Kindle-Preis: | 8,38 € |
Preis einschließlich USt. | |
Verkauf durch: | Amazon Media EU S.à r.l. Der Verkaufspreis wurde vom Verlag festgesetzt. |
Meine Mitgliedschaften & Abos
Lade die kostenlose Kindle-App herunter und lese deine Kindle-Bücher sofort auf deinem Smartphone, Tablet oder Computer – kein Kindle-Gerät erforderlich.
Mit Kindle für Web kannst du sofort in deinem Browser lesen.
Scanne den folgenden Code mit deiner Mobiltelefonkamera und lade die Kindle-App herunter.
Bild nicht verfügbar
Farbe:
-
-
-
- Herunterladen, um dieses Videos wiederzugeben Flash Player
Dem Autor folgen
OK
We Can Have Peace in the Holy Land (English Edition) Kindle Ausgabe
Preis | Neu ab | Gebraucht ab |
Gebundenes Buch, Rauer Buchschnitt
"Bitte wiederholen" | 20,17 € | 3,98 € |
Taschenbuch
"Bitte wiederholen" | 16,95 € | 9,11 € |
Audio-CD, Hörbuch, Ungekürzte Ausgabe
"Bitte wiederholen" | — | 16,87 € |
Carter describes the history of previous peace efforts and why they fell short. He argues persuasively that the road to a peace agreement is now open and that it has broad international and regional support. Most of all, since there will be no progress without courageous and sustained U.S. leadership, he says the time for progress is now. President Barack Obama is committed to a personal effort to exert that leadership, starting early in his administration.
This is President Carter's call for action, and he lays out a practical and achievable path to peace.
- ISBN-13978-1849830645
- HerausgeberSimon & Schuster UK
- Erscheinungstermin18. Februar 2010
- SpracheEnglisch
- Dateigröße1005 KB
- Kindle (5. Generation)
- Kindle Keyboard
- Kindle DX
- Kindle (2. Generation)
- Kindle (1. Generation)
- Kindle Paperwhite
- Kindle Paperwhite (5. Generation)
- Kindle Touch
- Kindle Voyage
- Kindle
- Kindle Oasis
- Kindle for Windows 8
- Kindle Cloud Reader
- Kindle für Blackberry
- Kindle für Android
- Kindle für Android Tablets
- Kindle für iPhone
- Kindle für iPod Touch
- Kindle für iPad
- Kindle für Mac
- Kindle für Mac
- Kindle für PC
Produktbeschreibungen
Pressestimmen
Carter’s advice to pursue peace.” —The New York Times Book Review
“Balanced, deeply felt. . . a thoughtful and much needed addition to the discourse. . . Eschews the partisan recriminations and historical gerrymandering that typify most discussions of the conflict. . . . Carter offers a pragmatic solution. . . . If only everyone involved in this issue were as considered and optimistic as Jimmy Carter.” —San Francisco Chronicle
“As always, his is a voice to be listened to.” —Booklist
“Carter is illuminating and inspiring in this knowledgeable insider’s history.”
—Publishers Weekly -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine andere Ausgabe: paperback.
Über den Autor und weitere Mitwirkende
Leseprobe. Abdruck erfolgt mit freundlicher Genehmigung der Rechteinhaber. Alle Rechte vorbehalten.
Introduction
STORM OVER A BOOK
I am writing another book about the Middle East because the new president of the United States is facing a major opportunity—and responsibility—to lead in ending conflict between Israel and its neighbors. The time is now. Peace is possible.
The normal path to resolving conflicts in this regional tinderbox should be through political leaders in Israel, Palestine, Syria, and Lebanon, with assistance when needed from Egypt, other Arab nations, and the international community. Yet for the past fifty years the United States has been widely recognized as the essential interlocutor that can provide guidance, encouragement, and support to those who want to find common ground. Unfortunately, most leaders in Washington have not been effective in helping the parties find peace, while making it harder for other potential mediators in Europe, the Near East, and the United Nations to intercede.
This peace effort should not be seen as a hopeless case. Five Nobel Peace Prizes have been won by leaders who negotiated successfully in 1979 and in 1993—one Egyptian, three Israelis, and one Palestinian. But the unpleasant fact is that there has been no tangible progress during the past decade and a half, despite significant efforts during the last years of the administrations of Bill Clinton and George W. Bush. Recent highly publicized peace talks between Israeli and Palestinian leaders have broached difficult issues but ultimately failed to narrow differences. At the same time, Israel and Syria became engaged early in 2007 in “indirect” conversations sponsored by Turkey, a fragile Gaza cease-fire has been implemented, and there has been an exchange of prisoners and the remains of others between Israel and Hezbollah but no further plans for easing tension between Israel and Lebanon.
As will be explained in the text, one of the notable developments in the region has been the repeated proposal by all twenty-two Arab nations to have normal diplomatic and commercial relations with Israel, provided major U.N. resolutions are honored. They have also said that modifications concerning controversial key issues could be considered in good-faith negotiations. This peace offer has been accepted by all Islamic nations and lauded by top U.S. officials, and Israelis have said it is a good basis for discussion.
If pursued aggressively with the full support of the United States and other members of the International Quartet,1 this Arab proposal could provide a promising avenue toward breaking the existing deadlock in promoting peace. This might make possible the formation of a multinational peace force in the West Bank to guarantee Israel’s security, the release of prisoners (including a prominent jailed leader, Marwan Barghouti, who might heal divisions), updating the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to include members from Hamas and other factions, and reconciliation between the two major Palestinian political parties. If a general framework could be forged, it would be difficult for minor factions to block a peace agreement.
Absent any real progress, conditions continue to fester, with Palestinians divided into two major parties. One group, Fatah, is “governing” in some parts of the West Bank not controlled by Israel (see Map 1, which shows actual control), supported officially by the international community as the dominant element of the PLO. Mahmoud Abbas was elected president of the Palestinian Authority to succeed Yasir Arafat, and he heads an interim government with most members from his Fatah Party. The other major group, Hamas, controls the small area of Gaza under the leadership of a group of local militants and more influential leaders of the politburo in Damascus, Syria. There are loyal supporters of these two major parties in both Gaza and the West Bank, and some tentative efforts are detectable among them and from other Arab leaders to reunite the two factions. As will be explained in Chapter 10, unified Palestinians, with a workable government and a competent security force, are a prerequisite to any substantive peace agreement with Israel, but these initiatives have been blocked or undermined by mutual animosity and by opposition from Jerusalem and Washington.
It has not been possible for the weak and divided Palestinian leadership to eliminate acts of violence against Israel from within the occupied territories, and many Israelis are fearful for their personal safety and for the ultimate security of their nation. To defend themselves, they accept their government’s policy of harsh reprisals and the constant expansion of settlements, although the majority of Israelis do not support the settlements as an alternative to peace. Except for some in-frequent public statements and assurances given to me based on the prospect of an Israeli-PLO peace agreement, Hamas has not acknowledged Israel’s right to exist and will not forgo violence as a means of ending the occupation of Palestinian territory.
• • •
For more than three decades, a major focus of my personal interests and political activities has been to help end the conflict among Israelis and their neighbors. As president of the United States and a leader of The Carter Center, I have had a special opportunity to study the complex and interrelated issues and to consult with leaders of all significant factions in the region who have been involved in these issues and will have to play key roles in reaching this elusive goal. I have learned some useful lessons, which I hope will help the reader understand the current situation more clearly.
Despite the recent lack of progress, I see this as a unique time for hope, not despair. The outlines of a peace agreement are clear and have broad international support. There is a remarkable compatibility among pertinent United Nations resolutions, previous peace agreements reached at Camp David and in Oslo, the publicly declared policy of the United States, the Geneva Accord, key goals of the International Quartet’s Roadmap for Peace, and tentative proposals made by all Arab nations for reconciliation with Israel. Perhaps most important, there is an overwhelming common desire for peaceful and prosperous lives among the citizens of Israel, Palestine,2 Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Egypt. Tentative steps are being taken or contemplated by these players, all waiting to be consummated with American leadership.
We already have a firm promise from our new president that he will make a personal effort for Middle East peace from the beginning of his administration. The United States will find all parties to the conflict—and leaders of other nations—eager to support strong, fair, and persistent leadership from Washington. This will not be easy. Everyone who engages in Middle East peacemaking is bound to make mistakes and suffer frustrations. Everyone must overcome the presence of hatred and fanaticism, and the memories of horrible tragedies. Everyone must face painful choices and failures in negotiations. Nevertheless, I am convinced that the time is ripe for peace in the region.
In the following pages I will describe—as succinctly and clearly as possible—the past history, my own personal involvement and observations, present... -- Dieser Text bezieht sich auf eine andere Ausgabe: paperback.
Produktinformation
- ASIN : B007YLTDAG
- Herausgeber : Simon & Schuster UK (18. Februar 2010)
- Sprache : Englisch
- Dateigröße : 1005 KB
- Text-to-Speech (Vorlesemodus) : Aktiviert
- Screenreader : Unterstützt
- Verbesserter Schriftsatz : Aktiviert
- X-Ray for textbooks : Aktiviert
- Word Wise : Nicht aktiviert
- Haftnotizen : Auf Kindle Scribe
- Seitenzahl der Print-Ausgabe : 256 Seiten
- Kundenrezensionen:
Informationen zum Autor
Entdecke mehr Bücher des Autors, sieh dir ähnliche Autoren an, lies Autorenblogs und mehr
Kundenrezensionen
Kundenbewertungen, einschließlich Produkt-Sternebewertungen, helfen Kunden, mehr über das Produkt zu erfahren und zu entscheiden, ob es das richtige Produkt für sie ist.
Um die Gesamtbewertung der Sterne und die prozentuale Aufschlüsselung nach Sternen zu berechnen, verwenden wir keinen einfachen Durchschnitt. Stattdessen berücksichtigt unser System beispielsweise, wie aktuell eine Bewertung ist und ob der Prüfer den Artikel bei Amazon gekauft hat. Es wurden auch Bewertungen analysiert, um die Vertrauenswürdigkeit zu überprüfen.
Erfahre mehr darüber, wie Kundenbewertungen bei Amazon funktionieren.Spitzenrezensionen aus anderen Ländern
This book is genuine, intelligently written, and has a well-thought out premise backed by Jimmy Carter's decades of experience working with key leaders on all sides of the Middle-East peace process. The political tide in the United States has turned, and the timing of this book is no mistake: Carter is hoping take advantage of the change to encourage another attempt of peace in the Holy Land.
The main body of the text provides a relevant history of peace efforts in the Middle-East. I found this review to be quite helpful. It reads much easier and more interesting than "The Blood of Abraham," Carter's 1985 detailed history of the various groups involved in the Middle-East. The reason I rated this book as 4 stars instead of 5 is because there really isn't a lot of new information or ideas for those who are well-read on Carter. But I can still highly recommend this book since most people out there haven't read lots of Carter.
Carter recounts the trial-and-error Camp David negotiation process that he used as President in 1978. He reminds us of the bickering and accusations made by both sides, but also the compromises they were ultimately able to agree upon. Carter's role was to lay down and enforce some rules, be willing to ad lib, be determined, and to act as friend and intermediary to both sides.
Carter is not getting any younger, and I think the take-home message is clear. This is an urgent issue that still requires a lot of hard work. Too many lives are being lost everyday on all sides. The Camp David Accords, the Oslo Accords, and other agreements were ground-breaking in their day, but time marches on. It's up to our generation and our country to go to work and use our influence in the pursuit of peace. The process will be difficult and may seem impossible at times. With this book, Carter urges us to try.
In any event, who is the Carter that we find? Certainly not the anti-semite or anti-Israel zealot that some would have you believe. Carter clearly believes that were Israel to remove its West Bank settlements, a peace deal could be reached. But he strongly defends the existence of the state of Israel, and is careful to emphasize the fact that Israel is democracy. Indeed, that is part of the problem, Carter believes: the vibrancy of Israel's political democracy means that small parties representing settler interests are able to block negotiations because they can threaten to bring down the government. Of particular interest is a revelation that I had never seen before: Carter relates that during a recent trip to the region, Israel's deputy prime minister, the ultra-orthodox Eli Yishai, wanted to negotiate with Hamas about captured Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit, but Hamas refused to see him. So much for the idea that it is all Israel's fault.
No--the Carter you see here is committed and well-intentioned: a genuine lover of Israel. He is also extraordinarily naive. For all the (justified) attention he gives to the noxious Israeli settlements, he gives virtually no attention to the issue that really killed the 2000-01 negotiations: the Palestinian demand for a "right of return" to Israel itself -- a demand that, if satisfied, would destroy the Jewish state. Outside of Sari Nusseibeh, no major Palestinian leader or public figure has agreed to relinquish this demand (unlike the many Israeli leaders who have called for evacuating West Bank settlements.). Perhaps this is because they feel they cannot say it in order to keep a bargaining chip. But Carter does not even acknowledge the issue.
It's not that Carter thinks the Palestinians are right about this: at the end of the book, when he sets forth his peace plan, he (finally) states quite clearly that Palestinian refugees should only have a right of return to the Palestinian state, and any who do not return should get monetary compensation. But why does Carter think that the Palestinians, who believe this right to be a sacred principle, will suddenly give it up? He doesn't say; indeed, he doesn't even think it's an issue. It's almost as if he thinks, "oh yes, by the way, that has to go." But why would the Palestinians accept it? And if they wouldn't accept it, how can there be a peace deal? He repeatedly references the Arab League's "acceptance" of Israel in the 2002 Saudi initiative, and that initiative was indeed an important development. But the Saudi initiative also insisted on the right of return. Isn't that a problem? Again, the silence is deafening.
The reader can expect as much after reading the first part of the book. There, Carter reflects on the use of the term "apartheid" in the title of his previous book. He explains that he only meant it as referring to conditions in the territories, not Israel itself. He notes that the use of the term to describe these conditions is often used in Israeli journalism (an overstatement, but true enough), and when he published the book, it did not dawn on him that it would receive the reaction it did, that American supporters of Israel might not take kindly to the idea that Israel itself is an apartheid state or that Israel in any way could be compared to the apartheid regime. He now admits that it was a mistake. You think?
And that's what makes the book so frustrating. Here is a very good man, who cares deeply about both Israelis and Palestinians, who is frustrated that a deal hasn't been reached, and has faith -- a sincere, compassionate, abiding faith -- that a deal can be reached. Since the deal hasn't been reached, he will show us the way. But it never seems to occur to him that there are real, significant issues between the parties, that it's not just that they ran out of time, and that real, serious, painful concessions must be made by both sides that they might not be ready for.
And because of that, he cannot really give us a clear idea of what, precisely, the United States should do. As much as he understands people, he doesn't seem to understand political forces -- a strange condition for a man who was, after all, elected President of the United States (and maybe the reason he wasn't re-elected). He seems to think that if only those terrible settlers would get out of the way (and they are truly terrible), then everything would be okay. I hope he's right. But he gives us little reason to believe him.
For those who know little about the region, the book is okay. He has some anti-Israel biases, but they are not strong, at least not in this book. But for those who really want the details of the region, of peacemaking, of the obstacles on both sides, you won't find much here. You are much better off just reading the online English version of the Israeli newspaper Ha'aretz: [...]
I note that although this book averages 3 stars, the majority of reviews are either 5 stars or 1 star. So it goes.
While I liked the book, I was very unhappy with the UPS service. Although promised delivery in three days, it was much longer than that, due partly to UPS sending the book from California (where I live) to the East Coast first before it finally came to me.