During the Falklands Conflict, Brigadier Julian H.A. Thompson CB, OBE (School House 1948-52) was Commanding Officer of 3 Commando Brigade, Royal Marines. In his book, No Picnic: 3 Commando Brigade in the Falklands, he described his experiences during the Falklands Conflict.
The following account by Brigadier Thompson of his own involvement in the Falklands Conflict was published in the The Shirburnian, Michaelmas 1982:
1982 started in its usual way for my Brigade with Winter training in Norway. We had not been back long, indeed the rear parties were still at sea when events started moving very fast indeed.
My telephone at home rang at 0315 hours on 2 April. It was my General who in guarded phrases told me that Argentina was about to invade the Falkland Islands. The first thought that went through my head was that the bulk of the staff were in Denmark on an exercise reconnaissance.
The first day of planning was done with the two staff officers who had remained in England, while the remainder of my staff got back as fast as they could, leaving our American, Danish and German allies amazed at their precipitate departure from their hotels at 5 o’clock in the morning.
Planning in the early stages was bedevilled by a number of factors not least a lack of intelligence, lack of shipping and on firm mission. All this got better as time went on and the first ray of light was agreed by the MOD to requisition merchant ships to augment the RN shipping.
The merchant service did splendidly throughout the campaign and did things that they would never have dreamed possible a few weeks before. I shall never forget the sight of one of our merchant ships doing a three ship re-fuelling at sea and at night as coolly as though he did it every day of his life.
Eventually we were loaded in 3 ½ days. This is not bad when one considers that we were at 7 days’ notice to move and achieved it from a standing start with one Commando actually on leave and spread from the USA to the South of France. We had also been augmented by a number of additional units notably 3rd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (3 PARA); T Battery (Shah Sujah’s Troop) a Rapier Air Defence Battery; and two troops of the Blues and Royals equipped with Scorpion and Scimitar. We were, of course, also to be joined by 2nd Battalion the Parachute Regiment (2 PARA) commanded by the redoubtable H. Jones, who brought with him another light gun battery and some more light helicopters. My Brigade totalled about 5,000 men, consisting of five commandos/battalions and four batteries of 105mm light guns plus helicopters and logistic support.
At Ascension Island we had a pause for a much-needed restow and work-up of those units not familiar with Amphibious operations. I should say a word here about how quickly we assimilated these units who are not normally part of my Brigade. We were greatly assisted by the small size of the Royal Marines and the British Army. As we are all regular forces, we know each other well and have served together frequently. A few examples will suffice: both Hew Pike (CO 3 PARA) and David Chaundler (commanded 2 PARA after H. Jones’s death) were students at the Army Staff College when I was a member of the directing staff; the 2IC of 2 PARA is a cousin of my Chief of Staff’s wife; H. Jones was Chief of Staff of the Brigade under whose command I served as a CO in Northern Ireland.
Throughout the journey south and during our stay at Ascension Island the planning continued. I was co-located in HMS FEARLESS (one of the LPDs) with Commodore Mike Clapp, the Commodore Amphibious Warfare and his staff. Admiral Woodward went ahead with the ‘flat-tops’ to establish the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ) around the Falkland Islands. At this stage the command structure was that CINCFLEET at Northwood near London was the Task Force Commander and Admiral Woodward, Mike Clapp and I were all Task Group Commanders; Admiral Woodward being “primus inter pares”. I had a direct link back to Northwood through the land Deputy to CINCFLEET, Major General Jeremy Moore. He was to land on the Falkland Islands 10 days after the initial lands as Commander Land Forces Falkland Islands (CLFFI).
The two problems uppermost in the Amphibious Task Group Commanders’ minds were:
- Where to land.
- The fact that Argentina had air superiority.
I was clear that I wanted to land where the enemy was in light strength only, because I did not have the ‘combat power’, to coin an American phrase, to storm ashore against a well-prepared enemy position. Conversely, I did not want to land so far away that it would take weeks or even months to get to Stanley possibly involving another amphibious operation.
Mike Clapp wanted a beachhead that provided a sheltered anchorage whatever the weather and protection from the air-launched Exocet.
San Carlos Water on East Falkland fulfilled both our requirements. All that now remained was to check the beach areas out for enemy and suitability. Here we were helped by an ace card held by us. Some years before, the Commander of the Royal Marines detachment on the Falkland Islands had carried out an extensive survey of most likely beaches in the Island. Only he has this information and he was in HMS FEARLESS with us.
Special Forces had been operating on both East and West Falklands since 1 May. It says a great deal for their skill that not one patrol was captured in the 21 days preceding our landing, although the Argentines were looking for them continually.
At about midnight on the night of 20/21 May 1982, Captain David Pentreath in HMS PLYMOUTH led the amphibious shipping down Falkland Sound and the landing started. Surprise was achieved and it was a complete success.
At this stage we had not achieved air superiority and for the next five or so days the Royal Navy was to fight, what in my opinion was, the crucial battle of the campaign. Until the Argentine Airforce had been reduced by attrition to a level at which it could not influence the land battle, we, the land forces could not operate in strength outside the air defence umbrella around the bridgehead except at night.
The decisive battle of the campaign was won by the gallantry and skill of the Frigates in Falkland Sound and San Carlos and by the Harrier pilots. They achieved the necessary attrition but not without considerable loss to themselves. Thereafter the Argentine Airforce could not prevent us from winning. Although of course, they were subsequently to inflict casualties at Bluff Cove when they bombed two LSLs unloading troops and had the temerity to bomb my Headquarters with 400kg SNAKE EYE bombs, less than 24 hours before the surrender.
I moved my HQ ashore in the early hours of D+1 and thereafter commanded from my CP which moved forward as we advanced out of the beachhead.
The land fighting started in earnest with the battle of Darwin and Goose Green. The details are generally known, but this was a critical battle, won by the tremendous fighting spirit of 2 PARA against what turned out to be odds of 2-1. H. Jones was killed halfway through the battle clearing an enemy position and has subsequently been awarded a posthumous Victoria Cross. In summary they cleared a position about 6 kilometres long defended by well dug-in troops who were supported by three 105mm guns, mortars and light air defence guns. After 36 hours the enemy surrendered. Only then did we realise what we had been up against and what I had asked 2 PARA to do.
I should explain that at no stage in the campaign did we ever have any air photographs of enemy positions showing defensive locations, gun positions and so forth. It was simply not possible to take photographs of the required standard from the equipment fitted to the Harriers. There were, of course, no other aircraft available to take air photographs.
At the same time that I ordered 2 PARA to take Goose Green and Darwin, I told 45 Commando RM and 3 PARA to march out of the Beachhead to the high ground West of Port Stanley via the settlements of Douglas and Teal. At this stage we had lost all but one of our lift helicopters when Atlantic Conveyor was sunk, so half my Brigade had to walk. I ordered the seizure of the key high ground, Mount Kent, by a night helicopter operation by the SAS closely followed by 42 Commando RM. After many false starts, caused by appalling snowstorms night after night, this succeeded.
By about 2 June 1982 I had two Commandos and 3 PARA forward on the high ground dominating Port Stanley from the West. By this time CLFFI had landed and 5 Infantry Brigade had also started to land taking 2 PARA under their command.
Before my Brigade night attack on 11 June there was necessarily an enormous amount to do. 42 Commando, 45 Commando and 3 PARA patrolled intensely to gather information on the Argentine main positions. (No air photographs!) At the same time my logisticians were beavering away to get forward the necessary gun ammunition for the ensuing battle. It was 70 kilometres in a straight line from our Brigade Maintenance Area at Ajax Bay in San Carlos Water to Mount Kent. Most heavy supplies came by LSL to Teal Inlet and forward from there by helicopter. There were still not enough helicopters and never were.
With my gun lines stocked with 500 rounds per gun and my men fully briefed, my Brigade, consisting of 42 Commando, 45 Commando, 3 PARA and reinforced by 2 PARA and 1 Welsh Guards (IWG), crossed their start lines at about midnight local time (0400 Zulu) to attack Mount Longdon, Two Sisters and Mount Harriet. By first light 2 PARA (Mount Longdon), 42 Commando (Mount Harriet) and 45 Commando (Two Sisters) were firm on their objectives. 2 PARA and 1WG were dug in in reserve waiting for the next bound. The objectives were not achieved without fierce hand-to-hand fighting. The Argentine regulars and marines stayed and fought, and their officers did not run away contrary to reports in the press. For example, 42 Commando took 300 prisoners, including the CO of the Argentine Battalion, and killed 50.
The following extract from Hew Pike’s report is typical of the scene that morning on all three objectives, with light snow falling and the bitter cold wind blowing:
‘The sight of groups of young soldiers, tired, grim-faced but clearly triumphant moving through the mist to check the enemy dead, with bayonets still fixed will remain forever vivid in the memory.’
And again
‘The misty scene as dawn broke, will perhaps be the most haunting memory of this long, cold flight. The debris of battle was scattered along the length of the mountain, encountered round every turn in the rocks, in every gully. Weapons, clothing, rations, blankets, boots, tents, ammunition, sleeping bags, blood-soaked medical dressings, webb equipment, packs, – all abandoned, along with the 105mm RCLs, 120MM Mortars and .50 Browning that had given us so much trouble during darkness. The enemy dead lay everywhere, victims of shell, bullet and bayonet. The sour odour of death lingered in the nostrils long after many of these corpses had been buried, for it was a slow job, and eventually the task was abandoned when their artillery and mortars started again. The enemy bunkers provided an Aladdin’s Cave of Camel cigarettes, bottles of Brandy, huge cakes of solid cheese, and of course – bully beef! Standing amongst the shell holes and shambles of battle, and watching the determined, triumphant, but shocked, saddened faces of those who had lost their friends on the mountain, the Iron Duke’s comment was never more apt – “There is nothing half so melancholy as a battle won… unless it is a battle lost.” ‘
Forty-eight hours later, 5 Infantry Brigade, led to their start lines by my Brigade Reconnaissance Troop, attacked Tumbledown and Mount William. At the same time 2 PARA attacked Wireless Ridge under my command.
Soon after first light I joined David Chaundler, CO 2 PARA, on Wireless Ridge, with his forward company. He had seen the Argentines fleeing in hordes into Stanley. As we watched, what must have been the last enemy DFs come crashing down on Tumbledown to our right and on some of our cheeky Scout helicopters firing SS11 missiles from the ridge just to the left of us at an enemy gun position, I gave David the order to advance and then returned to my Tactical CP by helicopter. As ever on these occasions, the radio in the helicopter was not working and I had to wait until I arrived at my CP before telling the remainder of my Brigade to advance. It was all over.
I walked into Stanley behind 2 PARA with 3 PARA close on my heels and the two Commandos coming round the town to occupy the high ground in case the Argentines changed their minds. All my guns were loaded and laid on the town too as an additional precaution.
I met Chris Keeble, the Second in Command of 2 PARA in Stanley as I arrived. He said, “Isn’t it wonderful to be alive.” I could not have agreed with him more.
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