened if such a Russian ship carrying naval infantry, tanks, and helicopters appears in its vicinity during a crisis in relations with Russia. Moreover, it could do something the Russian politicians craved in vain during the Kosovo war: send a visible signal of Russia’s strong displeasure with NATO, and demonstrate its ability and willingness to help its friends. The biggest question concerning the future of the Russian Navy is the condition of the Russian shipbuilding and manufacturing industry in general. According to a Russian expert, the Navy has received only four new ships since 2000. It can count on buying, in the foreseeable future, one nuclear attack submarine (the Severodvinsk, a Yasen’ class, project 855), three diesel submarines (the Lada class, project 677), and three corvettes (the Steregushchiy class, project 20380). (This forecast excludes SSBNs.) It has taken nearly 10 years to get the St. Petersburg, the irst of the Lada class submarines, to the stage of testing. It took 7 years to get the irst ship of the Steregushchiy class into service.43 Such a slow rate, even at the time of increasing defense budgets, suggests serious problems in the shipbuilding industry. Judging from the plans to import a Mistral class ship, the Russian naval command has apparently become quite skeptical about the ability of the Russian defense industry to provide them with all the ships it needs. The condition of the Russian shipbuilding industry, both civilian and naval, leaves much to be desired 349 and is outside the scope of this chapter. Still, some facts need to be mentioned. The Maritime Council concluded recently that “the shipbuilding industry currently cannot effectively fulill all the strategic tasks set by the government. . .”44 Russian shipbuilding exists mostly thanks to Navy orders—more than 70 percent of its contracts are with the Ministry of Defense.45 This has not made the industry as a whole competitive, because the habit of working for the Navy has made it unable to control costs.46 The formation of the USC so far has not changed the situation for naval shipbuilding. One of the more recent positive results of the Russian shipbuilding industry, the diesel-electric icebreaker St. Petersburg, was built at the Baltiysky Zavod in St. Petersburg by the United Industrial Corporation, and not by the USC.47 Without attempting a detailed discussion of the subject, I would like to note that the Russian defense industry as a whole is stuck in transition from a command economy to a market economy. Until this transition is complete, the defense industry will not be a reliable provider of new weapons for the Russian military. The Russian manufacturing industry in general, including the defense industry, suffers from many problems. According to Sergei Chemezov, the general director of the state corporation Rostekhnologii, noted that about 70 percent of the main equipment for Russian machine building (including shipbuilding) is 20 years old, or even older. Only 5 percent of machine tools are 5 years or younger. “The defense industry suffers badly because Russia has fallen behind in computer technology,” observed Chemezov.48 The current economic crisis has hit the defense industry hard: in January 2009 about one-third of defense industry companies were in danger of bankruptcy.49 350 After years of talk about building unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), Russia had to begin importing them from Israel. Now it is about to import Mistral class ships from France, thus spelling an end to Russia’s dream of being an autarkic, totally self-suficient military power. The Russian defense industry is not dead by any means, but Russia is no longer an autarkic defense industrial power. Its ability to arm itself will depend on cooperation with other nations and imports. This would obviously have a major impact on such complex weapon systems as modern surface and subsurface navy ships, and on Russia’s ability to conduct a foreign policy independent of the inluence of the major industrial powers. CONCLUSION The ultimate challenge of understanding the Russian Navy lies not in the capabilities of the Russian shipyards or in plans drawn by the Main Naval Staff and redrawn by the General Staff. Measuring strength and weakness in conventional terms is a less reliable forecasting instrument that in the recent past. The rapidly and unpredictably changing international scene can provide unexpected leverage to the weaker actors and paralyze the stronger ones. While the Russian Navy is not likely to project its power in a meaningful way over the world ocean in the foreseeable future, it will be able to serve as an instrument for gaining inluence vis-à-vis Russia’s smaller and weaker neighbors and for defending the maritime approaches to Russia proper. Therefore we cannot rule out the possibility of further naval or combined operations employing the Navy as one arm of the operating forces on Russia’s peripheries. Russia’s neighbors are smaller states that 351 depend to a considerable degree on the ability of the United States and other NATO members to project power around the periphery of Eurasia to ensure their stability and security. A physical and psychological exhaustion of the Western alliance may allow even a second-rate naval force to ish in the troubled waters around Russia. ENDNOTES - CHAPTER 6 1. Osnovy politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v oblasti voyennomorskoy deyatel’nosty nf period do 2010 goda, available from www. morskayakollegiya.ru/printer.php?menu=57&schema=1&id=26; Morskaya doktrina Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda, available from www.kremlin.ru/text/docs/2001/07/58035.shtml. 2. Strategiya razvitiya sudostroitel’noy promyshlennosti na period do 2020 goda i na dal’neyshuyu perspektivu, available from www. garant.ru/prime/20071204/92194.htm. 3. V. Kuroedov, L. Sidorenko, and M. Moskovenko, “Za lot Rossii nuzhno prodolzhat’ borot’sia,” Morskoi’ sbornik, No. 8, August 2009, p. 17. 4. Viktor Myasnikov, “Smena morskoi doktriny dorogogo stoit,” Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozrenie (further—NVO), February 10, 2006. 5. Vladimir Gundarov, “Raspravim kryl’ya nad okeanom?” Krasnaya zvezda, April 6, 2005. 6. Beseda s zhurnalistami po zavershenii morskogo pokhoda, August 17, 2005, available from kremlin.ru/text/appears/2005/08/92586. shtml. 7. Dmitriy Litovkin, “Pochemu Rossii ne nuzhny avianostsy, Izvestiya, June 8, 2006, available from www.izvestia.ru/armia2/article3093648/index.html. 352 8. “Razvitiye lota—zadacha gosudarstvennaya,” Krasnaya zvezda (further—KZ), July 29, 2006, available from redstar. ru/2006/07/29_07/1_03.html. 9. Vladimir Zaborskiy, “Bez avianostsev lot schitayetsya ushcherbnym,” NVO, July 28, 2007. 10. Andrei Gavrilenko, “Flotu byt’ avianosnym,” KZ, June 7, 2007. 11. Vladimir Gundarov and Viktor Yuzbashev, “Milliardy dlya ‘dlinnoy ruki; v okeane,” NVO, June 29, 2007. 12. “Glavkom VMF rasskazal, ka yego vedomstvo usilit yadernyy potentsial Rossii,” Newsru.com, April 4, 2008, available from newsru.com/russia/04apr2008/glavkom_print.html. 13. Beseda s lichnym sostavom tyazhelogo avianesushchego kreisera “Admiral lota Sovetskogo Soyuza N. G. Kuznetsov,” October 11, 2008, available from www.kremlin.ru/text/appears/2008/10/207617.shtml. 14. “Kuz’kina mat’-2,” Prime-Tass, November 14, 2008, available from www.prime-tass.ru/news/show.asp?id=2941&ct=articles. 15. Denis Tel’manov, “Avianosnym gruppam ne nashli primeneniya,” GZT.RU, June 18, 2009, available from www.gzt.ru/ print/243906.html. 16. For details on the situation in the manufacturing sector, see the interview with the director of Rostekhnologii state-owned corporation Sergei Chemezov, in Vladimir Soloviev, “Mashinostroiteli priobreli lobbistov,” NVO, May 18, 2007. 17. Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, “Izmeneniya lot nazreli davno,” KZ, February 11, 2009. 18. “Polnyy tekst vystuplenia General Makarova,” Kommersant Vlast’, July 13, 2009, available from www.kommersant.ru/doc. aspx?DocsID=1201042&print=true. 19. Tel’manov, “Avianosnym gruppam ne nashli primeneniya.” 353 20. Dmitri Medvedev, Vstupitel’noye slovo na sovheshchanii “O razvitii podvodnykh sil Voyenno-Morskogo Flota Rossii,” available from kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/07/218889.shtml; “Medvedev prokatilsya na katere v Severodvinske,” newsru.com, July 2, 2009, available from www.newsru.com/russia/02jul2009/medvsever.html. 21. Nikolay Poroskov, “Rossii neobkhodimo yedinoye proektno-konstruktorskoye byuro dlya grazhdanskogo sudostroyeniya,” Vremya novostey, April 21, 2009. 22. Available from www.newsru.com/inance/15jun2007/osk. html. 23. Available from www.newsru.com/inance/13may2008/sechin. html. 24. ”Khodorkovskiy obvinil Sechina i obyavil sukuyu golodovku,” newsru.com, January 30, 2008, available from www. newsru.com/russia/30jan2008/hodor.html. 25. “’Sevmash’ gotovitsya k proizvodstvu avianostsev,” Izvestiya, March 19, 2009; available from www.navy.ru/nowadays/ concept/reforms/carrierstobe.htm. 26. Admiral Vladimir Vysotskiy, “Izmeneniya oblika lot nazreli davno,” KZ, February 11, 2009, available from www.redstar. ru/2009/02/11_02/4_03.html. 27. Viktor Litovkin, “So strategicheskim razmakhom,” NVO, September 11, 2009. 28. Viktor Litovkin, “Reforma armii sdelala zakhod v proshloe,” Nezavisimaya gazeta, September 29, 2009, available from www.ng.ru/printed/231581. 29. Kuroedov, “Za lot Rossii nuzhno prodolzhat’ borot’sia,” pp. 17, 19. 30. Pavel Podvig, Strategic Fleet, available from russianforces. org/navy/. 354 31. See, for instance, Rear Admiral A. Yakovlev, “Kto vladeet Arktikoi’, tot upravliaet mirom,” Morskoi’ sbornik, No. 9, September 2008, pp. 28-37; A. Smolovskii’, “Poslednie voennopoliticheskie sobytiia v Arktike, Morskoi’ sbornik, No. 12, December 2008, pp. 18-21. 32. See Kristian Atland, “The Introduction, Adoption and Implementation of Russia’s ‘Northern Strategic Bastion’ Concept, 1992-1999,” Journal of Slavic Military Studies, Vol. 20, Issue 4, October 2007, p. 521. 33. Katarzyna Zyśk, “Russia and the High North: Security and Defence Perspectives,” in Sven G. Holtsmark and Brooke A. Smith-Windsor, eds., Security Prospects in the High North: Geostrategic Thaw or Freeze? NDC Forum Paper No. 7, Rome, Italy: NATO Defense College, May 2009, p. 106. 34. Arkadiy Moshes, “Bez dorogi,” Yezhednevnyy zhurnal, June 23, 2009, available from ej.ru/?a=note&id=92069. 35. Sotrudnichestvo rossiyskogo lot s VMS Ukrainy perspektivno—Vysotskiy, RIA Novosti, July 26, 2009, available from www.rian. ru/defense_safety/20090726/178699463.html. 36. Nikolai Poroskov, “Otrublennaya armiya,” Vremya novostei, March 5, 2009, available from www.vremya.ru/print/224358.html; Predsedatel’ pravitel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii V. V. Putin provel v Sochi soveshchanie po gosoboronzakazu, August 7, 2009, available from www.government.ru/content/governmentactivity/mainnews/ archive/2009/08/07/6720240.htm; Nachalo rabochey vstrechi s Zamestitelem Predsedatelya Pravietl’stva Sergeem Ivanovym, available from kremlin.ru/text/appears/2009/07/220134.shtml. 37. Sergei Ptichkin, “Glavkom pritsenilsya k avianostsu,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, October 30, 2008, available from www. rg.ru/2008/10/30/oruzhie.html. 38. Yuriy Gavrilov, “Frantsuz pod Andreyevskim lagom,” Rossiyskaya gazeta, August 31, 2009, available from www. rg.ru/2009/08/31/korabl.html. 355 39. Khramchikhin, “VMF RF na zarybezhnykh korablyah;” Ilya Kramnik, “Zagranitsa nam pomozhet,” RIA Novosti, June 26, 2009, available from www.rian.ru/analytics/20090626/175492980print.html. 40. Kramnik, “Zagranitsa nam pomozhet.” 41. Aleksei Nikol’skiy, “Frantsuzskoye sudno Pugacheva,” Vedomosti, August 27, 2009, available from www.vedomosti.ru/ newspaper/print.shtml?2009/08/27/211666. 42. Available europe/mistral.htm. from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/ 43. Aleksandr Khramchikhin, “VMF RF na zarubezhnykh korablyah,” NVO, July 3, 2009; Oruzhiye Rosii, www.arms-expo.ru/site. xp/049050054053124049051054049.html, available from available from www.arms-expo.ru/site.xp/049050054057124049052055056. html; Rossiyskiy podvodnyy lot, available from submarine.id.ru/sub. php?885. 44. Morskaya Kollegiya, “Obyedinennaya sudostroitel’naya korporatsiya i razvitie rossiyskoy sudostroitel’noy oblasti,” available from www.morskayakollegiya.ru/printer.php? menu=269&schema=1&id=202. 45. Vyacheslav Rumantsev, “Ozhivut li rossiyskiye veri?” Rossiyaskaya Federatsiya segodnya, 2009, No. 4, available from www.russia-today.ru/2009/no_04/04_SF_01.htm. 46. Predsedatel’ pravitel’stva Rossiyskoy Federatsii V. V. Putin provel soveshchanie po voprosam razvitiya sudostroitel’noy otrasli v Dal’nevostochnom regione, May 11, 2009, available from www. government.ru/content/rfgovernment/rfgovernmentchairman/chronicle/archive/2009/05/11/5379145.htm. 47. Fox Business, OPK Shipyards Deliver the New Icebreaker “St. Petersburg,” July 16, 2009, available from www.foxbusiness.com/ story/markets/industries/industrials/opk-shipyards-deliver-new-icebreaker-st-petersburg/. 48. Vadim Solovyev, “Mashinostroiteli priobreli lobbistov,” NVO, May 18, 2007. 356 49. Oksana Novozhenina and Aleksei Topalov, “Rossiyskiye tekhnologii zayma,” gazeta.ru, February 25, 2009, gazeta.ru/ 357 THE RUSSIAN MILITARY TODAY AND TOMORROW: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF MARY FITZGERALD Stephen J. Blank Richard Weitz Editors July 2010 Visit our website for other free publication downloads http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/ To rate this publication click here. The views expressed in this report are those of the authors and do not necessarily relect the oficial policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. Authors of Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) publications enjoy full academic freedom, provided they do not disclose classiied information, jeopardize operations security, or misrepresent oficial U.S. policy. Such academic freedom empowers them to offer new and sometimes controversial perspectives in the interest of furthering debate on key issues. This report is cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited. ***** This publication is subject to Title 17, United States Code, Sections 101 and 105. It is in the public domain and may not be copyrighted.