The pci’s strategy is not based on any of these ‘models’, for the very good reason that such models do not and cannot exist. I reject categorically the idea that there are one or several models of the transition to socialism from which we should draw our inspiration. There are only specific, unique, different societies, within unique, specific and different world contexts. It is pure metaphysics to seek a common model of revolution for all countries and in every context. Is there a classical model of the transition from feudalism to capitalism? Did the bourgeois revolution come about, I am not saying in the same way, but even in a comparable fashion, in France, Britain, Germany and Italy—to say nothing of the third world? If you try to deduce a strategy from a universal model, you inevitably fall into over-generalization and miss the main point: the specificity of a historical situation which requires a specific strategy.

We can speak of them in the same language, that of the Comintern. But even in the examples you have given, the purpose of historical analysis is to see what is different. You may employ a uniform academic language, while the reality to which you apply it is entirely heterogeneous. In Spain, there was working-class unity; in Germany, there was division and bitter struggle between socialists and communists; in Russia, it was different again. It is metaphysical to think that these diverse experiences involve one and the same model.

There are obvious international obstacles. Europe is divided into military blocs. Each country is conditioned by this; each has ‘limited sovereignty’. No country has absolute independence. The sovereignty even of France, a great independent country and the home of national independence, is limited; in the economic sphere by the multinationals and her financial dependence, and in the political domain by the Atlantic alliance. Even if she is no longer part of the pact, she still participates in the alliance. So these global divisions establish a balance of forces, which is a primary factor. . . .

In Angola the situation was different, not yet settled or organized, the situation was open. . . .

In Portugal, I believe that it had a profound effect, notably in the economic sphere. What was wrong with the Portuguese left was precisely that it did not understand clearly the constraints imposed on revolutionary class action. This lack of understanding has been responsible in large measure for the present outcome of the Portuguese crisis.

In Italy, the main obstacle is not just these external conditions; it is the fact that the majority of Italians are not convinced of the need for socialism—in the sense that we understand it, as a global transformation of society. You cannot make a revolution against the wishes of the majority. Even the Bolshevik revolution, an armed revolution, enjoyed the strong support of the basic masses: soldiers, peasants and, of course, workers. In Italy there is a majority, a consensus, for measures of transformation—on condition that these are not presented, as is often done, with the declared objective of destroying the system. For people do not give a damn about the strategic aims of groups or parties—even those of the Socialist Party. You have the Lombardi wing of the Socialists who say: we must put forward demands designed to disintegrate the system.footnote¹ Well, that is a fine argument! Most workers have every right to say: ‘That is your affair; you are revolutionary strategists, so do your job; but I want to sort out my own problems.’ So the question we face is whether we can resolve particular problems—of daily life, of work, of the transformation of cultural conditions, of health and so on—and thus advance towards socialism. Then socialism will not seem imposed by doctrinal choice, by violence, but a necessity born of the actual experience of people who come to realize that the economy can only be put in order by planning which sets limits to private enterprise. Socialism is, therefore, a need arrived at freely, with popular participation. It is a majority, not a minority concern.

This precisely proves that the great majority of Italians is not convinced. Antonio Labriola used to say that the formation of socialist consciousness is a difficult process, requiring time—decades. Since the liberation from fascism, Italy has been through a period of great progress. I scandalized everybody by saying that Italians have never been as free and as well off as they are today. The statement was provocative, but not basically false. So many Italians say: we must defend these gains. Never have workers had as many rights in the factory as they do now; never have they had as many civil liberties. There is more freedom in Italy than in France.

What do you mean, of course? It is not at all a matter of course! Formerly, France had a much more advanced democratic régime than post-fascist Italy. I was in the Resistance three years in France and two in Italy. I lived through five years of illegal existence, of armed struggle against the occupying forces, and I really know the situation on both sides. Now we find ourselves with a country which—from a democratic standpoint—is the most advanced in capitalist Western Europe. This did not drop out of the sky: it was achieved by a long process of democratic conquests. So now many people say: we must defend these conquests. Many feel grateful to the Christian Democrats [dc] for conceding such advances. The fourteen million dc voters are not all bourgeois. A large proportion are workers and peasants who, incidentally, are often the most combative and militant in struggles for their demands—and then vote dc. These voters are peasants, white-collar workers, artisans, working people.

We gave it that name in 1931–2. To put it bluntly, we were wrong. When the comrades in Germany said during the world crisis that the dictatorship of the proletariat was necessary in order to resolve it, they won votes, but you know where they ended up. On the crucial and burning issue—unemployment—they did not prevent Hitler from winning the workless. The unemployed did not give a damn about the dictatorship of the proletariat, they wanted work immediately; so fascist demagogy was able to deceive this whole mass of workers and young people and lead them onto the dangerous path which engulfed Europe in the Second World War. So now people want to know: what does a party like ours have to propose? Not so as to construct socialism tomorrow on the ruins of the present system, but to prevent the latter’s ruin from destroying the living conditions of the workers. So we must point to the concrete and immediate objectives which will enable the masses’ conditions of existence in our society to be protected and improved. Woe betide us if we advocate a solution to the crisis whose purpose is to destroy the present system. The far left, which does advocate such remedies, does not have much of an audience; Democrazia Proletaria got 1·5% of the votes and six deputies.

In Italy we do not have a Common Programme. Not only because the Socialists, at least up to now, have not wanted one, but because we Italians are suspicious of programmes—it is a feature of our political culture. Whereas in France the Cartesian tradition is always pushing you to make everything precise, to put it down in black and white. This is a cultural rather than a political difference between France and Italy.

We are not a social-democratic party, we are a communist party. We do not stand for marginal reforms in the sphere of distribution, but for fundamental reforms in the sphere of production. I mean nationalizations, agrarian reform. . . . The question is not to manage society as it is, but to transform it in a democratic and socialist direction.

We are not proposing new nationalizations at the moment. We are not anticipating what has to be done in this field. But when we raise the problems of planning and the dominant role of state industry, it is fundamental reforms, relating to control over the social surplus, which we have in mind. In Italy we already have a vast nationalized and public sector, which we are having trouble managing at present, so we are not suggesting its immediate extension. But although in this respect we do not have a pre-determined plan of an ideological kind, we always have the possibility, at the concrete level, of intervening to limit still further the prerogatives of private property; of reducing the area of the private sector and enlarging that of the public sector. Our whole policy for establishing public control over investment is a policy for structural change, not one for managing society as it is.

I do not see why. We put forward proposals for change not as the consequence of a prior ideological choice, but as an option imposed by necessity: to avoid bankruptcy. If, at a given moment, Fiat cannot resolve its business problems, as is the case today; and if the question of public control arises, since it is already so heavily in debt to the banking system and to the State; then taking it under public control is not seen as a political choice, but as an obligatory decision that everyone recognizes is necessary to avoid the liquidation of one of the principal Italian combines. All those who are concerned to avoid the collapse of the Italian economy cannot oppose this change in the mode of administration and hence the status of the firm. On condition, I repeat, that this choice derives from a particular need, not only internal but also external. I must emphasize that every step forward has to correspond to a necessity, remedying some failure of the ruling class to carry out its functions. For then even people hostile to socialism have to recognize reality. The old employer class is bankrupt. There is a powerful working-class force, endowed with a broad system of alliances with the middle strata, capable of providing a new impetus. So this new force will take control of the state and undertake reforms which have nothing in common with those advocated by the old German or Swedish social democracy.

No. It wanted to start doing so some months before its defeat; but for half a century it confined itself to intervening at the level of redistribution of income, and left ownership of the means of production intact. Whereas in Italy a large proportion of the means of production are already in the hands of the state. Of course, they are badly administered. We are critical of the way the Christian Democrats have used them to dispense patronage. But we can fight for a public control of these means of production which would stimulate a programme of development and full employment. And these are already elements of socialism.

Let us be frank: when all is said and done, in Italy a boss does not really have full and complete possession of his property, in the capitalist sense. He cannot, for example, sell it as he wishes, because occupation of his factory, trade unions, municipal, regional and provincial councillors, the state and so on, will obstruct him. Free enterprise, the basis of the capitalist system, is in fact limited by the balance of forces between the classes. One could give examples affecting all aspects of social relations within the firm. This is not codified, of course. It is the strength of the workers’ movement, trade-union unity, the bargaining power of the unions, different types of pressures, which push in this direction. Our conception of the path to socialism is very pragmatic: it is founded on a historicist understanding of social revolution as a process which has come a long way and is going a long way.

The word compromise was used by Italian historians to designate the formation of the unified state. The Italian unitary state was not, like the French state, produced by a radical bourgeois revolution. It was born out of a compromise made between the Savoy monarchy and certain layers of the aristocracy and bourgeoisie. These elements formed a right-wing bloc which was the core of the new state, and which excluded the popular masses. . . . So this is a notion which is part of the vocabulary of Italian historiography. It is difficult to grasp outside Italy.

All the same, what do we mean by ‘historic compromise’? In Italy, there is the Vatican, the world centre of the Catholic Church. We are not the ones who invented it! We found it already there, and are really bound to take account of it. The Vatican has always weighed heavily in Italian political life. At first, it kept large sections of the peasantry hostile to the new national state. Subsequently, it organized those peasants in a particular way, making them the mass base for a new political force, which is part of the organization of the ruling class. So there is a Vatican question which is expressed in an organization of the Catholic masses. This organization used to aspire to be the sole party of the Catholics, but it has not succeeded. We have a great majority of Catholics in our ranks. I myself am an atheist—the old Communist nucleus is made up of atheists. But today 90 per cent of Communists are Catholic. They are like all Italian Catholics: not over-zealous. They remember the Church when christenings, weddings and funerals occur. All the same, without fanaticism, they are Catholics. And precisely because they are not fanatical, they rejected the excommunication of the pci in 1949. This was a serious matter; there was no excommunication of Communists in France, but there was in Italy.

Well, despite the fact that we fought the Christian Democrats as our main enemy, as the party of the bourgeoisie, the years passed and we saw that this party still retained strong links with the toiling masses. These masses fight by our side, as I have said, in trade-union struggles—but on the political plane they are divided. They vote against laws liberalizing abortion, divorce and so on. Consequently, the unity which has been achieved at trade-union level between Communist, Socialist, far-left and Catholic workers must also be achieved in the political sphere. And if this is our aim, we have to draw the tactical conclusions. We cannot engage in a fight to the death with Christian Democracy when we want to win large sections of it to united action with us. The struggle must be waged in a particular way, within certain guidelines. Our policy of abstention vis-`-vis the Andreotti government is an episode in this struggle we are waging to achieve an agreement between the three historic components of the Italian popular movement: the Communists, the Socialists and the Catholics .footnote³

This is purely an Italian phenomenon, and I am well aware that it has no place in your perspectives in France. It has no place in the English perspectives either. The English Labour Party rejects proportional representation, while in France you are fighting for such an electoral system and in Italy we are defending it. We must get it into our heads that the workers’ movement—not only the Communists and Socialists—has many national characteristics. We are in favour of a multi-national European organization, and the French comrades are opposed. This is not simply a reflection of the policy of the pci and pcf. It reflects the fact that Italy has one history and France another. You see, I always come back to the question of history. Our line of advance to socialism flows from our history as an old country divided for centuries, endowed with middle strata differing greatly from region to region, which has yet to achieve a real national unity.

So the historic compromise is not a process which takes place primarily at the level of social bases, etc., but quite simply and straightforwardly involves reaching an agreement with Christian Democracy as a party, on the basis of a programme of renewal?

Important processes always develop at every level—at the social base and at the political summit. I have always rejected the simplistic opposition between base and summit. A great historical process obviously needs a broad base of experience, otherwise it is nothing but an intellectual construction. But the extent of this base of experience depends on political agreements reached between the acknowledged leaders of the mass movement. The two things must go hand in hand. If there is a preponderance of initiative from above, this can lead to bureaucratic degeneration; on the other hand, if the role of central initiative is underestimated, we are guilty of spontaneism.

Another thing which does not seem clear is your characterization of Italian Christian Democracy. Obviously it is a composite party, organizing broad popular layers. But this is not very specific; one could say the same of all large bourgeois parties. Moreover, it seems equally obvious that within this party, the power of decision lies with sectors which carry out the policies of the Italian ruling class. Yet your texts give the impression that it is an inter-class formation, a kind of front of heterogeneous forces; and that although today it is the right wing of this front which holds power, tomorrow it might well be the left. In terms of a class characterization, I do not see any difference between Italian and German Christian Democracy, or even—leaving secondary differences aside—the French udr. So on what do you base your characterization of the Christian Democrats?

In the early days of the Republic, Christian Democracy was the party of the Italian bourgeoisie. We said this from the start, and I still hold to it. Even today it is led by men who, it is true, carry out policies which correspond to the needs of the big bourgeoisie. Only, this party is not reducible to the German Christian Democrats, let alone to the French udr. For it has a very long history, whose roots go back to a social reality which existed long before the actual formation of the party. Italian Christian Democracy is not a bourgeois party seeking to build a mass base, as for instance Gaullism succeeded in doing in France. On the contrary, this mass base existed, in the form of the Catholic movement, well before the appearance of the party—even before the formation of the Popular Party, which was its first political expression in the post-war crisis of 1919–22.footnote⁴ Moreover, the dc was divided on the question of fascism: one wing went over to fascism, on the instigation of the then Pope, while another maintained anti-fascist positions and hence worked with us in the anti-fascist struggle and in the Resistance.

Thus the dc is not a bourgeois party that succeeded in creating a mass base for its own purposes. No, it is a movement rooted deeply in the national socio-political arena, with an acute sense of its own autonomy, of its particular character, of being at odds with the secular tradition of the workers’ movement. Hence it is a world of its own, with even a cultural and moral dimension that we cannot dismiss lightly. On the issue of abortion or divorce, your far-left Italian comrades criticize us bitterly for our moderation and ‘slowness’. But our slow approach flows from our conviction that if we fail to take into account the rhythm of political maturation of the Catholic masses, and that notorious social base of Christian Democracy which really is a multi-class one, we will bring about a clear-cut division of the country into two roughly equal blocs and the masses which could be won to the left will be pushed to the right.

Our greatest concern has always been to avoid ending up in a head-on confrontation with the Catholic movement; for such a confrontation would be fraught with dangers for the workers’ movement. If the latter commits itself to a test of strength against Italian reaction supported by all its international allies, and marshalling in addition a genuine mass base of millions of sincere people—active in struggles today, but mobilizable tomorrow for an anti-communist crusade if they feel their cultural universe is threatened—then the risk of defeat is clearly very great. If I wanted to make a French comparison, I would take the old Radical Party. It was undeniably the party of the bourgeoisie under the Third Republic, but it had a not inconsiderable peasant base. And this party participated in the Popular Front.

The Popular Front was constructed around the programme of the Radical Party.

No, not entirely, the Radicals did not support the forty-hour week.

Neither did the Popular Front programme. It was the general strike of June 1936 which forced it through.

No, no—this is an old historical polemic. I would concede that the Popular Front parties had not formulated the programme which corresponded to the Matignon agreement.footnote⁵ But the factory occupation movement was led by Communists. At that point the Communist Party played a decisive role. This is part of the reason for its influence among the French left. The point of all this is that the Radical Party was a party of the bourgeoisie, but also of the peasant masses, and that the socialist left has frequently made the mistake of not paying sufficient attention to this latter aspect.

Does your strategy involve the idea that Christian Democracy may eventually disintegrate or split?

I would merely note that up to now the dc has always succeeded in heading off this danger. But at the time of the last elections, there was an important break, with the inclusion of a number of well-known Catholics as independent candidates on the pci ticket. However, this is not yet a mass phenomenon. In fact, in spite of the presence of independent Catholics on our slate, the dc retained its share of the vote.

I know many Communist friends who are convinced that all this is a tactic aimed at putting the dc on the spot; and that it is succeeding, moreover, since the dc is losing ground. The aim being to win the popular base of the party in order to destroy it: in other words, what was known at the time of the Third International as ‘plucking the fowl’.

Not at all, this fowl is much too fat. We have the greatest respect for the autonomy of the Catholic movement, because we understand that it is not an artificial construct. It is a reality corresponding to certain deeprooted tendencies, which go back to the Italian people’s past—a past we wish to overcome, but cannot by denying it. It has to be understood, if we are to act effectively upon it. I believe that if at some point a tendency towards renewal develops within Christian Democracy, certain right-wing groups will become openly hostile. And I hope that the split will take place at their initiative, as occurred over fascism: whereas the Popular Party declared itself anti-fascist, there was a right-wing clerical-fascist tendency which went over to fascism, even before the fascists had consolidated their power.

But is it not the case that pci policy towards the Christian Democrats—which might appear designed to give them credibility, since when you say that the dc is a great popular, democratic party, you are enhancing its credibility in the eyes of the general public whether you want to or not—is it not the case that this policy did much to help the dc maintain its position in the last legislative elections?

I believe that a political line must be based upon an objective analysis of the forces at work. Are we giving the Christian Democrats credibility? I think they are achieving this on their own, by showing that they can retain their mass base. Italians are not fools. If 14 million of them are voting dc—despite inflation, scandals and misgovernment—they are not doing so because we are seeking an alliance with that party, but for other reasons which we should not misunderstand. They are doing so because under the Christian Democrats there has been a great improvement in Italian living standards. Italy has seen the greatest progress in the whole of Western Europe. Where there were formerly 5 million school students, there are now 14 million. They may not be getting the best education, but at least they are in school. I myself can remember the time—in Naples, when I was a Deputy—when the majority of militants attending workers’ meetings were illiterate! Nowadays all young workers can write and speak, they play a full role in debate. The same goes for many other fields. So we should not under-estimate this progress. Our position is not to ignore these gains, but to point out the sacrifices with which the people has paid for them and to show how modest they are compared with what could be achieved by an alternative policy. Above all, we want to make it clear that defending and extending these advances requires change—and thus collaboration with us, because without us there can be no change. So our tactics are not designed to split the Christian Democrats; they are tactics of struggle, which nevertheless take the real situation into account. We cannot forge unity in action with Christian-Democrat workers in the trade-union field, only to ignore them later in other spheres.

What perspective do you see for socialism in Western Europe, from a more general standpoint?

Western Europe is going to be deeply affected by the developments taking pace at a world level. The high standard of living in Europe derives largely from its position in the international division of labour. It buys raw materials at low prices and sells manufactured goods and means of production at high prices. This situation could not last for ever, and is already coming to an end: the oil crisis demonstrates the determination of third-world countries to alter the terms of exchange. This limits the proportion of world revenue going to Europe. The middle strata and even the working class in Europe must think of their world position in different terms in future. Either we learn to take a socialist, European and world perspective, i.e. proceed to re-organize Europe on the basis of collaboration with the socialist and developing countries; or there is a danger that the defence of present living standards may be taken over by the right. I believe that there are powerful democratic forces in Europe—not only the Communists, but also the social democrats and social Christians. If unity is achieved between these forces on a European scale, then it will be possible to solve the problems posed by the reorganization of Europe within the framework of a global economic restructuring. If we do not succeed in this, if everyone takes refuge in national self-interest and corporate defence of their positions, the worst could happen.

That is why, when your Italian friends say to me: ‘we must take advantage of the crisis to destroy the system’, I think back to the crisis of 1929–31. At that time, there was no Communist solution. There were two ways out: the fascist or the Roosevelt solutions. Roosevelt brought America out of the crisis and opened the way for subsequent economic expansion. To be sure, it was capitalist expansion. But it was not fascism. So we want to achieve a European development which does not just repeat the American model of 1930, but which is an original creation, worthy of the continent that first gave birth to socialism—and that has unmatched cultural strengths. Even the relationship here and now between the two of us, despite our far-reaching differences, is entirely European—I would even say, Italian! It is characterized by a certain degree of tolerance, and that is a fundamental conquest of that ancient European civilization, so disparaged nowadays, which has inspired and still inspires democratic thought—including that of Marx and Lenin—throughout the world.

I have the impression that your orientation is based on a particular assessment of the nature of class consciousness today: thanks, on the one band, to the accumulated defeats of the 1930s, and on the other, to the remarkable growth experienced by capitalist Western Europe in the last thirty years. . . .

And which is now collapsing.

I have the impression you think that the entire European proletariat constitutes a labour aristocracy in relation to the world proletariat, and that as a result it is not revolutionary at the present time.

But what does being revolutionary mean? It means acting to establish a new system. Well, we think that in order to establish a new system, we must start from the present situation: a working class which has improved its standard of living, and above all extensive petty-bourgeois layers whose existence we cannot ignore, because the outcome of the political struggle between left and right depends on how they move. Has the whole Italian working class become a labour aristocracy? Obviously not, that would be absurd. An aristocracy is a privileged minority, and clearly it is meaningless to say that the whole Italian proletariat forms a privileged minority! There are always marginal workers, the permanently unemployed. I was elected Senator for the poorest districts of Naples, with 42 per cent of the vote, without making promises but simply saying: ‘I do not promise to give you work. If we succeed in changing national policy, there will be jobs. If we do not, there will not.’

So there is a great store of energy in the European working class. We cannot confine ourselves to the schema of the labour aristocracy. This energy goes into the defence and improvement of living standards won after many struggles—a defence which will eventually lead to the socialist reorganization of society. The working class can defend and improve its living standards providing it does not isolate itself from the world, but confronts the latter’s problems, together with the socialist and newly independent countries. This is the national function of the working class, its function as a hegemonic class, as Gramsci used to say. Not to isolate itself with a perspective of armed revolution, which nobody knows when or how to achieve. And that is what we Italian communists are doing.

Is the strategy of the pci of a different kind from that of the pcf?

Yes, I believe so. We have two autonomous strategies, which correspond to two very different national situations. I am not saying that ours is better. I think that when people speak of Eurocommunism, they are wrong, because there is no such thing—there are as many specific strategies as there are communist parties. We opposed the re-establishment of a single world centre for the communist movement in Moscow—and we are not going to establish a single centre of ‘Eurocommunism’ in Rome or Paris. I know enough about the history of the French people to recognize that the pcf is formulating a national policy, which corresponds to certain features which do not exist in Italy, and vice versa. For example, so far as the European Economic Community is concerned, the position of the pci is more positive than that of the pcf, because Italians have been forced into migrant labour. There are millions of Italians in France, Germany, Belgium, Switzerland, etc. who already enjoy new rights today because of the existence of the eec. But the French were never forced into migrant labour, so they do not appreciate its drastic effects.