Range of their ships...
The Japanese doctrine dictated a naval battle near the home islands, a repeat of the Russo-Japanese war. They did so largely because they lacked enough fuel to reliably reach, much less maintain any kind of battle fleet off the coast of the U.S.
The major reason that a Japanese carrier attack on Pearl Harbor was of low probability was that it was believed the Japanese lacked the ability to refuel underway, especially in the North Pacific in the winter. Such refueling was absolutely necessary because a battle fleet absolutely required the protection of its destroyers and destroyers were small fast ships that carried little fuel and quickly burned through that which they did.
The U.S. had only managed to accomplish underway refueling under simulated war conditions in late 1939 using a newly invented and highly secret disposable fast decoupler for the fuel lines. Knowing the Japanese lacked this technology, it was thought unlikely they could reach Hawaii.
But as usual, the Japanese used hyper-intensive training and much higher tolerance for casualties to build the skills necessary to perform such refueling. Most of those superbly trained men died at Midway trapped in the inferno the hangar decks of the stricken Japanese carriers turned into, after the American bomb strikes.
Fuel oil ruled the Pacific War in 1942. The U.S. stupidly let itself get by with only three fleet oilers (tankers who could keep pace with battle fleets which traveled at twice the speed of regular merchant ships and tankers). Two were sunk or damaged and the U.S. relied on civilian tankers to support all their operations. See: Black Shoe Carrier Admiral: Frank Jack Fletcher at Coral Sea, Midway & Guadalcanal.
Every one of the battleships sunk and then razed at Pearl Harbor were relegated to patrolling the West Coast because they did not have either the speed or range to keep pace with carrier task forces. Neither did the U.S. have enough tanker capacity to support them away from home ports.
The real question is why the Japanese did not utilize their submarines like the Germans. Had they deployed submarines along the West Coast as the Germans did during Operation Drumbeat, they could have devastated the U.S. pacific merchant fleet and crippled all offensive actions.
They didn't do so because they were fighting a scripted war. They knew they could not defeat the Americans materially in a long war, so they all deluded themselves that the war would be decided by a quick devastating destruction of the Pacific fleet in one massive decisive battle. At which point the Americans who where nothing but greedy, craven businessmen, would beg for peace.
They originally planned on luring the U.S. Fleet to a decisive battle somewhere between the Philippines and Okinawa. The sole doctrine for the Japanese subs was to whittle down the U.S. battle fleet as it traveled across the Pacific to the area of the decisive battle. Sub commanders were ordered to ignore merchant vessels and only attack warships.
Worse, the doctrine required large fleet subs, able to travel on the surface with the main battle fleet. This made the sub too large to dive quickly, so they suffered high losses when they ventured too far into areas where the U.S. had dense air patrols. Even if they had decided to deploy their ship in anti-logistics attacks on the west coast, they didn't have subs suitable for such a mission.
The Japanese inflexibility to the point of delusion, gave the U.S. a year to build a real logistics system and unlearn all the mistaken doctrines the Navy had developed after not having fought a serious naval war since 1898.
In the end, the Military, who thought of themselves as Samurai whose only role was war, were so desperate to maintain their role and status that they deluded themselves they could win a war with U.S. But they could only win a war that followed a specific narrow script. The script said that the war would end long before logistics issues came into play; they did not plan on attacking U.S. logistics nor did they rush to develop the Indonesian oil fields.