Abstract
This study investigates the issues related to the commercialisation of genetically modified (GM) crops and examines the regulatory framework for GM crops development and commercialisation in India. It explores the positioning of various organisations and stakeholders that have directly or indirectly influenced this technology and delineates their roles in the technological governance system. The findings of this study show that institutions promoting research and innovation are not appropriately linked with the institutions for its governance and regulation in India. As a result, even after extensive debate and creation of new institutions, there is a persisting situation of antagonism and low public trust in GM technology as a viable solution for India’s agricultural problems. This has impeded the innovation and translation process despite successful field trials of many indigenous GM crop. Further, it underlines that individual and group concerns regarding the environmental, health and economic viability of GM crops as technological intervention can be addressed by promoting it as an alternative in specific conditions only. In conclusion, a group of interventions such as the development of a system to encourage innovation, capacity building and investment in alternate technologies is suggested to equip for the ever-increasing demand of agricultural products in the future.
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Keywords
1 Introduction
Genetically Modified (GM) Bt cottonFootnote 1 was introduced in India in 2002, leading to high production of cotton in the following years. This provided a stimulus to the biotechnology-based interventions in agriculture. Meanwhile, India became one of the largest exporters of cotton in the world (Chaturvedi and Arora 2014). According to many scientists, GM crops were the answer to food security and climate change induced crop failures. Countries worldwide, adopted new varieties of corn, brinjal, soybean, canola, sugarbeet, alfalfa, papaya, squash, potato, etc. to reduce the use of pesticides, increase productivity and other benefits. The estimated market value of GM crops being grown across the world is US$17.2 billionFootnote 2 (GeneWatch UK 2016, ISAAA 2018). However, even after 18 years since the introduction of GM crops in India, Bt cotton remains the only GM crops allowed for commercial cultivation in India. This is due to controversies about the potential long-term impacts of the plants on the environment and animals.
The use of GM crop in agriculture has assumed significant importance across the globe. Controversies pertaining to the use of GM crops have sprung up in the USA (Ishii and Araki 2016), European Union (EU) (Kuntz et al. 2013), Egypt (Adenle 2011; Sarant 2012), Japan (Morris 2013), Korea (Choi 2015), Brazil (do MST 2015), and Taiwan (Hsiao 2013). In Asia as well, concerns have been raised in China (Sun 2019) and Bangladesh (Nasiruddin 2011; Jitendra 2019), where they have adopted GM crops in their agricultural food production systems. In India, the issue around GM crops has remained in limbo for more than a decade. Different stakeholders have expressed their concerns about the introduction of GM crops in agriculture and food chain of the country. These concerns span from health (human, animal and environment), economics, and ethical issues; and they are the primary reasons for the delay in the commercialisation of GM-based crops. Two attempts to introduce GM crops namely, Bt Brinjal in 2009 and GM mustard in 2015 had met with resistance and the approval for their release, as a result, was withdrawn by the ministry of environment and forest.
The issue of GM crop cultivation in India is characterised by changing policy stances of the government. On the one hand, the government has generously funded research in the development of indigenous GM varieties, investing a considerable amount in field trials. On the other hand, the government has placed a moratorium on the commercialisation of GM food crops in India. This decision was based on the recommendations of various committees constituted at different periods; as the government has not been able to clearly articulate responses to convince those who have questioned the suitability of this technological intervention. The failure of regulatory agencies is evident in the fact that the Supreme Court of India had to intervene in the decision-making process (Technical Expert Committee 2013; Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. and Ors. vs. Monsanto Technology LLC and Ors. 2018).
In this chapter, we discuss some of the effects these interventions had on the development of GM crops in India and try to answer the following questions. What is the reason for the current deadlock between the regulators and the developers of GM technology? Does the existing review system have any shortcomings? Or is it because of an improper understanding of recommendations made by the review committees? Can there be a plausible way to utilise the best parts of GM technology still, while keeping in sight the associated risks being pointed out continuously? It is important to answer these questions, as many new technologies are coming up with the rapid boom in the information and technology sector. Many of these have the potential to fall in similar situations of system failure if proper policy guidance framework is not provided. This could entail environmental, health as well as economic and commercial costs in management or mitigation of their negative effects. In the available literature on GM crops, a lot has been debated regarding the reasons for GM crops not performing well (Levidow and Carr 2007; Dogra 2012; Gilbert 2013; Herring 2014) but studies on their regulation in India are limited. Thus, the reasons for the continued moratorium on the commercialisation of GM crops in India, despite promising research, regulatory interventions, a comprehensive portfolio of regulatory bodies, and continuous review of the issues by different bodies are worth examining (Chaturvedi and Arora 2014).
2 Highlighting the Governance and Regulation/Conceptual Framework
2.1 High Importance of Regulatory Governance and Participation of Stakeholders
Innovation which is at the heart of technological change, is the process that depends on the accumulation and development of relevant knowledge of a wide variety. This brings back the argument from previous section on innovation systems, and we can infer that economic development and technological changes are positively related to each other.
Both regulation and governance are necessary for management of innovation and are unified as ‘regulatory governance’ (Kotsemir and Abroskin 2013; Tidd 2006). Such coherence is essential for the development of new technological innovations and their appropriate acceptance from all stakeholders. They must be aware of the opportunities and risks involved in the use of technology. They should also share a need to accommodate change while retaining sufficient mutual trust and certainty in other stakeholders. This cannot happen in the absence of regulation as high competition may lead to malpractices for higher benefits (Heldeweg and Kica 2011).
2.2 Role of Regulation in Promoting Innovation
‘Regulation is the sustained and focused attempt to alter the behaviour of others according to standards or goals with the intention of producing a broadly identified outcome or outcomes, which may involve mechanisms of standard-setting, information gathering and behaviour modification’ (Black 2002). In terms of innovation governance, regulation is the act of balancing factors pertaining to innovation. It demarcates the extent of freedom available to companies to collaborate or receive protection for their inventions so as to ensure that downstream innovation remains unaffected. It defines the boundary for dissonance in public values so as to strike a balance between consumer interests and those of the producers, between manager and employee interests and between stakeholder and other interests in the pursuit of innovation. It also explores new roles that are of public interest considerations for technological innovation (Donnelly 2011). There can be both positive and negative impacts of regulation on activities of business, affecting their capabilities for technological innovation, and therefore regulatory agencies play a critical role. As a result, the outlook towards regulation has been evolving. In the UK, as early as the 1980s, the law-makers consider regulation as a service and treat the companies and citizens as consumers. In contrast, the traditional outlook considers them as objects of ‘regulatory implementation and enforcement’. Other ways of facilitative use of regulation are promoting for standardisation of products and allowing block exemptions for the leading responsible firms for example, firms sharing their knowledge in research and development (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Hall and Soskice 2000). Regulation ensures monopolistic competition as production and R&D activities are segregated. In the post-industrial economies, most of the R&D activities happen while production is done in emerging market economies. On the flip side, if regulation is used to minimise the level of competition too much, it may lead to adverse impact on the performance of companies or the whole economies (Arezzo 2007).
Cultivation and propagation of technological change encompass multifaceted interactions between institutions, organisations and firms. Individual firms play a crucial role in the development of specific innovations, but the role of government is complex and important. Government is an intermediary between the firms and the consumers. The government should operate based on the additionality principleFootnote 3 to foster innovation (Heldweg 2011). It must carefully plan any intervention. If required to intervene, government intervention should be minimal and withdrawn as soon as the issue is addressed (Wetenschappelijke 2008). The government may have the potential to rectify market and innovation failure, as seen in the case of GM crop technology. Government interventions can be characterised based on the position it takes in the innovation ecosystem. When acting intrinsically, its focus will be on securing innovation as such. This can be done by the government by making improvement in the rules deciding the overall innovation processes instead of focusing on one single product or technology. This way, the whole innovation ecosystem will be affected and not only the targeted technology. On the other hand, when it acts extrinsically, the interventions made by governments are based on specific technologies aimed at solving a (set of) challenges or improve the quality or efficiency of an existing process for safety and quality purposes (e.g. regular improvements in vehicular engine efficiency standards from BS-I to BS-V). Based on its requirement, the government when acting extrinsically may assume roles of a customer, a partner in the production unit, guarantee the sale of products or make laws to govern the activities related to the use of technology (Bochm and Frederick 2010; Heldweg 2011).
2.3 Factors Restricting Innovation
Innovation is a concept that includes a new functionality or a new way of using existing functionality. It is a ‘complex system’, comprising of ways to create new knowledge and new technologies, and their faster identification, diffusion and application. This often involves modification in the labour, its management and overall organisations in favour of faster systems (Wetenschappelijke 2008). However, innovation governance mainly focuses on the first part of the definition and often overlooks the need for complementing new technology with changes in the organisation structure, labour capacity/expertise, legal frameworks, etc. Market failures in adoption and commercialisation of innovation can be the reason behind these inefficiencies. Major causes for these failures are ‘reluctance to initiate innovation with positive external effects’, ‘uncertainty regarding returns on investment’, ‘insufficient or slow knowledge transfer’ and ‘insufficient cooperation between firms’ (Wetenschappelijke 2008; Heldweg 2011). ‘There is ‘systemic failure’ within the innovation process itself’. New technologies can be used and leveraged more effectively if the market structure also adapts to the requirement of the technology through institutional changes. Some of these changes are adoption of improved technological standards, implementation of better safety protocols, and creation of new production and distribution chains. New institutions and technological standards are required because the existing ones may not be suitable for the evaluation of the products based on new technology, hence impeding the process and leading to failure of innovation (Heldweg 2011).
Many of these concepts are useful in understanding why regulatory failure has occurred in the GM crop debate. In the following sections, we look at the regulatory framework and relate them to the concepts of regulation, governance and risk analysis.
3 Governance and Regulation of GM Crops
The regulation of GM crops has a long history spanning more than a decade. During this time, different situations have arisen that have helped shape the regulatory policies pertaining to GM crops around the world. In India, its regulation has been under debate owing to the constant rebuttal between the pro-GM researchers (supporting adoption of GM crops), developing and marketing firms; and the anti-GM activists (opposing adoption of GM crops) and non-government organisations (NGOs). The influence of these stakeholders on the regulatory landscape is evidenced in the changing policy stances of the government.
3.1 Agencies Involved in Regulation and Governance
In the past decade, there have been generous funding for research and field trials of GM crops, which has resulted in the development of many new varieties. Government agencies have actively shown their support for research and development of new crops (EPW Corrospondent 2003, Warrier and Pande 2016, Express News Service 2016, BioSpectrum Bureau 2016, Aggarwal 2016, Haq and Chauhan 2015, GeneWatch UK 2016). Regulation can assist or suppress economic and technological innovation in different ways. Innovation takes place in the business environments set up by regulation. Regulation can, therefore, have an impact on a company’s capacity to attract investments for adoption of innovation for fixed and human capital in its business. The entry of a company in a new market, its ability and chances of establishing collaboration with other companies and protection of company’s investments are also dependent on the regulatory processes. Thus, the role of regulation is not only in the development of an environment for technological innovation but also in determining the type of innovations happening in a system. A liberal regulatory framework will facilitate companies for exploring risky ideas and hence promote radical technological innovations, while regulation that emphasises on continuity of service and improvement in the existing standards may promote incremental innovations by skilled manufacturers (Brownsword and Somsem 2009).
Although the institutional support for research has been high, the regulatory authorities have remained sceptical regarding the introduction of GM-based food crops in India. The result of this scepticism is evident in the ongoing moratorium on the release of GM food crops. The committees that have reviewed the possibility of introducing GM food crops in India have unequivocally rejected the idea based on the lack of capacity building and unpreparedness of the system to manage the risks associated with the technology. The two committees, Jairam Ramesh Report (2010) and Sopory Committee (2012) had implicitly supported the concerns about safety and species intermixing raised by various groups of scientists, progressive farmers and civil society activists and vindicated the moratorium placed on conducting new field trials. The Parliamentary Standing Committee on Agriculture; and Parliamentary Standing Committee on Science and Technology, Environment and Forests (PSCST) in their reports in 2012 and 2017, respectively, had pointed at the flaws in structure and process of assessment of the impact of GM crops for environmental release. In response to a public interest litigation, the Technical Expert Committee set up by the Supreme Court of India evaluated the regulatory framework and supported the continuation of the ongoing moratorium on the environmental release of GM food crops because of unpreparedness of system to deal with the associated risks (Technical Expert Committee 2013). In addition, the focus of policy attention has been on risk management; specifically, environmental and technological risk. Historically, risk analysis conducted in social sciences focused on quantifying and understanding the magnitude and causes of public perceptions and concerns regarding the risk by utilising quantitative or qualitative methods (Sjoberg 2000). In the case of GM crops, the nuances from these studies can be useful for conflict resolution.
The government has been unable to clearly articulate their responses to convince those who have questioned the suitability of this technological intervention. Only one argument springs out to justify the introduction of GM crops, i.e. growing population needs more food to survive (Qiam 2001; Qaim 2009; Chaturvedi and Arora 2014; FAO 2015a, b). This argument holds little to no water for the public as tonnes of agricultural produce procured by the public distribution scheme rots away in the absence of proper storage and distribution mechanisms (NAAS 2019). Improving shelf life is not going to matter if the storage facilities cannot shield the produce from natural elements.
Over the years, many issues have come up, and different regulatory agencies have engaged in the management of technology, subsequently defining their roles and positions in the web of agencies. Looking at these events and the agencies involved have helped us to place these important stakeholders on a map that provides a bird’s eye view perspective of the regulatory landscape. Figure 11.1 presents the map with the important agencies involved in regulation and development of GM crops in India.
Notice that there is no emphasis on monitoring and review of yields and performance of crops; this is one of the major issues pointed out by the committees that have reviewed the regulatory system (Lalitha et al. 2009; ICAR 2012; Banerjee 2018). Additionally, there is apparent compartmentalisation of responsibilities among the different bodies. However, this distribution of functions is yet to result in a streamlined conveyor of regulation for development, assessment and commercialisation of new crops. In the next section, we look at these bodies, their proposed functions and their actions in the past, before connecting it to regulation and governance literature to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of past exercises in GM crop development in India. Our understanding of the innovation processes has been greatly informed by the study of system of innovation framework (Xue and Zhang 2006). This strategy and conceptual approach require qualitative methodologies to determine the sources of frustration, individual level of knowledge and the associated perception of risk, in order to interpret the associated underlying social, organisational and political processes (Gregory and Sattrfield 2002; Brownsword and Somsem 2009). The approach contrasts with previous attempts such as the traditional Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development’s (OECD) approach to technological change and innovation, which analysed resource inputs and system outputs from the research and development (R&D) system based on a narrower interpretation of innovation systems. In the traditional approaches, innovative activities of a few types are noticed while others are overlooked. This narrow focus on R&D is one of the major shortcomings of the traditional approach to innovation (Fischer 2000).
3.2 Legal Framework on GM Crops in India
To understand these issues comprehensively, it is necessary to first understand in detail the legal framework and debates around these crops.
3.2.1 Core Regulatory Setup
The evolution of laws regarding the development and release of GM organisms has happened in response to the emerging controversies over time. The Environment Protection Act, 1986 forms the basic framework, which has been used by Ministry of Environment and Forest & Climate Change (MoEF&CC), Department of Biotechnology (DBT) and the Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) in regulating this technology. Table 11.1 presents the salient features of the important laws under which the GM crops are regulated.
Any transgenic crop cannot be introduced and commercialised in India without receiving environmental clearance under 1989 ‘Rules for Manufacture, Use, Import, Export and storage of hazardous microorganisms/Genetically Engineered Organisms or Cells’ notified under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986. The research, large-scale applications of GMOs and hazardous microorganism (GM or otherwise) are covered under the biosafety regulatory frameworks issued by the MOEF in 1989. Presently, there are six committees under the rules of 1989 constituted by the DBT. These include the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee (GEAC), the State Biotechnology Coordination Committee (SBCC’s), District Level Committees (DLCs), the Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee (RDAC), the Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation (RCGM) and the Institutional Biosafety Committee (IBSC) (MoEF 2003). These committees have remained in the shadow of DBT and MoEF for one or the other reason.
Allegations of conflict of interest, favouritism and oversight have marred the reputation of these committees and as a result, waned the public trust in the decision these bodies take (Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017). The proposal to constitute a new independent regulatory body under the National Biotechnology Regulatory Authority Bill, 2012 has been rejected in the face of staunch opposition by NGOs and civil society (PIB 2012). Expectations from this bill were high as it would have clearly defined the union and state jurisdiction and their respective responsibilities for decision-making in the regulation of GM crops in India (Choudhary et al. 2014).
3.2.2 Supplementary Setup
Early on in the acknowledgement of the possible bio-safetyFootnote 4 risks associated with the application of modern biotechnology, provisions have been developed under the National Biological Diversity Act 2002 to deal with the unforeseen risks. Under the Act, an autonomous body is formed and is known as the National Biodiversity Authority (NBA) at national level and state level biodiversity board at state level. The authority functions as an advisory body, undertaking facilitative and regulatory roles for the Government of India. It deals with issues about conservation of biodiversity and sustainable use of biological resources. The authority is also mandated to ensure fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of biological resources (website: https://nbaindia.org/).
Many new bodies had to assume the responsibility of managing certain aspects of GM crop regulation. The most noticeable of these were the Director General of Foreign Trade (DGFT), Competition Commission of India (CCI), Food Safety and Standard Association of India (FSSAI) and the Central Information Commission (CIC).
Even the judiciary, including the Supreme Court of India, had to get involved amid tensions between the technology holding companies, the government and the civil society activists to decide on the proper mechanisms of governance. Allegations of bio-piracyFootnote 5 and bio-profiteeringFootnote 6 against MNCs by NGOs and activists were found to be valid by investigations ordered by the court. The spat between the government and MNCs around the royalty or trait fee paid by local seed companies to Mahyco Monsanto Biotech (India) for using its technology, pushed government price interventions and litigation to check the exploitative policies of MNCs. Over recent years, more issues related to consumer safety and environmental sustainability have come up. This has contributed to the uncertainty associated with the use of GM crops among the stakeholders. In a recent study including various stakeholders and conducted across different selected states of India, we observed that there is a need to further develop the clarity on regulations for research, testing and use of GM crops (Kanaujia and Bhattacharya 2018). Labelling is one such issue, where the FSSAI has framed the Food Safety and Standards (Labelling and Display) Amendment Regulations 2018.Footnote 7 These regulations specified threshold levels for labelling requirements of GM foods to be sold in the Indian markets (Banerjee 2018). Intellectual property and patent rights are another class of issues, which pertain to sustainability, and economic viability of the technology for the agricultural sector. Indian agriculture is a source of livelihood for rural marginal farmers (Vigani and Olper 2013, Nuziveedu Seeds Ltd. and Ors. vs Monsanto Technology LLC and Ors. 2018). These farmers depend on government subsidies and other forms of monetary support for their crops. In light of India’s socioeconomic background, this framework of privatisation of new seeds through patents is a major problem that needs to be addressed before the introduction of GM crops.
3.2.3 Research and Development
Indian Council of Agricultural Research (ICAR), Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR), Central and State Agriculture universities are the primary locations/institutions where research on development and performance of GM varieties have been carried out. However, most of the GM crops developed are yet to secure approval for release in fields. The government had pushed a vocal agenda on GM adoption in agriculture in the recent past. National Institution for Transforming India (NITI) Aayog in a statement in 2016 had called for allowing GM crops in agriculture.
As a part of its strategy to bring a Second Green Revolution, India must return to permitting proven and well tested GM technologies with adequate safeguards.
The research and development of GM plants are motivated by the quest for self-sufficiency agriculture because of (1) Sustainable Development Goal of Zero Hunger and (2) Economic goal of low food inflation. In addition to these motivations, international obligations also affect the governance activities. For instance, being a signatory to the Cartagena protocol, the government needs to protect the genetic diversity of plants and animals and ensure that agricultural intervention such as the GM crops does not present any risk to the local biodiversity (World Bank and OECD 2016).
3.2.4 International Collaboration and Information Dissemination
Several international institutions have worked continuously for developing cross-country collaboration and national capacities in the management of genetically modified organisms. Regulation of technology has been one of the agenda for many international organisations. In fact, the regulation and facilitation of international cooperation for technology development and use were the reasons behind the formation of some of the oldest international organisations (Wessel 2011). In the case of GM plants, Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations is one such body. It promotes the use of a nine-digit alphanumeric code as a unique identifier of any new transgenic variety. Available in its bio-track product database, the OECD’s Unique Identification for transgenic plants is another such identifier, available for each transgenic plant approved for commercial use (OECD 2006). It is a product database maintained and accessible from various platforms (namely, FAO, OECD and Convention on Biodiversity) to allow the “regulatory authorities and other interested stakeholders to easily access and share basic information on products derived from the use of modern biotechnology” (FAO 2015a, b) United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) had funded a 3-year-long project with MoEF for the Indian states to “educate a variety of stakeholders on biosafety and India’s commitments, under international treaties, to treat GMOs responsibly” (The Hindu 2016; MoEF&CC 2018–19). The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications (ISAAA) has also come up with reports about the status of GM crops grown worldwide (Vigani and Olper 2013).
4 Discussion
The development of the policy landscape for the adoption and commercialisation of GM crops has been punctuated with controversies on decisions of the government to allow open field trials in Bt brinjal and GM mustard. Several committees also evaluated the regulatory options and recommended actions for allowing or banning the field trials of GM crops. Their recommendations have not translated into policy actions and regulatory framework for the evaluation of GM crops is still found lacking. New regulatory bodies have entered the governance space, but there has been little to no impact on their introduction. The efforts that these new bodies have made have not taken into account the recommendations from the previous review committees. The draft regulations formulated have not come into effect and have failed to include important stakeholders such as seed corporations, farmers and consumers into the discussions. Responsible risk management for public safety requires institutions to consider many factors when making decisions. Factors such as technological and environmental risks cannot be the sole dictators. A proper risk management plan for the future is crucial in handling these radical technologies. In such cases, public participation in the decision-making process is vital to ensure fair and democratic risk assessment and management (Moon and Balasubramanian 2004). Public engagement can be a process, which addresses the opaque public information campaigns that often leave stakeholders frustrated and dissatisfied.
Individual risk perceptions can influence (and be influenced by) trust in institutions, personal knowledge, experience and understanding of the phenomenon of concern (Gregory and Sattrfield 2002; Sjoberg 2000; Poortinga and Pidgeon 2003). Aspersions about manipulated performance reports from the GM crops evaluation and appraisal committees have placed a question mark on the efficacy of the existing regulatory system (Rajya Sabha Secretariat 2017). Public trust also declined as the instances of faulty or incompetent regulation of research projects such as Bikaneri Bt cotton, GM soy and mustard have surfaced. In 2003, the Ministry of Environment and Forest had released a white paper detailing the performance of Bt cotton and the status of its regulation in 2002 (MoEF 2003). Following this paper, most of the studies about the performance of Bt cotton have had individual researchers (Lalitha et al. 2009; ICAR 2012; Qaim 2009; Warrier and Pande 2016). The lack of transparency in the evaluation and monitoring of crop performance fuels the concerns about environmental safety and economic viability of this technological intervention. Apprehensions of civil society about the effects of GM crops have grown more significant as a result of many litigations and instances of incompetent/ineffective regulation. The conflict between Monsanto Mahyco Biotechnology Ltd. and the government regarding the pricing of GM traits, royalty payments etc., has created an atmosphere of distrust between the parties.
The inability of institutional mechanisms to address farmer welfare in regions where Bt cotton is grown is one of the reasons behind the public anticipation of risk. Several participatory frameworks have been developed and tested for implementation of technologies. However, the decision-makers at institutions responsible for evaluating and managing risks associated with new technologies have to rely on their experience, in the absence of enough practical recommendations from research on diverse perspectives about the technologies. The most notable challenges to regulation of radical technologies that involve human health include mitigating (1) ‘strong vested interests of parties trying to use the deliberative process to sway the discussion or, ultimately, the outcome’, (2) ‘accountability to the participants for the outcome of the deliberation when the deliberative process is only one input into the decision-making process or if the final decision is several years into the future’, and (3) ‘building an infrastructure of civic deliberation within communities and public institutions’(Abelson et al. 2003). The public perceptions about the risk associated with new technologies and their trust in institutions have evolved with the changing nature of the relationship between technologies and society. Due to this evolving perception, many previously established approaches to institutional decision-making may no longer be appropriate for current decision-making processes (Morrison 1998). Thus there remains a need for objective research in this field.
5 Recommendations and Conclusions
5.1 Developing a System to Promote Innovations in Agriculture
It is not important that the solution to the problem of GM food crops be in regulations directly intended for them. Many other peripheral activities indirectly linked to the problem can also address the apprehensions regarding their adverse effects. First, let us discuss the actions directly related to the GM crop debate. The Economic Survey, 2016–17 suggested a decision-making matrix for regulators to allow GM seeds if they don’t have terminator gene or high cost and have any of the following properties: (1) disease and pest resistant, (2) resistant to variation in moisture and soil, (3) longer shelf life, (4) shorter crop duration, (5) non-food/tree format crops (Economic Survey 2016). Domestic institutions and companies rely on technology purchased or licenced from large MNCs while there is very low to none in-house R&D undertaken on the development of indigenous varieties. NITI Aayog, in its three-year agenda for development, has recommended the government to encourage domestic institutions and companies to pursue GM research (NITI Aayog 2017).
5.2 Capacity Building Through Existing Systems
Indirect interventions include utilising the existing national education infrastructure for capacity building in the field of research. The Indian agriculture extension services provide informal education and training to farmers, both men and women. Currently, their agenda is to change farmers’ outlook towards their agricultural problems, and villagers’ outlook towards economic and health issues. This is done via individual counselling by experts and trained workers at Krishi Vigyan Kendras (KVKs), Group counselling at village seminars and field visits; publicising government magazines/periodicals, mass media such as TV or radio programmes, e-technology through mobile applications, web portals, SMS, etc. Agriculture Technology Management Agencies (ATMAs) started in 1998 by ICAR, agri-clinics by private individuals (usually, agri. graduates) are some of the other notable programmes that can be used for monitoring, training and developing awareness among the farmers. Local participation of progressive farmers, self-help groups (SHG) and Primary Agricultural Cooperative Societies (PACS) and seed/fertiliser traders can act as major facilitators in maximising the reach of these programmes. A well-trained population of farmers and villagers will not only improve the efficiency of agricultural activities but also serve as a monitoring and evaluation network for new crop varieties (of GM or non-GM type). This will address a major problem of on-field monitoring of crop performance.
5.3 Investment in Alternate Technologies
Along with the push on GM crops, other progressive farming methods also need to be considered in improving the yield of crops. Instead of focussing solely on productivity, the researchers at government-funded laboratories must also seek to develop plants with traits such as better taste, aroma, appearance, shelf life, calorie, nutrient, antioxidants, etc. This would also address the problem of poor farmer income through value addition. Furthermore, a tight control on the prices of GM seeds and other materials required in their cultivation is crucial for ensuring that small farmers can also adopt them with as much ease as the large farmers. Another step towards reducing the risk in agriculture is to shift from a largely food grain production-based system to include pulses, oilseeds, horticulture, etc. Together these changes can create an ecosystem capable of managing risks and extracting highest returns from new technological innovations.
Notes
- 1.
Bt stands for Bacillus thuringiensis, a soil bacteria from which the gene Cry is taken for the cotton plant.
- 2.
Estimates of 2017 by the latest ISAAA report 2018 as available on May 12, 2020.
- 3.
‘Additionality is the property of an activity being additional. It is a determination of whether an intervention has an effect, when the intervention is compared to a baseline. ‘Interventions’ can take a variety of forms, but often include economic incentives.’ (for more detailed description see- A practical guide to adding value through non-financial support, 2015 EVPA).
- 4.
Bio-Safety:When Genetic modification of organisms are introduced into the ecosystem they can have unpredictable results. The products of such food crops may be unsafe for consumption by human and animals. In addition to this, they may also harm the soil bacteria, bees and other important organisms, thereby affecting entire food web and biodiversity. GM crop may eliminate the wild/indigenous species by cross-pollination. (for detailed description, see—Conner et al. 2003. The release of genetically modified crops into the environment, The Plant Journal 33(1), pp 19–46.)
- 5.
Bio-piracy: It is a concept similar to piracy in software, movies and other intellectual properties. When corporations use the genetic materials well known to farmers and indigenous people without sharing the benefits or paying a compensation for the genetic material it is termed as bio-piracy. Many people believe that GM technology in agriculture is ‘bio-piracy’ because of unfair patenting and patent licensing by MNCs (see Roberts R. 2000, Biopiracy: Who Owns the Genes of the Developing World?, Science Wire).
- 6.
Bio-profiteering: MNCs introduce terminator gene in their GM seeds. This makes the resultant plant sterile, thereby requiring farmers to repurchase seeds for every cropping season. Since GM crops will make wild/indigenous varieties extinct by cross-pollination, so farmer will be at the mercy of these MNCs for the future seeds.
- 7.
FSSAI Gazette Notification no. F.No. REG/11/27/BEVO-Labelling/FSSAI-2018.
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Kanaujia, A., Bhattacharya, S. (2021). Genetically Modified Crops and Indian Agriculture: Issues Relating to Governance and Regulation. In: Sudesh Ratna, R., Sharma, S.K., Kumar, R., Dobhal, A. (eds) Indian Agriculture Under the Shadows of WTO and FTAs. India Studies in Business and Economics. Springer, Singapore. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-33-6854-5_11
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