1The paper is examining the efforts to organize the host for the 1396 Nicopolis crusade, focusing the financial background, innovations in military administration and personnel and reforms in defence doctrines. It discusses of Sigismund of Luxemburg’s (1387-1437) work in frontier defence and measures to secure funds. The king has been recently treated negatively, seen as an inadequate leader who did not lead expeditions. Yet he was able to prevent a national bloodshed and did gain successes by garrisoning castles with standing forces.

2Investigating the 1390s anti-Ottoman campaigns, one is not able to consult direct sources, army mobilization, summons, pay-rolls etc. Much of the chancery documentation either perished or was destroyed after Mohács (1526), and one has to rely on indirect evidence, charter narrations, adjournment of suits (litterae prorogatoriae) or reambulatio for entering on campaign1; wills2, or a range of auxiliary evidence: rewards, installation into holdings, forfeiture, confirmations of privileges3.

3The Nicopolis host was substantial, numbering between 12,000-15,0004. It is hard to imagine how the king was able to raise it and lead a large-scale campaign for hundreds of miles and secure supplies for 8-10 weeks. Historiography have long maintained that the anti-Turkish campaigns were led by unpaid noble armies. Yet, in light of recent evidence the bulk seems to have been made up of paid baronial contingents5. The major question is how the crown was able to finance it since it was totally short of money. It will be seen that the wages were provided by mortgaged or donated royal properties.

Hungary in 1387-96: internal troubles

4After his ascension, amidst an endemic civil strife, facing a baronial opposition Sigismund was having a narrow basis. He was elected by a league, as a consort of the queen and was to take a coronation oath. He was bound to donate royal properties in exchange for support. He granted away over half of the domain, which weakened his financial background6. Armies had to be incessantly maintained along the southern fronts. Sigismund had to face a pretender, Ladislaus of Naples, who, with his followers in Bosnia cooperated with the Ottomans. In the 1380s the Bosnian warlord, Hrvoje Vukčić led forays with Turkish auxiliaries and occupied Hungarian territories7. After Kosovo Polje, with the fall of Serbia, the southern borderline regions, the marches of Temes [Timiş], the counties of Keve [Kovin], Krassó [Caraşova] were heavily plundered8. The key strongholds of Golubac and Orsova [Orşova] fell. The flourishing Szerém region [Srem or Syrmia] was depopulated. The loss of customs and taxes had a tragic effect on the revenues.

Defence shield–borderline fortresses

5It cost a lot even to keep up the existing frontier castles. Sigismund underlined that castles had an inevitable role in «tutelam et defensionem»9, and their maintenance and appropriate upkeep was also necessary10. Up to the 1390s few, 10-12 frontier castles had been built, and only Törcsvár [Bran] was organized as a semi-standing garrison. The others, Talmács [Talmaci], Haram [Hram/Nova Palanka], Keve [Kovin], Szörény [Drobeta-Turnu Severin] were protected by mobile field forces. On the Serbian frontier Debrc, Nepričava, Belastena were exchanged for a royal lordship with a baron11. The king appointed captains in custodia et conservatione of castles and either rendered money and men to their hands or entrusted them to upkeep and garrison the castles and rewarded them with estates12, paid with sums issued from tax returns13. E.g. in 1398 the king paid a salarium of 2,000 florins for the defence of four castles for four years14. Sums were reserved from taxes for captains «pro custodia partium inferiorum»15. The strongholds were not prepared for siege warfare but needed to be fortified and there were still no logistical bases and supply lines established, which the king had to provide for amidst the Turkish forays. Yet Sigismund started to organize a frontier defence zone, metae et confinia and kept on adding new fortresses: in 1396 it took an enormous sum to take Vidin and Rahova [Oryahovo] and lay siege to Nicopolis.

Military structure: the Angevin-age army

6«The baronies are neither hereditary nor lifelong, but are given and taken back according to the ruler’s will»16. In the Angevin period (1301-1387) army contingents were to be set up by the holders of honor dignities, temporary fiefs17. Royal counties were organized into provinces, governed from castles by warden-captains, who exercised power with their banderium or vexillum18. They were not paid but in return for mobilisation any time enjoyed the revenues that went with the district19. The banderium consisted the honor-holder’s own retinue (of familiares, lesser noble retainers, allowed a share of the incomes and partly paid stipendiarii), the nobles in the general levy and all the arms-bearing men20. The levy was regularly summoned almost each year, the nobles were obliged to wage war beyond the borders of the realm, on their own expenses, for 5-7 months, violating their ancient liberties21. As this mixed composition army proved to be less effective the crown was to levy extraordinary subsidies (collecta). The honor holder’s contingents needed to be paid in a greater proportion: as the king wrote to a captain «if the money you have is not enough, tell us how much you want, and we dispatch it to you»22. The Angevins’Western campaigns were fought by regularly paid forces, with mercenary contracts23. By the late fourteenth century paid stipendiarii were strongly preferred in defence24. In 1380 King Louis I paid English archers at Törcsvár25.

Army structure in the early reign of Sigismund: growth of private paid companies

7The crown had to contribute in a greater proportion to the maintenance of the honor-holders’banderia since their revenues decreased with the granting away of royal domain26. Sigismund was less able to enforce them to raise their banderia. The incomes of the honors were turned for the lords’private retinues27. Few followers remained who would take up arms free of charge. The wardens did only go to war if they received salarium28. Most frontier wardens asked extra amounts even to keep their positions. There was a difference made between the honor holders who receive our pay («pecuniam habent»), from those receiving only the revenues of the county, «comitatus habent»29. The retinues were in the first place filled with members of the kindred, familiares, consanguinei, fratres or clientes proximi as well as lesser noble servitores, though both groups served for pay or allowances30, but they were differentiated from mercenaries addressed as strenui or stipendiarii, who also involved foreigners, mainly Czechs31. The prelates also raised «vexillo propriis suis sumptibus»32. The retainers were paid pro eorum subsidio in silver, under fixed conditions, e.g. a heavy man-at-arms served for 1 florin per week33. In the campaigns of 1389-96 the forces were mostly made up of paid baronial contingents34. The king contracted with entrepreneur captains for lances, lancea or gleve, i.e. a heavily armed knight, and 2-3 adjoining lightly armed horse-archers (pharetrarii)35. In the 1389 campaign 16 baronial vexilla took part, ranging from 10 to 250 lances36. The warden of Szörény received three times as much salary as normal in 1395, and was rewarded with a mortgage for 2,000 florins37. Imre Marcali fought with 140 lances in propriis sumptibus et expensis38, but was rewarded with royal estates. Even the regulations of the king’s political league, the Order of the Dragon stipulated that he provide the barons with «iuvamina et subsidia pro defensione regni»39. The growth of mercenaries is proved by the increase of the personal names «stipendiarius» (zsoldos) in Hungarian40. In the early 1390s the private banderia were directly hired by the treasury and allocated pay from the ordinary revenues, first from tax returns, then from alternative sources41. In 1395 the chapter of Lelesz [Leles] was ordered to hand money over to a captain42. Or, wages in sortem solucionis gentium were to be reserved de pecunia lucri camere by the captains themselves43. Additional sums were issued when needed through pay-roll masters44. Some armies had their own masters who had «pecunia ratione expeditionis exercitus» at their disposal45. He was commissioned to supervise the army, oversee the equipment minutely, the proportion of knights and archers, etc46. Or, the king commissioned entrepreneur captains, mostly the dignitary holders to raise a retinue, but they received pay afterwards47. The king directly employed foreign mercenaries (Poles, Czechs and Germans) on a long term, e. g. with John, Duke of Mazovia for a year48. The average banderia totalled in the range of 75-120 professionals49. Some included infantrymen50. Banderia were frequently paid in salt, allocated from royal mines51. The chancery did spell out «the soldiers’salt»52.

8The troops sub vexillo regio were organized through household knights53. In the 1389-1390 campaigns the bulk of them served54. Most of them however did not have an own banderium55, but fought themselves, or possibly with a few lesser noblemen. They were also rewarded in a way or another, sometimes received stipendium, but mostly royal properties, mortgages or donations56.

The general levy

9Although Sigismund experimented with summoning the general levy, he complained of their inefficiency: «They appear on crutches rather than with arms, more like beggars than warriors», they should «at least have bows and arrows»57. «Our strength and that of all of our gentlemen of the realm appear to have declined»58. However, as the threat intensified, he was bound to rely on even the inefficient noble soldiers, and summon them first in 139259, then in 1394, 1395, 1396, 1398, 1399 and 140060. In fact, he occasionally summoned the levies of certain, mostly borderline counties61. He was bound to demand the nobles to do their obligation beyond the borders «tempore maxime necessitatis»62. He ordered all exercituales to rise fully equipped on pain of forfeiture of their properties63. Heavy fines were imposed against the disobendient64. Yet he could not in fact hope to have large number of nobles enrolling for service65. In 1397, it was decreed that an exemption was possible to be purchased, though it did not succeed66. It was not until 1411 that the punishments against insumision were in fact severely enforced67. The king often pardoned criminals sentenced to death on condition of fighting «cum propriis suis sumptibus et expensis»68. He also sentenced those who clandestinely left the army to the loss of nobility69. The levy militias did not fight totally free of charge but were rewarded with estates later on. County noblemen were ordered to take part in castle constructions, paid or rewarded70. However, if it was possible, the king kept the levy only in reserve71. Nevertheless, the nobles, even in the paid scheme, were unwilling to serve.

Campaigns from 1389 to 1396

10Sigismund realised that the incursions could have been effectively repulsed only with counter-attacks beyond the frontier. He led campaigns into the confines, sometimes fighting against two or three pronged attacks. The king was several times personally present, spent 2-3 months, wintered in the frontier, but more regularly the wardens of the marches gained captaincy72. Although most victories were smaller, the retaliatory assaults prepared the basis for the grand enterprise. In 1389, learning the news of the Kosovo Polje defeat, Sigismund moved to Serbia with a preventive purpose and captured castles, with which being now under Hungarian control the Turks could not reach the border73. The districts of Macsó [Mačva], Szörény and Temes were made into military zones under the supervision of wardens. In 1389-91, the marcher lords of Temes, Macsó and Szörény as well as the sheriff of the Székelyek [Szeklers, comes Siculorum] led assaults and took part in royal campaigns74. Most of the banderia were paid75. In 1392, Sigismund exacted the levy, mobilized 12 banderia and forced the main body of the sultan withdraw76. It was a longdistance and large-scale campaign, the army wintering in the frontline for months.

11Sigismund set forth to have his neighbours involved in the anti-Ottoman struggle as protégés. Yet the buffer state system and the struggle against the pro-Ottoman tribute-paying Balkan warlords hard-pressed the treasury.

Ordinary revenues

12The country faced severe financial difficulties. The ordinary revenues did not seem to have been sufficient for campaigns. The golden and silver mines started to get exhausted in the 1380s. Between 1385-96 a proportion of state revenues were not collected in large areas in the south. The ordinary revenues, estimated to 300-320,000 florins needed addition since they were used up in defence.

War expenses

13There survived only one pay-roll and army register from a 1410 Polish campaign, on the basis of which we might reconstruct army composition, numbers and wages94. The contingents of the captains numbered 100 to 150 lances, the other 4 barons mostly had about 40-60, but the bulk were made up of the 20-25 lances of county sheriffs and milites aulici. This army totalled 1,110 lances, 3,300-4,400 men (1,110 knights and 2,190/3,290 archers)95. They were paid for two months, 10 florins per lance, that is, 6 for a knight and 2 for archers. The king paid 22,000 florins, 7% of the annual revenue. The army were paid out in cloth, «cum draperye et pannis», of Kassa [Košice]96. The soldiers sold it along the return route at rates favourable and making profits for the king.

14On average, a lance was paid 10-20 florins, and within the lance a knight received 7 florins, and the archers 3 fl each97. For a two-month, medium-scale campaign with 1,500 knights and 3,000 archers the king needed 39,000 florins (i.e. 14 fl for 1 knight = 21,000 fl for 1,500 knights; 6 fl for archers = 18,000 fl for 3,000 archers), which consumed 12.5% of the annual budget, not to mention supplies, horses, etc.98. The costs of the 1396 army, 3,000 knights and 9,000 archers, paid for 10 weeks amounted to 120,000 fl (i.e. 7 x 2,5 x 3,000 = 52,500 fl; 3 x 2,5 x 9,000 = 67,500), running to 40% of the annual revenues.

Extraordinary revenues

15The crown was bound to have recourse to extraordinary war taxes. Already the Angevin kings imposed subsidia, pronounced «pro stipendiariis»99. In 1323, it was 1/8 of a mark (250 g silver) per peasant holding100; then in 1332 was raised 8 times higher101. It was four times higher than the seigneurial rent. Later on it became almost regular and constant, 1 florin, i. e. equalling 1 mark of silver.

16Sigismund’s extraordinary revenues can be estimated to 160-180,000 florins per year. The bulk was made up of taxa extraordinaria, but were only levied ten times, putting the yearly average very low103. The king might have been only able to get the consent of the council to levy collecta if he rewarded them with properties. In 1387, a one-seventh property tax was imposed on peasants and townsmen104. The sheriffs were ordered to put the collected money at the disposal of captains105. This was much heavier than the tithe or the 10% seigneurial rent106. It was promised to be one-time but was followed in 1394 another one of half florin per porta, i.e. three times as much as the annual royal tax107. It was repeated in 1395108 but became more regular after Nicopolis (in 1397, 1399, 1415, 1416, 1417, 1432 and 1434)109. The subsidy ran to 1/2 fl 21 denarius in 1399, and was even doubled, 1 fl, more than 5-6 times greater than the royal tax by the end of the reign110. Sigismund also ordered the conscription of peasant families111.

17Special extraordinary taxes were levied on cities from 1395112. Sopron and Pozsony were imposed 2,000 florins each while their annual tax was 400113. Sopron paid 800-1000 florins per year, double its normal tax, «per occasione stipendiorum». The cities were even asked to pay extra amounts114. On average, they had to pay an equivalent of their normal taxes. They were occasionally to hand over money «ratione stipendiariorum» to captains115. Kassa was to give about 6-800 fl116. Eperjes [Prešov] was to pay 400 florins117, Kolozsvár [Cluj] 200, Bártfa [Bardejov] 800-1,200118, Körmöcbánya [Kremnica] 300 fl119 and Zágráb [Zagreb] 40 marks of silver120, Pozsony paid well over 3000 florins121, Nagyszombat [Trnava] alike122. Sometimes extra subsidies were levied, e.g. for galleys123, or, «pro tuicione et conservatione castri», or if the king was in arrears with wages124. It might be estimated that the cities yielded in extra subsidies taxes at least the equivalent of their normal taxes, i.e. 30,000 fl.

Donations of royal domain, loans and mortgages

18Baronial banderia were largely financed by donations of royal property125. Even military wardens received now grants as not being able to repulse the attacks with their own forces, and bound to use their own money to recruit extra troops126. The wardens of Temes received castle lordships in 1390-1392127. The wardens of Szörény and Macsó laid preventive assaults on their own expenses, but made out their bills in no time128. However, as the Turkish pressure intensified fewer barons undertook to fight even on the king’s money and Sigismund gave away larger properties to instigate them. In 1391, only three banderia fought129. Some lords exchanged their southern estates; some wardens resigned from offices130. The king increased the rewards and gave away escheated or confiscated estates and extorted properties from collateral heirs: on the 1392 campaign there appeared now nine barons131.

19The crown took substantial loans, especially «ad expeditionem contra... Turcorum»132, and «pro salario», or «pro tuitione confiniorum ab insultibus Turcorum fienda»133, as well as «pro defensione confiniorum regni»134 and «pro conservatione castrorum», «pro tuitione castri in confiniis»135. Nevertheless, huge loans were taken for general defence concerns, but the narration or the context or other indirect evidence help us define the enterprises for which they were allotted136. Between 1387 and 1396 the king took loans totalling over 60,000 florins, which might seem an enormous amount, but in comparison, in 1427 the upkeep of Belgrade alone amounted to 12,000 florins and lesser fortresses needed 1,200-1,600 per year. Sigismund has been negatively treated for extravagant prodigality and lavishly taking enormous loans also for his own daily expenses. Yet, it is not entirely true, since 97% of the 770,000 florins he borrowed in 50 years were explicitly turned to defence costs137.

20As surety, the king mortgaged entire lordships, totalling for 500,000 fl. during his reign, often for unlimited time138. He mortgaged whole principalities: Brandenburg for 565,000 fl and Neumark for 63,200 fl139 as well as 15 cities and 1 lordship for 100,000 fl to Poland140. The sureties were soon to be donated away as perpetual heredity as the crown not being able to redeem them141. Later on, he pledged castles for almost each campaign142. The crown being in arrears with stipendia mortaged castles to the castellans themselves143. The dignitary holders were to be paid with properties: the voivod of Transylvania received 8 castle lordships in 1398144. The Palatine was granted Liptó county in 1406 for war expenses145. Properties were even donated away in advance in return for future service146. The crown did even sell estates for cash and granted royal domain towns to war leaders147.

Pledge, lease and sale of royal revenues and monopolies

21Taxes and various ius regale revenues, mines, mints, customs, dues were either obligated for assurance of loans, leased out for a lump sum sometimes years in advance or even donated away. The revenues of whole counties, mints and salt mines were assigned to wardens to pay their armies148. First, some of the gold and silver mines and mints were leased out on a long term to entrepreneurs, Italians or Germans, for a lump sum, for years in advance149. Occasionally whole gold mints were leased, e. g. Buda in 1402 e.g. for 8,000 florins150. The king took up loans from foreign merchants, and paid them not only with long-term leases, but offices in the financial administration151. In some cases the offices of mining, minting and customs chambers were concentrated in the hands of a banker as comes monetarum nostrarum, being granted exclusive privileges152. The Medicis gained control over the mines and minting chambers in 1393-95 since they provided credits in advance to the king153. The copper mines were pledged to the Medicis between 1387-1391154. From 1395, the Italians were followed by Germans in the comes monetarum office, largely the representatives of Nuremberg bank houses155. Mark of Nuremberg «brought the capital» of the consortium of the Flextorfer-Kegler-Kromer-Zenner banks to Sigismund’s hands156. In 1404-1405, he received authority over all the money exchanges in the country, as comes tricesimatorum ac urburarum et cusionis monetarum nostrarum157.

22The king increased the number of mints: Nagybánya [Baia Mare], Offenbánya [Baia de Arieş] and Nagyszeben started to issue golden florins. He sought to increase the gold production and issuance of currency but the mines’output fell from the late Angevin age level of 3,000 kg per year to to 700 kg in the 1430s158.

23Monopolies were sold or leased to set up mints in cities, in return for which the king asked extra, increased extraordinary taxes. Pozsony received a licence in 1430 and contracted a chamber leasehold with the treasury159. The king also gave licences to establish money exchanges in cities, for which he received rents. Pozsony was granted to exchange money in a huge territory of 8 counties and 11 cities, including two of his commercial rivals160.

Seizure of ecclesiastical revenues and property

24Special extraordinary taxes were levied on the clergy from 1395. On certain occasions some chapters were taxed161. The exacted money was directly spent to recruit mercenaries162. It was enacted in 1397 that the king would seize half of all ecclesiastical revenues for the defence of the frontiers, estimated to 100,000 fl per year163. In theory, it was temporary, «as long as this present war with the pagans lasts»164. Yet it was kept on being seized during the whole reign, and special exactores were entrusted to collect the money directly. Beyond that, in 1398 another «annual» ecclesiastical tax was imposed and in 1405 the tithe of the bishopric of Zagreb was seized for stipendia165. Furthermore, the bishops themselves often seized their tithes to pay their own mercenaries166. There were several other ecclesiastical revenues (e. g. ius spolii) assigned to captains and wardens and special subsidies imposed on the clergy (e. g. a fiftieth was envisaged in 1434)167. A range of bishoprics were being kept vacant and governed by lay vicarii for years.

Chamber’s profit: debasement of the coinage

25The crown had recourse to devaluation almost continually. In 1387 Sigismund issued a «denar with the small cross», of an average weight 0.42 g, which soon failed169. 1 golden florin was equivalent to 240 silver denars in 1387 and 300 in 1390. There was an Angevin silver penny in circulation that kept its value on a stable level170. However, the crown asked taxes in the «pure and genuine» Angevin money and not the devaluated one171. The king consciously kept the old Angevin money in circulation, called bardus (battle-axe) by the attribute of St. Ladislaus, whose figure was minted on the verso172. This was addressed as «pura et vera pecunia, bonorum denariorum»173, as opposed to ac praesens moneta utilis nove nostra174. People trusted it more, 400 of it were worth a mark, it had a greater fineness and silver content (666–875‰)175.

26In 1390, the king, while leaving the circulation of the old money, issued a new «denar with the long cross», weighing 0.52 g, 100 of which being worth 1 florin176. For a few years this seemed to have stabilized, and there was only 30% debasement, but after 1403 it was debased by 60, then by the 1420s by 300%177. But after 1403, the king asked the tax in the 1390s denar and not in the newer devaluated ones178. But even the new denar’s fineness (593‰) did not reach in practice the officially fixed level of 800‰179. Its net weight was only 0.4 g, i.e. less than half being not silver. The king manipulated with the currency, regularly debased and withdrew money, that is why the old bardus was used in transactions, and in counting the value of the florin, even by the king180.

27Debasement was applied to a greater extent in the smaller currency, the parvus, of an average weight of 0.32 g, minted with a consciously increased nominal value181. It had a small silver content, 353‰ and the copper content was greater thus was popularly called «communis moneta de cupro»182. It got devaluated immediately and withdrawn but re-issued with a high nominal value, maintaining a constant profit. The ducat was minted on a low silver level, 187.5‰, average weight 0.225-0.25 g183. In three years it also fell drastically by 60% and was withdrawn184, and the quarting was issued, with a low silver content, of 125‰.185. The king also manipulated with this, its nominal value fell in three years 250% and its market value by 2,000%. It contained almost nothing but copper186.

28A great variety of forced loans and contributiones were also exacted. Armies were billeted in cities in exchange for their future taxes187. Kassa was ordered «to supply anything the armies might need»188. Barons were authorized to seize the taxes in advance189. Army leaders were authorized to seize provisions in cities, e.g. fish190. The privilege of ius gladii as well as market licenses were granted for cities and nobles in exchange for troops191.

The lessons of Nicopolis

29At the Diet Timişoara, in 1397, the king issued a decree that made a complete change in the military institutions. He reorganised the general levy, suspending ancient privileges192. The barons were to rise with all of their banderia, more exercituantium, whether they had a honor office or not, whenever and wherever the king required. The lesser nobles had to fight in the county banderia193. The reluctant would be liable to heavy fines. A new quota system of recruitment (militia portalis) was introduced: each landowner was to equip and lead to war one archer (pharetrarius equestris) from every 20 tenant peasant holdings. This was not an absolutely peasant army, the archers could have been raised from paid professional retainers, the number was just calculated by the tenants. Lesser nobles raised only peasant soldiers. The troops had to be supplied by the king. The obligation was reduced in 1435 to raise 3 archers upon 100 holdings.

30Although historiography has for long maintained that it was an existing institution, there is no unequivocal evidence. There are very few references for a levy of one-twentieth of the villeins194. It is a few times that it was partly applied, and not in the whole country, but in Transylvania195. Occasionally abbots, chapters were to raise soldiers «secundum connumerationem jobagionum»196, and peasants of some counties were summoned197. There were peasants fighting in the royal armies198. Some recent opinions hold that the county levy included paid peasants199. Nevertheless, the portalis army proved to be too cumbersome and disorganized to resist a major attack. Although efforts were made to revive it, the realm still relied on magnate banderia, paid by properties and mortgages. Sigismund elaborated military regulations in 1415-1417 and 1432-1433, part of which were enacted in 1435. He established frontier districts (confinia), for the defence of which allotted fixed payments and assigned baronial banderia and levies of adjacent counties200.