The Transnistrian conflict turned 30 last month. In 1990, as Moldova agitated to break away from the Soviet Union, its Russian-speaking region declared independence in order to stay in the federation. The UN recognised Moldova’s independence in March 1992; fighting with Russian-backed separatists in Transnistria immediately intensified. The five-month civil war claimed up to 1,000 lives but failed to resolve the territory’s status. Transnistria, home to 450,000 people by its own estimates, has become an awkward regional feature. There is no hard border with Moldova (see map). The region uses much of the country’s public infrastructure, including railways and the postal service. Moldova relies on Transdniestria for most of its energy supply.
Transnistria, which has a bigger industrial base than Moldova itself, also benefits from having quietly joined Moldova’s trade agreement with the EU. Local barons have profited from life on the international sidelines and from proximity to the port of Odessa in Ukraine. The last thing they want is to be “liberated” by the Russians. But Transnistria may not have much choice. Russia exercises considerable political control, provides free gas and keeps a permanent force of 1,500 troops and almost 20,000 tonnes of Soviet-era military equipment in the territory. It has nonetheless stopped short of recognising its independence, as it has done in the past for Georgia’s breakaway statelets, South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and more recently, in February, for Ukraine’s eastern separatist regions, Donetsk and Luhansk.
The war in Ukraine has brought Transnistria into the spotlight. On April 22nd Rustam Minnekayev, a Russian general, said that a successful military thrust through the south of Ukraine would give his army access to Transnistria. That would cut Ukraine off from the Black Sea, dealing a significant blow to its economy. It would also create a land corridor, allowing Russian forces to attack Ukraine from the west and penetrate deeper further north. Moldova, a country of about 2.6m people, which is neither a NATO nor EU member, and therefore lacks security guarantees, has been quick to declare its “neutrality”. Capturing Transnistria would also extend Russia’s foothold towards Romania, NATO’s eastern flank in the region. That threat may increase pressure on Ukraine and its Western allies to reach a peace deal on Russian terms, says Stefan Wolff, a professor of international security at the University of Birmingham, in Britain.
Russian tanks are unlikely to roll into Transnistria soon. They are mostly tied up in Donbas, in eastern Ukraine. A path through Odessa, Ukraine’s main port, would be difficult: the city is heavily fortified. Russia might hope to attack Transnistria first, making a land corridor that would cut Odessa off from the rest of Ukraine. But in practice, this would leave its flanks dangerously exposed to Ukrainian forces. The territory has an airstrip and old depots of ammunition (in varying states of decay) which could be of limited use. Russia, Ukraine and Moldova each have a renewed interest in this sliver of land. Life on the international sidelines looks like a thing of the past for Transnistria. ■
