Home Rule During a World War: The Lloyd George Proposals and Irish Convention, 1915–1918

Abstract

This chapter examines attempts to address Irish discontent prompted by the 1916 Easter Rising. Cabinet member David Lloyd George proposed to implement home rule but exclude six Ulster counties. These negotiations failed amid discrepancies concerning partition’s permanence, but Rast asserts they laid foundations for what would become Northern Ireland. The 1917–1918 Irish Convention is often dismissed as an inevitable failure, but Rast argues it came close to succeeding as some unionists adopted the idea that self-government was inevitable. Its ultimate failure divided Irish unionists and the ensuing conscription threat further alienated nationalists, accelerating the rise of the separatist party, Sinn Féin. Partition remained the overarching issue, but questions concerning Ireland’s constitutional and financial future divided nationalist factions and those unionists willing to accept self-government.

Introduction

In his poem “Easter 1916,” concerning a failed rebellion to establish an Irish republic, W. B. Yeats declared the dead leaders were “changed utterly” in the minds of contemporary and future Irish people. While this was true in the long term, in the Rising’s immediate aftermath politics reverted to a mode reminiscent of summer 1914. Asquith appointed Lloyd George to find a settlement acceptable to Irish nationalists and unionists. He proposed immediate home rule and six-county exclusion. The ensuing negotiations failed amid a welter of competing interpretations and accusations of underhandedness, particularly relating to whether exclusion would be temporary or permanent. Some commentators downplay allegations of “treachery” against Lloyd George and join him in blaming southern unionists for wrecking the settlement.¹

Historians often note short-term effects of the negotiations’ failure. This was a further blow to constitutional nationalism in the face of surging Sinn Féin sympathy.² Irish unionists’ continuing aloofness from home rule showed the IPP policy of unity through the war effort was failing.³ Carson’s support for the proposals diminished his standing with some northern unionists due to the seeming abandonment of their comrades in three of Ulster’s nine counties. However, he remained the Ulster unionist leader and reverence for him among many in this political tradition continued, while the IPP and its leaders faded from prominence due in part to their perceived acceptance of partition.⁴ Ronan Fanning describes the episode as the first instance of the Unionist Party’s “stranglehold” on Irish policy and attributes Lloyd George’s promotion of unionist-inspired policies to ambition.⁵ While he certainly acted to further his own career, his personal and political proclivities inclined him toward unionist stances on Irish issues rather than British Liberal or Irish nationalist positions.

The Lloyd George proposals had a long-term significance and influenced the two Irish political entities existing today. Fanning asserts the proposals “blazed the trail towards partition,” but variations of this idea had been mooted as early as January 1910.⁶ I argue, during the 1916 negotiations, partition assumed the form eventually enacted, and Lloyd George was its primary author. Though only four of the counties to be excluded were majority Protestant and unionist, Lloyd George proposed to meet Carson’s demand, enunciated in 1913, by excluding two more. The British government would not hold plebiscites to determine the wishes of people there, and the temporal length of this division would depend not on public sentiment in the six counties but on parliamentary politics at Westminster. This form of partition proved the most lasting aspect of Lloyd George’s failed attempt at settlement in 1916.

Following the miscarriage of private negotiations, the government, which changed hands from Asquith’s leadership to Lloyd George’s in December 1916, sought a new departure. Historian John Fair describes conferences as a “safety valve” in British politics, providing a space in which “the participants could rise above the petty demands of party and personal ambition for the sake of the entire nation and posterity.”⁷ Conferences minimized the contest system in United Kingdom politics, placing a premium on compromise rather than victory over one’s opponents. The European conflict absorbed most British politicians’ attention at this time, minimizing party conflict and increasing the likelihood of an agreement.

Despite such lofty ideals, most historians describe the Irish Convention as a non-event. There is only one book devoted to its proceedings, R. B. McDowell’s The Irish Convention (1970). A reviewer dismissed it by describing this conference as undeserving of lengthy study. F. S. L. Lyons called it a “gigantic irrelevancy,” citing the refusal of Sinn Féin and some sections of Irish labor to participate, as well as Ulster unionist intransigence.⁸ Most historians agree, describing the Convention as Lloyd George’s device to defer the Irish question, not a sincere attempt at finding a solution. Patrick Maume considers the conference at length but frames it as part of the IPP’s eclipse by Sinn Féin, assuming an agreement contrived there would have been rejected by most nationalists and northern unionists.⁹

There is evidence Lloyd George wanted to keep Ireland quiescent during the war. However, whether he intended for the Convention to reach an agreement or not, it came close to doing so. The Prime Minister admitted, if the conference succeeded, he would be compelled to implement its findings. The assumption that Sinn Féin’s non-participation doomed the Convention marks an ahistorical focus on this party, which was hardly organized in 1917. Similarly, the assertion Ulster unionists would block any settlement is an assumption that ignores the workings of the conference and bipartisan cooperation outside it.¹⁰

Most commentators disregard the Convention’s tangible results for Irish unionism. During the talks, southern unionist Lord Midleton and his supporters agreed to a tentative home rule deal. Opposition to this acceptance of self-government fractured this group, forcing them to reconsider their positions on home rule and partition. Jackson highlights disagreements between southern and Ulster unionists, but the conference provoked a lasting split within the former group. Patrick Buckland notes the Convention’s profound effects on southern unionism but frames it as part of an almost inevitable process of decline, whereas I see it as an evolution in the political thought of many individuals within this group informed by changed circumstances, particularly the war, the apparent inevitability of home rule, and the prospect of partition.¹¹

Ireland and the First World War

Irish support for the war effort seemed high at the outset. In September 1914, Redmond urged the Irish Volunteers to fight abroad, alienating separatists but garnering praise among southern unionists and Britons. In the ensuing split, the vast majority, all but about 10,000 of 182,000, joined Redmond’s new National Volunteers.¹² According to the War Office, 40,439 Irish people enlisted in the Army between Britain’s entry in August and year end, about 10,000 per month. This plummeted to 4,000 monthly recruits by early 1915 and, despite occasional spikes, fewer than 2,000 by March 1916.¹³ Some historians note initially high enlistment throughout the United Kingdom, aided by unemployment, that diminished as casualties and negative news reports mounted.¹⁴ Ireland fits this trend.

Developments specific to the “sister island” further hampered recruitment. From the war’s outbreak, there was considerable opposition from Arthur Griffith’s Sinn Féin, James Connolly’s labor organizations, the Irish Volunteers, and the secret IRB. The War Office ignored Redmond’s advice to use nationalist and unionist volunteers for home defense. Army authorities seemed to favor the 36th (Ulster) Division, largely UVF recruits, over two new Irish formations identified with nationalism.¹⁵ In May 1915, Asquith incorporated Unionists into a coalition government, including vociferous anti-home rulers Balfour, Bonar Law, Carson, Lansdowne, Long, and Selborne. The Prime Minister offered Redmond a Cabinet post, but he declined, citing IPP tradition. The Manchester Guardian called the alterations “the downfall of the Home Rule Government.”¹⁶

In January 1916, the government implemented conscription in Britain, heightening anxiety Ireland would be next. Cabinet reports indicated anti-IPP nationalists, collectively described as Sinn Féin, were gaining strength.¹⁷ Even sympathizers sensed the Party’s position was eroding. Shane Leslie asked Horace Plunkett on April 24, “Is Home Rule really safe?”¹⁸

That day, Irish Volunteers and the labor-aligned Irish Citizen Army seized parts of Dublin and proclaimed a republic. The British Army suppressed what became known as the Easter Rising after a week of fighting that destroyed much of the city center. Isolated outbreaks took place across the island. Authorities placed Ireland under martial law. In the first two weeks of May, sixteen insurgents were executed by firing squad. Roger Casement, who tried to procure German help for the rebels, was hanged in London in August. About 3,500 people were arrested, some as rebels and others suspected of involvement with the IRB, anti-recruitment, or Sinn Féin, erroneously associated with the Rising. Approximately 2,000 were imprisoned after a court-martial or interned without trial. This seemingly harsh treatment accelerated the growth of advanced nationalism.¹⁹

Tensions within Irish unionism were less severe but present.²⁰ Ulster unionists portrayed their participation in the First World War as a natural outgrowth of affinity for Britain and loyalty to the Empire.²¹ However, Carson and some supporters were unwilling to sublimate political priorities to the war effort. He denounced southern unionists supportive of Redmond’s appeal for unity, the UUC refused to cooperate with the Ulster Liberal Association in recruiting, and some UVF units hampered enrollment to government forces.²² The Irish unionist leader discouraged a recruitment tour of Belgian clergy from visiting “parts of Ulster” where it would be considered “Catholic propagandist.”²³ After the Easter Rising, UVF officers told Carson the rank-and-file were “anxious to know exactly to what extent they are going to be led on this principle of the Empire first.”²⁴ The failed rebellion drew British attention back to Ireland, where political tensions had abated little since 1914, while threats to the IPP’s ascendancy within nationalism were amplified.

Lloyd George’s Proposals

Political changes followed swiftly after the Rising, though traditional structures and issues remained in place. Chief Secretary Augustine Birrell resigned on May 3. Asquith visited Dublin from May 11 to 19. On his return, he asked Lloyd George to become the new Chief Secretary. The latter declined but agreed to mediate between Irish parties.²⁵

Lloyd George was ostensibly a neutral arbitrator and portrayed himself as a home ruler.²⁶ However, as a consistent supporter of exclusion, his position was closer to unionists than Irish nationalists. During the 1916 talks, Lloyd George assured a northern unionist, “I have always been sympathetic to the claims of Ulster, and as a Protestant Nonconformist I have a thorough appreciation of the Ulster anxieties about Home Rule.”²⁷ His anti-Catholicism was not apparent, but those who were aware of it knew it aided unionists. UUC member James Stronge wrote in 1917, “Carson says that Lloyd George is decidedly anti-papist and that his feelings on this point are a help to us.”²⁸

During the war, Lloyd George developed a friendship with Carson. The two were colleagues in Asquith’s war Cabinet between May and October 1915. He considered asking Carson to join him in forming a new party to remove Asquith as Prime Minister. In July 1916, Lloyd George suggested Carson become Premier.²⁹ He was toying with these ideas while negotiating a deal between the Irish unionist leader and his nationalist opponents. Had Lloyd George’s thoughts been widely known, little would have irritated Irish nationalists more than to suggest Carson be put in the United Kingdom’s top political post.

Even before the announcement of his role as “Head Pacificator,” Lloyd George began to outline ideas to Irish leaders.³⁰ Throughout the negotiations, Lloyd George inculcated a feeling among participants they were united for a common goal and may have to overcome outside obstacles to do so. He encouraged this feeling in Carson by telling him southern unionists and their supporters in the Cabinet—erstwhile allies of the Irish unionist leader—were “working hard to prevent a settlement.”³¹

Little information on the talks leaked to the press. Several papers reported Carson was demanding a “clean cut” of six Ulster counties, their permanent exclusion from home rule. The Times speculated Carson would get what he demanded. Reacting to such rumors, the Irish Independent said nationalists should resist any deal to divide the island. Such “dismemberment” might be presented as temporary but would likely prove permanent.³²

In the first week of June, Carson and Redmond left London. The former outlined Lloyd George’s proposals at a June 6 UUC meeting in Belfast. Reports of the terms confirmed press speculation. The most widely discussed aspect was six counties, Antrim, Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry, and Tyrone, would be excluded from home rule. The Independent retorted, “This plan is more objectionable than any arrangement previously suggested.” On June 9, a number of northern Catholic clergy published letters protesting exclusion.³³ Ulster nationalist leader Joseph Devlin sounded out several bishops. All were hostile. Bishop O’Donnell of Raphoe warned, “the Party could not survive the offer of such proposals to the country,” adding, “the country … was rational, democratic, & responsible, but the present proposals were not so.” Devlin predicted Belfast’s nationalists, many of them his constituents, would approve, but no one else would.³⁴

With nationalist sentiment swinging against the settlement, Redmond explained the terms at a June 10 IPP meeting. The 1914 Home Rule Act would operate immediately, except in the six excluded counties. This would last until one year after the war’s end, when an Imperial Conference involving dominion representatives would review the entire situation, including partition. The press recognized Irish leaders were giving different versions; in Carson’s six-county exclusion would be “definite” or permanent, while Redmond insisted this was “provisional” or temporary.³⁵

Exclusion’s permanence became the most controversial aspect of the negotiations. Carson and Redmond received Lloyd George’s proposals in writing before leaving London.³⁶ The text did not address the temporality of exclusion but said the bill—referring to legislation implementing the agreement—would remain in force until a year after the war’s end. Afterward, the settlement could continue or be altered by Parliament. Redmond thought the excluded counties would join the Irish parliament automatically unless Parliament or the Imperial Conference altered this. Before the Irish nationalist leader left London, he obtained Lloyd George’s assurance he and Asquith would uphold the written proposals, “we could rely upon him and the Prime Minister not to tolerate any further concessions being sprung upon us.” Lloyd George would “stand or fall by the agreement come to.”³⁷ Redmond likely requested this guarantee to avoid a recurrence of Asquith’s constant pressure for further concessions in 1914. Devlin made a note of Lloyd George’s terms, “The arrangement was to be temporary,” “During the interval the Irish representation at Westminster would be retained in full strength,” and “There would be no separate Parliament for the six counties.”³⁸

Carson also sought clarification on exclusion’s permanence. When Lloyd George sent him the proposals on May 29, he included the oft-quoted note, “We must make it clear that at the end of the provisional period Ulster does not, whether she wills it or not, merge in the rest of Ireland.” Most commentators interpret this as a commitment to permanent partition.³⁹ D. G. Boyce and Alvin Jackson point out it means the excluded area would not be added to the home rule area except by an act passed at Westminster. Boyce highlights that this rejects Redmond’s interpretation of automatic inclusion. Jackson notes it would make partition’s length contingent on “the sympathies of the party in power.” Both argue Carson and Redmond were likely aware of the proposals’ ambiguity and accepted it in their eagerness for a settlement. This does not seem likely, as both Irish leaders pushed Lloyd George for clarification.

While the May 29 note did confirm that ending partition would require a new act of Parliament, unionists interpreted this as a pledge to permanent exclusion. Carson said so in 1924.⁴⁰ UUC member Hugh de Fellenberg Montgomery wrote after the June 12 meeting, “Carson holds a letter from Lloyd George stating that the proposed Amendment of the Government of Ireland Act is to be a definitive one and not an Emergency Measure for the duration of the war.” Regardless of the technicality partition could be ended by an act of Parliament, Montgomery interpreted this as permanent partition, “The Ulster Unionist will be more or less on velvet when the matter comes to be finally settled.”⁴¹

One often overlooked aspect of the May 29 note is its denial of people in the six counties—nationalist or unionist—the right to decide exclusion themselves. Only O’Donnell’s assertion the proposals were not “democratic” hints at this. Many contemporaries—including Irish nationalists—said “Ulster,” referring to any excluded area, should not join a home rule parliament until the population wished.⁴² This maxim ignored six-county supporters of immediate home rule, but in any case, the Lloyd George proposals did not embody this pronouncement. The phrase “whether she wills it or not” denies any element of choice or, to use a phrase coming into vogue during the First World War, of self-determination. Provisions for gauging the wishes of the population in any area proposed for exclusion had been a theme of the 1914 Buckingham Palace Conference, but the fact the proposals contained no provision for doing so confirms that six-county inhabitants would not be consulted on the region’s future.

Carson responded to Lloyd George’s written proposals with a memorandum outlining what he understood them to mean. This included, “The 6 counties mentioned in paragraph 2 are to be excluded from the Government of Ireland Act and are not to be included unless at some future time the Imperial Parliament pass an Act for that purpose.” This accords with Boyce and Jackson, but combining this with later statements it is evident Carson interpreted this as permanent exclusion. The proposals suggest the excluded area would require an alternate administration, and Carson seized on this as an offer of self-government, at least in local government, education, post office, customs, and land purchase.⁴³ These interpretations opposed the two principles in Devlin’s understanding of the proposals, the settlement would be temporary and the six counties would not have a separate administration. The proposals’ text and Carson’s interpretation skirt the second point by not suggesting a six-county “parliament.”

On the thorny issues of exclusion’s geographic area and time limit, Lloyd George’s proposals gave Ulster unionists everything their leaders demanded during the Buckingham Palace Conference. Carson stated publicly he asked Lloyd George for all-Ulster exclusion. He had to do so to mollify his supporters. Privately, he admitted the proposals met his demands on Ulster unionists’ behalf. British unionists Bonar Law, Hugh Cecil, Chamberlain, and Lansdowne all agreed. Craig later admitted that during the negotiations he and Carson asked Lloyd George to exclude six counties, not nine.⁴⁴

Party Approval and Cabinet Disapproval

Despite public disagreement over exclusion’s duration, both parties moved forward with votes on the proposals. Unbeknownst as yet to nationalist leaders or the public, Carson was armed with Lloyd George’s May 29 private note and could assure followers his interpretation was correct. On June 12, the UUC passed resolutions protesting home rule’s introduction, but because the Cabinet thought it necessary to introduce self-government, “as loyal citizens … in this crisis of the Empire’s history it is our duty to make sacrifices.”⁴⁵ The proceedings were not published, but Ronald McNeill emphasized the sacrifice six-county unionists made by agreeing to part with their colleagues in the province’s three counties to be included in home rule, “It was the saddest hour the Ulster Unionist Council ever spent. Men not prone to emotion shed tears. It was the most poignant ordeal the Ulster leader ever passed through.” Publicly, northern unionists and their supporters upheld this moment as a sacrifice for peace with Irish nationalists and to strengthen the Empire.⁴⁶

Privately, many unionists admitted exclusion for six counties was better politics than the entire province. This had been Carson’s policy since 1913, though most Ulster unionists were unaware of it. An argument he used in his June 6 UUC speech was purely utilitarian. The nine counties would contain approximately 869,000 Protestants and 700,000 Catholics, forecasting a unionist parliamentary majority of one. The six-county population would comprise 825,000 Protestants and 432,000 Catholics, a unionist majority of 7 representatives.⁴⁷ Montgomery recognized the nine counties elected seventeen nationalists and sixteen unionists to Westminster; therefore, the latter could not consider their position secure if that area were excluded. A Belfast correspondent wrote in congratulations to Carson, “as regards practical politics, the exclusion of six counties is a better proposition than nine.” A note on Ulster in Unionist Party leader Bonar Law’s papers described “her sacrifice” as “more psychological than real.”⁴⁸

While Carson assuaged his followers, IPP leaders worried they could not convince their Ulster supporters to back the proposals without assurances they would be temporary. The Prime Minister seemed to rise to the occasion. During a June 14 speech at Ladybank, Asquith said of Ireland, “what is desired now is a provisional settlement. When the war comes to an end, when the reign of peace is reestablished, we shall have to take stock, as an Empire, of our internal relations.” Dillon told Lloyd George Asquith’s remarks were fortunate; if the unionist interpretation of “definite” exclusion had been confirmed, “all the nationalists in Ireland would have been unanimous in rejecting the proposals with contempt.”⁴⁹

Ulster nationalist MP Jeremiah MacVeagh urged Lloyd George to declare the deal temporary and plebiscites would follow. He might say, “the Irish Settlement proposed is merely provisional and does not in any way prejudice the undoubted right of the people in every County to decide for themselves the question of inclusion or exclusion.” No such announcement was forthcoming. Dublin Castle official Frederick Wrench assured Carson, “Asquith as usual is confusing the issue,” adding, “when I saw him the word ‘provisional’ was not in Lloyd George’s mind, and he said more than once that there was to be no time limit whatever to the exclusion of the Ulster counties.”⁵⁰

The Prime Minister’s speech reassured IPP leaders their interpretation of Lloyd George’s proposals was correct. Devlin advocated acceptance, arguing in a June 21 public letter the six counties would be drawn into home rule out of self-interest and sympathy with southern unionists, perhaps before the postwar Imperial Conference. Until then, IPP members at Westminster would safeguard six-county nationalists. He called Lloyd George’s plan “the greatest chance that has ever been offered to our people to win not only the freedom of their native land, but the friendly co-operation of our Unionist fellow-countrymen.”⁵¹

On June 23, the IPP convened a conference of six-county nationalists in Belfast to consider the proposals. Redmond stressed exclusion’s temporary nature and warned if they rejected the deal, their sole option was to resume a long and potentially fruitless parliamentary battle. Opposing the proposals, Omagh solicitor F. J. O’Connor said if they accepted and a parliamentary majority decided exclusion should be permanent, the IPP would be powerless to reverse this. Both Devlin and Redmond threatened to resign if the six-county nationalists rejected the proposals, which the Independent compared to holding a pistol to delegates’ heads.⁵²

The final vote was 475-275 for the settlement. The figures show a clear geographical divide. Representatives from majority-nationalist areas, Fermanagh, Tyrone, and Londonderry City—which might have been included in home rule if plebiscites were held—voted against. Delegates from counties Antrim (including Belfast), Armagh, Down, and the Londonderry countryside, majority-unionist areas that would likely have been excluded in any case, were overwhelmingly for the agreement.⁵³ The convention gave Redmond the indication of support he needed, reinforced by an IPP vote on June 26.

Bodies representing Irish unionists and nationalists had now agreed to Lloyd George’s proposals, which might have ended the ordeal. However, since Carson and Redmond left London, Unionists in the Cabinet had grown alarmed at the lengths to which Lloyd George’s offer committed them. Most protested he exceeded his authority by representing his proposals as government policy. That the proposals entailed immediate home rule angered them further. Chamberlain, Lansdowne, Long, and Selborne all thought Lloyd George might negotiate the area of exclusion and perhaps a temporary administration to replace Dublin Castle, not self-government. Lansdowne and Long are sometimes considered southern Irish unionists but did not consider themselves part of this group.⁵⁴ Selborne, the only Cabinet member to resign over the affair, had no personal connection to Ireland. Long said he had only a general idea of what Lloyd George would propose, and when the two met on May 30, he discovered the proposals had already been sent to the Irish leaders. That day, Lloyd George told Long exclusion would be subject to revision after the war.⁵⁵

British and Irish unionists were concerned nationalists would see immediate home rule as validating the recent rebellion. Long expanded on this by asserting self-government combined with exclusion would show adherents of both Irish parties that force works:

Ulster is to be excluded and therefore it is said in Ireland that she succeeded because her wealth and her population enabled her to take up arms and threaten violent resistance to Home Rule. It is said that the Nationalists have succeeded to a considerable extent owing to the fact that the Sinn Feiners took up arms and actually did resort to rebellion.⁵⁶

Long’s concern is ironic as he encouraged Ulster unionists in any methods of resisting home rule from January 1910.

Not all unionists, not even all those in the Cabinet, opposed the proposals.⁵⁷ Lloyd George described southern unionists as opponents, as do some historians, but this group was divided. Southern unionist MPs circulated a protest against the proposals on June 6, but William Hutcheson Poe wrote to Redmond offering to form “an influential body of Unionists of the South & West” to support him. They might even act as intermediaries between the IPP and the Ulster unionists, “every Unionist who has the country’s best interest at heart” would aid in “reconciliation and co-operation between the two hitherto opposing political parties.” Liberal MP and Trinity College alumnus Cecil Harmsworth met with the majority-unionist Dublin Chamber of Commerce during the controversy and said members opposed the Lloyd George plan because it guaranteed exclusion.⁵⁸

Unionist opponents did not have a coherent alternative to the proposals. This lack of unanimity was particularly acute on partition. Southern unionist and Attorney General for Ireland James Campbell warned any scheme involving administrative division would “inevitably result in constant agitation, friction, and disorder.” Lansdowne opposed immediate self-government and exclusion, “if Home Rule is to come I should prefer a measure embracing the whole of Ireland, with safeguards for the minority.”⁵⁹

Balfour supported the proposals and expressed the logic of partition, “If we must have Home Rule, let us at least exclude from its operation as much of Unionist Ireland as is possible.” This ignores the existence of northern nationalists by assuming it was possible to identify a geographical location of “Unionist Ireland.” Balfour said Lloyd George’s proposals offered a chance for “settling peaceably and permanently the problem of Ulster.” Both hindsight and contemporary criticism undermine this idea. Other unionists supported partition but opposed the six-county area. The Church of Ireland’s Archbishop of Dublin, John Bernard, warned Lloyd George against dividing the island by religious identity. The demarcation should be “on geographical, rather than on theological, lines.” Therefore, Bernard favored excluding the entire nine-county northern province.⁶⁰

Cabinet opposition disturbed Ulster unionists, who based their support on the idea the government considered immediate home rule a war necessity. Somerset Saunderson learned from Long that Lloyd George never put the proposals before the Cabinet, “as he had led us to understand.” Travers Blackley, secretary of the Cavan UUC delegates, said his group wanted to confer again, as when they voted to accept the proposals, “they were under the impression that the Unionist party in England had thrown them over and would no longer stand by them.”⁶¹

This is a noteworthy moment in the history of Ulster unionism. Since 1911, their spokesmen expressed their demands uncompromisingly and warned—or threatened—violence would ensue if they were not met. This confidence was based largely on the support Ulster unionists believed they commanded within the Unionist Party, as well as the British government and public. When that support showed signs of wavering, Ulster unionists made what they considered significant concessions. This supports the assumption of many contemporaries that if British unionists removed or even relaxed support for their Ulster colleagues, their uncompromising stance on Irish self-government would prove untenable.

Cabinet opposition enabled Lloyd George to continue his strategy of making the Irish leaders feel they were united in a common struggle. In a June 10 letter to Dillon, he blamed his colleagues’ hostility on southern unionist pressure. Lloyd George promised if Dillon and Carson convinced their followers to support the proposals, he and Asquith would fight for them within the government. He ended with a scarcely veiled threat that if both British parties were united, they could govern Ireland by coercion, but not if he and the Prime Minister remained on the Irish nationalists’ side. Lloyd George assured both Dillon and Redmond that Asquith approved the proposals, and “he also will stand or fall by them.”⁶² Lloyd George was not really concerned about the opposition. He told Asquith if Carson and the IPP supported the settlement, the Cabinet Unionists “will rail in vain.” He threatened to resign if his colleagues did not support the deal, but Long called his bluff, “I cannot believe that you seriously intend to base your resignation upon this excuse,” indicating Irish issues were not foremost even then.⁶³

Events in Ireland showed Lloyd George’s tactics were working, but Cabinet dissension continued. T. P. O’Connor warned Redmond on June 28 there might be changes to the settlement. He was convinced of Lloyd George’s sincerity and implored, “I hope you will not regard any suggestion made by L.G. to meet the situation as anything like surrender or betrayal, or indeed serious modification.”⁶⁴

The issue of exclusion’s permanence was still unresolved and returned to the forefront in Parliament. Responding to questions on June 29 as to whether exclusion would be temporary, Lansdowne said the proposals were not approved by the Cabinet and were only “consultations.” On July 7, Redmond urged Lloyd George that Asquith must declare the agreement provisional, the six counties would not have its own executive, and there would be no new conditions since the nationalist convention approved the proposals.⁶⁵

Instead, responding to a July 10 question from Carson, Asquith said the excluded counties could not be brought into home rule without a new bill. This confirmed Lloyd George’s private assurance of May 29 and contradicted Redmond’s assumption of automatic inclusion, but IPP representatives seem not to have realized this.⁶⁶ Next day, Lansdowne said the proposals entailed “permanent and enduring” amendments to the 1914 Home Rule Act. Dillon called this speech “absolutely fatal” to the settlement’s chances. On July 18, Redmond told the Prime Minister the new home rule bill should be published immediately and without deviation from the “strictly temporary and provisional character of ALL sections of the bill.”⁶⁷

A draft circulated to the Cabinet on July 14 provided for six-county exclusion “only for the period of the war and twelve months later,” agreeing with Redmond’s assumption of automatic inclusion. When Cabinet unionists insisted the terms be altered, they focused not on safeguarding their southern comrades but ensuring exclusion’s virtual permanence. Despite Lloyd George’s promise to Dillon to fight for the proposals, he acquiesced in the Cabinet’s decision to compromise between Carson’s and Redmond’s interpretations. On July 19, they agreed to keep the overall settlement temporary but insert language saying the excluded counties would not join the Irish parliament automatically. This would render home rule temporary, but partition perpetual. They also planned to reduce the number of Irish MPs at Westminster. Redmond called keeping the IPP in Parliament at full strength “an indispensable safeguard of the temporary character of the whole arrangement.”⁶⁸ Irish nationalist MPs could counter attempts to make exclusion permanent, but this was less likely if their numbers were reduced.

Home Secretary Herbert Samuel informed Carson of the Cabinet’s decisions on July 21. The Irish unionist leader wanted to call the excluded area “North Ireland.” Samuel objected, as that would be “taken in the rest of the country as hoisting the flag of a permanent separation and as the definite constitution of a new state within the Empire, which is not, I believe, what you have in view.” They should call the area simply “the Six Counties.”⁶⁹ Despite Samuel’s belief Carson wanted only temporary partition, the foundation for what would become Northern Ireland had been laid. There was no plan for a six-county legislature, but Carson and Lloyd George were already devising a form of self-government, even down to an acceptable name.

Samuel and Lloyd George conveyed the terms to Redmond on July 22. The IPP leader warned Asquith next day, “any bill framed upon these lines will meet with the vehement opposition at all its stages of the Irish Party.” Redmond and Dillon ended the negotiations publicly on July 24. Dillon declared, “I rest on the written document,” placing his faith in the proposals as formulated originally.⁷⁰

The affair damaged the relationship between Redmond and Lloyd George. Frances Stevenson, Lloyd George’s secretary and future wife, wrote on July 26, “The Irish are angry with him: they think he should have upheld the original terms of the agreement, & I think they have reason to be angry.”⁷¹ The reference to “original terms” is significant, as this, Long’s assertion, and the draft bill all indicate Redmond’s interpretation of the proposals was correct.

New Government, New Ideas

1916 continued to be a disastrous year for the IPP. Asquith’s Cabinet slowly fractured due to his perceived indolence in prosecuting the war. In December, Lloyd George brought matters to a head by using his favorite tactic of threatening to resign. Asquith stepped down preemptively, assuming no one else could form a Cabinet and the King would recall him to office. Instead, Lloyd George built a new coalition. Historian David Powell describes this government as “dominated” by conservatives; thirteen out of twenty-three Cabinet members were Unionists. In his first statement as Prime Minister, Lloyd George said he did not have time to devote to Ireland. Redmond said the speech “showed an utter and complete absence of that quick decision which, we were told, was to be the characteristic of this Government.” Nationalist MP Stephen Gwynn, an Army captain, said he was happy to return to the Western Front after Parliament’s hostility toward his Party.⁷²

Though Lloyd George professed to have no time for the Irish question, it remained on the minds of many. Opinion gradually shifted toward holding an all-party conference. AFIL founder William O’Brien suggested this in September 1916. His experience arbitrating land disputes between nationalist activists and unionist landlords instilled a belief in settlement by consent, and a determination that this was the way to self-government. Lord Lieutenant Wimborne also suggested all-party talks.⁷³

The most ardent advocate within the government of a conference was Leo Amery. A Unionist and Covenant signatory, in his memoirs he said partition would provide “no real solution” to the Irish question.⁷⁴ Amery’s February 1917 assessment included cutting criticism of the 1914 Home Rule Act, calling it “unattractive to all sections of Irishmen” and “framed by Englishmen to suit Parliamentary exigencies at Westminster, and not by Irishmen to suit Irish ideas or to meet Irish needs.” He asserted, “No British Government can solve the Irish problem by legislation, and no British statesman can solve it by negotiation.” No solution was possible “until Irishmen themselves shoulder the responsibility of discovering a form of government on which they can agree. The surprising thing is that anyone should ever have thought that any other method could succeed.”⁷⁵ This last observation is not surprising as British politicians of both major parties assumed they should play a major role in determining Irish governance.

The Prime Minister did not act immediately on the convention suggestion. Some officials suggested the government set up a boundary commission to “define Protestant Ulster.” O’Connor liked the idea if the IPP controlled the body’s composition. The only other option was to convince Lloyd George to “bully” Carson into accepting an all-Ireland parliament, which he thought unlikely. O’Connor may have been embarrassed by his and his colleagues’ acceptance of the 1916 proposals. He wrote in February 1917, “I could be no party to the exclusion of Tyrone and Fermanagh or indeed to any county of Ulster, without a plebiscite.”⁷⁶ Redmond distrusted Lloyd George after his conduct during the previous negotiations, but in March 1917, Liberal MP Harold Spender offered a boundary commission to define the area of exclusion on the Prime Minister’s behalf. Spender hinted at this body’s powers, “We often cut up counties in England without engaging in a Civil War.” The IPP leader was unmoved.⁷⁷

Rebuffed by Redmond, in mid-April 1917, Lloyd George appointed a Cabinet committee to draft a new home rule bill composed of Unionists Lord Curzon and new Chief Secretary Henry Duke, as well as Liberal Christopher Addison. The last described himself as “a sincere Home Ruler.” He was quickly disillusioned with the measure that caused so much controversy before the war, “it was a very crippled affair, for the Irish Government was so hedged about by restrictions and limitations and was financially so impotent that the first year … would certainly have brought about an unanswerable demand for drastic amendment.”⁷⁸

On the crucial issue of partition, the committee’s bill would provide county option for the six counties. Exclusion would be temporary with the option of renewal; each county would hold a new poll every seven to ten years. Committee members were “directed” that inclusion should require a 55 percent vote in each county. Carson wanted the figure to be 75 percent.⁷⁹ The committee rejected these ideas. Anything other than a bare majority would “invite the criticism that an apparently trifling departure from ordinary constitutional procedure was proposed for the transparent purpose of enabling a minority in Tyrone and Fermanagh to decide the issue in those counties.” Excluded counties would be linked to the rest of the island through a “Council of Ireland,” which would negotiate legislation of common concern and eventual reunification.⁸⁰

The Cabinet decided to send the proposals to Redmond and offer an all-party Irish convention.⁸¹ However, Lloyd George’s letter to the IPP leader said the six counties would be excluded as a bloc. He did not mention plebiscites, and Parliament would reconsider the position after five years. This removed the principle of choice and confirmed the idea, embodied in Lloyd George’s 1916 proposals, that Westminster should decide the duration of exclusion. If IPP leaders rejected this, the Prime Minister offered “that Irishmen of all creeds and parties might meet together in a Convention for the purpose of drafting a Constitution for their Country.” Redmond and his colleagues accepted the latter option.⁸²

Once the government determined to convene a conference, its composition became a point of contention. Announcing the Irish Convention in Parliament on May 21, Lloyd George said each delegate would pledge “to do his best” to reach a settlement. He promised if the gathering came to “substantial agreement” on the “character and scope” of a constitution for Ireland within the Empire, his administration would frame legislation accordingly. These phrases were characteristically vague and might enable Lloyd George to argue anything short of unanimity did not meet them. Given the diversity of interests represented, “substantial agreement” would be a significant challenge. Moreover, two days later Bonar Law said on governmental authority if every party in the conference agreed except Ulster unionists, this would not constitute “substantial agreement.”⁸³ The “Ulster veto” seemed very much intact.

Lloyd George announced the Convention’s composition on June 11, 1917. Five seats each were allotted to the IPP, Sinn Féin, Ulster unionists, southern unionists, and organized labor. The AFIL and Irish nobles were offered two representatives each. Chambers of commerce were given three seats. Local government representatives totaled forty-seven, mostly home rulers. Clergy included four Catholic bishops and three Protestant officials. Finally, the government intended to nominate 15 “leading Irishmen” for a total of 101.⁸⁴

Irish Parties and the Convention

Lloyd George reserved no seats for northern nationalists. The IPP ensured several of their representatives came from Ulster, but the government scheme shows a refusal to recognize the existence and concerns of nationalists there.⁸⁵ AFIL leader William O’Brien declined to participate, citing Ulster nationalists’ exclusion and alleged IPP and northern unionist overrepresentation. He advocated a small meeting like the 1902 Land Conference, not a sprawling assembly, and wanted the government to guarantee the resulting settlement would be subject to a referendum of all Irish people.⁸⁶

Sinn Féin representatives rejected the Convention almost immediately. A May 21 statement from prominent members asserted, as the British government backed Ulster unionists on partition, the conference’s failure was “assured beforehand.” The Convention’s collapse “would give the English Government the opportunity of declaring to its Allies, to the U.S. and to neutral Powers, that England had left the solution of the Irish question to the Irish themselves; that the Irish were unable to solve it; and that therefore, England’s continued occupation of Ireland was justified.” Labor leader William O’Brien—no relation to the AFIL founder—signed this statement, indicating his Irish Transport and General Workers’ Union (ITGWU) would not participate. Griffith and Sinn Féin’s National Council demanded the British government agree to submit a Convention agreement to international arbitration. Barring this, they intended to continue preparing Ireland’s case for representation at the peace conference to follow the First World War.⁸⁷ There was virtually no chance of agreement, making this tantamount to refusal.

Some historians claim Sinn Féin’s absence from the Convention doomed it from the outset, assuming it was more important to assuage this school of Irish nationalist thought than any other. Advanced nationalism was clearly growing. Prisoners interned after the Easter Rising were released in December 1916. Between February 1917 and the Convention’s opening in July, figures associated with the Rising running under the Sinn Féin banner defeated IPP candidates in three successive by-elections. Another Sinn Féin victory followed in August. Some observers claimed these contests killed the Convention before it began. However, it was unclear whether this was an expression of dissatisfaction with the IPP or approval of another policy. London’s Daily Telegraph asked in July 1917, “what is Sinn Fein for? The difficulty is that nobody is in a position to answer that question.”⁸⁸ The group was less an organized party than a collective term for the IPP’s nationalist opponents. Though considered the first Sinn Féin MP, Count Plunkett started his own association after his election in February 1917, the Liberty Clubs. Yet another body, the Irish Nation League, was trying to establish itself as a nationalist alternative. It was not until a party conference at the end of October 1917, three months into the Convention’s deliberations, Sinn Féin reorganized and propounded its objectives.

Historian Michael Laffan attributes the group’s 1917 electoral successes in part to IPP weakness. Sinn Féin was composed of several factions, including anti-IPP nationalists and physical-force republicans.⁸⁹ Given this chaotic state, it is not certain adherents could nominate credible representatives to the Convention. Government confusion on this point was evident. Bonar Law said in June the Sinn Féin movement was not “organised in such a way that any person or persons could authoritatively speak for those engaged in it.”⁹⁰

Despite such confusion, the government and the IPP recognized Sinn Féin deserved representation. The Cabinet released convicted Rising prisoners in June 1917 to “create a good atmosphere” and nominated two Sinn Féin sympathizers: Edward Lysaght (later MacLysaght) and writer George “AE” Russell.⁹¹ The former kept republicans apprised of developments in the conference. Russell pointed out that, far from Sinn Féin’s growth destroying the Convention, the by-elections gave them a more authoritative voice within it.⁹²

Southern unionists agreed to participate through the Irish Unionist Alliance (IUA). With sympathizers from other delegations, they mustered ten representatives. Midleton said participation necessitated a change in mindset. Lloyd George’s terms implied “some form of Home Rule” and “entering the Convention was a sacrifice to every Unionist.” He joined believing home rule was inevitable, and he must obtain the best possible settlement.⁹³

Ulster unionists took the most cautious approach of any party to the Convention. Carson sometimes seemed open to an accord. He reminded Montgomery the 1914 Home Rule Act, which included Ulster, “has now become the law of the land.” Ulster unionists must obtain every safeguard possible.⁹⁴ Carson told the UUC’s standing committee they should establish their contentment under the Union and listen to all that was said, but not necessarily aid an agreement. A member summarized the policy as, “We sit tight, and practically say nothing, until the others have told us what they want, and have come to some agreement among themselves. We will then discuss it with them.” Carson emphasized that division among the various nationalist parties provided little chance of “substantial agreement.” He assured the committee, “we can go in, and come out of the Convention without prejudice to our position, and no settlement will be forced upon Ulster against our will.”⁹⁵

The UUC appointed five representatives and a Belfast-based advisory council to which the delegates should refer all decisions. Some unionists outside the six counties were anxious to prevent a repeat of 1916. The UUC passed a resolution brought by Monaghan’s representatives, “‘Ulster means Ulster’ and that there should be no partition of the Province, and that the three counties of Monaghan, Cavan, and Donegal should not again be expected to sacrifice themselves.” They were likely reacting to Belfast press statements that six-county exclusion was the Ulster unionist demand.⁹⁶ If maintaining the Union proved impossible, the UUC’s official fallback position was to safeguard the nine-county province rather than the six counties discussed in 1916, but the latter idea did not disappear.

The policy of “considering” and “discussing” home rule was too open-minded for some UUC members. Montgomery said the primary reason for sending a delegation was “to produce a good effect on English Public opinion.” During the conference, he assured a supporter Ulster unionist members were “proposing nothing, but obstructing everything which would tend to commit the Convention to any form of Home Rule.” Refusing to join might weaken their British support, but Ulster unionists appointed a delegation with a mandate to do little to advance a solution. Interestingly, Montgomery added in the last resort the UUC would advocate either federalism enabling “Ulster to manage its own affairs,” or exclusion for six counties, not nine as the Council agreed officially.⁹⁷

Between abstaining parties, Sinn Féin electoral victories, and the difficult attitudes of some delegates, the Convention was not entered upon with much optimism. Frances Stevenson said Lloyd George was “hopeful that peace may reign for a few months at least in that quarter, though I do not know whether he has any hopes of the Convention ultimately solving the Irish puzzle.” Fanning cites this as evidence the Prime Minister never intended the assembly to succeed, merely to defer contentious issues until peacetime. This was Sinn Féin’s interpretation. Ronald McNeill said Ulster unionists were doing their patriotic duty by helping to prevent disorder, calling the conference “a bone thrown to a snarling dog, and the longer there was anything to gnaw the longer would the dog keep quiet.”⁹⁸

Lloyd George’s purposes in calling the meeting were likely more nuanced than this allows. It was evident to many the Convention had little chance of success, and the Prime Minister probably saw value in deferring the Irish question. However, in April 1917 Lloyd George told Stevenson of the Irish question, “I want to get it settled now.”⁹⁹ The Prime Minister had formed multiple committees to draft home rule bills, and before the Convention ended, he interjected in its deliberations. Lloyd George committed his and his government’s time and energy to Ireland despite the war but did not find a solution. Through the conference, the Prime Minister could gauge what terms were acceptable to the Irish political classes. Moreover, the Convention did not keep Ireland quiet, as political agitation continued outside its deliberations.

Even Horace Plunkett, the most optimistic conference proponent, was not sanguine regarding its prospects. The Convention was asked to succeed where three British administrations—Asquith’s Liberal government, his war Cabinet, and Lloyd George’s coalition—all failed, “It is little wonder that even friendly public opinion should regard the Convention as an imperfect instrument for the accomplishment of a hopeless task.” Ulster unionist James Craig typified almost forlorn hopes for the conference, “Everyone now felt that a solution free from the sacrifice of any principle for which they had struggled so nobly, a solution come to by agreement, if such were possible, would be a great relief.”¹⁰⁰ Craig wanted the Convention to succeed and believed his constituents did, but they were unwilling to minimize their demands to ensure this achievement. Similar attitudes prevailed among all parties. If there was room for maneuver between these stances, it was the delegates’ task to find it.

The Irish Convention

The Convention met on July 25, 1917, at Trinity College. Members elected Plunkett chairman. Unionist MP for South Dublin from 1893 to 1900, by 1911 he adopted a pro-home rule stance, without joining any party. Plunkett has been criticized justifiably as egotistical, but he was one of the few people on good terms with leaders of every party. An official said some Britons considered him “a sort of saint or hero” for working to develop cooperative agriculture in Ireland. Plunkett was known to support the British war effort and had been trying since at least August 1915 to convince U.S. officials to join the Entente. His transatlantic connections reached all the way to the White House, lending him increased influence as efforts by Lloyd George’s government to address the Irish question were partly to assuage American opinion.¹⁰¹ At the same time, Plunkett had little experience in the political management necessary to orchestrate the Convention. He became convinced the Ulster unionist delegation was the biggest obstacle to a settlement. By October 1917 he referred to “the arrogant Ulstermen,” who “assume that they alone count.” Frustration with this delegation was evident. Lord MacDonnell called the northerners’ intransigence “an impeachment of their honesty,” referring to Lloyd George’s assertion delegates were pledged to do their best for an agreement.¹⁰²

As chairman, Plunkett became nearly obsessed with procedure. He wanted speakers to adhere to a strict timetable. Plunkett, not Lloyd George, was primarily responsible for the assembly’s length, and he was convinced this would aid a settlement, “we are not likely to break up without coming to some agreement,” and “the longer we fight over it inside the Convention, the better chance there is of producing a scheme which will be acceptable to North and South and possible for the Government to adopt.”¹⁰³ Plunkett told the King, “the Irish question has never been argued in Parliament (or, for that matter, out of it) on its merits. Reason has been overborne by passion.” He determined the Convention should provide this debate. Delegates’ speeches were not published. The only signs of activity were brief official statements. Secrecy may have aided delegates’ candor but increased public perception the Convention was not accomplishing anything.¹⁰⁴

There was considerable support among delegates and the public for a more authoritative form of home rule than the 1914 Act. Seven schemes of self-government were submitted to the Convention, five based on dominion precedents and two on federalism. Six of seven included fiscal autonomy. Some of the plans contemplated provincial legislatures subordinate to an Irish parliament; others would create local committees within the Irish legislature, ideas for conciliating Ulster unionists while maintaining political unity.¹⁰⁵

MacDonnell submitted a scheme based on Erskine Childers’s The Framework of Home Rule (1911). Childers served on the Convention’s secretariat. Russell published Thoughts for a Convention (1917), arguing for dominion status with safeguards for Ulster unionists. He predicted partition would cause lasting strife, “Ireland would regard the six Ulster counties as the French have regarded Alsace-Lorraine, whose hopes of re-conquest turned Europe into an armed camp.” The Irish Independent , whose publisher William Martin Murphy was nominated to the Convention, renewed calls for dominion status.¹⁰⁶ Plunkett thought the apparent popularity of Sinn Féin’s independence demand drove IPP supporters toward dominion home rule. Lysaght told the Convention the party “demanded a republic” but “was not intransigent.” He believed the organization could be won over “if it can be persuaded that national freedom is possible within the Empire.” Plunkett believed Sinn Féin would welcome an offer of dominion status.¹⁰⁷

Ulster unionists assumed the conference would be based on the Home Rule Act and were surprised more authoritative forms of self-government were being mooted. Ronald McNeill complained, “The Act of 1914 was brushed aside as beneath contempt,” an ironic protest given Ulster unionists’ reactions to that measure. The Ulster unionist delegation said in their report, “Had we thought that the majority of the Convention intended to demand … what is tantamount to full national independence, we could not have agreed to enter the Convention.” They need not have worried. Lloyd George had no intention of implementing an agreement based on dominion home rule, “the Dominions were virtually independent States and could secede at any time if they chose.”¹⁰⁸ While the Convention was allegedly empowered to frame a constitution for Ireland, Cabinet officials intended to veto any arrangement they considered unsatisfactory.

Ulster unionist delegates offended their southern counterparts before the conference began by not consulting them on policy. Midleton said they thought his group “should hew wood and draw water for Ulster.”¹⁰⁹ Tensions increased in mid-August 1917 when southern unionist J. B. Powell submitted a home rule scheme based on a single-chamber legislature for the six counties and another for the rest of the island, united by a senate. Garvin’s Observer discussed a similar plan in 1910. UUC members were incensed any unionist suggested self-government and compelled an official expression of regret from their southern counterparts.¹¹⁰ This did not stop unionists from moving toward an accord. By November, the new Lord Londonderry, whose father was one of Carson’s chief associates before his death in 1915, wanted to submit a plan based on federalizing the United Kingdom. His fellow Ulster unionists discouraged him, advisory council member Adam Duffin admonishing, “This is no time to succeed in framing a constitution for Ireland.” Nonetheless, Londonderry’s intention was an intimation Ulster unionists were not uniformly intractable.¹¹¹

The Convention delegated decision-making powers to a “Sub-Committee of Nine” comprised of five nationalists, three Ulster unionists, and one southern unionist. Surprisingly, the group reached compromises on constitutional issues. Unionists agreed to an all-Ireland parliament. Nationalists conceded that 40 percent of the lower house be occupied by unionists for ten years. After the Convention, Ulster unionists tried to portray themselves as having rejected this stipulation as “undemocratic.” In fact, their delegation leader Hugh Barrie suggested the 40 percent figure.¹¹²

Deadlock took the predictable course of dividing nationalists and unionists but occurred on fiscal autonomy. Nationalists wanted the Irish parliament to collect and distribute its own taxes, including customs and excise. Unionists wished to maintain the economic union with Britain. Nationalists suggested, if the Irish legislature had fiscal autonomy, they would make a free trade agreement with Britain. Unionists rejected the idea. Midleton said they wanted a self-governing Ireland compatible with a future federalized United Kingdom.¹¹³

Facing a possible breakdown, Redmond urged Lloyd George to compel the Ulster unionists to give way. The government might break the deadlock by declaring their intention to enforce the Primrose committee report. The Prime Minister replied he had urged Carson to advocate compromise. He inveighed the only alternative to the Convention was government by coercion, which he assured Redmond he opposed and “would regard with perfect horror.”¹¹⁴ It was the same combination of assurance and threat Lloyd George used in 1916.

Suddenly, unionists moved toward compromise. On November 26, Redmond declared himself willing to entertain any suggestions. Barrie admitted an Irish parliament should have some taxation powers, but customs and excise must remain with Imperial authorities. That day, Midleton suggested customs be retained by the Imperial Exchequer as a contribution, but excise be reserved for “special treatment,” presumably by an Irish legislature.¹¹⁵

Midleton’s compromise gained ground steadily. Southern unionist delegates backed it, and at a meeting on New Year’s Day, 1918, the IUA supported them by a 41-4 vote.¹¹⁶ Redmond did not pledge his support, but it was believed he would advocate the compromise. Devlin did not want to vote on it, as he thought Ulster unionists would soon make their own proposals. He may have misinterpreted their intention to draft amendments to Midleton’s resolution. Bishop O’Donnell opposed the compromise. His strategy was “to put the Nationalists in a strong position in the country by getting them to come out for fiscal autonomy. He [O’Donnell ] then thinks that the Government will step in and sweep away all Unionist resistance.” O’Donnell thought nationalists could beat Ulster unionists at their own game by appearing so intransigent the Cabinet would relent. He did not believe thoroughgoing partition was possible and would amount to no more than an Ulster legislative committee within the Irish parliament. Nonetheless, Midleton learned Dillon convinced the bishops to back the deal.¹¹⁷

Plunkett despaired of getting Ulster unionist consent to any settlement. He wrote in October 1917, “I may have to tell them that the Convention will report without asking their leave.” He shifted his strategy to cementing a deal between southern unionists, the IPP, and independent nationalists. In January 1918, Plunkett thought “the Government would put pressure upon the Ulster Unionists and, if necessary, legislate over their heads once it could be shown that they alone blocked the ending of the Irish Question.” Redmond wrote in a similar vein, “It is not now a question of Ulster agreeing. It is a question of whether by all the rest of Ireland agreeing she may be forced or shamed to come in.” Former nationalist MP and administrative official T. P. Gill advised him to support the compromise and “call on the Govt. to overrule the Ulster malcontents.”¹¹⁸

Britons involved with the Convention made the same diagnosis. Convention Secretary Lord Southborough was convinced by mid-November 1917 that Downing Street must pressure disagreeable delegates into a settlement. He thought Londonderry and Carson would convince Ulster unionists to accept a majority decision and relied on Lloyd George to do so if necessary. Chief Secretary Henry Duke told the Cabinet on November 22 the fault for a Convention failure would lie with the representatives of “North-East Ulster.” Carson took exception, but this convinced Lloyd George to become more involved.¹¹⁹

A fundamental problem for everyone working toward an agreement was if against all odds, the Convention reached an agreement, they relied on Lloyd George’s government to give it effect. While Plunkett maintained his faith in the Cabinet, the IPP leader did not. On December 4, 1917, Redmond said the conference was only called to pacify Ireland during the war. Plunkett denied this but told Lloyd George he would not keep the conference going merely “for the sake of keeping the country quiet,” indicating he was getting uneasy on this point.¹²⁰

Despite Plunkett and Redmond giving up on the Ulster unionists , Midleton received indications they might acquiesce in his compromise. Church of Ireland Primate and Convention member John Crozier said Carson counseled acceptance, they must “risk all their popularity in Ulster” for a settlement. Crozier later faced unionist recriminations for his support.¹²¹

On December 18, the Ulster unionist delegation drafted amendments to Midleton’s compromise. References to a meeting with the UUC advisory council in Belfast on New Year’s Day, 1918, also imply they were willing to see the Midleton resolution advance, without necessarily approving it. However, the meeting also sanctioned an exclusion scheme for submission to the Convention when Barrie deemed appropriate. Montgomery said this plan was, like so many Ulster unionist moves, designed to influence the British public. He told Barrie the exclusion proposal must make them appear “not as people who put special provincial interests before those of the Empire, but as people who by the stand they made against Home Rule saved the Realm.”¹²² Barrie now had several options. His delegation could endorse Midleton’s compromise and withhold the exclusion scheme, resulting in a unanimous settlement. If the Ulster unionists intended to wreck the deal, he could suggest exclusion as soon as an agreement between the other parties seemed likely. Finally, they could abstain and let the other parties pass a majority agreement.

Some advisory council members considered Midleton’s efforts a betrayal. Duffin wrote of the southern unionists, “they want to capitulate and make terms with the enemy lest a worse thing befall them. They are a cowardly crew and stupid to boot.” Barrie later called the compromise a “surrender” and claimed Midleton and his associates “tried to betray Ulster.”¹²³ However, when the Convention reassembled in January 1918, he told the southern unionist leader, “I think you may count on us. We shall certainly not be against you.” This indicates the Ulster unionists would abstain from voting or support the compromise. It is likely the plan agreed between the UUC and their delegates was either to abstain or support the compromise with amendments, but then to try to ensure the resulting settlement would not apply to the northern province by announcing their exclusion scheme.¹²⁴ This would have placed Ulster unionists’ appeal for separate treatment on record and may have ruptured the fragile coalition supporting the Midleton compromise. However, it is possible Amery’s hope the conference atmosphere would convince its members to work constructively was coming to fruition. Duffin noted in November 1917 Londonderry and Barrie were inclining toward concessions, if not proposals of their own.¹²⁵

Redmond did not believe the Ulster unionists intended to endorse the compromise and tried to compel a promise from Lloyd George to enforce an agreement between nationalists and southern unionists. On December 26, he said the Prime Minister assured he and Devlin if the other parties supported Midleton’s proposal, Lloyd George would “fight the Ulstermen” to ensure its success. However, the Prime Minister refused to put this in writing. Finally, on New Year’s Eve, the Prime Minister promised if the Midleton plan passed “with the opposition of Ulster alone,” he would “use his personal influence with his colleagues … to accept the proposal and to give it legislative effect.”¹²⁶ The language was characteristically vague, but it was the most Redmond could extract. On January 12, 1918, the Prime Minister told Bonar Law, “If the southern unionists and the nationalists agree, as they are likely to, the position of any government that refuses to carry out that compact will be an impossible one.”¹²⁷ Lloyd George was warning the Unionist leader he may have to renege on his promise not to force a settlement on his Ulster constituents, nullifying Bonar Law’s assurance “substantial agreement” could not be reached without them.

On January 4, 1918, Redmond announced his support for Midleton’s compromise. Given the representation scheme, he said he was ready to serve under the first Unionist Prime Minister of Ireland. Midleton said if a poll had been taken at that moment, no more than two Convention members would have opposed the settlement.¹²⁸ However, there was no vote. The assembly was scheduled to hear debates on land purchase and Plunkett did not alter the program. Midleton later blamed this delay for wrecking the settlement. Some scholars support this. At the time, the southern unionist leader did not place such a high value on speed. Instead of staying in Dublin and pressing for a vote, he went to London to attend Parliament.¹²⁹ Plunkett felt the more time spent talking the better. However, this delay allowed nationalist supporters of fiscal autonomy to rally against Redmond. On January 15, the IPP leader met with Plunkett and said three bishops and Devlin intended to defy him on the compromise, therefore he must withdraw his support. Plunkett called it “the worst shock of my public life.”¹³⁰

This ended the Convention’s best chance at an agreement with such overwhelming support Lloyd George would be forced to enact it, with or without Ulster unionist endorsement. The conference continued until April 5. The northern unionists seemed more pliable, though this may have been because they knew other parties lacked the cohesion to force a united Ireland.¹³¹ In a January 28 meeting with W. G. S. Adams, one of Lloyd George’s secretaries, Barrie suggested home rule within home rule involving an Ulster committee in the Irish parliament and some local administration in Belfast. Carson indicated his support. On February 13, Adams and Southborough convinced the Cabinet the ideal outcome of the Convention was an all-Ireland parliament. However, just eight days later the Prime Minister announced Carson had backtracked and was now refusing to aid a settlement. Balfour seized the opportunity to argue strenuously for partition, and the appearance of consensus vanished.¹³² Plunkett and Redmond continued to implore Lloyd George to act as an intermediary. Instead, in a letter to the Convention on February 25, the Prime Minister listed terms his government would accept.¹³³

Amid other setbacks, the Convention was bedeviled by untimely deaths. Belfast lawyer Alexander McDowell, a liaison between the Ulster unionist and nationalist delegations, passed in March. Redmond died the same month. His lack of initiative during the Convention reflected his declining health and self-confidence.¹³⁴ The IPP chairman’s passing provided a sad analogy for home rule, coinciding almost precisely with the point at which this idea ceased to captivate many Irish nationalists.

Despite all the negativity regarding the Convention, near-agreement within it reflected shifts in wider Irish public opinion. The narrative of an unbroken string of Sinn Féin victories between February and August 1917 omits that they declined to contest the South Dublin seat in July. Local unionists indicated they did not want a contest and would support an IPP representative, but not a republican. Sinn Féin declined to run a candidate, and the IPP won unopposed.¹³⁵ Home rulers defeated Sinn Féin in three straight by-elections between February and April 1918. Two of these—South Armagh and East Tyrone—came in Ulster, and IPP-unionist cooperation was apparent in both. During the Armagh campaign, a local unionist said he was working for the IPP candidate because he was “keen on a Convention settlement.” Commentators reiterated these victories were signs of support for the conference.¹³⁶ The Convention was aiding a potential reformulation of the contest system of Irish politics. The “nationalist versus unionist” dichotomy may have given way to a “constitutionalist versus revolutionary” arrangement. Midleton told nationalist Stephen Gwynn he hoped “all the moderate elements in Ireland” would combine for a settlement.¹³⁷

In seven contested by-elections between February 1917 and April 1918, Sinn Féin won 53.7 percent of the vote and the IPP 43.4 percent (Table 5.1). The latter proportion would have been higher had South Dublin been contested, but home rulers could not expect unionist cooperation in a general election. However, partition was a major issue agitating the Irish public.¹³⁸ If the Convention delivered a unified settlement, popular attitudes might have shifted. As Cabinet Under-Secretary Cecil Harmsworth wrote in November 1917, “if the Ulstermen will concede the setting-up of any sort of Parliament for all Ireland nine points in ten have been gained.”¹³⁹

Table 5.1 Contested Irish by-elections by party, 1917–April 1918 (end of Irish Convention)

Nationalist-unionist cooperation would have been lauded at any other time, but complicated Sinn Féin’s “straight fight” with the IPP. Moreover, republicans were co-opting the claim to speak for all of Ireland and portrayed opponents as hindering the march of “the nation.” The pro-Sinn Féin Meath Chronicle called home rulers and unionists voting together an “unholy alliance.” Armagh republican John Cosgrove recalled angrily “the green Hibernian flag and the Orange union jack flying side by side” at election meetings.¹⁴⁰ Eamon de Valera, East Clare election winner and Sinn Féin President from October 1917, used a mix of threats and conciliatory rhetoric concerning northern unionists. He said in July, “if those Unionists did not come in on their side they would have to go under,” but added, “Ulster was entitled to justice, and she should have it, but she should not be petted, and the interests of the majority sacrificed to her.”¹⁴¹ Unionist journals like the Belfast News-Letter and Northern Whig portrayed Sinn Féin’s rise as validating their opposition to self-government and claims all nationalists were separatists.¹⁴² This did not stop some Ulster unionists from cooperating with home rulers. Though Sinn Féin had a clear advantage in nationalist public opinion, the Convention convinced many nationalists and unionists to collaborate against the rising party, and if the conference delivered a unified settlement, much anti-IPP criticism might have receded.

As it happened, the Convention failed to formulate a joint solution on adjournment in April 1918. There were three reports and five “notes.” The majority report, supported by sixty-six delegates, embodied the agreements of the Sub-Committee of Nine, modified by Lloyd George’s letter. In a final irony, Ulster unionists voted with “extreme” nationalists, including O’Donnell and Devlin, against the majority. Days after receiving the report, Lloyd George declared it did not represent “substantial agreement.”¹⁴³

Most of the goodwill the Convention fostered vanished when the Prime Minister announced on April 9 the government would extend conscription to Ireland. After the Military Service Bill became law on April 18, the IPP—some of whom declared they would support conscription passed by an Irish parliament—walked out of the Commons. The Catholic Church struggled to chart a neutral course between the British government and Irish nationalist factions, but now most clergy and the IPP allied with Sinn Féin against conscription.¹⁴⁴ Irish unionists remained at Westminster. In the future, when Lloyd George justified his government’s right to impose legislation on Ireland, he used the Convention as evidence Irish people could not agree on their administration.¹⁴⁵ This confirmed the worst fears regarding the conference and seemed to vindicate the criticism of skeptics like Sinn Féin.

Southern Unionists Split

The Convention fallout had a direct impact on the coherence and goals of southern unionism. The January 1, 1918, IUA meeting approved the southern unionist delegates’ course in the Convention overwhelmingly. They had every reason to believe their base was secure. However, a Church of Ireland Synod meeting on January 16 revealed deep fissures. Richard Bagwell, the only IUA member to speak against the Convention delegates on New Year’s Day, attacked Midleton’s initiative as “not a compromise but a surrender.” Montgomery was present and called a declaration against partition the “only weak point” in Bagwell’s speech.¹⁴⁶

Over the next several weeks, Montgomery and other Ulster unionists contacted several discontented southern unionists. On March 4 a document titled “The Crisis in Ireland: Call to Unionists” appeared in the press. It appealed to “all true Irish Unionists, especially those outside Ulster” to “reiterate” their commitment to the Union as “the only hope for the future of our country.”¹⁴⁷ It was signed by prominent unionists, north and south. Leading “Callers” formed the Southern Unionist Committee but denied wanting to compete with the IUA. They claimed the Alliance was not representative, implying any apparent support for Midleton’s Convention policy was illegitimate. By mid-May, the Call attracted a reported 14,000 southern unionist signatories.¹⁴⁸

Carson approved the movement and warned self-government now “will place Ireland under the joint rule of Sinn Fein, Nationalists, and the Roman Catholic Hierarchy.” Ulster unionist organizations did not take sides, but the Alliance was an all-Ireland association, containing many UUC members. Montgomery said they were determined “to purge the I.U.A. of traitors and get the machine into sound Unionist hands.”¹⁴⁹

It is difficult to gauge the movement’s popularity. Many southern unionists supported Midleton’s Convention policy and considered self-government inevitable. J. H. Nunn called the Union “dead as Hector” and blamed “Unionist leaders in England” for killing it by exchanging home rule for Ulster exclusion at the Buckingham Palace Conference. A. F. Blood suggested “joining hands with our Nationalist fellow-countrymen” to support self-government and the war effort, paying tribute to Redmond’s “character and patriotism.”¹⁵⁰ Callers identified themselves with partition, and all three successful southern unionist candidates in the December 1918 election opposed this policy. The only Caller to run was W. M. Jellett, who failed to gain either of Trinity College’s two seats.¹⁵¹ His followers might not have galvanized southern unionism as thoroughly as they claimed, but if they held key IUA positions, Midleton and his supporters would lose control of the organization regardless.

An IUA meeting on January 24, 1919, rejected an anti-partition resolution Midleton proposed. He and his supporters resigned and formed the Unionist Anti-Partition League (UAPL). Midleton called the restructured IUA “for all practical purposes an offshoot of the Ulster Council.” Interestingly, while scholars sometimes call the idea of British government responsibility for partition an Irish nationalist myth, these unionists held the Cabinet accountable for this policy, Ulster unionists merely acquiesced.¹⁵² Despite Caller control of the IUA, Midleton remained the southern unionist leader trusted by Irish nationalists and British officials.

One of the ironies within Irish unionism in this period is, while some accused Midleton and his colleagues of treachery for their willingness to cooperate with home rulers, six-county Ulster unionists declared their readiness to abandon comrades elsewhere in Ireland. Historian J. J. Lee asserts, if one believes unionist rhetoric, “If the Pope was indeed anti-Christ, if unionist fears of the persecution awaiting Protestants in a Home Rule, much less a Sinn Féin, state were valid,” the six-county unionists’ abandonment of their fellows in the other three Ulster counties was “the basest of all ‘betrayals’ in the period.”¹⁵³ This applies to their treatment of southern colleagues.

Another irony is, while Midleton was losing part of his following, Lloyd George tried to make him the most powerful person in Ireland. On April 27, 1918, the Prime Minister offered him the Lord Lieutenancy, “with a free hand” in governance.¹⁵⁴ The new viceroy’s primary duty would be to enforce conscription, which Lloyd George viewed as necessary to uphold the Imperial Parliament’s authority, and “giving the Catholic hierarchy a lesson that they could not control the State.” Midleton warned 90 percent of the Irish population opposed conscription. Further interviews convinced him the Cabinet had no strategy regarding Ireland, “they think that a slap-dash policy can suddenly be adopted with success.”¹⁵⁵ Midleton declined the post.

Several organizations rose and fell between 1918 and 1919. In November, Horace Plunkett formed the Irish Reconstruction Association, a non-party group to oppose partition. In his diaries, he called it the “I.R.A.” and wrote on December 7, 1918, “I hope these initials will get known.”¹⁵⁶ The association did not last long, but the initials were already becoming famous.

Conclusions

The 1916 Easter Rising brought simmering discontent among Irish nationalists into the open and highlighted the importance of dealing with it. Lloyd George’s attempt entailed immediate home rule and exclusion for six of Ulster’s nine counties. However, Redmond believed this partitioning of Ireland would be temporary, while Carson understood it to be permanent by requiring new legislation before termination. Lloyd George was likely correct in asserting if Carson and Redmond embraced the settlement, Cabinet opposition could be overcome. That the administration drafted a bill embodying temporary exclusion as the IPP leader understood it shows this was, at one time, the correct interpretation. When the Cabinet forced Lloyd George to clarify his intentions, he made little effort to uphold promises to Redmond or Dillon but did stand by assurances to Carson.

As historians have noted, the short-term impact of the Lloyd George proposals’ failure was to further undermine the IPP by again delaying Irish self-government and reviving the appearance that they sanctioned partition. Despite the breakdown of the 1916 negotiations, six-county partition without plebiscites and a form of local government for the new area became a basis upon which Lloyd George dealt with Ireland in the future. His government explored other possible settlements but ultimately returned to the formula enunciated in 1916.

Lloyd George tried several means of reaching an Irish settlement after he became Prime Minister in December 1916. A boundary commission might delimit the areas included or excluded from home rule. He established two committees to draft home rule bills, but when they suggested temporary exclusion with plebiscites, he disregarded them. Lloyd George then offered an all-party convention to devise a new Irish constitution. Despite the Prime Minister’s assertions, the Convention was not free to determine Ireland’s future. Dominion home rule—favored by many delegates and members of the public—would not be permitted, and Lloyd George tried to shape the gathering’s conclusions to suit his government’s priorities.

While contemporaries acknowledged the Irish Convention’s long odds, success was possible. Whether Lloyd George intended for it to succeed or not, and evidence suggests he wanted an Irish settlement, he admitted participants could nullify his intentions by reaching an agreement among themselves. The Convention came close to a deal in January 1918. Southern unionists and home rulers signaled their consent. The Ulster unionist attitude is difficult to gauge, but there is evidence they would either abstain from voting or support the compromise. Lloyd George warned Bonar Law the government would have to implement an accord between southern unionists and nationalists. The deal failed as some nationalists decided to push for fiscal autonomy, though some of them believed by doing so they could compel the British government to force a more authoritative settlement on Ulster unionists.

With the Convention failure and the “conscription scare” in April 1918, Irish politics did change utterly. Consistent delays in self-government and apparent acquiescence in partition damaged the IPP in the eyes of their Irish nationalist constituents. Home rule always had nationalist critics, and Sinn Féin’s ideal of complete independence was more attractive to many than this comparatively meager concession. The conscription threat destroyed what little remained of Irish nationalists’ willingness to cooperate with the British government. Some southern unionists were more accommodating than ever to the idea of self-government, but their organization fractured due to others’ intransigence and acceptance of partition. With both traditional parties embattled, the way was clear for major changes in Irish politics.