11 At the Simla Conference and in the General Elections: (1945–6)

The year after the failure of the Sapru Committee was marked by the Simla Conference of June–July 1945 and the general elections of 1945–6. The importance of these two events is evident from the attention given to them by the Governor General, the Punjab Governor, Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Maulana Azad, and Master Tara Singh. The Simla Conference clarified the issues for the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Akali Dal. The elections were fought on the issues of mutually clashing objectives of independence for India, creation of Pakistan, and an autonomous area for the Sikhs. The results of the elections demonstrated that the Congress, the Muslim League, and the Akali Dal were the political parties which counted, and this made the situation more difficult to deal with.

On 24 October 1944, Governor General Wavell wrote to Prime Minister Churchill that he wanted to express his views on the present and future of India. The vital problems of India had been treated by His Majesty’s Government ‘with neglect, even sometime with hostility and contempt’. He was convinced that the situation warranted proposals for ‘political advance’ in India ‘to rally all classes to support the war effort’. The failure of Gandhi–Jinnah talks, he added, had created a favourable moment for a move by His Majesty’s Government.¹

Within a month, two other proposals came to the notice of the Governor General: Bhulabhai Desai’s proposal for a ‘National Government’ and Tej Bahadur Sapru Committee’s pending recommendations. Wavell asked the Secretary of State for India to consider his proposals even if action was taken after the submission of the report of the Sapru Committee. It was extremely important for Wavell ‘to persuade Whitehall of the paramount importance of British prestige, British security and British prosperity to secure a satisfactory but generous settlement of the Indian problem’.²

Wavell was keen to visit England in March for meeting the Prime Minister to discuss and finalize the proposal to be announced. When the Secretary of State suggested a visit in June, Wavell made ‘an indignant protest’, and he got back the message that he had ‘better come home at once’.³ From 24 March to 31 May 1945, Wavell discussed matters, formally and informally, with Linlithgow, the Cabinet Committee on India, the India Committee, and the Prime Minister. Eventually, the Cabinet met on 30 May to decide about India but Wavell was not invited. On 31 May he presented to the Cabinet a draft statement he had prepared. The Prime Minister made a long statement against the proposal. But at a later meeting the Prime Minster made just as forcible an address in favour of the proposals as he had made in their condemnation in the morning. Wavell’s draft for broadcast was approved with one or two minor suggestions. What accounted for the Prime Minister’s dramatic reversal was the logic of facts. With the elections coming up in Great Britain, he could not possibly see India becoming a party issue and he decided ‘to give way with good grace’.⁴

Back in India, Wavell met the council in Delhi on 6 June to disclose the proposals, with no good response from the members. However, the broadcast on 14 June evening came through quite well. The press was not unfriendly in their response to the proposals. Wavell noted that it was something of an achievement to have got so far, but difficult times were ahead.⁵ In his broadcast on 14 June, Wavell announced that he proposed to invite Indian leaders with a view to forming a new Executive Council representing the main communities with equal proportions of caste Hindus and Muslims. It would be entirely an Indian council, except for the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief as the War Member. The main tasks of the new council would be (a) to prosecute the war, (b) to carry on the Government of British India, and to think of the long-term solution. As the means of forming such a council, Wavell had decided to invite, among others, the two main recognized leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League, that is, Gandhi and Jinnah, for a conference. Master Tara Singh was to represent the Sikhs.⁶

The official organ of the Muslim League, the Dawn, stated on 15 June that ‘the Musalmans will tolerate no infiltration of non-League stooges to humour any party’. Jinnah said that only after the discussions on 24 June he would decide whether or not the members of the League should participate in the Conference on 25 June.⁷ Wavell had separate interviews with Azad, Gandhi, and Jinnah on 24 June. Azad appeared to accept the general principles of the proposals. He made it clear, however, that the Congress must have a say in the representation of non-Hindu communities, and would not agree to only one communal organization putting forth all Muslim names. Mahatma Gandhi blessed the proposals but objected to the term ‘Caste Hindus’ for the non-Scheduled Caste Hindus and their parity with the Muslim League. Jinnah claimed that the Muslim League represented the whole of Muslim India and had the right, therefore, to nominate all Muslim members. He hinted that he would consult the League Working Committee. The way was cleared for holding the Conference but there were two issues of possible contention: parity between Muslims and Hindus other than the Scheduled Castes and the demand of the Muslim League to nominate all Muslim members to the Executive Council.⁸

The first day of the Conference went ‘pretty well’ for Wavell. Only Jinnah was a little difficult. On 26 June, Wavell put up to the conference that the composition of the Executive Council should be taken up first and then the names. This was approved, and the meeting was adjourned for 27 June. No progress was made on 27 June. Jinnah met Wavell in the evening and reiterated that all Muslim members should be nominated by the Muslim League. It was obvious on 29 June that the Congress and the League had failed entirely to agree. Wavell suggested the alternative that the party leaders should send panels of names to him, and he should try to form an acceptable council out of those named. Wavell decided to adjourn the Conference till 14 July.⁹

On 30 June, Wavell informed the Governors that discussion in the Conference had broken down on the strength and composition of the new council. Wavell had the feeling that a council consisting largely of non-League Muslims and Congressmen would not work, and on this point, he wanted to have the advice of the Governors with regard to the course he should follow if the League refused to cooperate.¹⁰ Glancy responded on 3 July. Jinnah’s claim to nominate all Muslim members appeared to him to be outrageously unreasonable in the light of the meagre hold of the League on Muslims in the Muslim-majority provinces. Glancy agreed that if Jinnah maintained his present attitude, it would be inadvisable to form a council without the League’s representatives. Glancy sent another telegram on 6 July that it would be better to suspend the Conference, expressing the hope that Jinnah would adopt a reasonable attitude.¹¹

On behalf of the Congress, Maulana Azad sent a list of fifteen names of members of the entire council consisting of both Congressmen and non-Congressmen to make the list as inclusive as possible. The name of Master Tara Singh as the Sikh nominee was sent on 9 July.¹² Wavell wrote to Amery on the same day that Azad offered to Master Tara Singh full support for the Sikhs in the Executive Council if an agreed Sikh name were sent through the Congress. The Sikhs did not accept the Congress offer and Master Tara Singh sent a separate list of his own. It included the names of Master Tara Singh, another prominent Sikh, and an ex-Minister of Patiala.¹³

Wavell informed the Governors on 10 July that Jinnah finally refused to send a list of names for the new council. Wavell had made provisional selection, including four Muslim League members and one non-League Muslim from the Punjab. If the selections were approved by the British Government, he would discuss them with Jinnah and the other leaders. But the chances of a settlement in his assessment were small. The non-League Muslim selected by Wavell was not Khizar Hayat Khan but Sir Muhammad Nawaz Khan.¹⁴ The ‘shadow’ council selected by Wavell was approved by the Cabinet on 11 July but Jinnah refused even to discuss names unless he could be given the absolute right to select all Muslim members.¹⁵

In the Conference on 25 June, Master Tara Singh had said that everything would depend on the spirit in which the proposals were worked. He feared that the parties in the end might drift further apart. He made it clear that the Sikhs did not identify themselves with the Congress but they were in sympathy with it insofar as it favoured India’s freedom. The future of the Indian army, in his view, called for careful consideration; new ideas about its composition might injure people who had served the country well.¹⁶ Master Tara Singh informed Wavell on 6 July that he had placed his own name at the head of Sikh nominees for the council at the insistence of the Akali Dal Working Committee. The other two names in Wavell’s opinion were ‘complete duds’. ‘This may be awkward’, he added, ‘since Master Tara Singh would be a poor member of Council’.¹⁷

Wavell owned full responsibility for its failure in the Conference on 14 July. But Azad said that it failed because the Muslim League had refused to abandon their claim to nominate all Muslim members of the council. The communal problem could now be solved only by a just decision which must be firmly enforced. Rajagopalachari suggested that an Interim Government might be formed on territorial or administrative basis rather than on communal lines. Jinnah made a long statement. The Muslim League and the Congress viewed affairs from entirely different angles, he said, and in the proposed new council there would have been constant clash between the idea of Pakistan and plans for united India. Nomination of all Muslim members by the League was a fundamental point for Jinnah. Master Tara Singh said that ‘Sikhs could accept Pakistan only if Muslims agreed to separate Sikh State’.¹⁸

Amery congratulated Wavell on the generosity and wisdom of his statement: ‘If anything can bring about a change of heart in the Party Leaders it will be your magnanimity in placing the failure of the Conference on your own shoulders.’¹⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru met Wavell and talked to him for an hour and a quarter. ‘His main theme was that the Congress represented a modern nationalist tendency—the League a medieval and separatist one.’ He admitted that there was ‘a section of Hindus out for complete Hindu domination’ and there was a psychological fear of Hindu domination but it was ‘unreal and unwarranted’. Wavell remarked that Nehru ‘is more of a theorist than a practical politician but earnest and I am sure honest’.²⁰

In his note of 15 July 1945 on the Simla Conference, Wavell clearly stated that the immediate cause of the failure of the Conference was Jinnah’s intransigence about Muslim representation and safeguards for Muslims. ‘Their fear that the Congress, by parading its national character and using the Muslim dummies will permeate the entire administration of any united India is real, and cannot be dismissed as an obsession of Jinnah and his immediate entourage.’ It was not clear now what Jinnah would be prepared to accept short of Pakistan. Mahatma Gandhi told Wavell that His Majesty’s Government would have to decide sooner or later ‘whether to come down on the side of Hindu or Muslim, of Congress or League, since they could never reconcile them’.²¹ This equation of Hindus with the Congress is significant.

Sadhu Singh Hamdard, Editor of the Ajīt, who was in Simla, refers to Master Tara Singh’s warm response to the press after the sessions as the sole representative of the Sikhs. He used to speak the language of the Hindu Mahasabha, asserting that under no circumstances would the Sikhs allow the creation of Pakistan. He held Jinnah responsible for the failure of the Conference, and he believed that the British Government was no longer keen to create Pakistan. He thought that there was a great probability of a ‘National’ government being set up. On being asked as to who would represent the Sikhs in the government, Master Tara Singh remained silent. Mangal Singh said, ‘Of course, Master Tara Singh.’ Durga Das mentioned Baldev Singh’s name as a possibility. Master Tara Singh said that only the leaders of first rank would join the government. In regard to the effect of the failure of the Conference on the Sikhs, Master Tara Singh said that the Sikhs would be happy to see the end of talk about the creation of Pakistan.²²

‘So ends 1945’, wrote Wavell in his journal on 30 December, ‘a busy and eventful year for me.’ His long struggle for permission to make an attempt to end the Indian deadlock was followed by his failure at Simla to do so. Then came two rather unexpected developments, the Labour success in the elections and the sudden end of the war with Japan. Both had considerable effect on the ‘problem in India’. The end of the war brought the difficult period sooner than he had expected; but a Labour Government had, on the whole, made things easier. More attention was paid to India and the outlook was rather more ‘sympathetic’.²³

Two weeks after the end of the Simla Conference, all the Governors, except Glancy, favoured general elections to the Central Assembly as soon as possible, and all, except Glancy, wanted provincial elections in the coming winter.²⁴ Glancy explained that the main issue in the Punjab was Pakistan. It was necessary to clear up the Pakistan issue and to steer the Muslim League away from ‘the crude version of Pakistan’. Otherwise, there would be civil war in the Punjab. The elections might consolidate the Muslim League position because the Punjab Muslims would vote simply on what appeared to be a religious issue for them.²⁵ Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence a few days later that the Sikhs, who formed a solid block in the middle of the Punjab, would never acquiesce in their inclusion in a Muslim Sovereign State.²⁶

On 21 August 1945, the Secretary of State for India indicated to Wavell that a reversion to the Draft Declaration of 1942 was contemplated by His Majesty’s Government and asked Wavell to suggest a procedure to be followed along with composition of an electoral college and a Constitution-making body. The total number of members of the Constitution-making body proposed by Wavell was 209, of whom 106 were Hindus and 64 were Muslims. The total number of the Sikhs was 6. In Wavell’s view, the Draft Declaration of 1942 was unacceptable to the parties in India and it should not be revived. He also added that if British India was partitioned, there would be no incentive for the states to cooperate with the British Indian provinces, and they would wish to stand out permanently as independent sovereign units.²⁷

Wavell left Delhi for London on 24 August to discuss the issue. He told the India Cabinet Committee that the Cripps offer would not be acceptable to the parties concerned. Eventually, a new draft put forward by him was finalized. After his return to Delhi, Wavell made the announcement on 19 September that the British Government would do their utmost to promote early realization of ‘full Self-Government in India’. Elections to the Central and Provincial Assemblies to be held during the coming cold weather had already been announced. Thereafter, the intention of the government was to convene a Constitution-making body as soon as possible. Wavell was authorized to constitute an Executive Council with the support of the main Indian parties.²⁸

Wavell wrote to Pethick-Lawrence on 22 October 1945 that the Muslim League’s propaganda about Pakistan was having a disturbing effect. The League’s speakers were saying that the elections would decide whether or not there would be Pakistan. It was necessary to clarify the position more or less formally.²⁹ Master Tara Singh wrote to Prime Minister Atlee on 23 October that communal feeling was steadily deteriorating in the Punjab. The cry of Pakistan was being raised more and more loudly by the Muslim Leaguers. They openly asserted that the whole of the province would be separated from the Indian Union if there was a bare majority in favour of separation. Master Tara Singh requested on behalf of the Sikhs that the Cripps offer should be clarified by announcing that the term ‘province’ did not mean the province as it existed. He referred to the speech of the Secretary of the State delivered on 28 April 1942 suggesting an alternative. He had said:

The particular method which we suggest for arriving at a constitutional settlement, more particularly on the present Provincial basis, both for setting up a constitution-making assembly and for non-accession is not meeting with sufficient support for us to press it further. It may be that alternative methods might arise which form a better basis for the definition of boundaries and might give representation for smaller elements such as Sikhs whose natural aspirations we appreciate.

Master Tara Singh suggested that an announcement of this nature would help to make the position clear to the average voter and prevent his being misled by false propaganda. An early action was necessary to minimize the danger of widespread bloodshed.³⁰

Nehru and Patel were threatening in their ‘wild speeches’ to launch a mass movement after the elections in continuation with ‘Quit India’. Wavell told Nehru on 3 November that no government could indefinitely tolerate ‘incitement to violence or threats to its officials’. Nehru said that the Congress could make ‘no terms whatever’ with the Muslim League under its present leadership and policy. He was preaching violence because he did not see how violence could be avoided to attain ‘legitimate aims’. Wavell got the impression that Nehru was quite incapable of considering any views which did not coincide with his own. The government, thought Wavell, would have to face before long another violent suppression of the Congress, with weaker and perhaps rather demoralized forces. He sent a note to His Majesty’s Government on 5 November on the gravity of the Indian situation and wanted the British Government to make it clear that they would not permit any political party to resort to violence.³¹

The Cabinet responded to Wavell’s note with the proposal to send a Parliamentary Delegation to India and to form a Constitution-making body after the elections. Wavell saw Mahatma Gandhi on 15 December. On the issue of violent speeches by the Congress leaders, Mahatma Gandhi said that he was trying to get the pitch lowered. On the need of agreement between Hindus and Muslims he said that he was frustrated in his efforts by the British policy of divide and rule. He defended the Congress Ministries which were seen by the Muslim League as responsible for Muslim alienation.³²

Glancy had noted at the beginning of 1945 that some unrestrained speeches were made by Congress leaders at Ludhiana. They accused the Communists of treachery in an attempt to increase Congress influence among the rural population. Their idea was to rebuild its strength on a fairly wide scale. Early in April, Glancy suggested that if revival of the Congress was to be checked, all meetings and conferences organized by the Punjab Workers Assembly should be prohibited.³³ The Congress was building up its organization in the Punjab. Nehru had not been very successful in reconciling the factions in the Punjab Congress during his visit, and this task was entrusted to Maulana Azad. The Indian National Army (INA) trials at Delhi in November gave rise to an alarming agitation encouraged by almost all political parties. The Congress being the first in the field in the campaign had already strengthened its position greatly. There was no general compromise yet between the Congress and the Akalis with regard to elections.³⁴

After the breakdown of the Simla Conference, the Muslim Leaguers had begun to make the most extravagant statements to blame their opponents. Before the middle of August they were indulging in wholesale vilification of the Congress and the Unionist Government in the Punjab. They were loudly clamouring for elections. Jinnah’s reputation among the Muslims had risen very high after the Simla Conference and he was hailed as the champion of Islam. He had openly given out that the elections would show an overwhelming verdict in favour of Pakistan.³⁵ The Muslim Leaguers were conducting their propaganda on fanatical lines. In mid-September, religious leaders and religious buildings were being used freely by the League for advocating Pakistan. The Ahrars and the Khaksars were included among the opponents of the Muslim League for abuse and vilification. In October the supporters of the Muslim League in the Ambala Division declared that Pakistan would soon be a reality and the laws of Islam would prevail in Pakistan. By the middle of November the Muslim League had succeeded in undermining the loyalty of some trusted supporters of the Unionists. Towards the end of December, Pirs and Maulavis were enlisted in large numbers to tour the province and announce all who opposed the League as infidels. Copies of the Qur’ān were carried around as an emblem peculiar to the Muslim League. Their tactics were not easy for the Unionists to counter.³⁶

The Unionists were losing ground. They had supported the war effort consistently and unconditionally and they expected to be represented on the Executive Council. The rank and file of the Unionist Party were bewildered by the turn of events at the Simla Conference. Only towards the end of September did they set to work, selecting their candidates for the elections. No Unionist was thinking of an alternative to Pakistan for solving the Punjab problem. On the eve of the elections, the Unionists were weaker than what they were ten months earlier, in relation to the League as well as the Congress. The Hindu Mahasabha had practically vanished from the scene. The Ahrars and Khaksars were only marginal parties.³⁷

The Akalis were coming up as the most important party among the Sikhs. They were strongly opposed not only to Pakistan and the Muslim League but also to the Communists who were mostly Sikh and catered to the needs of the Sikh peasants and workers. Rather distanced from the Congress, the Akalis were linked with it through the pro-Congress Nagoke group. Baldev Singh was another conduit. Before the Simla Conference Master Tara Singh’s important concern was to keep the two Akalis groups together and to eliminate the Sikh Communists who were taking interest in the affairs of the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC), apart from making a dent in the rural following of the Akalis. Early in March 1945, Master Tara Singh had a long talk with the Punjab Governor. Much disturbed about the Communist influence, he pleaded that all Communists were atheists and, therefore, no Communist should be allowed to pose as a Sikh or vote in gurdwara elections. On 7 April, Glancy remarked that the Communists were denounced by the Akalis as atheists and projected by the Congress as traitors. In June, Sikh politics were in ‘the usual welter’ because of the rival factions among the Akalis. Master Tara Singh was veering towards Giani Kartar Singh’s group at the cost of the Nagoke group who was feeling increasingly dissatisfied with Master Tara Singh’s leadership and threatened at times to break away from him.³⁸ The Simla Conference boosted the image of Master Tara Singh as the sole representative of the Sikhs.

In September 1945, the Sikhs in general and the Akalis in particular were growing distinctly nervous at the possibility of Pakistan being created. Glancy had no doubt that they would forcibly resist any attempt to include them in Pakistan. One result of their apprehensions was a greater measure of concord between the Giani and the Nagoke groups. Inclined towards the Congress, the latter had become more influential than before. The Akali leaders appeared to have decided that they would contest the elections on their own and not with the Congress. The prospects of the Communists in the Sikh constituencies appeared to be growing more remote.³⁹

The All-India Akali Conference, held at Gujranwala at the end of September 1945, rejected the plan announced by Wavell on 19 September. It appeared to be based on the Cripps offer which had been rejected by the Akalis. They attached great importance to the provincial elections because the composition of a Constituent Assembly and the integrity of India depended on the results of these elections. They were determined to oppose Pakistan through ‘concerted Panthic action’. In the presence of 100,000 people, Ishar Singh Majhail unfurled the Sikh flag (nishān sāhib) and declared: ‘The Sikh Panth would resist Pakistan to the last man.’⁴⁰ Most of the Congress Sikhs participated in the Conference despite Daud Ghaznavi’s direction against it. On 31 September, the Conference decided to fight the elections on a common Panthic ticket with the demand for an independent Sikh state.⁴¹ Before the end of October it seemed that the Nagoke group was finding it difficult to continue their pro-Congress policy.⁴²

The SGPC passed two resolutions on 26 October 1945. The insistence of the Muslim League on Pakistan posed a threat to the Sikh Panth. The resolution of the CWC at Poona had diluted Congress opposition to Pakistan. The Communists were openly supporting the demand for Pakistan. But the SGPC made it absolutely clear on behalf of the entire Panth that in no circumstances would the Sikhs accept Pakistan. Since the new Constitution was to be framed by the representatives of the assembly members, the SGPC appealed to all the citizens of India to elect only those candidates who were opposed to the creation of Pakistan so that the country and the Sikh Panth remained safe. The SGPC appealed to all the Sikhs to prepare for sacrifice to save the country and the Panth in this critical situation. The resolution was passed by a large majority.⁴³

The second resolution was drafted by Jathedar Udham Singh Nagoke. The SGPC appreciated the recommendation of the Executive Committee to contribute Rs 5,000 to the fund for fighting the legal battle for the Azad Hind Fauj (the INA), and increased the amount to Rs 7,000. The SGPC also impressed upon the Government of India to withdraw the cases against its men and release them immediately. The SGPC demanded the release of army prisoners in the Indore and other jails, and that all the soldiers of the Azad Hind Fauj released outside India be brought back. The resolution was passed unanimously.⁴⁴ It may be added that the Nagoke group was dominant in the SGPC at this time, with Jathedar Mohan Singh Nagoke as its President.

Sadhu Singh Hamdard dwells on the attitudes of Master Tara Singh, Giani Kartar Singh, and Udham Singh Nagoke. Even though he appreciated Giani Kartar Singh more than Master Tara Singh, he kept up a neutral stance quite often. Giani Kartar Singh was keen about the Sikh state. Udham Singh Nagoke was opposed to Pakistan but he did not approve of any talk of a Sikh state. Master Tara Singh was sympathetic to the idea of a Sikh state but he was reluctant to make it a political issue for various reasons. Hamdard wrote a booklet of 250 pages in Urdu on the theme of ‘Panth Āzād’. It was widely appreciated (presumably by the Sikhs). The first edition of 1,000 copies was immediately sold out and he printed 10,000 copies more which too were sold in a short time. He elaborated the argument that the Congress had its slogan of ‘Complete Independence’ or ‘Desh Āzād’. The Muslim League had the slogan of Pakistan, a sovereign Muslim state. The Akalis must adopt the slogan ‘Panth Azad’, an independent Sikh state. Master Tara Singh wanted the Sikhs to have an independent identity and an independent policy, but he was not in favour of the slogan ‘Panth Āzād’. Eventually, the Akalis adopted the slogan of ‘Panth Āzād, Desh Āzād’.⁴⁵ For Master Tara Singh, freedom of the country and freedom of the Panth were the two sides of the coin of independence.

Elections to the Central Legislature were held in November 1945 and to the Punjab Legislative Assembly in the first half of February 1946. Sardar Patel was most closely connected with the elections as Chairman of the Central Election Board. His correspondence from the 1st of October 1945 to the end of February 1946 clearly suggests that in theory he gave greater importance to both Bengal and the Punjab than to any other province but in practice he gave far greater importance to the Punjab than to Bengal. Four of the ten chapters of the second volume of his correspondence relate very largely to the Punjab. Sardar Patel remained in close touch not only with Jawaharlal Nehru and Maulana Azad or with Gopi Chand Bhargava and Maulana Daud Ghaznavi but also with Sardar Baldev Singh directly, or through his private secretary, B.S. Gilani. All the three Congress stalwarts looked upon the Punjab as the key province to the future of India, just as Jinnah looked upon the province as the key to Pakistan.

Sardar Patel wrote to Nehru on the 1st of October 1945 that programme of the Central Assembly elections had been announced by the Government of India and suggested that Nehru should send to him a small draft of the election manifesto for the Central Assembly elections, basing it on the main issue of independence or Quit India.⁴⁶ The Congress manifesto prepared by Nehru, corrected by Mahatma Gandhi and approved by the Congress President, opened with the role of the Indian National Congress in raising a powerful movement of resistance to foreign rule in the past sixty years as the living and vibrant symbol of India’s will to freedom and independence. It stood for independence and for equal rights and opportunities to every citizen of India, the unity of all communities and religious groups, and the freedom of each territorial area to develop its own life and culture within the larger framework. The special concerns of the Congress were to enable women to take full part in national activities as equal citizens, to raise the depressed sections of the society from their backward state. To raise the standards of the masses, it was necessary to plan in advance in all fields with a certain degree of central control over the methods of production and distribution. A cooperative commonwealth in free India and establishment of a world federation of free nations were the national and international objectives of the Congress. The manifesto laid emphasis on the urgency of Indian independence.

Nehru went on to write that the All India Congress Committee had passed a resolution which gave the battle cry ‘Quit India’. The Congress stood by that demand and challenge, and it reaffirmed the national and international objectives of that August resolution. On the basis of this resolution and with this battle cry would the Congress face the elections for the Central and Provincial Assemblies.⁴⁷ Thus, the Congress stood for immediate independence of united India for a fully democratic and somewhat socialistic federation in India to take its place in a comity of free states in the world.

Maulana Azad wrote to Sardar Patel on 16 October 1945: ‘Considering the present condition, the reorientation of the Congress Committee in Lahore is quite satisfactory, and it is hoped that work will go on smoothly till the formation of the new committees.’⁴⁸ Maulana Azad wrote again on 21 October that the Punjab and Bengal held the key position in the present election. Both the provinces needed funds. A cheque of Rs 20,000 had been presented to him in Lahore for the Punjab election. Azad had kept it back to be used for urgent work if no other arrangement was made. On 26 October, Gopi Chand Bhargava was in Poona to secure financial assistance for the Punjab.⁴⁹

Jawaharlal Nehru wrote to Sardar Patel on 31 October that he was dissatisfied with recent developments in the Punjab, specifically at some of the choices made, or proposed to be made.⁵⁰ Patel acknowledged that there was a complaint about the selection of Gopi Chand Bhargava’s brother.⁵¹ Actually, Patel himself had written to Maulana Azad on 20 October that Thakur Das Bhargava (Gopi Chand’s brother) would be the best candidate.⁵² Azad pointed out that the sitting member, Sham Lal, had always stood with the Congress and suffered for it, while Thakur Das had always opposed Congress candidates and kept away from imprisonment. People had begun to say that Gopi Chand Bhargava was using his influence unduly for his brother. If the Punjab Board had made such a recommendation, the Central Board would have to interevene.⁵³ Azad sent a telegraphic message to Sardar Patel, reiterating the merit of Sham Lal and the demerit of Thakur Das, and asking him to announce the name of Sham Lal. Sardar Patel sent back a telegraphic message that the name of Thakur Das had already been announced and he had no authority to upset it. Nor was it desirable.⁵⁴ Sardar Patel managed to have his way. Thakur Das Bhargava was elected to the Central Assembly.

The Congress in the Punjab had to contend with the Unionists, the Muslim League, the Ahrars, the Communists, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Akalis. Azad wrote to Patel on 16 October that the Ahrars might get two or three seats on the Congress ticket. They were in great need of help.⁵⁵ On 26 November, Nehru conveyed his impression to Patel that there was a very good response among Muslims to the Congress appeal, and foundations were laid of a favourable drive for the provincial elections. He hoped that the Congress would contest every Muslim seat.⁵⁶ In Patel’s view, the Congress did not have to think of any settlement with the Hindu Mahasabha. There was absolutely no need as the Congress would easily win all the non-Muslim seats in the Central Assembly.⁵⁷ On 7 November, Patel wrote to Nehru that the Hindu Mahasabha ‘will be finally finished this time’.⁵⁸

In the Punjab there were two Sikh seats, wrote Patel to Azad on 23 October, and one of these would be contested by Sardar Kapur Singh. ‘He is a strong candidate and will win.’ But the other seat for which Sardul Singh Caveeshar was proposed, the Congress was sure to lose against Sampuran Singh, the Akali candidate. It was now proposed that Sant Singh should be set up for that constituency. He was sure to win. The decision was to be taken on the day following after consulting Maulana Daud Ghaznavi.⁵⁹ Sardar Patel wrote to Maulana Azad on 26 October that the Akalis were ‘on the warpath’. They had started violence in public meetings because the Congress Sikh candidates for the two seats were ‘fairly strong’.⁶⁰ The Akali Dal was putting a stiff fight against the Congress Sikh candidates for the Central Assembly. All the important forces had gathered behind Master Tara Singh and Baldev Singh to defeat the Congress. ‘A defeat in the Centre will have a very bad repercussion in the province.’

B.S. Gilani had gone to Maulana Azad on behalf of Baldev Singh with a proposal to settle the Sikh question so as to avoid a fight. Master Tara Singh, it appeared, was not averse to the idea.⁶¹ Nehru’s letter of the same day mentions that the deputation sent to him by Master Tara Singh consisted of ‘so-called Congress Akalis’. Nehru noted that Master Tara Singh himself had kept away.⁶² On 8 November, Master Tara Singh’s man came with a proposal for settlement, both for the Centre and the province. Patel told him that no settlement was possible now for the Centre but the question could be considered for the provincial elections if there was goodwill on both sides. However, any proposal for settlement would be considered by the Congress President and the Central Election Board only if it was supported by the local Parliamentary Board and a large majority of the Sikhs in the Congress.⁶³

The results of elections to the Central Assembly in the Punjab showed that the influence of the Congress was confined to the Hindus. All the three ‘General’ seats were won by the Congress candidates: Pandit Thakur Das Bhargava, Raizada Hans Raj, and Diwan Chaman Lal. But the Congress won no Muslim seat. The Muslim League candidates won five seats out of six. For the Sikh seats, both the Congress Sikh candidates were defeated by the Akali candidates: Sardar Kapur Singh by Sardar Mangal Singh, and Sardar Sant Singh by Sardar Sampuran Singh.⁶⁴ These results were not good from the viewpoint of the Congress, diluting its ‘national’ credentials.

Maulana Daud Ghaznavi sent a telegraphic message to Sardar Patel on 30 December 1945 that the Unionists, the Akalis, the Muslim Leaguers, and the Communists were strongly opposing the Congress candidates (on Muslim and Sikh seats). He requested Patel to ask Nehru for a tour in the Punjab in the second or third week of January.⁶⁵ Sardar Patel wrote to Maulana Azad that Nehru’s tours created a lot of enthusiasm and pulled huge crowds, but this had no value for the purpose of elections. It influenced ‘no voters in the Muslim constituencies’, and the Hindu voters needed ‘no encouragement’.⁶⁶

Patel had written to Azad on 21 December that he sent a cheque of Rs 50,000 but he was afraid that this was a wastage of good money for nothing, and Congress reputation would suffer badly in the end. The Ahrars whom the Congress had supported joined the Muslim League.⁶⁷ Maulana Azad fully appreciated Patel’s view and added that he would not do anything in connection with the Ahrars unless he was fully satisfied. Patel remarked on the 1st of January 1946 that the two parties in the Punjab Congress were still quarrelling with increasing vigour. This had a very demoralizing effect on the general situation.⁶⁸

Patel wrote to a Congress leader of Rupar that Congressmen in the Punjab, the key province which held ‘the future of India in the balance’, should have no quarrels or parties or factions. ‘We must all unite and fight the forces of reaction and disintegration.’⁶⁹ These forces were certainly the Unionists and the Muslim League. On 8 January, Patel wrote to Sachar that it would a misfortune if he, Bhargava, and Ghaznavi failed to act with one mind and one voice at this critical period in the history of the country. ‘The Punjab holds the key to the future’ and the Punjab Congress leaders had to play a most important role at this hour.⁷⁰

On 15 November 1945, Gopi Chand Bhargava sent to Sardar Patel an estimate of Rs 550,000 needed for the Muslim, Sikh, and the Scheduled Caste seats. Maulana Daud proposed to keep a few Muslim preachers for three months.⁷¹ Patel wrote a few days later that Bhargava seemed to throw the whole responsibility on the Centre. A substantial sum should be raised from the Punjab.⁷² He wrote also to Sachar that the Punjab was prosperous and it should not be difficult for the Congress to raise any amount of money for the all-important issue of elections.⁷³ Sachar underlined that financial aid could make a difference of five or six seats more.⁷⁴

Sarat Chandra Bose sought Sardar Patel’s intervention on behalf of Sardul Singh Caveeshar, who was not nominated by the Congress as its candidate for the Punjab Assembly. The candidate preferred over Caveeshar was Inder Singh, a mill owner of Kanpur, with no record of public work. Ramrup Sharma, who had written to Sarat Bose about Caveeshar, had also said that when mill owners and millionaires were allowed to put on the Congress label, Sikhs naturally felt that the Congress was putting up a fight to create friction among the Sikhs and not because the Congress Sikh candidates were better.⁷⁵ The Congress leaders were no doubt keen to win as many Sikh seats as possible.

The pro-Congress Akalis of the Nagoke group were in favour of a settlement between the Akalis and the Congress. However, no settlement was made for the Central elections. For the provincial elections, negotiations began on the 1st of November 1945. B.S. Gilani, personal secretary of Sardar Baldev Singh, had talks with Maulana Azad and Sardar Patel and gave several arguments in favour of a settlement. The chances of Congress candidates without a settlement with the Sikhs were meagre. A fight between the Sikhs and the Congress would give advantage to the Communists in more than half a dozen constituencies. The rift between the Sikhs and the Congress was having its repercussion in wider fields. The Congress organization in the Punjab was weak. Friendly alliances with the Sikhs and others were imperative.⁷⁶

On 9 November, Sardar Patel wrote in response to Gilani’s letter that Sardar Basant Singh did not come with Master Tara Singh’s letter, but talked to him on the phone. Patel told him that difficulty was created by the resolution passed by the Akali Conference (in favour of a Sikh state). He would still try his best to persuade Maulana Azad to come to an understanding. But, as yet, he had received no encouragement from the Sikhs.⁷⁷ Sardar Patel wrote to Bhargava that there should be no bitterness between the Akalis and the Congressmen as both stood for the independence of India and there was much common ground between them. Patel advised Bhargava to discuss the matter of arrangements for provincial elections with Daud Ghaznavi and the Congress Sikhs. If they were of one mind, it would be possible for Patel to get in touch with Maulana Azad for this purpose.⁷⁸

On 14 November 1945, Maulana Azad sent a telegram to Sardar Patel that if the Akalis approached him he should refer them to Azad.⁷⁹ Talks with the Akalis began on 15 November. It was proposed to issue a statement which, in Bhargava’s opinion, would induce the ‘nationalist Sikhs’ in the Akali Dal to join the Congress. Bhargava sent a copy of the statement to Sardar Patel for approval.⁸⁰ Patel wrote to Bhargava that he did not know how a promise of 50 per cent seats could be made to any party or group. He wondered if Maulana Azad had done it during his last visit to the Punjab. Nehru would not be a party to any such understanding or assurance, nor would he encourage such a thing.⁸¹ In other words, Patel was not in favour of leaving half of the Sikh seats to Master Tara Singh.

‘I am afraid we have mishandled the whole Punjab situation,’ wrote Sardar Patel to Maulana Azad on 21 December 1945. The Congress would have to fight the Akalis and ‘we will not get more than 5 or 6 seats after a good deal of expense which could be easily avoided’.⁸² Daud Ghaznavi wrote to Sardar Patel on 4 January 1946 that Baldev Singh eventually gave a proposal which fell short of 50 per cent seats for the Congress. It was accepted in the interest of unity. According to this proposal the Akalis would not oppose the Congress in ten constituencies and the Congress would not oppose the Akalis in ten others. On five seats, the Congress and Akalis would have a contest. On seven seats the Congress would not oppose the Akalis because in their view the Congress had no strong candidates to put up on those seats. But when negotiations were nearing completion, Sohan Singh Jalal-Usman opposed the proposition and Baldev Singh was unable to carry it through. Daud Ghaznavi goes on to add that sixteen or seventeen Communists were contesting Sikh seats. But only a few of them were serious candidates. It was agreed by Baldev Singh that on two of these only the Congress candidates would contest, and on the other two, only the Akali candidates. This arrangement was accepted by the Akalis and brought into action.⁸³

Gilani wrote to Sardar Patel on 10 February 1946 that the aftermath of no settlement with the Sikhs was disconcerting. Bitterness was running deep, and it was widening.⁸⁴ Sardar Patel agreed that the Sikh question was giving trouble. He held Master Tara Singh primarily responsible for this. So long as Master Tara Singh was the leader of the Akali Dal, he said, there was hardly a chance of easing the situation.⁸⁵ This may be taken as a left-handed compliment to Master Tara Singh’s success in mobilizing the Sikhs in support of the Akali Dal as an independent party.

The Akali–Congress relations in the elections of 1945–6 were not the same as in the elections of 1936–7. They were fighting the elections now not in collaboration but in opposition to each other. Nehru’s election speeches in the Punjab, which were addressed largely to the Sikhs in November 1945, leave no doubt that he was strongly opposed to the Akalis in general and to Master Tara Singh in particular. He presented them as ‘communal’ and appealed to the other Sikhs to support the Congress. His rhetoric was meant to appeal to the patriotic spirit of the Sikhs and their sense of honour.

In view of the importance of the elections of 1945–6, almost all the top political leaders of India got involved. On the whole, Jinnah, Nehru, and Master Tara Singh represented the ideas, rationale, and concerns of their respective parties more authoritatively than others. Jinnah was acutely aware of the Congress objective of ‘immediate independence’ of India as a single state. In his first public pronouncement after the Simla Conference, he declared in Bombay that there were only two major parties in the country, the Muslims represented by the Muslim League and the Hindus represented by the Congress. He spoke again in August 1945 in his home city, accusing the Congress of trying ‘by hook or by crook’ to lure Muslims into an ‘all-India union’. But the Muslims could not agree to any arrangement that means ‘freedom for Hindus and establishment of “Hindu Raj” and slavery for the Muslims’. His audience donated Rs 300,000, called ‘silver bullets’. His message was simple wherever he spoke. The Muslim League was ‘the only authoritative’ party of Muslims throughout India, and the sole demand of the League was Pakistan.⁸⁶

‘Pakistan is the question of life and death for us’, said Jinnah at Ahmedabad in October 1945. He collected a cheque of Rs 200,000 from Gujarati Muslims. All Muslims, he said, were ‘one nation’. They wanted Pakistan and they would attain it. On the 1st of November Jinnah predicted a Muslim League ‘sweep’ at the polls. At a Muslim League Conference on 24 November he said that they had no friends: ‘Neither the British, nor the Hindus.’ Nevertheless, the Muslims would fight with their united might and win in the end. To win Pakistan, all they had to do was to ‘vote for the League candidates’. In December, he said to the students in the Punjab that the first round was over and the day was not far off when they would see Pakistan as a sovereign state.⁸⁷ Thus, Jinnah staked everything on the sole objective of Pakistan.

Jawaharlal Nehru articulated the Congress ideology more elaborately than any other Congress leader. He was opposed to the division of India not because he had some sentimental attachment to united India. It was his progressive and modern mind that made him believe that united India could make a powerful state. Secondly, partition would not solve ‘the communal problem’. Instead, it could be intensified. Jinnah’s fear of the Hindu majority in ‘a centralized national government’ was based on his ‘medieval trend of thought’. In any case, the Punjab’s problem would remain unsolved. The Hindus and Sikhs of the eastern districts would never go over to Pakistan. Indeed, separation was not in the interest of anyone, certainly not of the Muslims.⁸⁸

In Nehru’s view, all the communal troubles in India were due to separate electorates. Given the historical background, however, safeguard would have to be provided for the protection of minority interests. There should be semi-independent autonomous provinces with all possible protection to the minorities: cultural, linguistic, and religious. Nehru defined ‘medievalism’ as ‘a religious group functioning as a political party’. An obvious example was the Muslim League which was confined to Muslims. The Congress had a national foundation and its political programme was to fight for the complete independence of all, irrespective of caste or creed. The Hindu–Muslim question was an obstruction to freedom but to say that freedom could not come unless there was Hindu–Muslim unity was incorrect. Political freedom could come even before that unity was achieved.⁸⁹ Nehru compared the ‘Quit India’ movement of 1942 with the historic Indian rising of 1857. He made it plain that he could not condemn those who took part in the 1942 movement. ‘It was a mighty and staggering phenomenon to see a helpless people spontaneously rise in despair without any leader or organization or preparation or arms.’⁹⁰

When elections were announced on 21 August 1945, Nehru asserted: ‘No power on earth can now stand in the way to freedom.’ While the Muslim League was raising the issue of Pakistan, the Congress was thinking of ‘the economic, political, social and cultural problems’ of India and the world. The Indians who joined the Indian National Army and fought against the British were misguided, but they had been actuated by the love of their country. It would be ‘a supreme tragedy’ if these officers and other men were liquidated by the British by way of punishment.⁹¹

The Congress had already acknowledged the right of self-determination and the right of secession to the provinces. But the Pakistan scheme was still vague. Besides its economic consequences for the body politic of India, it was bound to create complications in India and Pakistan for all times. In the Punjab it was not possible to concede the right of self-determination to one community in defiance of the other.⁹²

Nehru emphasized the crucial importance of the elections which might lead to ‘a constituent assembly’ for framing ‘a constitution for the country’. The elections were being contested by the Congress for deciding the issue ‘as to who should be the rulers in Delhi: the people’s own elected representatives or friends of the British bureaucracy’? The elections would decide ‘the fate of the Red Fort and the Viceregal Lodge’.⁹³ These were the symbols of a single sovereign state in India.

To vote for the Congress was to vote for the freedom that was coming soon. The people of the Punjab could declare by their vote whether they stood for ‘freedom or slavery’. The communal organizations were trying to sidetrack the main issue, serving the purpose of British imperialism. Nehru warned the opponents of the Congress: ‘Those who try to go against the great gushing torrent of Indian nationalism will be swept ashore, lifeless as a log of wood.’⁹⁴

There were other parties in the Punjab. The Communists had created a gulf between themselves and the people by opposing the August Resolution of 1942. In the ‘war between India and England’, they were on the side of England. The Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha had made no sacrifices for the freedom of India. A communal organization could never think of ‘the good of the country as a whole’. Therefore, no communal organization was entitled to speak for India. In the free India of the future there would be no Hindu Raj, nor a Muslim Raj, nor a Sikh Raj. ‘It will be a people’s raj—a raj of all, Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians and others with power resting in the hands of the people as a whole.’⁹⁵ The ‘people’s raj’ of Nehru was not a ‘partnership’ among the religious communities of India.

The talk about Pakistan sounded empty and meaningless to Nehru. The question of its acceptance or rejection did not arise because nobody had yet defined Pakistan. Moreover, if Pakistan was created then the parts of the Punjab with Hindu majority would join Hindustan, and the Punjab would have to be divided. No sensible Punjabi would like the province to be divided into two parts. Nehru advised the Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs of the Punjab to think twice before embarking upon a division of their province into two. Though their religions were different, their culture, civilization, and language were the same. In any case, the problem of Pakistan could be solved only by ‘a compromise’.⁹⁶ Nehru’s slogan of composite culture had no appeal for the Muslim League.

More crucial than the Communists, the Hindu Mahasabha, the Muslim League, and the Unionists in the Punjab were the Sikhs, ‘a great people, a most patriotic people’. But the Akalis could not rise against the British. They were all the time going ‘from one door to another, not sticking to any party, for negotiations’. When the Congressmen were in jail after the August Resolution of 1942, the Akalis were ‘opposing the Congress movement and abusing Gandhiji’. They blamed the Congress that it had sanctioned Pakistan but they themselves had negotiated with the Muslim League ‘through the back door so many times’. Many Akalis had fought ‘shoulder to shoulder with the Congress in the fight for liberty’. It was against ‘the dignity and honour of the brave Sikhs’ to oppose the Congress. As ‘a brave freedom-loving people’ the Sikhs should strengthen the hands of all progressive forces and work with the Congress for freedom.⁹⁷

Master Tara Singh propagated his own ideas among the Sikhs in view of the elections. His pamphlet on ‘Pakistan’ was widely distributed by the Shiromani Akali Dal. ‘Pakistan’ meant ‘Muslim Raj’, but the use of the term ‘Pakistan’ had made the Muslims more fanatical about it. Consequently, fear among non-Muslims had increased. The Congress objected to Pakistan but not to Muslim Raj. Whereas Cripps had said that a ‘province’ had the option to separate, the Congress said that only an area (‘ilāqa) had the option to separate. Rajaji and Mahatma Gandhi proposed that districts and tehsils with Muslim majority could separate from Hindustan to form Pakistan. Had this formula been implemented, half of the Sikhs would have come under Pakistan and the other left in eastern Punjab.⁹⁸

The Communists favoured the idea of Pakistan. They talked of Sikh right to self-determination but opposed all specific proposals for the protection of Sikh rights. Then there were some ‘angry’ friends (the Sikhs annoyed with the Akalis) who had full faith in the Congress and in Nehru to protect them even if Pakistan was established. Master Tara Singh was ‘shocked and surprised’ that there were Sikhs who placed greater faith in ‘a non-Sikh mortal than in constitutional safeguards’. It was absolutely clear that the Sikhs who were not under the influence of the Congress, the Communists, or the ‘angry’ Sikhs had to oppose Pakistan.⁹⁹

Master Tara Singh found it strange that Muslims did not trust the Congress because it was dominated by Hindus but they expected the Sikhs to trust the League which was entirely Muslim. It was more difficult for a non-Muslim to trust the Muslim League than for a Muslim to trust the Congress. None should expect the Sikhs to willingly accept any kind of Muslim Raj. There were three ways in which Muslim Raj could be thrust on unwilling Sikhs: (a) by force, (b) with the support of the British, and (c) by dividing the Sikhs. He felt certain that whatever the way, Muslim Raj over the Sikhs would put an end to the Sikh faith, the Sikh tradition, and the Sikhs.¹⁰⁰

Muslims could establish their rule over the Sikhs by force only after the British had left. In such an eventuality, actions would be needed rather than words. Verbal arguments could help in establishing their Raj only with the support of the British. That was why the Muslims were demanding that the British should leave only after the transfer of power into Muslim hands. This amounted to use of force by proxy. But no nation (kaum) willingly accepted the Raj of another nation. It would be a grave injustice on the part of the British to thrust Muslim yoke on the Sikhs for any reason whatever. Furthermore, the British had taken rulership from the Sikhs on trust and it would be a betrayal of the Sikhs to entrust it to Muslims.¹⁰¹

The possibility of Muslim Raj over the Sikhs due to their disunity would be created only if the Sikhs voted for those candidates who were in favour of Pakistan. Thus, to vote for a Congress or a Communist candidate was to vote for Pakistan. The Congress was no longer a common party of all communities; it had become virtually a ‘Hindu’ party. For the Sikhs to remain subordinate to the Congress was to remain in favour of Pakistan. The Sikhs must remember all the time that the successful candidates in the coming elections would participate in the framing of the final Constitution. Master Tara Singh declared: ‘I shall fight all alone, if need be, to preserve the independent identity of the Panth.’¹⁰²

After the elections were announced, Master Tara Singh circulated a pamphlet called ‘Congress te Sikh’ (the Congress and the Sikhs), underlining the message that the Sikhs should not vote for a candidate fielded by any non-Sikh party. There were two such parties: the Communists, who were openly supporting the idea of Pakistan, and the Congress, which wanted to ensure that the Sikhs should not remain in a position to oppose Pakistan or to think of some other strategy independently of the Congress. Master Tara Singh refers to the background of Sikh–Congress relations to remind the Sikhs that the Congress had set aside its promise to the Sikhs, and the Sikhs had to put forth their own scheme of Azad Punjab. In 1944, Mahatma Gandhi blessed the Rajagopalachari Formula which visualized the River Beas to be the boundary with Pakistan, dividing the Sikhs into two equal halves, both under political slavery. Mahatma Gandhi affirmed his adherence to the Congress resolution of 1929 as well to the Rajagopalachari Formula, but no one knew how he would do this.¹⁰³

Maulana Azad had stated that Muslims in the Muslim-majority areas should have the right to separate from Hindustan, and he appealed to Sikhs and Hindus to agree. His argument was that if they did so, the Muslims would think calmly and abandon the idea. This logic was beyond comprehension. In any case, if the Muslims did not abandon the idea, Hindus and Sikhs would be committed to accepting Pakistan. The Hindus might find consolation in the idea that they would be free in Hindustan but what kind of consolation would the Sikhs have? If the Punjab was lost, everything was lost for them.¹⁰⁴

Nehru wisely coated the poisonous pill with sugar. He agreed with Maulana Azad but added that if Muslims had the right to self-determination, so had the Sikhs. However, the Sikhs were not in majority in any district or tehsil. Therefore, their right to self-determination remained a theoretical proposition. Master Tara Singh said that the first step should be to ask the Sikhs how their interests could be safeguarded. Sardar Patel had stated for the first time that the promise given to the Sikhs should be honoured. However, much hope could not be placed on this statement because it was made during campaigning for the elections. The more important leaders like Mahatma Gandhi, Maulana Azad, and Pandit Nehru were vocal in favour only of the Muslim right to self-determination.¹⁰⁵

In the light of his experience, Master Tara Singh came to the conclusion that the only right path for the Sikhs was to work for the freedom of the country ‘by standing on their own two feet’. He was in favour of establishing independent identity of the Panth and maintaining it. He did not wish the Congress to speak on their behalf in taking all decisions. The Congress would honour its assurance to the Sikhs only if they were politically alive. If their political identity was destroyed, ‘which Sikhs would the Congress care for?’ If the Sikhs were with the Congress, to consult the Sikhs would be to consult itself. The Muslims had separated themselves and there was ‘no question any longer of forming one nation’. The real issue now was to maintain ‘the independent identity of the Sikhs and to increase their strength’.¹⁰⁶

The Sikhs were told again and again that they should make sacrifices for the country. It was surely a good thing. ‘But the country is not so much its land as its people and the Sikhs too are included among its people.’ If the suggestion was that the Sikhs should make sacrifices for the sake of Hindus and Muslims alone, such a sacrifice would be worse than suicide. Every Sikh should be prepared to make sacrifice for a just cause (dharam), for the oppressed, and the indigent. The Guru had defined the martyr for the guidance of the Sikhs: the true warrior laid down his life for the good. To sacrifice one’s life in the service of the Panth and for the protection of the Panth was true sacrifice. To die for the sake of those who tried to put an end to the freedom of the Panth was no sacrifice. By far the most important thing for the Sikhs was their faith (dharam); for its preservation, it was necessary to preserve the Panth, and for that it was necessary to preserve its independence.¹⁰⁷

Some people were saying that the British rulers were pulling the strings to keep Indians disunited. But the British were neither gods nor devils; they were selfish people ‘like ourselves’. What had obliged them to concede independence for India was the international situation. They would neither wish to impose unity on the Indian people, nor would such a forced unity be a guarantee of peace. The only way out of the impasse was to work on the principle that no nationality (kaum) should try to rule over another. To save one nationality from the domination of another did not infringe the ideal of Nationalism. Both Hindus and Muslims had demonstrated their preference for communal considerations (firkādārī) by devising plans to rule over others. The Sikhs could think only of plans to save themselves from the domination of others. If bifurcation of the country was inevitable, the Sikhs should have a separate state for themselves on the basis of the total lands they owned.¹⁰⁸

The Congress was keen to weaken the Panthic organization for its own purposes. All those Sikhs who joined the Congress out of ignorance, self-interest, sheer obstinacy, or out of spite were helpful to the Congress. It was necessary for the Sikhs to keep their authority in their own hands and not to entrust it to others. Therefore, no Sikh should vote for a candidate fielded by a non-Sikh party. To elect such a candidate was to support the party opposed to Sikh interests. No personal consideration should be shown to any such candidate, whether put up by the Congress or the Communists. Master Tara Singh declared that a friend of the Panth was his friend and an enemy of the Panth was his enemy. ‘I have no kinship or friendship with a person who stabs the Panth in the back.’¹⁰⁹

‘The Cat Is Out of the Bag’ is the title of a pamphlet written by Master Tara Singh after the Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal had nominated their candidates for the Sikh seats in the Punjab. The candidates nominated by the Shiromani Akali Dal were staunch Sikhs as well as patriots who would fight for the freedom of the country. The best candidates nominated by the Congress were those who were committed only to fight for freedom. The Akali slogan was ‘Panth Āzād, Desh Āzād’; the slogan of the Congress was ‘Desh Āzād’. The Congress wanted to put an end to the independent identity of the Sikh Panth. The Sikh candidates fielded by the Congress would never think of Sikh interests. Master Tara Singh told the pro-Congress Sikhs that they were needed only so long as the independent identity of the Panth was intact. Their relevance lay in their opposition to the Akalis. ‘The demise of the Panth would be their death.’¹¹⁰

Master Tara Singh made a prophecy in his address to the Akali Conference at Bannu on 23 January 1946 that Hindus and Muslims would come to an agreement after the elections ‘on the basis of Pakistan’. His address reiterated some of the statements already made during the election campaign and raised the basic issue: whether or not independence of the ‘third Panth’ (tīsar panth) of Guru Gobind Singh would survive. The Hindu newspapers were hoarse that there was no threat to the Panth; only the leadership of Master Tara Singh was in danger. Master Tara Singh replied that not his leadership but his life was in danger. He would not wish to live if the Panth died.¹¹¹

The Congress was no longer a party fighting for freedom. It had become a Hindu party with a large number of loyalist Hindus. Every Hindu was a Congressman just as every Muslim was a Muslim Leaguer. Now the struggle was between Hindus and Muslims for grabbing power. The Hindus were dividing the Sikhs with their money power in the name of the Congress. Their objective was to put an end to the independent identity of the Panth. The Sikh candidates fielded by the Congress made it quite clear that its intention was to atomize the Panth. The Akalis were trying to keep the Panth together. In this situation, could the Sikhs save the Khalsa Panth by entrusting its leadership to others? This was the crucial question.¹¹²

Sikh nationality was based on a distinctive faith (dharam). ‘If there is no Sikh dharam there can be no Sikh kaum, and if there is no Sikh kaum there can be no Sikh dharam.’ That was why politics and religion could not be separated. The argument to separate religion from politics was meant actually to destroy Sikh nationality. For the first time the British had declared that no Constitution would be framed without the consent of the ‘main elements’ in the country, and the Sikhs were among these ‘main elements’. At the time of the Simla Conference, Maulana Azad had tried very hard to persuade Master Tara Singh to accept the Congress as representing the Sikhs too, but Master Tara Singh did not relinquish the right to independence. The Congressmen in general and the Congressite Muslims in particular were unhappy about the view of the government to regard the Sikhs as one of the ‘main elements’, which made their consent necessary for an agreement. If the Sikhs entrusted their right to the Congress, there would be no need of their consent because their consent would be included in that of the Congress.¹¹³

The Congress at its Poona session had denounced the idea of Pakistan but passed the resolution that an area in which the majority was in favour of separation could not be forced to remain in Hindustan. The only difference between the Muslim League and the Congress on this issue was that the former wanted Pakistan up to Delhi and the latter wanted its boundary to be the River Beas. In both the cases, the Sikhs would be subject to slavery. The Sikh candidates fielded by the Congress were already a party to the idea of accepting Pakistan. If the Sikhs were united, it would not be possible for the Muslim League, the Congress, and the British, even in combination, to force Pakistan on the Sikhs. Therefore, Master Tara Singh appealed to the non-Akali Sikhs: ‘Save us, if you wish to save yourselves.’ They who did not subscribe to the idea that the Sikhs as a nationality had some rights had no right to get Sikh votes.¹¹⁴

The general elections of 1945–6 for the Central and Punjab Legislatures showed a high degree of polarization. The Muslims voted overwhelmingly in support of the Muslim League; the Hindus voted mostly for the Congress candidates; and the Sikhs voted largely for the Akalis. Out of the eighty-four Muslim seats in the Punjab Assembly, the Muslim League won sixty-nine and the Unionists won twelve. Only one seat went to the Congress, while two independent candidates were elected. Out of the thirty-four general seats, the Congress won thirty-two. The Unionists got only two seats. Out of the thirty-one Sikh seats, the Akalis won nineteen and the Congressite Sikhs got nine. Independent candidates were elected for the remaining three seats. The Akalis were able to oust the moderate Sikh leadership of the Chief Khalsa Diwan and the Communists. The Congress Sikhs retained about one-third of the Sikh seats now as in 1937. The Sikh presence in the Congress was certainly important but the larger majority of the Sikhs had turned towards the Akalis. Two of the three Sikh seats for the Central Legislature were also won by the Akalis.¹¹⁵ This, at least partly, may be taken as a measure of the influence of Master Tara Singh’s campaign and propagation of the idea of independent political entity of the Sikhs.

Sadhu Singh Hamdard, who was deeply involved with the elections of 1945–6, made some observations on the results. First, that the Akalis emerged as representatives of the Sikhs as a third party, like the Congress and the Muslim League. Second, that by and large the Hindus were with the Congress, the Muslims with the Muslim League, and the Sikhs with the Akali Dal. The Muslims were seeking a solution to the Hindu–Muslim problem in Pakistan, and it was necessary to find a solution for the Sikh problem as the third ‘nationality’ (kaum) in India. A solution could be found only with the consent of the Sikhs. Third, whereas Nehru was the spokesman of the Congress and Jinnah of the Muslim League, the spokesman of the Sikhs should be of their own choice, whether Master Tara Singh or Sardar Baldev Singh. Incidentally, Hamdard was partial to Baldev Singh, who was never a leader of the Sikh masses. Fourth, the Sikhs were neither with Jinnah nor with Nehru on the issue of Pakistan. It was for the Sikhs to decide what kind of safeguards they wanted. This issue could be taken up with the British more appropriately than with the Congress or the Muslim League, each of whom had their own objectives to pursue. In other words, the logic of the situation called for an independent course for the Akalis.¹¹⁶

In Hamdard’s own view, if Pakistan was to be conceded to Jinnah (whose position had been very much strengthened by the elections results), it would be incumbent upon the Sikhs to ask for a Sikh state in which all the Sikhs were concentrated. It should have the right to accede to Hindustan or Pakistan. The elections had proved that the Sikhs had a distinct ‘nationality’ and their problem should be taken up simultaneously with the Hindu–Muslim problem. The elections had made it absolutely clear that the Sikhs should be treated not as a part of the Congress but a separate entity.¹¹⁷

On Wavell’s initiative the Simla Conference was held in June–July 1945 to discuss the proposal of a new Executive Council representing ‘the main communities’, including equal proportions of Caste Hindus and Muslims. All the members of the council were to be Indian except the Viceroy and the Commander-in-Chief. A new constitution for India was to be evolved after the war. Master Tara Singh, who represented one of the three main elements in Indian politics, found the proposals acceptable but feared that the parties might drift further apart in the end. He made it clear that the Sikhs did not identify themselves with the Congress though they favoured India’s freedom like the Congress. Asked to give three names for the Sikh members of the Executive Committee, Master Tara Singh placed his own name at the head. In Wavell’s opinion, the two other Sikhs listed were ‘dummies’. Significantly, he remarked that Master Tara Singh ‘would be a poor member of the Council’. The Congress leaders were inclined to accept the proposal. Jinnah claimed to be the sole representative of the Muslims of India and asserted that he alone had the right to send the names of Muslims to be nominated as members of the Executive Council. This was unacceptable to the Congress, claiming to be the representative of the Indian Nation. But Wavell did not ignore Jinnah’s claim. The Conference failed.

By mid-August 1945, Jinnah was clamouring for general elections, confident of success of the Muslim League at the polls. The League fought the elections on the sole issue of Pakistan, ‘the question of life and death’ for the Muslims. Elections in the Punjab were a ‘critical test’ for the Muslim League. Its leaders mobilized Muslim religious elements and students. Jinnah predicted a Muslim League sweep at the polls.

Nehru started his campaign immediately after the announcement of elections. ‘No power on earth can now stand in the way to freedom,’ he declared. The scheme of Pakistan was bound to create complications in India and Pakistan for all times, and the right to self-determination could not be conceded to one community in defiance of the other in the Punjab. The elections were to decide who would frame a new Constitution for free India. He asserted that the Congress alone was relevant for resolving these vital issues. No other organization could speak for India as a whole. The first and foremost objective before the Congress was ‘India’s freedom’. Nehru took keen interest in the Punjab, especially for the Sikh seats. He was in favour of putting up ‘straightforward Sikhs’ as candidates rather than those who had some affiliation with the Akalis. If Master Tara Singh stood for elections, he should be opposed by a strong Sikh candidate. Evidently, Nehru did not want Master Tara Singh or any other Akali leader to be elected. He wanted the Congressite Sikhs to win the elections so that there was no opposition from the Sikhs to the decisions of the Congress. He came again to the Punjab for three days in the third week of November 1945, especially for the election to the Sikh seats. To vote for the Congress was to vote for freedom, he said, and to vote for a communal organization was to sidetrack the basic issue and, thus, to serve the purpose of British imperialism. In free India, there would be no Hindu Raj, nor a Muslim or Sikh Raj, but a Raj of all the people—Hindus, Muslims, and Sikhs. The Sikhs, for Nehru, were ‘a great people, a most patriotic people’, but the Akalis were not sticking to any party for negotiations. It was against ‘the dignity and honour of the brave Sikhs’ to oppose the Congress in its fight for freedom. The line between the so-called nationalist and the so-called ‘communalist’ Sikhs was clearly drawn.

Master Tara Singh’s perspective on the situation was fundamentally different. He wrote a number of pamphlets before and during the elections for circulation among the Sikhs and he addressed conferences. For him, ‘Pakistan’ essentially meant ‘Muslim Raj’. The Congress accepted the idea of ‘Muslim Raj’ and conceded ‘Pakistan’ upto the River Beas. This proposal was worse than that of Pakistan because it divided the Sikhs into two halves, each under the domination of another community. If the Muslims were a nation, the Sikhs too were a distinct nation, and the Muslims had no right to rule over them. To vote for a Congress candidate was to vote for Pakistan. For the Sikhs to remain subordinate to the Congress was to subordinate themselves to a ‘Hindu’ party which was in favour of Pakistan. The Congress wanted its Sikh candidates to win so that the Sikhs did not remain in a position to oppose Pakistan or to think of another strategy independently of the Congress. The real issue for the Sikhs was to maintain ‘independent identity of the Sikhs and to increase their strength’. To recognize the principle that no nationality should try to rule over another was the only way to resolve the problem of unity, asserted Master Tara Singh. He told the pro-Congress Sikhs that they were needed only so long as the Sikh identity was not destroyed. Their relevance lay in their opposition to the Akalis. ‘The demise of the Panth would be their death.’

Master Tara Singh observed that the Hindus wanted to have a democratic system on the basis of adult suffrage to establish a permanent ‘Hindu Raj’. Understandably, all the Hindus were in its favour. The Congress was prepared to make some modifications in order to satisfy the Muslim and Sikh minorities. But the Hindu Mahasabha subscribed to an undiluted ideal of democracy based on adult suffrage. Its leader, Veer Savarkar, regarded the Hindus alone as the true nationalists. Their true patriotism, according to Master Tara Singh, was meant to cover up their aspiration to establish ‘Hindu Raj’ on a firm footing. The Muslim League was not prepared to accept the safeguards offered by the Congress and demanded the creation of Pakistan. Injustice to the Sikhs was built into this demand. Logically, the Muslim League should concede the Sikh aspiration to be free of Muslim domination, which was as legitimate as the Muslim aspiration to be free of Hindu domination. But the Muslim League did not concede this. The only solution to the communal problem in India was to evolve a constitution in which no community was under the domination of another. What India needed, therefore, was a constitution similar to that of Switzerland. The basic issue for Master Tara Singh was to ensure independence of the Third Panth (tīsar panth, a phrase used in eighteenth-century Sikh literature for the Sikh Panth to underline its distinction from Hindu and Muslim identities). Those who did not recognize that the Sikhs had some rights as a nationality had no right to get Sikh votes. Master Tara Singh wanted partnership of the Sikhs in political power as much as in the struggle for freedom.

The general elections of 1945–6 resulted in a large degree of polarization. An overwhelming majority of Muslim seats were won by the League at the cost of the Muslim Unionists. Similarly the large majority of general seats were won by the Congress at the cost of the ‘Hindu’ parties and the Hindu Unionists. The larger majority of Sikh seats were won by the Akalis at the cost of both the moderate Sikhs and the Communists. But the Congress got ten out of thirty-three Sikh seats. The Muslim League got a sort of Muslim mandate in favour of Pakistan and, consequently, the partition of India. The Congress got a mandate of Hindus and a considerable proportion of Sikhs for independence. The Akalis got support of a large majority of the Sikhs for an independent political entity of the Sikhs. Thus, the elections of 1945–6 proved to be of crucial importance for the future.