chapter 16 Artaxerxes III: King and Commander, 358–350

With satrapal revolts ended and defecting subject states recovered, the eastern Mediterranean and Anatolia were securely under imperial Persian control by the time Ochus became king (as Artaxerxes III) in 359/8.¹Close At the same time the mainland Greek world was relatively peaceful. This boded well for the resumption of the Persian effort to reconquer Egypt. However, even with Ochus’ ascent to the throne, the long Persian succession struggle was not yet entirely over, and Artaxerxes III's preoccupation with lingering succession issues delayed resumption of Persia's Egyptian enterprise for more than a half-dozen years.

Ochus had made his way to the throne through the claims of three other sons of Artaxerxes II, but thanks to an alleged total of 360 “wives,” Artaxerxes II reportedly had altogether 115 sons (Just. 10.1.1). Having a mother other than the queen was no bar to the succession, as the kingship of Artaxerxes II's own father, Darius II, had shown, and as Artaxerxes II's designation of Arsames, even before the final elevation of Ochus, indicated. This meant that Artaxerxes III, though king, still faced a number of potential rival claimants. These included not only various sons of Artaxerxes II but, given Artaxerxes’ longevity, probably also some of his grandsons. If we can trust Polyaenus’ report (7.17) that Ochus delayed announcing the death of Artaxerxes II for ten months while he circulated letters in Artaxerxes II's name commanding that Ochus be proclaimed king, it appears that although other leading candidates for the succession had perished, Ochus had not been officially designated Artaxerxes II's successor before Artaxerxes’ death. Artaxerxes may have needed ten months to secure the succession, particularly if absence from court because of the Egyptian campaign made it impossible for him to act swiftly at the time of Artaxerxes II's death. Curtius’ notice that Ochus killed off all his relatives, including eighty brothers in one day (Curt. 10.5.23; Just. 10.3.1; Val. Max. 4.2.7; cf. Plut. Artax. 30.5), points to the need for decisive action on Ochus’ part. If there was anything like that number of potential rivals at the time of Artaxerxes II's death, Ochus evidently did not have a really broad power base on which he could rely.²Close

Initially, Artaxerxes III's strength may have rested primarily on his command of the recently levied army. We may be sure that he did not disband this whole force upon returning from Egypt. According to Justin (10.3.2–4; Diod. 17.6.1), Artaxerxes III waged a Cadusian campaign soon after his accession. While the Cadusians, the object of repeated campaigns during the fourth century, were undeniably a perennially troublesome population, the new king's primary interest in waging such a war at this time was probably that it provided a pretext for retaining command of a very large force.³Close

Artaxerxes III's greatest concern must have been that no possible rival should have or acquire any military strength. Such a determination was undoubtedly behind his command in 358 that the “the satraps of the coast”—the satraps in western Anatolia—disband their mercenary forces on the grounds that they used up too much money (Schol. Dem. 4.19). By this time, the so-called Satraps’ Revolt was long over, and the still unreconciled officials Ariobarzanes and Datames had fallen to capture or assassination before Artaxerxes II's death, so imperial authority seems to have been restored everywhere in Anatolia. But Artaxerxes III knew that Datames had maintained virtual independence for years with an almost entirely mercenary force and that before this, Cyrus the Younger's mercenary force had enabled him to strike from western Anatolia and nearly seize the kingship. Probably unable to gauge with certainty the attitudes of officials in Anatolia to his kingship, Artaxerxes most likely wanted to make sure that no official had even the nucleus of a force which would allow him to act independently. With the political situation still fraught with uncertainty at the time of Artaxerxes III's accession, the royal blood of Artabazus, the grandson of Artaxerxes II who had finally assumed the satrapy of Hellespontine Phrygia some time before the old king's death, may have made Artaxerxes III wary of him in particular.

According to the scholiast on Dem. 4.19, all the satraps complied. That Artabazus was among these is attested by the availability of his mercenaries for employment by the Athenian commander Chares in 356 when Athens was campaigning in the Aegean against recalcitrant Athenian allies, Chios, Rhodes, and Byzantium (Schol. Dem. 4.19).⁴Close Artabazus undoubtedly intended to signal his loyalty by obeying Artaxerxes III's order and discharging his mercenary troops. But that was evidently not enough. We find Artabazus in “revolt” just a short time later in 356 (Diod. 16.22.1).⁵Close The most plausible explanation for this situation is that Artaxerxes tried to remove Artabazus once he gave up his mercenary army and that this drove Artabazus into rebellion. Polyaenus’ reference (7.33.2) to Artabazus’ brothers, Oxythres and Dibictus, participating with him suggests that Artaxerxes was targeting the whole family, the offspring of Pharnabazus and a daughter of Artaxerxes II.

Like Datames before him, Artabazus proved a resourceful and determined rebel. Diodorus’ notice that satraps having 70,000 troops opposed Artabazus probably involves greatly exaggerated figures, but likely indicates that Artaxerxes III dispatched the rest of the satraps in western Anatolia against Artabazus and probably supplied some of the troops they deployed (16.22.1; cf. Schol. Dem. 4.19). Only Tithraustes, satrap of Great Phrygia (and not Artaxerxes’ chiliarch, active from the 390s through the 370s),⁶Close who commanded 20,000 mostly cavalry troops (probably local levies), is mentioned by name (Schol. Dem. 4.19). But given Diodorus’ use of the plural “satraps” we may plausibly add Autophradates and Mausolus. As survivors of the recent satraps’ “revolt,” both had every reason to respond dutifully to royal directives at this time.

Having complied with Artaxerxes’ “mercenaries decree,” Artabazus initially had few forces at his disposal (Diod. 16.22.1). He did have close Greek connections, having married a Rhodian woman whose brothers Memnon and Mentor (both destined for many subsequent exploits in Persian service) were now in his entourage (Diod. 16.52.3). Perhaps one or another of these Rhodian relatives had commanded Artabazus’ mercenaries—their activities in the 340s and 330s show them to be highly skilled military figures—but once Artabazus discharged his mercenaries in response to Artaxerxes’ “mercenary decree,” Memnon and Mentor's military skills would have no significance. Nevertheless, Artabazus was lucky. Athens had recently hired most of Artabazus’ discharged mercenaries for its so-called Social War against Byzantium, Chios, and Rhodes, important states that had seceded from the alliance system known as the Second Athenian League. By the end of 356, this mercenary force was under the command of Chares, the sole Athenian commander in the Aegean after his fellow commander Chabrias (the veteran of much Egyptian service) had died in battle in 357 and other Athenian generals had returned to Athens to face charges of incompetence based on Chares’ complaints (Diod. 16.7.3–4; Nep. Chabr. 4; Dem. 20.82).⁷Close Lack of funds, however, immobilized Chares, and when Artabazus made an offer to Chares’ mercenary force, mostly if not entirely Artabazus’ own former mercenaries, Chares himself took the mercenaries into Artabazus’ service, abandoning operations in the Aegean and crossing to the Anatolian mainland to join Artabazus (Schol. Dem. 4.19; Dem. 4.24; Isoc. 8.44; Diod. 16.22.1).

Artabazus thus got back his previously discharged mercenary force and, acquired, in addition, a skilled Greek commander in Chares. Thanks to Chares, Artabazus defeated the satraps opposing him and during 355 was able to advance inland, ravaging territory in Great Phrygia.⁸Close When news of this reached Artaxerxes III, he must have seen the elements of a familiar situation taking shape: a rebel official (driven into revolt like so many others by court politics), supported by a leading Greek state—Athens in this case—which had a big fleet and aims of its own. Both Artabazus and Athens, it could be assumed, would welcome additional manpower and funds. Artaxerxes must have anticipated that, given the opportunity, the Egyptian king Nectanebo would gladly assist them in hopes of delaying any new Persian attack on Egypt.⁹Close

For Artaxerxes, there was no question of solving the problem by reconciling with Artabazus, but Artaxerxes could limit the opportunities for Egyptian mischief by ending Athenian involvement and thereby weakening Artabazus, Chares’ employer. This Artaxerxes did quickly, demanding in 355 that Athens recall Chares. Rumor spread, probably by design, that Artaxerxes was prepared to send 300 ships—that is, the typical campaign fleet from the eastern Mediterranean—into the Aegean to support Athens’ opponents. Presumably, it was Persian envoys who delivered Artaxerxes’ demand to the Athenians, and it may have been they who made references to the fleet being readied in the eastern Mediterranean (Diod. 16.22.2; P. Erzherzog-Rainer FGH 105 F4; Dem. 14.25).

The Athenians had received a similar demand in 380–379—bring Chabrias back from Egypt or else—and had complied. Now in 355, already weakened by losses in a battle off Chios with their former allies and Mausolus in early 356, and facing aggressions by Philip of Macedon (who had taken Amphipolis in 357/6 and then Pydna and Potidaea from Athens) and the possibility of similar aggressions against towns in the Thracian Chersonese by the Thracian king Cersobleptes (Diod. 16.8.1–7), the Athenians could not risk further losses should Artaxerxes send ships to operate in the Aegean. They thus acceded to Artaxerxes’ demand and recalled Chares, probably in late 355 (Diod. 16.22.2), and soon ended the Social War, abjuring further operations across the Aegean.¹⁰Close

Artabazus lost Chares as commander, but he likely still had the force that had kept loyal satraps at bay. Chares’ last service to Artabazus was to arrange a truce with Tithraustes. Whether or not Tithraustes knew of Chares’ imminent departure, he undoubtedly wanted to avoid further depredation by Artabazus’ troops. For Artabazus, the truce meant at least a temporary respite from attack, and he quickly made up for the loss of Chares by enlisting the Theban general Pammenes, who brought along 5,000 additional troops from Boeotia in 354 (Diod. 16.34.1–2).¹¹Close Fighting resumed, and thanks now to Pammenes, who defeated “the satraps” in two great battles, Artabazus was again successful.¹²Close

The situation was more and more resembling what had happened in the revolts of Datames and Ariobarzanes—military enterprises by loyal imperial officials failing repeatedly. Both previous revolts had come to an end through treachery rather than military victories. What we know about the end of Artabazus’ revolt suggests that here too betrayal or anticipated betrayal was critical. According to Polyaenus (7.33.2), Artabazus grew suspicious of Pammenes’ loyalties and arrested him before deciding to abandon his rebellion and seek refuge in Macedonia. Given Pammenes’ great importance to Artabazus, there must have been good grounds for Artabazus’ suspicion. Most plausibly, Artabazus learned of attempts by Artaxerxes III (through intermediaries) to bribe away Pammenes—we may imagine Artaxerxes promising direct subsidies to Thebes (see Diod. 16.40.1–2)—and, recognizing that Pammenes and the Thebans wanted funds more than anything and probably cared little where they got them, Artabazus concluded that he could not trust Pammenes and put him under guard (and away from his troops).

Without Pammenes and without any ready substitute, Artabazus’ prospects dimmed considerably, leaving Artabazus little alternative but flight. Philip of Macedon offered hospitality, and in 354/3 Artabazus abandoned his satrapy for Macedonia, bringing with him Memnon, one of his two Rhodian brothers-in-law (Diod. 16.52.3).¹³Close We next encounter the other brother-in-law, Mentor, in the early 340s in Egyptian service (Diod. 16.42.2). Since Mentor had been in Egypt long enough by that time to be trusted with taking 4,000 troops to Sidon on Nectanebo's behalf, we may suspect that Mentor went to Egypt soon after Artabazus fled to Macedon.

By 353, with Artabazus finally removed (albeit by flight to Macedonia rather than death), Artaxerxes III could proceed with his first Egyptian campaign as king. After the 390/89–388/7 campaign and Ochus’ putative 359 incursion, this is the most poorly documented Persian attack on Egypt in the fourth century. The fact that in 355–354 the Athenians believed the report that Artaxerxes was ready to send 300 Phoenician and Cilician ships into the Aegean against Athens’ fleet suggests that there was indeed a large Persian naval force available at this time, and this most likely indicates that Persian preparations were underway already in 355. Many of the ships may have actually been “on duty” for some time. It is likely that Tachos’ fleet had returned to Egypt after Tachos’ flight and Chabrias’ departure in 360, and there is no evidence that this fleet engaged in the struggle between Nectanebo and the Mendesian claimant. This means that Nectanebo had a sizable, intact fleet, and while continuing domestic political concerns might prevent him from dispatching any Egyptian troops outside Egypt, Nectanebo might not be so cautious about deploying the Egyptian fleet. Prudence certainly demanded that Artaxerxes make such an assumption. Thus, as had been the case in the 390s, Persian security concerns along the eastern Mediterranean coast may have prompted the assembly and maintenance of a Phoenician/Cilician security force in the early 350s, well before Artaxerxes turned to preparations for a new Egyptian campaign.

In connection with new preparations, Artaxerxes III seems to have made an innovative arrangement, installing a permanent Persian overseer to secure the staging area in and near Phoenicia against Egyptian intervention and to discourage any collusion between local rulers and the Egyptian king. Artaxerxes’ appointee was Mazaeus, who had previously assumed a satrapal or quasi-satrapal position in Cilicia as part of the restoration of imperial authority in Anatolia following collapse of the “satraps’ revolt” and termination of the Egyptian offensive. Mazaeus appears in literary sources only in 345, when Diodorus terms him “archon of Cilicia” (16.42.1), but his numbered Cilician coinage extends over at least twenty-seven years and ends with Alexander's arrival, so if we count back from the time of Alexander's arrival in 333, we can place the beginning of his role in Cilicia in 361–360.¹⁴Close In Cilicia, Mazaeus had probably assumed the maritime security responsibilities connected with Cilicia and the native dynast Tarkumuwa since the 370s (we do not know what happened to Tarkumuwa, not even whether he was still alive when Mazaeus became “archon” of Cilicia). Now, while retaining his Cilician position, Mazaeus also took on additional responsibilities, involving supervision of Phoenician affairs. Certainly, on the occasion of previous Persian preparations for Egyptian campaigns, Persian officials of various kinds had appeared at Sidon, Acco, and other nearby sites, and specially installed overseers, Hecatomnus and Iphicrates, based on Cyprus or at Acco, had looked after the security of the region while preparations were underway. But these had been temporary, and in their absence, Egyptian diplomacy, money, and sometimes military activity had disrupted Persian control of staging areas and, twice already, the whole eastern Mediterranean. The record of the last fifty years had been one of Persian failures and Egyptian successes, and, anticipating the same results even as Artaxerxes III began his own first campaign as king, rulers in the eastern Mediterranean might well be receptive to renewed Egyptian blandishments.

The evidence for Artaxerxes’ new arrangement in the Levant comes from coins on the Sidonian standard with conventional Sidonian iconography issued in the name of the Persian Mazaeus. This series began, it seems, in 353 (coins are numbered successively from years 1 to 21 of Mazaeus, 21 being 333, the time of Alexander's arrival in the eastern Mediterranean and year 1 being the first year of his office). Mazaeus had started out in Cilicia following Datames’ revolt, and there had minted at Tarsus. Year 1 of his Sidonian coins likely reflects Mazaeus’ assumption of a new role in 353, which placed him at Sidon or at least gave him good reason to use Sidon's minting facilities.¹⁵Close There is no evidence of revolt or even unrest in the trans-Euphrates region in the mid-350s, so Mazaeus’ position and his coinage are best explained on the assumption that Artaxerxes III installed him to oversee and serve as paymaster for large-scale Persian preparations for a new campaign against Egypt which were getting underway in 353.¹⁶Close The fact that Mazaeus continued to issue Sidonian coinage (with some interruptions) through the 330s indicates that the position he held was a permanent one. Although local kings like Strato remained in place, the autonomy they had enjoyed was certainly curtailed by the supervisory role assigned to Mazaeus. Just as Artaxerxes II had moved to “make Cyprus his own” in the late 390s by stationing Hecatomnus on the island, now Artaxerxes III moved to make the heretofore autonomous Phoenician cities “his own” by giving Mazaeus authority in Sidon, the main naval base among the Phoenician cities. What this amounted to militarily was an expansion of the maritime responsibilities Mazaeus was already discharging in Cilicia, or, we might say, a combination of two maritime roles, one centered in Cilicia, the other in Sidon. In addition to minting Sidonian coinage, Mazaeus continued to issue his Cilician coinage.

Artaxerxes himself intended to command the expedition against Egypt (Isoc. 5.101; Trogus, Prol. 10). His foray into Egypt in 360/359 gave him some experience with such an undertaking. Perhaps he planned to finish in person what he seems to have suspended abruptly at that time. His readiness to lead an army into Egypt in the late 350s suggests a sense of political security on his part. He had evidently secured full control of the court, had dealt in some way with the Cadusian problem, and with Artabazus’ flight to Macedonia had seen the last of the potential challengers to his kingship disappear. But Artaxerxes was still risking much politically by taking personal command of and thus direct responsibility for an Egyptian campaign. We can certainly trust the reports that he “fitted out the largest possible force” and assembled “vast multitudes of soldiers” (Isoc. 5.101–2; Diod. 16.40.3); he presumably did everything possible to ensure success. Although we have no direct evidence, we may assume enlistment of Greek mercenaries. Perhaps there is some indirect evidence for this in the great numbers of Greek mercenaries seemingly between jobs in Syria and Cilicia in the early 340s (when they flocked to Cyprus to fight on Persian behalf against rebel Cypriot cities: Diod. 16.42.8¹⁷Close).

If there were Greek mercenaries, there were certainly Greek mercenary commanders, but there is no indication of Artaxerxes’ use of any Greek in a leading command position of the sort that Iphicrates and then, for a time, Timotheus had filled under Pharnabazus. Since Artaxerxes III, the Great King himself, was going to lead the campaign in person, he may not have wanted to associate with himself any other figure who, when victory came, might be perceived as responsible for Persian success. Artaxerxes may already have seen his achievement in his Cadusian War diminished by the renown Codomannus (the later Darius III) garnered for his single-combat victory in that war (Diod. 17.6.1–2).

References to the fate of Strato of Sidon may hint at other measures connected with Persian preparations at this time. Strato's coinage indicates that his kingship continued down to 352, that is, beyond the time of Mazaeus’ assumption of supervisory and security functions.¹⁸Close Contemporary and near contemporary reports (Theopompus of Chios and Anaximenes of Lampsacus¹⁹Close) note Strato's death by violence but provide no details. A third-century ce source, Maximus of Tyre, refers to Strato ending his life in misery. An even later source (Jerome) reports Strato's fear of approaching Persians and his decision to commit suicide rather than become a “plaything” (when Strato was unable actually to stab himself, according to Jerome, his wife seized the sword from him and dispatched him).²⁰Close We might conjecture that Artaxerxes tried to guard against any possibility of defection or collusion, and decided it was time finally to put away the former political apostate Strato.²¹Close Perhaps Strato had chafed against the heavy Persian exactions, or perhaps there was friction with Mazaeus (possibly the basis of the tradition that Strato ended his life in misery). Tennes followed Strato as king. Continuity of coin types might suggest that he was part of the same dynasty, possibly a son of Strato, but an unrelated successor may have chosen to continue familiar types.²²Close

The Persians may also have removed Nicocles, Evagorid king of Salamis since 374/3, at about the same time. Without preserving any details about the circumstances, Photius reports that Theopompus discussed how both Strato and Nicocles met their deaths through violence (FGH 115 F114). We cannot be sure that Strato's and Nicocles’ deaths were closely connected chronologically—the two kings may have shared similar deaths which occurred at different points in time—but it is perhaps noteworthy that Nicocles’ successor, Evagoras II, was a very dutiful subject king who refused to join in the subsequent Cypriot revolt against Artaxerxes. He may have owed his position to Persian suppression of Nicocles at about the same time the Persians took care of their potential Sidonian problem by doing away with Strato.²³Close Though the Persians themselves may have been responsible for Nicocles’ elevation following the death of Evagoras, in the intervening years, marked by satrapal and dynastic defections and by Egyptian aggression, it is possible that Nicocles had proved himself an unreliable client-king.

If we put aside Ochus’ putative opportunistic advance to Egypt in 359 while Artaxerxes II still lived, the last full-scale Persian attack on Egypt had been in 373—two decades previously. But thanks to preparations going back well before this, Nectanebo II had a permanent defense system, with fortifications guarding every point of access and native and Greek forces at the ready. Nectanebo had devoted himself over the last decade to gaining native and priestly support through temple-building activities and temple endowments on a scale almost unprecedented in Egyptian history,²⁴Close and this may have helped him pay for a substantial mercenary force without worrying about the political consequences. Building activities and benefactions represented an extraordinarily great expense, but temples paid taxes and duties, so to invest in temple-endowment was to build up the tax base of the crown and thus the resources for military expenditures.²⁵Close Nectanebo may thus have figured out how to cultivate powerful priesthoods while still sustaining a big military budget.

Diodorus (16.48.2) identifies two Greeks, Diophantus the Athenian and Lamius the Spartan, as critical to Nectanebo's success against Persian invasion in 351/0. Lamius is otherwise unknown, but Diophantus may be identified with the syntrierarch on the trireme Dēmokratia Hagnodēmou in 349/8 and also with the Diophantus whose absence “in Asia” Isocrates notes in Letter 8 (To the Rulers of the Mytileneans).²⁶Close Consequently, we may conclude that Diophantus was a figure normally at Athens and not a mercenary commander on long-term service in Egypt. Presumably, he took employment in the late 350s as Persian preparations signaled an imminent attack on Egypt. This suggests that, despite the presence of very large Greek as well as native forces in Egypt, Nectanebo still recruited Greeks and bestowed high commands on some of them. Quite likely, it was under these circumstances that Mentor, the Rhodian brother-in-law of Artabazus, made his way to Egypt after the collapse of Artabazus’ “revolt.” Possibly, following the practice Tachos had employed with Agesilaus, Nectanebo not only engaged figures such as Diophantus and Mentor (and possibly Lamius) but provided them with funds to hire mercenaries and bring them to Egypt. The rewards Egyptian kings had given such Greek commanders as Chabrias and Agesilaus were probably well known, and expectation of gaining a great fortune will have provided sufficient incentive to potential commanders to enter Egyptian employment on an individual basis in the 350s. Their presence in Egypt need not point to involvement on the part of their home cities.

The 351/0 campaign itself is attested by the merest handful of general references. Isocrates, writing (ostensibly) to Philip of Macedon in 346 and attempting to depict Artaxerxes III as a weak opponent, asserts that “after [Artaxerxes] had brought together and fitted out the largest force he could possibly raise and marched against [the Egyptians], he retired from Egypt not only defeated but laughed at and scorned as unfit either to be a king or to command an army” (Isoc. 5.101–2). Allowing for exaggeration, we may still take from this that Artaxerxes brought a very large force to Egypt—perhaps the largest yet mustered during the fourth century—and that he failed. Diodorus gives us a date but little more, noting under 351/0 that “[Artaxerxes] made an expedition into Egypt with vast multitudes of solders and was unsuccessful” [16.40.3]. Demosthenes, speaking in 351/0, corroborates the date in his reference to the report, unconfirmed at the time of his speech, of Artaxerxes’ failure in Egypt (15.11–12).²⁷Close

In an effort to glean some more information about Artaxerxes’ enterprise, we may turn to additional remarks by Diodorus. Diodorus mentions the 351/0 campaign only briefly before moving on, still under 351/0, to discuss at great length the Phoenician and Cypriot revolts that followed this campaign and then Artaxerxes’ subsequent second large-scale Egyptian campaign, which actually took place in 343/2. In his narrative of this second campaign, Diodorus notes that Artaxerxes suffered a great disaster: “As he came to the great marsh where are the Barathra [‘the Pits,’ where windblown sand obscured the waters of Lake Serbonis and created a kind of invisible quagmire; see Diod. 1.30.4–9], as they are called, he lost a part of his force through his lack of experience of the places” (Diod. 16.46.4–6). If Artaxerxes had advanced along the desert route all the way to the Delta in 351/0, even if he had not taken the route to the north of Lake Serbonis, he must certainly have learned of it and its dangers, so it seems impossible that he lacked knowledge of this situation in 343/2. Possibly, then, this episode really belongs to Artaxerxes’ 351/0 campaign (here we must assume that Artaxerxes’ invasion of Egypt in 359 had not penetrated as far as Lake Serbonis or that he had taken the southerly route from Rhinocorura to the Delta, perhaps hoping to reach Memphis while Nectanebo's and the Mendesian's Egyptian forces were fighting each other to the north [at Pelusium?]). If so, the losses may have been significant enough to hinder his army's fighting abilities.

Diodorus remarks that it was because of Nectanebo's Greek generals, Diophantus the Athenian and Lamius the Spartan, that Nectanebo was victorious in everything in his 351/0 campaign (16.48.1–2). Unfortunately, Diodorus never says exactly what Diophantus and Lamius did. We can only speculate. The most general sort of explanation would simply be that they commanded the forces which repelled Artaxerxes. Diodorus’ reference to victory “in everything” might indicate different kinds of encounters—on land as well as at sea. Victory on land might possibly be linked with the disaster at Lake Serbonis. Perhaps defenses overseen by the Greek commanders to the south of this (typically the area entrusted to Greek mercenary forces) compelled Artaxerxes to take the northerly route along the treacherous edge of Lake Serbonis. Perhaps Nectanebo's Greek commanders were then able to assault Artaxerxes’ apparently much diminished force and prevent it from seizing Pelusium. We may conjecturally place here Polyaenus’ report of a stratagem employed in Egypt during “the Persian war” by Gastron the Lacedaemonian, when he was commanding—another story of dressing up non-Greeks as Greeks and driving off the Persians.²⁸Close If Diophantus the Athenian and Lamius the Spartan were Nectanebo's primary Greek commanders in 351/0, possibly Polyaenus’ Gastron was a subordinate commander at this time who augmented his forces with Egyptian troops armed and arrayed in Greek fashion. The Spartans had a long history of training non-Spartans (albeit Greeks) such as Lacedaemonian perioeci and helots to bolster their own forces, so such a maneuver by a Spartan commander in Egypt would not be a great innovation.

In his next attack on Egypt, in the 340s, Artaxerxes presumably made corrections, doing what he had not done in 351/0 or not doing again what had failed in 351 (such as approaching Egypt via “the Pits”). Perhaps, then, we can make inferences from Artaxerxes’ distinctive tactics in 343. At that time, he created three strike forces, each comprising a Greek and a Persian contingent, and deployed the forces in separate though coordinated operations (Diod. 16.47.1–4). If this represented an alteration of failed tactics that Artaxerxes had previously employed, we might guess that Artaxerxes had kept his army intact as a single unit in 351/0 (which would have been a deviation from Pharnabazus’ deployment of Iphicrates’ mercenaries separately from his non-Greek troops), and that a single battlefield failure (following the disaster at Lake Serbonis?) forced a withdrawal.

Even accounting for rhetorical exaggeration, the ignominy that Isocrates attaches to Artaxerxes’ effort in 351/0 suggests that the contrast between the enormous size of the expedition and its very limited duration and achievements was so great as to be laughable. Artaxerxes was clearly not an incompetent, ill-prepared, or fearful commander. Something else must explain his defeat and evidently hasty retreat. Our sources do not seem to know just what it was. But a combination of very effective, well-manned frontier defenses (given Egyptian abandonment of any offensive strategy after Tachos’ ill-fated campaign, Nectanebo II undoubtedly concentrated on frontier and other defenses—the system put in place by Acoris, Chabrias, and Nectanebo I—and had had almost a decade to perfect them), the loss of a portion of his army in the disaster along Lake Serbonis, and an overwhelming attack by forces under Diophantus and Lamius may have been responsible. Nevertheless, with so few real clues, all is speculation.

The outcome alone is clear. Within a matter of months after its initiation, the third great fourth-century Persian attack on Egypt collapsed. Whatever the details of Artaxerxes’ failure in Egypt in 351/0, Artaxerxes’ sole leadership of the campaign meant that blame and derision would be directed at him alone rather than at an unfortunate subordinate. There was no scapegoat. Artaxerxes’ only course now was to renew the campaign as quickly as possible and make sure that it finally succeeded.