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NOVA | The Deadliest Plane Crash | The Final Eight Minutes | PBS
The investigation into the myriad causes of the disaster at Tenerife's airport
on March 27, 1977 was one of the largest in aviation history, involving more
than 70 officials from Spain, the Netherlands, and the United States. Because
the actions of both the flight crews of the two aircraft involved and Los
Rodeos Airport's air traffic controllers so directly contributed to the
disaster, the log of conversations between the two planes and the tower in the
minutes leading up to the collision was investigators' key tool for ultimately
piecing together the events. Below, examine an interactive diagram of the
events of that afternoon and read an annotated transcript of the two planes'
communications with the tower. Then decide for yourself just what caused the
worst plane crash of all time.—Lexi Krock
Note: Throughout this feature, click on highlighted terms for a brief
explanation.
The Final Minutes
Cockpit Recordings
Key to communications
APP—Air traffic control tower at Los Rodeos Airport
PA RT—Pan Am aircraft radio transmission
PA 1—Victor Grubbs, Pan Am Captain
PA 2—Robert Bragg, Pan Am First Officer
PA 3—George Warns, Pan Am Flight Engineer
PA 4—Unidentified fourth person in Pan Am cockpit, likely one of two Pan
Am employees who boarded in Tenerife and were sitting in the cockpit
jumpseats
KLM RT—KLM aircraft radio transmission
KLM 1—Veldhuyzen (Jacob) van Zanten, KLM Captain
KLM 2—Klaas Meurs, KLM First Officer
KLM 3—Willem Schreuder, KLM Flight Engineer
?—Unidentified
Note: The transcript below comes from the official Spanish accident report (see
www.project-tenerife.com/engels/PDF/Tenerife.pdf) and has been slightly
modified for clarity and ease of reading. Paragraphs preceding sections of the
transcript, and also explanatory text attached to linked words or phrases, are
NOVA annotations.
At 4:58 p.m. on March 27, 1977, when this transcript begins, the KLM and Pan Am
747s are both in queue to taxi down the runway and turn around for takeoff. The
KLM aircraft is ahead of the Pan Am aircraft (see number 1 on the diagram
above). Some back-and-forth occurs initially about what Air Traffic Control
considers the best way to get the KLM plane into position for takeoff, but
ultimately the controllers decide to send it taxiing straight down the runway.
This portion of the transcript comes from the KLM cockpit voice recorder.
Taxi into the runway and—ah—leave runway (third) to your left.
1658:47.4
KLM
RT
Roger,
sir, (entering) the runway at this time and the first (taxiway) we, we go
off the runway again for the beginning of Runway 30.
1658:55.3
APP
Okay,
KLM 80—ah—correction, 4805, taxi straight ahead—ah—for
the runway and—ah—make—ah—backtrack.
1659:04.5
KLM
RT
Roger,
make a backtrack.
1659:10.0
KLM
RT
KLM
4805 is now on the runway.
1659:15.9
APP
4805,
roger.
1659:28.4
KLM
RT
Approach,
you want us to turn left at Charlie 1, taxiway Charlie 1?
1659:32.2
APP
Negative,
negative, taxi straight ahead—ah—up to the end of the runway and
make backtrack.
1659:39.9
KLM
RT
Okay,
sir.
With the KLM aircraft now taxiing down Runway 12, Air Traffic Control turns its
attention to Pan Am 1736. The controllers instruct the plane to travel down the
runway and then exit it using one of the transverse taxiways. This would clear
the way for the KLM plane to take off. This portion of the transcript comes
from the Pan Am cockpit voice recorder.
We
got four and a half and we weigh 534. [sound of stabilizer trim]
1704:44.6
PA
2
Four
and a half on the right.
1704:46.8
PA
2
Engineer's
taxi check.
1704:48.4
PA
3
Taxi
check is complete.
1704:50.5
PA
2
Takeoff
and departure briefing?
1704:52.1
PA
1
Okay,
it'll be standard. We gonna go straight out there till we get 3,500 feet, then
we're gonna make that reversal and go back out to ... 14.
1704:58.2
APP
[KLM]
8705 [sic] and Clipper 1736, for your information, the centerline lighting is
out of service. [APP transmission is readable but slightly broken]
1705:05.8
KLM
RT
I
copied that.
1705:07.7
PA
RT
Clipper
1736.
1705:09.6
PA
1
We
got centerline markings (only) [could be "don't we"] they count the same thing
as ... we need 800 meters if you don't have that centerline ... I read that on
the back (of this) just a while ago.
Yeah,
but it goes ... ahead, I think (it's) gonna put us on (the) taxiway.
1705:35.9
PA
3
Yeah,
just a little bit, yeah.
1705:39.8
PA
?
Okay,
for sure.
1705:40.0
PA
2
Maybe
he, maybe he counts these (are) three.
1705:40.0
PA
?
Huh.
1705:44.8
PA
?
I
like this.
In the final minute before the collision, key misunderstandings occur among all
the parties involved. And in the end, the KLM pilot initiates takeoff, even
though Air Traffic Control has not issued the proper clearance.
1705:41.5
KLM
2
Wait
a minute, we don't have an ATC clearance.
KLM
1
No,
I know that. Go ahead, ask.
1705:44.6
KLM
RT
Uh,
the KLM 4805 is now ready for takeoff and we're waiting for our ATC clearance.
1705:53.4
APP
KLM
8705 [sic] uh you are cleared to the Papa beacon. Climb to and maintain
flight level 90 ... right turn after takeoff proceed with heading 040 until
intercepting the 325 radial from Las Palmas VOR.
1706:09.6
KLM
RT
Ah,
roger, sir, we're cleared to the Papa beacon flight level 90, right turn out
040 until intercepting the 325, and we're now (at takeoff).
1706:11.08
[Brakes
of KLM 4805 are released.]
1706:12.25
KLM
1
Let's
go ... check thrust.
1706:14.00
[Sound
of engines starting to accelerate.]
1706:18.19
APP
Okay.
Why
Air Traffic Control would say "okay" after KLM has said it is taking off is
unknown. Perhaps, the official investigation noted, the controller thought that
KLM meant "we're now at takeoff position." But the problem is compounded
in the moments immediately following, when both Air Traffic Control and Pan Am
RT speak simultaneously. This causes a shrill noise in the KLM cockpit that
lasts for almost four seconds and makes the following three communications hard
to hear in the KLM cockpit:
1706:20.08
APP
Stand by for takeoff ... I will call you.
PA1
No, uh.
PA
RT
And
we are still taxiing down the runway, the Clipper 1736.
The following messages are audible in the KLM cockpit, causing the KLM
flight engineer, even as the KLM plane has begun rolling down the runway, to
question the pilot:
1706:25.47
APP
Ah—Papa
Alpha 1736 report runway clear.
1706:25.59
PA
RT
Okay,
we'll report when we're clear.
1706:31.69
APP
Thank
you.
1706:32.43
KLM
3
Is
he not clear, then?
1706:34.10
KLM
1
What
do you say?
1706:34.15
PA
?
Yup.
1706:34.70
KLM
3
Is
he not clear, that Pan American?
1706:35.70
KLM
1
Oh,
yes. [emphatically]
Perhaps because of the KLM pilot's very senior position, neither the copilot
nor flight engineer questions the pilot again, and the impact occurs about 13
seconds later. Based on the Pan Am cockpit voice recording, investigators
determined that the Pan Am flight crew saw the KLM coming at them out of the
fog about nine seconds before impact. The Pan Am captain says "There he is ...
look at him! Goddamn, that [expletive deleted] is coming!" and his copilot
yells "Get off! Get off! Get off!" The Pan Am pilot guns the engines but
it's too late. At 1706:47.44, the KLM pilot screams, and the collision occurs.
By the time either flight crew saw the other plane in the fog, it was too late to avert the disaster, which arose out of a series of miscommunications among both flight crews and the control tower.
One of many what-if questions that students of the tragedy ask is: Could the KLM 747 have cleared the taxiing Pan Am plane if the KLM's pilot hadn't insisted on refueling his aircraft before leaving Tenerife, thereby greatly increasing its weight?
