Axis History Forum

Aber wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 12:10

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 02:21

Given the usual Italian response when the RN was at sea and looking for trouble - and, for that matter, when the USN was doing the same off northern Sicily in 1943 - it's a reasonable bet.

Here's the counterpoint from the "historical alternative" side - if, after the posited 2nd Washington - the Allied decisions are to focus on Africa/the Med/Europe in 1942-43, to the extent that any major offensives in the Pacific/Asia are limited (reduced from five theaters - 1st Arakan, Buna-Gona/NE New Guinea, southern and central Solomons, Gilberts, and Aleutians - to two, for example)

Probably more interesting if you look at US carrier deployment; moving them to the Atlantic gives you far more options for amphibious attacks.

Summary of what is where when
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_a ... rld_War_II

ljadw wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 15:42

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 02:21

Given the usual Italian response when the RN was at sea and looking for trouble - and, for that matter, when the USN was doing the same off northern Sicily in 1943 - it's a reasonable bet.

Here's the counterpoint from the "historical alternative" side - if, after the posited 2nd Washington - the Allied decisions are to focus on Africa/the Med/Europe in 1942-43, to the extent that any major offensives in the Pacific/Asia are limited (reduced from five theaters - 1st Arakan, Buna-Gona/NE New Guinea, southern and central Solomons, Gilberts, and Aleutians - to two, for example), and there's no need for STAB or anything like it, is it likely that London (WSC, Pound, etc.) are going to have Somerville's modern ships sitting in port in the Indian Ocean?

At the same Harwood and Vian and Curteis and company are doing what they are ordered to do in the eastern and central Med?

Seems rather - "cautious"? - for the RN in 1942-43, doesn't it?

The result of the counterpoint from your '' historical alternative'' side would be an additional big number of Democrats losing their seat at the midterm elections and this would not please the leader of the Democratic Party who occupied also the accidental post of POTUS (accidental for FDR ).

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

27 Apr 2024, 23:58

So, yeah, seems that more of the resources assigned and active with the Eastern Fleet in Q2 and Q3 1942 could have been put to better use in the eastern Med than was done historically

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 00:18

ljadw wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 15:42

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 02:21

Given the usual Italian response when the RN was at sea and looking for trouble - and, for that matter, when the USN was doing the same off northern Sicily in 1943 - it's a reasonable bet.

Here's the counterpoint from the "historical alternative" side - if, after the posited 2nd Washington - the Allied decisions are to focus on Africa/the Med/Europe in 1942-43, to the extent that any major offensives in the Pacific/Asia are limited (reduced from five theaters - 1st Arakan, Buna-Gona/NE New Guinea, southern and central Solomons, Gilberts, and Aleutians - to two, for example), and there's no need for STAB or anything like it, is it likely that London (WSC, Pound, etc.) are going to have Somerville's modern ships sitting in port in the Indian Ocean?

At the same Harwood and Vian and Curteis and company are doing what they are ordered to do in the eastern and central Med?

Seems rather - "cautious"? - for the RN in 1942-43, doesn't it?

The result of the counterpoint from your '' historical alternative'' side would be an additional big number of Democrats losing their seat at the midterm elections and this would not please the leader of the Democratic Party who occupied also the accidental post of POTUS (accidental for FDR ).

There's no evidence the Republicans gained seats in Congress, or the Democrats lost them, based on the strategic decisions made by the Allies in 1942. After Midway, the Japanese were stopped dead, and if the Administration wanted a "quick" victory with political overtones in the Pacific, thasn US forces would have been landing in the Aleutians in August, 1942, rather than the Solomons.

No one in the US cared about the British defeat in Burma in 1942-43, and Papua and NE New Guinea were only of interest because the SWPA theater was led by an American; if it had been led by Blamey, very few would have followed the course of events; the South Pacific offensive was of interest, of course, but the South Pacific offensive was staged becase there was a strategic goal in mind, however limited; stopping the Japanese in that theater in the same way they had been stopped in the Central Pacific.

If there was a desire for a "quick" victory in the Pacific - and again, you have presented no evidence there was - than Attu would have been a very easy choice; it wasn't even occupied by the Japanese after the initial operations in June; from August to October, 1942, the Japanese left for Kiska.

Even the Gilberts would have been easier in Q31942 than Guadalcanal; Makin - essentially - fell to a company of US Marines in August, after all, and the rest of the islands were hardly better defended at that point. Vandegrifts's historical WATCHTOWER force would have destroyed what the Japanese had in the Gilberts at the time, and probably could have picked up the Ellices at the same time, since they were undefended.

Aber wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 10:32

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

27 Apr 2024, 23:58

So, yeah, seems that more of the resources assigned and active with the Eastern Fleet in Q2 and Q3 1942 could have been put to better use in the eastern Med than was done historically

Doing WHAT? [head-banging emoji]

Operation Vigorous was before 2nd Washington, which is the Point of Departure for this What If? and so should not be changed.

You have not suggested ANY plausible operations in the Eastern Med, and it would more useful if you could move on.

• A version of STAB as a deception operation;

• A distant cover force if Iachino comes out;

• Air cover against RM and LW reconnaissance aircraft in the eastern Med;

• Strikes against the Italian bases in the southeastern Aegean (Castellorizo and Rhodes) to diminish Axis resources and as a distraction operation

• ASW at the source when it comes to the RM and KM submarine forces in the central and eastern Med

ljadw wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 10:33

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 00:18

ljadw wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 15:42

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 02:21

Given the usual Italian response when the RN was at sea and looking for trouble - and, for that matter, when the USN was doing the same off northern Sicily in 1943 - it's a reasonable bet.

Here's the counterpoint from the "historical alternative" side - if, after the posited 2nd Washington - the Allied decisions are to focus on Africa/the Med/Europe in 1942-43, to the extent that any major offensives in the Pacific/Asia are limited (reduced from five theaters - 1st Arakan, Buna-Gona/NE New Guinea, southern and central Solomons, Gilberts, and Aleutians - to two, for example), and there's no need for STAB or anything like it, is it likely that London (WSC, Pound, etc.) are going to have Somerville's modern ships sitting in port in the Indian Ocean?

At the same Harwood and Vian and Curteis and company are doing what they are ordered to do in the eastern and central Med?

Seems rather - "cautious"? - for the RN in 1942-43, doesn't it?

The result of the counterpoint from your '' historical alternative'' side would be an additional big number of Democrats losing their seat at the midterm elections and this would not please the leader of the Democratic Party who occupied also the accidental post of POTUS (accidental for FDR ).

There's no evidence the Republicans gained seats in Congress, or the Democrats lost them, based on the strategic decisions made by the Allies in 1942. After Midway, the Japanese were stopped dead, and if the Administration wanted a "quick" victory with political overtones in the Pacific, thasn US forces would have been landing in the Aleutians in August, 1942, rather than the Solomons.

No one in the US cared about the British defeat in Burma in 1942-43, and Papua and NE New Guinea were only of interest because the SWPA theater was led by an American; if it had been led by Blamey, very few would have followed the course of events; the South Pacific offensive was of interest, of course, but the South Pacific offensive was staged becase there was a strategic goal in mind, however limited; stopping the Japanese in that theater in the same way they had been stopped in the Central Pacific.

If there was a desire for a "quick" victory in the Pacific - and again, you have presented no evidence there was - than Attu would have been a very easy choice; it wasn't even occupied by the Japanese after the initial operations in June; from August to October, 1942, the Japanese left for Kiska.

Even the Gilberts would have been easier in Q31942 than Guadalcanal; Makin - essentially - fell to a company of US Marines in August, after all, and the rest of the islands were hardly better defended at that point. Vandegrifts's historical WATCHTOWER force would have destroyed what the Japanese had in the Gilberts at the time, and probably could have picked up the Ellices at the same time, since they were undefended.

1 I did NOT say that the GOP won seats in the House in 1942 because of the strategic decisions made by FDR .I said that if the war against Japan was subordinated to the war against Germany, this would result in losses for the ruling party ,which was the Democrats .
2 I did also not speak about a ''quick '' victory in the Pacific .
3 The demands of the White House for a big offensive in Europe in the Summer of 1942 were mainly politically motivated because the White House was inhabited by politicians and for politicians,everything is subordinated to politics and elections .There is also the fact that MacArthur was a republican and a potential candidate for the elections .Marshall on the other hand,did not like MacArthur .

EwenS wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 17:22

Pedestal put enough supplies into Malta to keep it going for some 10 weeks longer than previously held. Not enough to increase the rations of the islanders but enough to stave off surrender. So further resupply was not required until the end of Oct at the earliest.

And Axis invasion plans for invading Malta ceased entirely on 21 July 1942.

Following Operation Bellows (part of the overall Pedestal Operation), Furious delivered another batch of Spitfires to Malta immediately as Operation Baritone. She made a final trip at the end of Oct 1942 as Operation Train.

A supply service using submarines was continued after Pedestal until the beginning of Dec 1942 with trips from both the western end (Gibraltar) and the eastern end (Beirut & Haifa) of the Med. Supplies included aviation fuel, submarine torpedoes & stores, aircraft torpedoes, powdered milk, dehydrated veg, olive oil, NAAFI stores, medical supplies, radar spares, etc. Not huge quantities, but again enough to keep the island going for a bit longer.

The first convoy, STONEAGE, sailed from Suez on 16 Nov and arrived on 20th virtually unmolested. That was the same day 8th Army reached Benghazi.

Planning for Pedestal began immediately Harpoon / Vigorous failed to deliver enough supplies to Malta i.e. before the end of the Second Washington Conference on 25th June. The timing was set by the period 10-16 August 1942 being moonless. The tanker SS Ohio was handed over to British control on 25th June. The other merchant ships were selected in the last week of June & first week of July. The convoy sailed from Britain on the evening of 2 Aug 1942.

So given the massive effort put in to Pedestal from the second half of June 1942 through to its arrival in Malta on 14/15 Aug which ensured the island would not fall until at least Nov, what good was to be had by attempting another full convoy run from the eastern Med between July & Oct when virtually its whole journey would have been subject to air attack from both sides of the Med (a far worse prospect than that faced by the Pedestal convoy)? Air cover would have been wholly dependent on limited carrier air power (only one carrier after Aug), far more limited than that available to Pedestal.

The downside risk to the RN seems to me to far outweigh the benefits of maybe getting a mere handful of merchant ships into Malta from the eastern Med.

Any other operations (eg strikes on Axis bases in and around the Aegean) would be placing ships at great risk with little hope of a significant return in terms of damage to the Axis.

• A version of STAB as a deception operation;

• A distant cover force if Iachino comes out;

• Air cover against RM and LW reconnaissance aircraft in the eastern Med;

• Strikes against the Italian bases in the southeastern Aegean (Castellorizo and Rhodes) to diminish Axis resources and as a distraction operation

• ASW at the source when it comes to the RM and KM submarine forces in the central and eastern Med

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

29 Apr 2024, 00:44

ljadw wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 10:33

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 00:18

ljadw wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 15:42

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 02:21

Given the usual Italian response when the RN was at sea and looking for trouble - and, for that matter, when the USN was doing the same off northern Sicily in 1943 - it's a reasonable bet.

Here's the counterpoint from the "historical alternative" side - if, after the posited 2nd Washington - the Allied decisions are to focus on Africa/the Med/Europe in 1942-43, to the extent that any major offensives in the Pacific/Asia are limited (reduced from five theaters - 1st Arakan, Buna-Gona/NE New Guinea, southern and central Solomons, Gilberts, and Aleutians - to two, for example), and there's no need for STAB or anything like it, is it likely that London (WSC, Pound, etc.) are going to have Somerville's modern ships sitting in port in the Indian Ocean?

At the same Harwood and Vian and Curteis and company are doing what they are ordered to do in the eastern and central Med?

Seems rather - "cautious"? - for the RN in 1942-43, doesn't it?

The result of the counterpoint from your '' historical alternative'' side would be an additional big number of Democrats losing their seat at the midterm elections and this would not please the leader of the Democratic Party who occupied also the accidental post of POTUS (accidental for FDR ).

There's no evidence the Republicans gained seats in Congress, or the Democrats lost them, based on the strategic decisions made by the Allies in 1942. After Midway, the Japanese were stopped dead, and if the Administration wanted a "quick" victory with political overtones in the Pacific, thasn US forces would have been landing in the Aleutians in August, 1942, rather than the Solomons.

No one in the US cared about the British defeat in Burma in 1942-43, and Papua and NE New Guinea were only of interest because the SWPA theater was led by an American; if it had been led by Blamey, very few would have followed the course of events; the South Pacific offensive was of interest, of course, but the South Pacific offensive was staged becase there was a strategic goal in mind, however limited; stopping the Japanese in that theater in the same way they had been stopped in the Central Pacific.

If there was a desire for a "quick" victory in the Pacific - and again, you have presented no evidence there was - than Attu would have been a very easy choice; it wasn't even occupied by the Japanese after the initial operations in June; from August to October, 1942, the Japanese left for Kiska.

Even the Gilberts would have been easier in Q31942 than Guadalcanal; Makin - essentially - fell to a company of US Marines in August, after all, and the rest of the islands were hardly better defended at that point. Vandegrifts's historical WATCHTOWER force would have destroyed what the Japanese had in the Gilberts at the time, and probably could have picked up the Ellices at the same time, since they were undefended.

1 I did NOT say that the GOP won seats in the House in 1942 because of the strategic decisions made by FDR .I said that if the war against Japan was subordinated to the war against Germany, this would result in losses for the ruling party ,which was the Democrats .
2 I did also not speak about a ''quick '' victory in the Pacific .
3 The demands of the White House for a big offensive in Europe in the Summer of 1942 were mainly politically motivated because the White House was inhabited by politicians and for politicians,everything is subordinated to politics and elections .There is also the fact that MacArthur was a republican and a potential candidate for the elections .Marshall on the other hand,did not like MacArthur .

1. Based on what evidence? Because it made no difference historically in 1942 or 1944; the GOP did not run against the Democrats on war strategy with any success.
2. You suggested as such, that strategic decisions by the FDR Administration were politicized, and the response was that if FDR's administration actually made decisions on that basis, than the Aleutians or Gilbert-Ellices would be much simpler and quicker than a six-months-long slog at Guadalcanal.
3. What "big offensive" in Europe was waged by the US in the summer of 1942? The 50 Rangers at Dieppe?

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

29 Apr 2024, 00:51

EwenS wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 17:22

Pedestal put enough supplies into Malta to keep it going for some 10 weeks longer than previously held. Not enough to increase the rations of the islanders but enough to stave off surrender. So further resupply was not required until the end of Oct at the earliest.

And Axis invasion plans for invading Malta ceased entirely on 21 July 1942.

Following Operation Bellows (part of the overall Pedestal Operation), Furious delivered another batch of Spitfires to Malta immediately as Operation Baritone. She made a final trip at the end of Oct 1942 as Operation Train.

A supply service using submarines was continued after Pedestal until the beginning of Dec 1942 with trips from both the western end (Gibraltar) and the eastern end (Beirut & Haifa) of the Med. Supplies included aviation fuel, submarine torpedoes & stores, aircraft torpedoes, powdered milk, dehydrated veg, olive oil, NAAFI stores, medical supplies, radar spares, etc. Not huge quantities, but again enough to keep the island going for a bit longer.

The first convoy, STONEAGE, sailed from Suez on 16 Nov and arrived on 20th virtually unmolested. That was the same day 8th Army reached Benghazi.

Planning for Pedestal began immediately Harpoon / Vigorous failed to deliver enough supplies to Malta i.e. before the end of the Second Washington Conference on 25th June. The timing was set by the period 10-16 August 1942 being moonless. The tanker SS Ohio was handed over to British control on 25th June. The other merchant ships were selected in the last week of June & first week of July. The convoy sailed from Britain on the evening of 2 Aug 1942.

So given the massive effort put in to Pedestal from the second half of June 1942 through to its arrival in Malta on 14/15 Aug which ensured the island would not fall until at least Nov, what good was to be had by attempting another full convoy run from the eastern Med between July & Oct when virtually its whole journey would have been subject to air attack from both sides of the Med (a far worse prospect than that faced by the Pedestal convoy)? Air cover would have been wholly dependent on limited carrier air power (only one carrier after Aug), far more limited than that available to Pedestal.

The downside risk to the RN seems to me to far outweigh the benefits of maybe getting a mere handful of merchant ships into Malta from the eastern Med.

Any other operations (eg strikes on Axis bases in and around the Aegean) would be placing ships at great risk with little hope of a significant return in terms of damage to the Axis.

Appreciate the detailed response and the rational points. As stated, any or all of the following come to mind:

• A version of STAB as a deception operation;

• A distant cover force if Iachino comes out;

• Air cover against RM and LW reconnaissance aircraft in the eastern Med;

• Strikes against the Italian bases in the southeastern Aegean (Castellorizo and Rhodes) to diminish Axis resources and as a distraction operation

• ASW at the source when it comes to the RM and KM submarine forces in the central and eastern Med

Sea power is inherently flexible, and given the RM's track record when RN capital ships were at sea, they may just stay in port...

EwenS wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 09:11

US forces arrived in the Ellice Islands on 2 Oct 1942 in great secrecy and immediately built an airfield on Funafuti.
https://www.nps.gov/parkhistory/online_ ... 0/sec8.htm
https://pacificwrecks.com/provinces/tuvalu.html

Edit. 7th Air Force began using Funafuti as a refuelling base for Hawaii based B-24 tasked with striking Japanese outposts from April 1943 including Nauru & Tarawa. As 1943 went on, airfields were built on other islands and air units began moving physically onto bases in the Ellice Islands in Sept 1943.

Baker Island, which had been evacuated in 1942, following Japanese air attacks, was reoccupied in Aug 1943, an airfield built and a fighter squadron moved there in Sept.

Canton Island, which had been developed pre-war as a stop off point for flying boats on trans Pacific routes, was defended by US troops from the outset and an airfield built. A fighter squadron moved in to defend it in March 1943.

These islands provided bases for USAAF bombers during the Gilberts and Marshall Islands campaigns.

Tom from Cornwall wrote: ↑

29 Apr 2024, 12:58

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

29 Apr 2024, 00:51

EwenS wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 17:22

Pedestal put enough supplies into Malta to keep it going for some 10 weeks longer than previously held. Not enough to increase the rations of the islanders but enough to stave off surrender. So further resupply was not required until the end of Oct at the earliest.

And Axis invasion plans for invading Malta ceased entirely on 21 July 1942.

Following Operation Bellows (part of the overall Pedestal Operation), Furious delivered another batch of Spitfires to Malta immediately as Operation Baritone. She made a final trip at the end of Oct 1942 as Operation Train.

A supply service using submarines was continued after Pedestal until the beginning of Dec 1942 with trips from both the western end (Gibraltar) and the eastern end (Beirut & Haifa) of the Med. Supplies included aviation fuel, submarine torpedoes & stores, aircraft torpedoes, powdered milk, dehydrated veg, olive oil, NAAFI stores, medical supplies, radar spares, etc. Not huge quantities, but again enough to keep the island going for a bit longer.

The first convoy, STONEAGE, sailed from Suez on 16 Nov and arrived on 20th virtually unmolested. That was the same day 8th Army reached Benghazi.

Planning for Pedestal began immediately Harpoon / Vigorous failed to deliver enough supplies to Malta i.e. before the end of the Second Washington Conference on 25th June. The timing was set by the period 10-16 August 1942 being moonless. The tanker SS Ohio was handed over to British control on 25th June. The other merchant ships were selected in the last week of June & first week of July. The convoy sailed from Britain on the evening of 2 Aug 1942.

So given the massive effort put in to Pedestal from the second half of June 1942 through to its arrival in Malta on 14/15 Aug which ensured the island would not fall until at least Nov, what good was to be had by attempting another full convoy run from the eastern Med between July & Oct when virtually its whole journey would have been subject to air attack from both sides of the Med (a far worse prospect than that faced by the Pedestal convoy)? Air cover would have been wholly dependent on limited carrier air power (only one carrier after Aug), far more limited than that available to Pedestal.

The downside risk to the RN seems to me to far outweigh the benefits of maybe getting a mere handful of merchant ships into Malta from the eastern Med.

Any other operations (eg strikes on Axis bases in and around the Aegean) would be placing ships at great risk with little hope of a significant return in terms of damage to the Axis.

Appreciate the detailed response and the rational points. As stated, any or all of the following come to mind:

• A version of STAB as a deception operation;

• A distant cover force if Iachino comes out;

• Air cover against RM and LW reconnaissance aircraft in the eastern Med;

• Strikes against the Italian bases in the southeastern Aegean (Castellorizo and Rhodes) to diminish Axis resources and as a distraction operation

• ASW at the source when it comes to the RM and KM submarine forces in the central and eastern Med

Sea power is inherently flexible, and given the RM's track record when RN capital ships were at sea, they may just stay in port...

Given that units of the RN were being moved south through the Suez Canal at the end of June and beginning of Jul 42 it is not really that surprising that they might want to wait to see if Rommel would be halted somewhere west of the canal before committing capital units into the contested eastern Mediterranean. Hindsight back in play here?

Regards

Tom

ljadw wrote: ↑

29 Apr 2024, 08:25

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

29 Apr 2024, 00:44

ljadw wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 10:33

daveshoup2MarDiv wrote: ↑

28 Apr 2024, 00:18

ljadw wrote: ↑

26 Apr 2024, 15:42

The result of the counterpoint from your '' historical alternative'' side would be an additional big number of Democrats losing their seat at the midterm elections and this would not please the leader of the Democratic Party who occupied also the accidental post of POTUS (accidental for FDR ).

There's no evidence the Republicans gained seats in Congress, or the Democrats lost them, based on the strategic decisions made by the Allies in 1942. After Midway, the Japanese were stopped dead, and if the Administration wanted a "quick" victory with political overtones in the Pacific, thasn US forces would have been landing in the Aleutians in August, 1942, rather than the Solomons.

No one in the US cared about the British defeat in Burma in 1942-43, and Papua and NE New Guinea were only of interest because the SWPA theater was led by an American; if it had been led by Blamey, very few would have followed the course of events; the South Pacific offensive was of interest, of course, but the South Pacific offensive was staged becase there was a strategic goal in mind, however limited; stopping the Japanese in that theater in the same way they had been stopped in the Central Pacific.

If there was a desire for a "quick" victory in the Pacific - and again, you have presented no evidence there was - than Attu would have been a very easy choice; it wasn't even occupied by the Japanese after the initial operations in June; from August to October, 1942, the Japanese left for Kiska.

Even the Gilberts would have been easier in Q31942 than Guadalcanal; Makin - essentially - fell to a company of US Marines in August, after all, and the rest of the islands were hardly better defended at that point. Vandegrifts's historical WATCHTOWER force would have destroyed what the Japanese had in the Gilberts at the time, and probably could have picked up the Ellices at the same time, since they were undefended.

1 I did NOT say that the GOP won seats in the House in 1942 because of the strategic decisions made by FDR .I said that if the war against Japan was subordinated to the war against Germany, this would result in losses for the ruling party ,which was the Democrats .
2 I did also not speak about a ''quick '' victory in the Pacific .
3 The demands of the White House for a big offensive in Europe in the Summer of 1942 were mainly politically motivated because the White House was inhabited by politicians and for politicians,everything is subordinated to politics and elections .There is also the fact that MacArthur was a republican and a potential candidate for the elections .Marshall on the other hand,did not like MacArthur .

1. Based on what evidence? Because it made no difference historically in 1942 or 1944; the GOP did not run against the Democrats on war strategy with any success.
2. You suggested as such, that strategic decisions by the FDR Administration were politicized, and the response was that if FDR's administration actually made decisions on that basis, than the Aleutians or Gilbert-Ellices would be much simpler and quicker than a six-months-long slog at Guadalcanal.
3. What "big offensive" in Europe was waged by the US in the summer of 1942? The 50 Rangers at Dieppe?

1 An attack by the GOP on the Democrats on war strategy was not needed .If nothing happened in the Pacific/ Europe ,the voters would punish the ruling party .
2 All decisions of a ruling administration are politically motivated : see Afghanistan, Iraq, Vietnam ....
3 Marshall demanded a big offensive in the Summer of 1942 in Europe,although we know that this was not possible and when Britain continued to say no ,US wanted an offensive in North Africa, before the midterm elections .
Marshall supported FDR and the New Deal,that was one of the reasons why he became chief of staff,although he was only number 34 in the list of candidates .