Las Fuerzas de Operaciones Especiales en la era del retorno de la competición entre grandes potencias. Un análisis del caso ruso y chino
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Las Fuerzas de Operaciones Especiales (FOEs) desempeñan un papel crucial en la competencia geopolítica en el contexto de la reemergencia de la multipolaridad. Este artículo analiza cómo las ambiciones globales de los Estados los impulsan a desarrollar FOEs en línea con su política exterior y de defensa, en consonancia con la teoría realista neoclásica. A medida que la rivalidad entre grandes potencias se intensifica, se espera que Jugadores Globales como China busquen fortalecer sus FOEs para competir con sus adversarios. Este ensayo argumenta que la capacidad económica no es el único factor determinante en el desarrollo de FOEs, utilizando el ejemplo de Irán, que ha establecido un programa de FOEs globalmente competente a pesar de tener recursos limitados.
Por otro lado, China, a pesar de sus recursos considerables, aún no ha desarrollado un programa de FOEs globalmente competente, lo que podría atribuirse a factores endógenos y exógenos. A través de estudios de caso de Irán, Rusia y China, se examinan los factores que influyen en la toma de decisiones de los estados en relación con el desarrollo y uso de FOEs, destacando la discrepancia entre los recursos disponibles y el desarrollo real de estas fuerzas.
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