Offshore Tapestries and Collective Defence - Sir Terence Lewin and NATO To what extent did Sir Terence Lewin as Vice Chief of Naval Staff influence the nature of the relationship between the Royal Navy and NATO (c.1971-1974)? Copyright: Aleksander Loesch, April 2015 * * * I don't want you to think I am going to lecture you on naval history. I am going to talk about the Royal Navy. Not maritime strategy, not the ever-growing Soviet maritime expansion, but the Royal Navy. What I aim to do is to look at the various fields of maritime warfare and see how the Royal Navy are providing ships, weapons, aircraft and equipment to cope with today's warfare. Sir Terence Lewin, 1979 * * * Introduction Current British maritime doctrine states that ‘the modern [British] political dimension of the maritime environment took shape largely during the 1970s’ and that contemporary strategy and doctrine is, in part, a continuation of ideas originally developed within the Ministry of Defence (MOD) and other Whitehall departments in this period.1 In an MOD publication from 1979 titled: Britain and NATO: Thirty Years of Collective Defence, it was stated that whilst ‘British forces [had] other commitments’ internationally, ‘the continued success of NATO [was] vital for the future wellbeing of Britain.’2 The document reports a major shift in British defence strategy during 1970s, moving from decreasing Britain’s military presence internationally following the Suez Crisis of 1956 to ‘[enable] Britain to resume, within her resources, a proper share of responsibility for the preservation of peace and stability in the world’. 3 Is it truly the case that contemporary British naval doctrine is based upon this simplified understanding that NATO is the central pillar of British defence? At the start of the decade in June 1970, the newly elected Conservative government led by Edward Heath set out to revaluate British defence priorities and expenditure in order to forge a new strategy which diverged from ‘the defence programme it inherited’ from the previous administration.4 The initial statement, released in October 1970, confirmed plans to re-establish an “east of Suez” military presence yet explicitly identified NATO as Britain’s ‘first priority.’5 This was echoed in the government’s Statement on the Defence Estimates white paper from 1971, which particularly focused British defence resources towards supporting NATO security, in order to demonstrate taking the ‘proper share of responsibility’ in defence of the free world.6 This commitment is most evident in sections concerning and British maritime strategy, where it is stated that: ‘Virtually the whole of the Royal Navy, the largest European NATO Navy, is assigned to NATO and permanent 1 Ministry of Defence (2011), Section 1, p.10 2 Ministry of Defence (1979), pp.14, 25 2 3 Ministry of Defence (1979), pp.14, 25 ibid 3 4 ibid Government (1970), pp.3-4 HM 4 5 HM Government (1970), pp.3-4 ibid 5 6 ibid Government (1971), p.1 HM 6 7 HM Government (1971), p.1 ibid, p.18 8 Moulton (1969) 1 contributions are made to NATO’s Standing Naval Forces.’7 As a result, maritime strategy and policy featured heavily throughout the 1971 statement, echoing the conclusions of reports commissioned towards the end of the 1960s concerning the future of British maritime strategy and NATO relations. In one report, written by Major General RM James Moulton for the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) in 1969, there is an extensive review of British naval strategy from the period in which provides a clear set of proposals for the decade to follow.8 Moulton argued that while reducing British involvement East of Suez was showing positive results, particularly in balancing British economic and security ambitions in Europe, the increasing threat of the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact, particularly on NATO’s flanks and in nuclear capability, was so great that Britain must look to respond.9 He continued to argue that in light of the ‘essentially maritime nature of British strategy’ the Royal Navy was the logical service to provide the majority of Britain’s contribution towards NATO and collective Western defence through the 1970s.10 By 1975, the Royal Navy had faced numerous challenges. It had engaged in a number of low-intensity operations across the globe including two “Cod Wars” with Iceland and had evacuated civilians from Northern Cyprus during the Turkish invasion in 1974. It had also been restructured in order to enable the Offshore Tapestry strategy (a title made popular, if not coined by, Admiral Terence Lewin), which aimed to protect British interests in its coastal waters. Furthermore, it had had to adapt to changing political sentiments towards various research-and-development, procurement and refit programmes, particularly concerning the fixed-wing carriers HMS Ark Royal and Eagle, V/STOL aircraft (i.e. the Sea Harrier) and the acquisition of weapons systems such as the French Exocet antiship missile. All of this happened during a period of increasing naval ambition by Soviet and Warsaw Pact states and subsequent adaption of NATO strategy in light of the 7 ibid, p.18 8 Moulton (1969) 9 ibid, pp.9-13 10 ibid, pp.40-44 2 perceived threat, for which Britain was committed to providing vessels to a permanent standing NATO maritime force in the Atlantic.11 Sir Terence Lewin Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Terence Thornton Lewin, Baron Lewin KG, GCB, LVO, DSC (November 19, 1920 - January 23, 1999) is most commonly remembered as Chief of the Defence Staff (CDS) (c.1979-1982) and for his military leadership during the Falklands War.12 However, Lewin’s naval career spanned half a century and some of his most important work was done in the decade preceding his appointment as CDS. Little has been published on Lewin. He is the subject of one biography, written by his friend and former subordinate officer, Admiral (retired) Richard Hill. Hill introduces the biography, explaining how ‘unfortunate’ it is that many of the documents concerning one of Lewin’s ‘most important Ministry of Defence appointments, that of Vice Chief of Naval Staff [VCNS] from 1971 to 1973’ were inaccessible to him during the period of writing because of the 30-year-rule.13 Nonetheless, Hill continues to identify Lewin’s work as VCNS (subordinate to the First Sea Lord) as pivotal, situated at the heart of the strategic, tactical and operational command of the Royal Navy. 14 He champions Lewin as the admiral who successfully oversaw fundamental changes to the Royal Navy whilst balancing international commitments to NATO, laying the foundations for his tenure as CDS and influencing British maritime policy for a long period ahead.15 Whilst Hill provides the only substantial published account of Lewin’s life, or any aspect of his naval career, it must be read with some caution. His representation of Lewin as a leader with ‘star quality’ who really established himself during his tenure as VCNS must be viewed in light of his friendship to Lewin and the knowledge, which Hill readily reveals, that Lewin approached Hill to write the monograph initially: a request he could not refuse.16 11 ibid, p.1; Hill (1981), pp.24-30; Friedman, in: Hill and Ranft [eds.] (1995), pp.414-416; Hill (2000), p.253 12 Freedman (2005), p.20 13 Hill (2000), p.10 14 ibid, pp.241-274 15 ibid, pp.241-243; 271-274 16 ibid, Introduction; p.274 3 Where possible, this essay will use archival materials to test Hill’s reading and evaluate Lewin’s role as a key individual during this pivotal point in British naval history. In one example, minutes from the first meeting of the MOD Chiefs of Staff Committee that Lewin attended as VCNS, we see his concern for international naval relations over the wishes of government department(s).17 One of the topics discussed was the proposed increase (in some cases tenfold) of tuition fees for foreign students attending naval staff courses at British establishments so as to be in line with equivalent courses in the Army and RAF.18 Lewin argued that while the proposals would help the government ‘settle’ defence expenditure, it would do so at a cost to strategic and diplomatic relations. He argued that it was unlikely that certain states with which ‘Britain sought to retain close links’ would able to afford the raised fees, whereas ‘less welcome countries…perhaps certain oilrich nations’ would stand to benefit from increased access to British resources. If such a policy were implemented, Lewin felt that it might even have a degenerative effect on defence exports and international standing in the long run. 19 In spite of Lewin’s reservations, the policy was implemented demonstrating, at least in the early period, that his advice was not always followed. Nonetheless, it is clear that his strategic and operational concerns were crucial to his reasoning, in this instance, against the wishes of the MOD. Whilst this has no tangible correlation between the Navy and NATO, it provides an example of Lewin’s own perspective from a primary source that is not documented by Hill as well as an indication of his attitude towards Commonwealth and other non-NATO states. Cod Wars The Cod Wars ended in the mid-1970s following two periods of concentrated, albeit extremely low-intensity, conflict. The Royal Navy was given the complex task: to win at all costs but without using hostile methods. 20 Whilst this was a sub-NATO level dispute between Britain and Iceland over access rights to fisheries in the North Atlantic and Arctic Oceans, actions during the conflicts in the 1970s prompted an international response. 17 National Archives: DEFE 4/256/1 (April 15, 1971), Minutes of the Ministry of Defence Chiefs of Staff Committee. (Part I, Item 1: Vice Admiral T T Lewin), p.2 18 ibid, (Part I, Item 3: Tuition Charges for Overseas Students), pp.1-5 19 ibid, p.2 20 Guðmundsson (2006), pp.112-113 4 Norway and America, who believed that the balance of power and provision of ‘nuclear umbrella’ security within NATO was at risk if Iceland carried out its threat to leave the alliance, pressured Britain to concede to Iceland’s demands.21 This conflict between Britain and another NATO state calls the solidity of this crucial relationship into some question as the inevitable struggle between domestic and international concerns collided. It also provides a good example of Britain’s pursuit of a relatively minor national matter in spite of the executive direction to prioritise supporting NATO. In response, Lewin and Captain David Macey developed a new strategy – Offshore Tapestry – to help protect British assets in the North Sea which was arguably in conflict with the Navy’s wider international interests. Throughout the 1960s, British prospectors searching for natural energy resources discovered of a number of oil and gas fields in the North Sea. 22 Whilst commercial production did not commence until the latter-half of the 1970s, the early decade saw the instalment of the vital infrastructure required for production.23 Simultaneously, Britain saw an ‘unexpected increase in pleasure-boat use.’24 Responsibility to ensure the safety and security of Britain’s sea-based assets and the individuals whom worked on them fell primarily to the Royal Navy. It was identified that ‘aspects of major concern [included] the sea bed, gas and oil rigs, pollution, traffic control, search and rescue, fishery protection and mine countermeasures.’25 Hill dedicates a considerable portion of his chapter on Lewin’s time as VCNS to show how he balanced Britain’s primary strategic priority - to support NATO - with the task of monitoring the increased recreational and industrial use of waters around the British Isles.26 The strategy aimed to consolidate all of the separate resources and services relevant for the provision of security for costal and sea-based infrastructure under a unified strategy 21 Jóhannesson (2005), pp.39-51; Lodgaard (1982), pp.90-91 22 Kemp (2012), p.1 23 ibid 24 Weaver, in: The Naval Review (1974), p.119 25 ibid 26 Hill (2000), p.252 5 and command - no easy task given the number of institutions and authorities involved.27 While Hill admits that it was Macey who completed a lot of the groundwork for the strategy, he suggests that it was Lewin who pushed the plan through the various stages of the Admiralty, MOD and governmental boards.28 Indeed, in a lecture originally presented by Lewin to the Royal Society for the Encouragement of Arts, he emphasises how minesweeping, the ‘unglamorous but vital part of maritime operations’ was fundamental to safeguard British trade and how he was proud of the increase in Britain’s mine warfare capabilities in relation to the Offshore Tapestry.29 Hill continues to suggest that the strategy is one of the most enduring aspects of Lewin’s legacy as the programme he originally envisaged in the early seventies has endured and expanded and is still the essence of current doctrine.30 The scope and level of resources required in this programme make it noteworthy in this paper. The fact that it was approved and went ahead provides another indication of the British executive’s willingness to prioritise national concerns in the maritime realm over those of NATO. It also demonstrates Lewin’s influence as an innovator and leader at the forefront of Britain’s maritime development in the period in spite of Britain’s pledges to NATO. Apart from the Offshore Tapestry project, Royal Naval resources in the English Channel and the Atlantic were primarily devoted to NATO operations under SACLANT and CINCHAN commands to counter threats from the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. 31 In the Mediterranean however, there was an entirely different picture. In 1971, the Heath government signed the bilateral Five Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand, and Singapore Which was a commitment to maintaining a military presence in South East Asia, despite an overall reduction in forces east of Suez.32 Whilst 27 Hill, in: Till [ed.] (2006) p.173; An non-exhaustive list of the services involved in the Offshore Tapestry project included: the Royal Navy, HM Coastguard, the Royal National Lifeboat Institution, the Scottish Fisheries Service, Trinity House, the Royal Air Force, and numerous port and local authorities. 28 Hill (2000), p.253 29 Lewin, in: The Naval Review (1979), p.269 30 ibid; Ministry of Defence (2011), Section 2, pp.16-17 31 Ministry of Defence (1979), p.12 32 Till, in: Story et al [eds.] (2011), pp.8-9 6 some permanent military establishments were maintained in the region, it was acknowledged that the Royal Navy, with its reputation as a ‘world-wide actor in defence of the British Empire and Commonwealth’ was key to maintaining the British presence in the region.33 At surface level, the British thought that this policy had little to do with NATO. Indeed, as Geoffrey Till argues, the policy was much more to do with the protection of long-standing shipping routes than of strategic defence.34 Hill takes a similar approach in discussing Lewin’s work regarding the policy, stating that he was concerned with securing British sea-routes and protecting interests.35 He adds that Lewin managed to take directives from the Admiralty and Joint Chiefs of Staff to enable a deployment of ‘some six destroyers or frigates…not far from a classic naval deployment’ East of Suez.36 However the reality was not as simple as Hill makes out. In order to maintain any form of naval presence at the “far end” of the Suez Canal, a permanent presence needed to be maintained in the Mediterranean (i.e. bases in Gibraltar and Malta), which Lewin agreed with.37 This led to two major problems: Firstly, whilst the Cabinet and MOD thought that Britain should maintain the dominant Western European Navy in NATO, they acknowledged that other alliance members (i.e. Italy, Greece and Turkey) should take the lead in the Mediterranean. 38 Therefore, a British naval presence in the Mediterranean could be seen as threatening and in competition with other NATO forces which was therefore counterproductive. Secondly, the economic and logistical burden of maintaining shore establishments, vessels and the staff required to man them in far-off regions was also somewhat contradictory to the government’s aim to develop a more cost-effective defence budget and meet the ‘additional commitments it promised to undertake and for improvements required in defence capabilities.’39 In short, the Royal Navy was given contradictory messages for the 33 ibid, pp.1, 4-5 34 ibid 35 Hill (2000), p.257 36 Hill (2000), pp.242-243; 247-248 37 Lewin, in: The Royal United Services Institution Journal (1968), p.209 38 Ministry of Defence (1979), p.11 39 HM Government (1970), pp.10-11 7 Mediterranean: Prioritise NATO but also maintain a fleet east of Suez for non-NATO purposes. In reality, these opposing priorities were far more related, particularly in the Mediterranean context, than the literature makes out: Following Malta’s move towards independence from Britain in 1964, Maltese prime minister Dom Mintoff sought to negotiate a new defence agreement that was more beneficial to the Maltese people. Maintaining British bases in Malta was deemed strategically vital and served a dual purpose. Whilst it linked Britain’s interests and the resources east of Suez, it also provided a useful location for the safeguarding of the region from the Warsaw Pact and Soviet Union, who could access it from the Black Sea to the north, as well as from potentially hostile states in the Southern and South-Eastern Mediterranean. Minutes from an MOD Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting from January 17, 1972 provide detailed insight into the discussions regarding the future use of bases and shore establishments in Malta, in preparation towards the Military Base Agreement signed between Malta and Britain (who was also acting on behalf of NATO) in March 1972.40 Minutes from the MOD outline the priorities of the Chiefs of Defence Staff and senior civil servants. On the ‘issue’ of sharing British bases in Malta with NATO and America, it was recorded that Admiral Peter HillNorton, CDS, stated ‘that while he felt that they should have no objection to sharing their facilities with NATO Allies, he believed…that this was more a matter for their Allies to consider against the money they might be prepared to offer.’41 Additionally, the committee agreed that they wished for the Royal Navy to be the dominant force in that area of the Mediterranean, optimistically stating that ‘the US might be prepared to accept denial of access to Malta for the 6th Fleet [America’s European standing naval force] if this resulted in similar denial to Warsaw Pact and other Communist Warships.’42 The reason this was being discussed at all was that the government had earlier ‘declined to pay £30 million which would have bought [Britain] exclusive defence rights’ to Malta, whilst seeking a way to deter 40 National Archives: DEFE 4/264/3 (January 17, 1972), Minutes of the Ministry of Defence Chiefs of Staff Committee. (Part I: Malta) 41 ibid, (Item 6), p.3 42 ibid, (Item 7), p.6 8 ‘the [other] countries which might wish to use [its] defence facilities from doing so.43 Such documents indicate how the military leadership, whilst acknowledging the importance of NATO in Britain’s security needs, were at times prioritising their interpretations of British priorities in security and economic interests. Lewin, who was present at meetings concerning Malta (also representing the Chief of Naval Staff) stays remarkably quiet, commenting only briefly on the location of some minor administrative offices and on the numbers of Royal Marines who would be stationed there.44 Conclusion This paper has shown that whilst the Heath government placed NATO security as its primary security policy, believing that the security of NATO was security for Britain, when it came to maritime issues, the Royal Navy was frequently put in a position where it was required to place other (domestic) issues above those of NATO. Whilst Policy Point Two of the 1971 Statement on the Defence Estimates acknowledges that many of Britain’s economic interests lie in areas overseas beyond immediate concern to NATO, it would therefore pursue them as much as it could within the confines of Policy Point One and supporting NATO. However it is clear that, on occasion, the pursuit of British interests overtook the need to support NATO. Whilst this paper provides only a brief insight into the international, political and military issues between Britain and NATO in the 1970s, it does indicate the opportunity awaiting any future researchers who wish to undertake a larger project further investigating a comparatively under-studied subject (Lewin), period and topic in British naval history. 43 National Archives: DEFE 4/260/3 (October 7, 1971), Minutes of the Ministry of Defence Chiefs of Staff Committee. 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