1 Introduction

The complexities of international interactions, the unpredictability of other actors, and unexpected natural events create uncertainties that constantly challenge the day-to-day formulation of appropriate foreign policy. Yet, beyond the immediate tactical decisions lies a more profound strategic challenge: comprehending the fundamental dynamics of global politics and interpreting their implications for effective long-term actions. The task of rethinking strategic principles of action is particularly acute at present. The configuration of world politics has changed fundamentally in this century, and as the philosopher Hegel (1840, 9) noted, “Every era has such idiosyncratic circumstances—is in such a unique situation—that decisions must be made, and can only be made, appropriate to their unique situations.” The most popular grand theories of international relationships were formulated by and for hegemonic great powers, and their “realism” does not fit the realities of a new post-hegemonic era. Following an old map in new terrain is a recipe for frustration, and possibly disaster.

The need to cope with the unparalleled complexity of the current global situation is the starting point for post-hegemonic strategic thinking. In an intensely interconnected world with no controlling great power, the basic strategic task for each actor is to reduce the uncertainty of one’s future welfare. While situations and prospects of countries differ, they all have to face this common task. There are no easy answers to the tactical questions of what to do, or to the longer-term concerns about what might happen next. But decisions matter, and better decisions can reduce future uncertainties, though not eliminate them. Since many of these uncertainties are embedded in an international environment, a key domain of strategic principles for guiding decision-making is the management of international relationships.

As Amitav Acharya (2014) argued, the American world order was neither as complete nor as benevolent as was assumed by most of its theorists. But the events of the twentieth century, including two world wars, a Cold War between great powers, on the background of preceding centuries of Western domination, informed a general perspective that global politics was essentially a game played by those at the top of the pyramid, a bipolar rivalry succeeded by unipolar hegemony in 1990. Strategy was a calculus for victory against an enemy (Platias and Koliopoulos 2010). World order was assumed to be a vertical structure ordered by relative power.

The twenty-first century has unfolded quite differently. Change has been driven by development rather than by destruction. The transformation has escaped attention because it has been peaceful and gradual, but it is no less consequential. The global South is not primarily concerned with victory in war, but rather with continued and sustainable development. Increasing tensions between the United States and China are distressing to others, and few countries want to join a Cold War camp. New economic regions have emerged that are globally inclusive in their outlook (Womack 2023a). This is not a transition between hegemonic regimes, but rather an evolution beyond hegemony.

A post-hegemonic world is not necessarily a war of all against all. However, it is one in which each participant faces more uncertainty than they would if there were a hegemon to obey. There are many more actors, many more international issues, and a web of interrelationships that render the consequences of each action less predictable. But complexity is not simply chaos. Strategic principles of international prudence can be can be formulated to provide considerations that should be involved in the successful management of foreign affairs in the new era, even though they may not offer specific answers to individual problems.

The first task of this essay is to analyze the structure of the post-hegemonic world. I argue that, especially since 2008, the world order can best be described as multinodal.Footnote 1 Others have used a variety of other terms to describe the shift, the most popular being multipolar. But multipolar suggests perhaps an enlargement of the field of competition for power rather than a different situation altogether. A multinodal world is an asymmetric matrix of actors in which each is located in a web of relationships. The pursuit of one’s own welfare requires the management of relational uncertainty. Even though power is unevenly distributed, the use of power to coerce a relationship is likely to have undesirable reverberations throughout the matrix. Transactions have collateral consequences. Thus, the strategic principles appropriate for a multinodal international configuration are basically different from hegemonic calculations. Moreover, these principles apply to all international actors, not just great powers.

The second task is to explore the corollaries of a post-hegemonic, multinodal world order. These strategic principles are not utopian, rather the opposite. They reflect the new realism of an international configuration in which effective pursuit of one’s own interest is more complex than compelling or submitting to others. Differences in relative power and capabilities still matter, and differences in national situations create conflicts of interest. But the horizontal dimension of continuing interaction among autonomous actors is more important than the vertical dimension of unilateral imposition. Post-hegemonic strategy must encompass both dimensions. A multinodal configuration may be less existentially threatening because it is not based on the logic of victory or defeat. However, it is more complex, and therefore more uncertain.

Because the international web is complex and sticky, the first strategic principle for a multinodal era is to attend to the general ecology of an action. Although bilateral interactions remain the primary component of international relationships, the consequences of reverberations throughout the system can outweigh the intended bilateral effect. Second, differences of interests and differences of capabilities necessitate careful attention to the situation and the perspectives of counterparts, rather than solely focusing on relative power. But power differences create asymmetries that are difficult to manage. Strategic international relationships are essentially centered around relationships, not transactions. The third task is to stabilize prospects by reducing uncertainty. Partnerships and multilateral orders are key methods of stabilization. Fourth, the encouragement of common interests and collaboration not only advances one’s own welfare, it has the collateral advantage of reducing uncertainties by strengthening relationships. Lastly, a multinodal world is noisy and anxious, and states have different interests. Force and resistance may be necessary, and on occasion, whether necessary or not, they are likely to be used. But it is prudent in asymmetric conflicts for the larger side to limit compellence and for the smaller to limit resistance to the matter under dispute, rather than escalating to general hostility.

2 The multinodal world

The year 2008 can be seen as the watershed between the hegemonic era and the post-hegemonic era. The Global Financial Crisis was its most spectacular event, though the Beijing Olympics that year also provided a suggestive spectacle. But perhaps more importantly, in that year the production of the developing world exceeded that of the developed world for the first time since the nineteenth century.Footnote 2 The rise of China was not the only factor in this historic shift in global economic mass. Greater international connectivity encouraged the diffusion of global production, and industrial policies, especially in Pacific Asia, amplified transnational investment and product chains. China had the additional stimulus of a fundamental shift toward reform and openness, and this, together with its size, made it the avatar of the new surge of global production. Even though capital from developed countries and the existence of a liberal economic order played important roles, the key factor in “the rise of the Rest” has been the autonomy of national decision-making. Each country makes its own policies within the context of its capabilities, interests, and opportunities. When the U.S. hub of the economic hub-and-spoke order dramatically showed its fragility in 2008, China’s presence, population, and production evolved into a new center for the Pacific Asian economic region. The political crisis of global confidence initiated by the election of Donald Trump added another dimension to the uncertainties of the U.S. role (Womack 2017). The COVID pandemic followed by the wars in Ukraine and Gaza have added new dimensions to global uncertainty.

The new global era has been given many names, of which the official fallback is “multipolar.” “Multipolar” is useful in that it points to the decline of American unipolarity while rejecting the idea of a new Cold War bipolarity (Womack 2004). But the idea of “poles” suggests that there is a group of powerful actors while everyone else is merely a passive spectator. Five poles appear to be the upper limit, because, as Kenneth Waltz (1979, 163) puts it, “We know that complications accelerate as numbers grow because of the difficulties everyone has in coping with the uncertain behavior of many others…” But it is exactly this general context of uncertainty that requires a multinodal strategy. The convenience of limiting attention to a manageable “pole club” ignores the actual cascade of complexities involving international power. If we go to the other extreme and assert that every country is a “pole,” then we overlook the true differences in situations among countries. Every country is an actor, but each acting within the confines of its own resources and relationships.

The dynamics of the new era require a new term and new analyses. Acharya (2014) suggests “multiplex,” Zakaria (2011) proposes “post-American,” others say “post-Western, (Stuenkel 2016)” “polycentric, (Möckli 2012)” “G-zero, (Bremmer 2013)” “polygonal, (Noesselt 2022)” “heterarchy, (Cerny 2023)” or “de-centered globalism. (Buzan 2011)” I call it a multinodal world order (Womack 2023a, 161–172). Each country is a vertex in a multi-dimensional web of international relationships. Its perceptions and options are shaped by its location and relative capabilities. Because of globalized connectivity, each confronts more significant actors, more issues, and more reverberations of specific actions. Relative power matters, but coercion is difficult. Attempted coercion is more likely to lead to stalemate than to victory. We should think of post-hegemonic power as the ability to influence rather than as the capacity to coerce. As Evelyn Goh (2016) argues, influence involves inducing others to do what otherwise might not be done. Influence does not necessarily involve compulsion, or even rewards and sanctions. According to Goh (2016, 11), “weaker actors may conform to the will of the stronger not only because the latter may wield greater incentives, sanctions or legitimacy, but also to further their own political or strategic agendas.” This is in stark contrast to the overt domination of the strong over the weak in imperialism, or to the periphery’s lack of alternatives in a hub-and-spoke system. Because of the multinodal web, each node has more agency, but its options remain bounded by its position, both geographical and in terms of resources and relationships.

As Qin Yaqing (2021) argued, global governance in a post-hegemonic world is flat, but not chaotic. Without hierarchy, states have agency, but they face uncertainty. The diplomatic calculus of each state is to pursue its national interests, but a major part of that pursuit is to reduce uncertainty (Goh 2020). Reducing uncertainty is not simply a matter of de-risking. Because of the stickiness of the web of connectivity, de-risking can create opportunity costs as well as new sources of risk. The primary mission in reducing uncertainty is to stabilize the prospects of one’s welfare. Since all have agency, forming relationships based on mutual respect is key to reducing uncertainty. Strategic partnerships become a more appropriate stratagem than strategic alliances. Long-term stability of prospects is more important than short-term gain (Huang and Shih 2014). A central power, whether regional or global, successfully exercises strategic influence by reducing the uncertainty of others.

The multinodal matrix of relationships is mostly horizontal, but it is not uniform. Each state views its prospects from the unique vantage point of its relational situation. The distance between nodes is multi-dimensional. Geography is important, but differences in culture, ideology, historical memories, economic ties, and politics create a more complex map. The relationship between Cuba and the United States is an extreme example of geographical proximity negated by ideology and politics. Furthermore, since everyone is more exposed to global powers, they seem closer than smaller nodes at the same geographical distance.

The vast differences of situations among states create a context in which most relationships are asymmetric. In an asymmetric relationship, one side is more exposed to the interaction, for better or for worse, and this leads to a structural difference in perception (Womack 2016a). The weaker side is concerned about its autonomy. Thus, a symmetric formulation such as “win–win” is not reassuring to the smaller side if a dependency might be created that restricts its future choices. Conversely, the larger side requires respect for the existing asymmetry of the relationship. An asymmetric relationship can degenerate into hostility, but there are many examples of mature and effectively managed asymmetric relationships.

The rivalry between the United States and China is the most prominent international relationship of the multinodal era, and one that shapes the overall contours of the era. As world powers, they are each other’s primary concerns. But they are in a relationship of asymmetric parity because their situations are fundamentally different (Womack 2016b). The United States is the incumbent power, and one whose strength derives primarily from its centrality in the economics, politics, and security of the current global system. China has become a world power due to its domestic economic development, globalization, and its centrality to the Pacific Asian economic region. Although China’s pace of development has slowed, its centrality in the world’s most productive and dynamic region undergirds its global role.

Despite the rivalry implicit in parity, the strengths of the United States and China do not create a zero-sum relationship. China has benefitted from the global order anchored by the U.S., and the U.S. has benefitted from China’s contribution to global growth. In any case, neither the United States nor China is capable of establishing a global hegemonic order. However, each has its international affinities. The United States shares some general concerns with other wealthy countries regarding the shift in global economic mass, while China shares concerns with other developing countries committed to further development. But in a multinodal world order, joining an exclusive camp means a reduction of autonomy and opportunity. If a world power attempts to corral other states into exclusive relationships, it is going against their interests and therefore is likely to isolate itself.

The difficulty of successful coercion in a multinodal context does not mean that conflicts will not occur. Quite the contrary. In a hegemonic order, military coercion is a privilege of the hegemon. The hegemon engages in “small wars” in order to maintain its sphere of influence, but a local power risks intervention if it attempts to coerce a neighbor. The best example is Iraq President Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Saddam mistakenly assumed that the U.S. was indifferent to the invasion and then suffered the consequences (Duelfer and Dyson 2011). If there is no hegemonic policeman, more localized conflicts can be expected. But even without hegemonic oversight, the secondary consequences of war are likely to render coercion imprudent. The impulse to resolve a conflict of interests may lead to attempted coercion, but the result is likely to be bilateral stalemate and greater alienation of third parties.

President Vladimir Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 is a good example of the problems of coercion in a multinodal matrix. Even if his initial attack on Kiev had been successful, Russia would have been worse off. The invasion confirmed a hostile relationship with the rest of Europe, a reinvigoration and expansion of NATO, persisting problems regarding Ukraine occupation, a militarization of the Russian economy, and an increased dependence on China. If the cardinal point of post-hegemonic foreign policy is the reduction of uncertainty, Putin failed from the first day of the invasion. As it turned out, Putin has added to his mistake the embarrassment of initial failure and the sufferings of a prolonged war. Putin’s 2014 takeover of Crimea was a limited action and therefore more successful, but unfortunately his initial success led to later adventurism.

3 Five strategic principles for actors in a multinodal order

The Russian invasion of Ukraine illustrates two deep realities of a post-hegemonic international context. First, the use of coercive power disturbs the whole global web of relationships. Not only is it difficult to force a bilateral outcome despite asymmetric capabilities, but the reverberations of a coercive action throughout the international web are likely to reduce the aggressor’s influence. Second, regardless of strategic prudence, some leaders and some states will continue to act as if compulsion in the pursuit of exclusive interests can be successful. That is the old and familiar hegemonic paradigm, a default mentality familiar to all and especially attractive to the more powerful. A post-hegemonic era is not beyond hegemonic illusions, either global or localized. Therefore, a post-hegemonic structure is not necessarily predictive of appropriate post-hegemonic behavior. Rather, if the deep reality of post-hegemonism is true, then the realities of continuing attempts to pursue hegemonic policies will, at a minimum, demonstrate the opportunity costs of attempted domination, and, more likely, result in stalemate or failure.

The following strategic principles are suggested as points of reflection concerning the long-term consequences of foreign policy action. They are neither predictive nor normative, but rather prescriptive. As the example of Ukraine illustrates, and as Jonathan Kirshner (2022) has argued more generally, international relations theory cannot foretell the future because actors face real alternatives and make consequential choices. The articulation of strategic principles aims to shape perspectives and guide decision-making processes. It cannot predict the choices that will be made, nor their complex consequences. The principles are not normative because they attempt to raise awareness of likely long-term consequences in a multinodal world, rather than to judge actions by an ethical standard. Like a doctor advising a patient on the physical consequences of smoking, strategic principles address general concerns appropriate in the pursuit of national welfare in a post-hegemonic world. They provide general guidelines to prudent diplomacy. As each state is its own agent in the multinodal web, the principles should be applicable to all, rather than limited to great powers and their conflicts. However, universality of principles does not equate to uniformity of application.

3.1 Attend to the ecology of an action

In a web of interactive connectivity, any specific action occurs in a three-dimensional ecology of secondary effects. First, there are the possible simultaneous consequences for the web of relationships. In a multinodal world, actions make waves that affect one’s neighbors. Their connectivity involves a direct linkage of interests and concerns, prompting others to respond in order to protect their interests and mitigate uncertainties. For example, it is hardly surprising that Finland and Sweden applied to join NATO after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The greater the power differential between two actors, the more likely it is that the collateral impact of coercive action will be significant. Conversely, positive and reassuring action will have general, positive effects.

Second, there is the linear effect of an action on the ongoing relationship with the affected party. In the words of Chas Freeman (2023, 41), “The negotiation of a specific issue is always also the negotiation of a relationship.” One of the few virtual certainties in the global future is that the nodal arrangement of countries will remain roughly the same regardless of what happens. While no one can peer 20 years into the future, Russia and Ukraine are likely to remain active participants. The future of Gaza is less certain, but the political community of the Palestinians will persist, and it will remember. Meanwhile, most countries are not in danger of elimination, and they remain in their multinodal locations.

If one will be interacting with known counterparts in unknown future circumstances, the most prudent policy is to maintain strong relational ties. Actions in a relationship are like beads on a string, and the value of a specific outcome depends as much if not more on the positive or negative effect on the relationship rather than simply on the gain or loss in the transaction. For example, Finland’s wish to join NATO is an understandable reaction to Russia’s invasion of a neighbor. However, Finland has had a complex, nuanced, and generally beneficial relationship with Russia for the past 70 years. Finland is more attentive and more knowledgeable about its own Russian risks and opportunities than are its new NATO allies, all of whom have had very different experiences with Russia. By tying its Russia policy to NATO, is Finland burdening its own responsiveness in its relationship to Russia, and stepping into an unknown future? It will be hard for Finland to react to Russia differently from NATO, and yet Finland exiting NATO would put at risk even more important relationships. Finland might be a moderating influence on future NATO diplomacy, but it would be only a small, soft voice in a large, loud room.

The third ecological dimension is the constellation of international behavioral expectations in which any action takes place. These range from definite institutional precommitments, such as treaties and memberships in global and regional organizations, to expectations regarding “normal” international behavior. These may appear to be soft constraints in a post-hegemonic context, given the absence of enforcement mechanisms and dominating powers. However, they hold value as they help shape expectations, and shared expectations reduce general uncertainty. A violation of normal expectations for the sake of a transactional advantage shakes other states’ confidence regarding effective constraints on future behavior. An example would be President Trump’s criticism of NATO and the pressure his administration asserted on Japan and Korea. In a hegemonic order, the hegemon can feel that the constraint of institutional expectations is a hindrance because it believes that its power can prevail. But in a post-hegemonic situation, the texture of reciprocal expectations of normal practice becomes important for all.

As the example of Finland’s quandary illustrates, the ecological dimensions of simultaneous secondary effects, linear relational effects, and normative international expectations are interactive. Just as no action happens in isolation, no relationship is simply a bilateral affair. And every transaction affects a relationship. Acting within the constellation of international institutions and norms strengthens the ordinary assumptions about world order and thereby reduces systemic uncertainty.

To be sure, beneath the general ecology of strategic principle there can be micro-climates surrounding specific relationships or policy areas in which an embedded zero-sum atmosphere seems to dictate tit-for-tat responses. But such situations are essentially stalemates, and therefore time is not to the interest of either side. A current example would be the sovereignty disputes in the South China Sea (Womack 2011). No party can enforce their claim without unacceptable collateral consequences, and yet no party can afford the domestic consequences of abandoning its claim. The Code of Conduct that is currently under negotiation could be an important step beyond this stalemate (Hoang 2020). Difficult as it is to move beyond a stalemate, the status quo is to no one’s interest.

3.2 Respect the situation of the counterpart

In interpersonal relationships, it is often observed that it is a mistake to assume that the behavior of the other person can be interpreted as a mirror of one’s own situation and motives. This mistake of projecting one’s own behavior onto a counterpart is even more common—and more misleading—in international relationships. States differ significantly more than individuals, and one’s own political community often makes the mistake of mirroring the other as a negative image of oneself. Moreover, both sides have different memories of the history of the relationship (Vogel 2019). Sunzi’s admonition to “know your enemy” is not satisfied by inserting different facts into a mirrored image. Since each state operates from its own located interests and capacities, correct interpretation of a counterpart’s behavior requires a conscious attempt to appreciate its unique situation.

Asymmetry is an important factor in hegemonic relationships, but it is even more important in a multinodal configuration. In an asymmetric relationship in which both sides assume that coercion might be used, the weaker side faces a mortal threat, while the stronger side imagines a “small war” or a “lesson.” Thus, the weaker side might mount a determined and persistent resistance to protect itself, and its extraordinary commitment may frustrate the limited commitment of the stronger side (Womack 2016a, 39–67). This was particularly evident in the Vietnamese resistance to the United States (Mack 1975). In a multinodal context, the efficacy of coercion is greatly reduced in asymmetric relationships, but the disparity in capacities still exists. The smaller side remains more exposed in the relationship, and therefore more anxious about it. The larger side remains tempted to use its capabilities, whether military or economic, to get its way in disputes. Thus, a more nuanced and complex interaction occurs, still involving pressure and resistance. Moreover, other states are watching closely. It is important to both sides not to let points of conflicting interests get out of control. It is necessary, therefore, to publicly reaffirm mutual respect and to create expert commissions to handle contentious matters (Womack 2006, 88–92).

3.3 Stabilize prospective interactions

Given the importance of relationships in structuring a non-hostile environment for coping with unknown issues, the stabilization of positive relationships is a key diplomatic task. The first requirement for ensuring positive relationships may appear simple: be diplomatic. However, the immediate impulse of governments is to state their positions and opinions in the strongest possible terms. But it is important to note that being frank, particularly in official and public settings, is not necessarily a virtue. In diplomacy it is good to emphasize shared values and opinions, necessary to state differences, risky to publicly rebut claims by the other side, and bad to insult. Rebuttal highlights the gap between positions and is not likely to convince the other side. Insults display disrespect, and will be remembered and resented. The mission of diplomacy is to advance one’s welfare within relationships, not to score points in a debate. An example of bad diplomacy is the Obama administration’s criticism of the United Kingdom’s and Australia’s decisions to join the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. This post-facto public criticism could not reverse their decisions, and it provided an official demonstration of a failure of American influence. An important positive example of diplomatic restraint was the avoidance of mutual public criticism between China and Russia during the Russian transformations of 1989–91. China and Russia both had strong private opinions about the behavior of the other side, but if there had been harsh mutual public denunciations, the improvement of relations in 1995–96 would have proven more difficult.

Second, the formation and enhancement of partnerships is key to stabilizing prospective relationships. Partnerships are based on demonstrated mutual respect, and they are active in advancing mutual interests. Bilateral relationships are the key building blocks of international relations, and partnerships are the best connecting points between countries. Partnerships are bilateral agreements, but they do not exclude partnerships with others. For example, Vietnam has recently established comprehensive strategic partnerships with Australia, Japan and the United States, in addition to its existing comprehensive strategic partnerships with China, Russia, India, and South Korea. Stability and improvement in relationships with all these partners are especially important to Vietnam in its efforts to reduce the uncertainty of its future welfare.

Partnerships differ from alliances in that alliances usually involve security commitments against specific or unspecified adversaries. Thus, a bilateral alliance constricts other relationships and adds a security obligation. Because of its exclusivity and stronger bonds, an alliance poses more future opportunity costs in an uncertain world. To return to the example of Finland, while no one knows what the future political trends in Russia may be, Finland’s opportunities vis-à-vis Russia are likely to be constricted by its NATO membership.

The Cold War alliances of the United States are particularly complicated cases. On the one hand, their original anti-communist framing has evaporated. European communism collapsed, and most American allies have China as their top trading partner. Europe’s current anxieties about Russia resonate more with its nineteenth-century concerns than with the Cold War. In effect, the alliances are heritage alliances, formed in a different era, but the continuing central role of the United States in global security as well as the American framing of its “pacing challenge” from Russia and China are creating unwelcome pressures (U.S. White House 2022). In a multinodal world, the greater complexity of international relationships calls for strategic partnerships to navigate the challenges effectively.

Third, regional organizations that promote common interests step beyond bilateral partnerships to create a multilateral stabilization of prospects. They range in content and extension, from highly organized ones such as the European Union (EU), to long-standing regional organizations such as Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to regional fora such as the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States (CELAC). Similar to bilateral partnerships, regional organizations are founded on formal declarations of mutual respect, and they pursue mutual benefits. ASEAN, the most successful organization of this kind, not only promotes internal regional relationships, but has been the prime mover in the region’s outreach in Asia and beyond. Organizations like these move slowly, since they are typically based on consensus, but their existence, meetings, and aspirations formally pre-empt major zero-sum hostility among members. Perhaps the most impressive case of such an organization pre-empting hostility is the formation of the Shanghai Five in 1996, succeeded by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) in 2001. Without this initiative, it is easy to imagine that growing tensions between Russia and China could have made Central Asia the venue of hostile competition. Instead, the SCO’s membership and activities have steadily expanded.

3.4 Encourage common interests and cooperation

While encouraging common interests is a necessary element of partnerships, the strategic principle of highlighting common interests merits special attention as it is not limited to partnerships. Global issues such as climate change affect everyone, and so efforts to rise to these challenges should be generally appreciated. Moreover, issue-based cooperation can encourage and reinforce partnerships and regional organizations. Similarly, emergency rescue and restoration efforts in catastrophes are another important form of common concern and effort. These are areas where larger countries are expected to show regional and global leadership. Efforts in these areas attract positive attention.

The greater connectivity of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and globalization more generally, create new issues that require responsive efforts. While China’s investments are appreciated, the effect of the pandemic, combined with the rise in the value of the USD and the slowing global economy, has created debt crises in many developing countries. Similarly, the rise in food and energy prices affects many, and economic sanctions constrain normal trade patterns. These general problems related to connectivity are accompanied by grass-roots problems connected with economic transformation and redirection. Wealthy countries bear special responsibilities, but China, as the largest promoter of development, also bears significant obligations.

Larger countries are tempted to leverage their common interests in pursuing exclusive goals, but this damages long-term trust, thus reducing their influential power. The most egregious example of such leverage is the U.S. use of financial sanctions. In order to be effective, sanctions depend on the general utility of a global, dollar-based financial system. But they demonstrate that the United States will use its central financial position for its own interests, increasing the uncertainty of the global system. This lowers trust in the U.S., and it encourages de-risking from the dollar and from U.S.-based institutions. On a much smaller scale, threatening to restrict bilateral trade or tourism has the same effect. Leverage highlights the differences of interest in asymmetric relationships, thereby undermining confidence.

An alternative approach to leveraging is to use commitment to common interests in order to isolate conflicting interests. For example, all parties in the South China Sea, regardless of differing sovereignty claims, are interested in preventing over-fishing, piracy, maritime safety, and pollution. Cooperative engagement with these common interests draws attention away from sovereignty disputes. Similarly, pursuit of a Code of Conduct in the South China Sea highlights a common interest in avoiding conflicts. If attention continues to be fixated on conflicting interests, common interests will be neglected.

3.5 Limit force and resistance

A multinodal context makes coercion more problematic, but confrontation is sometimes necessary. Because every country has unique interests, certain interests can conflict with others. Moreover, national leadership and public opinion can sometimes drive an international dispute beyond the possibility of negotiation. In such cases the forcible assertion of the interests of one side are likely to meet the forcible resistance of the other side until a new boundary of interests can be negotiated. While it may be tempting to promise unconditional victory in order to rally one’s own side, the objective should be to resolve the conflict efficiently and effectively. This requires that the use of force be appropriate in scale and contingent on resolution of the specific matter of dispute. In a multinodal ecology, coercion has secondary effects, and also damages relationships and raises questions about international norms. Thus, not only should compellence be a last resort, but its execution should also be carefully limited.

To think of coercion in terms of victory and defeat is to regress into the hegemonic paradigm in which relative power is decisive. The invasion of Ukraine is the most recent example of the problems caused by this approach in a post-hegemonic era. The use of power in a multinodal relationship should be thought of as the forcible establishment of the boundary of interest of the larger side. Conversely, resistance is a counter-force against a unilateral pressure. The larger side should make it clear and credible that its use of force is directed at a specific object, rather than to pose a general threat. The weaker side should be clear that its resistance conforms to the needs of defending its specific threatened interests. This allows each side to focus on the costs of conflict and possibilities of negotiation, limiting unnecessary destruction, a prolonged stalemate, and the aftereffects of hostility. Of course, this is a prescription that is hard to swallow in a time of conflict. If the larger side is successful with its limited war, it will be pressed by opportunism and by public opinion to venture down the slippery slope of mission creep. And the smaller side is likely to be skeptical of the announced limited aims of the larger. In the fog of war, precise navigation is difficult.

A complicating factor in managing hostility in a globalized environment is that domestic voices can demand excessive responses. This can be a matter of party politics in democracies, but social media in every country can fuel nationalistic excesses. While public opinion should be expressed, the government should be clear to state its general respect for the other side and its hopes for a speedy settlement. The other side should not be officially demonized, and demonization in social media should not be encouraged.

A final corollary of limited force is the provision of credible evidence for one’s position and the evocation of international norms. Satisfying the international court of public opinion is vital to controlling the negative reverberations of conflict. Conflict anywhere increases everyone’s uncertainty, as the war in Ukraine has demonstrated. A party to a conflict should reduce general uncertainty by demonstrating the necessity of its limited action, and the sincerity of its limits, as well as its correspondence to international norms. The evidence should be public and confirmed by outside observers. Unsubstantiated claims will have the counterproductive effect of lowering general credibility.

4 Conclusion: difficult prescriptions

Since the time of Machiavelli, Western principles of strategic realism have focused on how to win, how to avoid defeat, and how to deter war. The pursuit of power, the balance of power, spheres of influence, and power vacuums are key elements of hegemonic thinking. They are embedded in the dynamics of colonialism, imperialism, fascism, and the Cold War. They tend to form the default orientation of “hard-headed” thinking about international relationships today. Brute force aimed the smaller states was usually not necessary because, as Thomas Schelling (2008, 3) put it, “it is latent violence that can influence someone’s choice—violence that can still be withheld or inflicted.” More explicitly, Schelling (2008, 31) continues, “military force…wants the bargaining power that comes from its capacity to hurt, not just the direct consequence of direct military action.” However, there was polar rivalry at the top between those states capable of challenging one another for domination, and there avoiding defeat was necessary for survival.

Realism fit the hegemonic Cold War environment because it conceptualized and helped shape that environment. The American leadership of a hub-and-spoke configuration left states outside the Warsaw Pact with few alternatives to U.S. preferences, and those within it were even more directly under the Soviet thumb. Relative power certainly mattered, and it was concentrated in the hands of the hegemon. Cuba and Vietnam demonstrated that the United States could be resisted successfully, but at great cost to themselves. Realism, as the logic of Great Powers and their Great Wars, shaped the American perspective, and understanding that perspective was important to the rest.

The strategic principles presented here are premised on the emergence of a different international era. By no means is a multinodal matrix a world of harmony. There are more significant actors, in greater connectivity, dealing with more issues, and with less guidance from hegemons or from international institutions. Power still matters. States still try to maximize their interests, and try to have the upper hand in transactions. But given the diversity of significant international interactions with various partners, success in a transaction should not be judged in isolation from its effect on relationships. The logic of iterative games (Axelrod 1984) suggests that starting with cooperation is the best policy, and this should be all the more true of a multi-dimensional and intersecting set of relationships. Of course, if all continued to play by the rules of coercive transactionalism, post-hegemonic anarchy might be more chaotic and vicious than its predecessor, hence the wisdom of considering strategic principles appropriate to a post-hegemonic world.

The United States is still the pre-eminent global power, and it remains wedded to the hegemonic paradigm because it validates its accustomed claims of control and influence. However, even the United States would be better off following the principles sketched above. Its increasing frustrations with maintaining control and influence, and its shrinking share of global production and trade, will not be reversed by ever more clever—or harsh—uses of power, or by industrial and trade policies that strain its relationships with the rest of the world. Many in the United States imagine the U.S. to be the embattled king of the hill that needs to shower down rocks on possible challengers. But this reduces the hill, and it contributes to a new international landscape that is uneven and alienated. Hegemonic economic policies, such as decoupling and neo-protectionism, raise American consumer prices and create risks for inbound and outbound investment. Hegemonic politics induces reluctant deference and minimized compliance from heritage allies and others. Hegemonic security paradigms tie the United States into races to maintain unilateral invulnerability and industrial superiority, races that crowd its budgets for welfare and infrastructure. A self-isolated United States would become a high-priced, boutique economy, increasingly burdened by military expenses and security concerns. Such a fate is unnecessary. No one can defeat the United States or claim its hegemonic hill, and no one should want the United States to fail. That would add to everyone’s uncertainty, and uncertainty, not victory or defeat, is the key problem of a multinodal world.

China’s diplomatic culture is better situated for a multinodal era, but it also has its temptations. China’s major advantage is its traditional diplomatic culture based on managing asymmetric relationships with its neighbors. Before the modern era, China’s presence, population, and production made it the center of an asymmetric Pacific Asia, but it had to cope with its neighbors rather than control them. The tribute system was a ritual exchange of deference from neighbors in return for recognition of their autonomy by China (Womack 2012). This was quite different from imperial Roman triumphal processions of the spoils of conquest. But the distant past is remembered more complacently by China than by its neighbors. China’s second advantage is that it was at the wrong end of the Western hegemonic era, and the best diplomats of the PRC, Zhou Enlai and Qian Qichen, were anti-hegemonic and careful in their relationships with fellow members of the Rest (Richardson 2009). But what for China had been a “century of humiliation” had been a transition period, for many of its neighbors, from a paternalistic but thin form of humiliation centered on Beijing to another, more intrusive one forced by the West. The acceptance of China’s new centrality in Pacific Asia cannot be taken for granted. The neighbors value their autonomy and their global access, and if China is seen as a greater risk than opportunity, the foundations of China’s world status will erode (Womack 2023b). Beyond its neighborhood, China’s promotion of development is popular, though its move into quality production heightens tensions with developed countries. In its asymmetric rivalry with the United States, China’s strength is its mutually beneficial post-hegemonic partnerships and trade relationships. But China must be careful to respect the autonomous interests of its counterparts. Otherwise increasing economic dependency can generate political and security anxieties. China has a recessive gene of big country chauvinism, and other countries, especially its neighbors, are quite sensitive to its symptoms.

Although Europe feels the uncertainties created by conflicting pressures, it is perhaps the major power best situated to respond appropriately to a multinodal era. There are, to be sure, the dark residues of European domination, supplemented by current worries regarding the economic convergence of the West and the Rest. But Europe faced its own crises of hegemony in the wars and post-colonial traumas of the last century. The result was an internally multinodal EU, deferential to the United States but aware of differences of interest. It copes with its external uncertainties from a cluster of national perspectives that are already accustomed to managing regional relationships rather than forcing them. The situation of ASEAN is similar, except that in the increasing friction between the United States and China, ASEAN is closer to the Chinese side in both geography and outlook, while Europe is closer to the American side. But both the EU and ASEAN could be alienated by actions by either global power that do not respect their autonomy and add to their uncertainties.

As the examples above suggest, although the strategic principles of the post-hegemonic era are general, their application would be quite different in each national situation, and sometimes quite difficult as well. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and U.S. sanctions are current examples of continuing hegemonic actions. Is a hegemonic response required in order to counter hegemonic behavior? Such situations certainly require resisting hegemony, but resistance now comes in more forms than simply countering power with power, or joining a camp. The reality of the effects of a multinodal matrix can be seen in the difficulties faced by both Russia and the U.S., as well as the likelihood of longer-term negative effects of both the Ukraine invasion and of sanctions.

Further down the dark road of continuing power struggles, if both global powers, the United States and China, act as if they are in a symmetric hegemonic contest, does this not constitute a return to a bipolar world? Not if the rest of the world resists lapsing into roles of passive spectators. The rivalry between the U.S. and China will occupy the middle third of the world’s political economy for the foreseeable future. If both realize that hegemony is impossible, then they will occupy the apex of the multinodal matrix. Others will want to develop their relationships with both. But if one persists in hegemonic action and the other doesn’t, then the would-be hegemon becomes the greater threat to the autonomy of others. Since the others have agency, they will move away from the threatening side. If both global powers fixate on their bilateral contest, then the most prudent move for the other actors would be to insulate themselves from the central conflict by strengthening their relationships among themselves.

The strategic principles discussed here are not hypothetical corollaries of an ideal multinodal system. Applications of the principles benefit from a context of reciprocity, and they do best in responsive relationships. However, they remain valid principles of prudence for any actor located in a complex array of uncertain interactions. They are not a recipe for how to win, but rather are things to think about when trying to secure one’s welfare in a complex and unpredictable future. They are no less applicable in a more chaotic world, though any country’s prudent behavior will contribute to making the world less chaotic.