One of the most controversial aspects of the Gettysburg Campaign was General Jeb Stuart’s absence until late in the battle. Stuart had been surprised by the Union cavalry at Brandy Station, and his ego was hurt by the criticism he received in the southern newspapers. Through early June, he had done a magnificent job screening Lee’s movement to the northwest. Stuart hankered to circumnavigate the Union army once again. Nevertheless, Lee gave Stuart orders on June 22, which have been controversial ever since. Lloyd W Klein explains.
J. E. B. (Jeb) Stuart.
The absence of Stuart's cavalry during critical stages of the Gettysburg Campaign contributed to a lack of crucial intelligence for Lee and resulted in a crucial communication gap. Stuart's absence during the early stages of the Battle of Gettysburg left Lee without cavalry reconnaissance and intelligence, depriving him of valuable information about the Union Army's strength, positions, and intentions. This lack of intelligence significantly impacted Lee's decision-making process and contributed to the uncertainties he faced in the initial phases of the battle. It is frequently speculated that had Stuart been present to screen the front of Lee’s army, Lee wouldn’t have been surprised by the proximity of the Union army and the Battle of Gettysburg would have been much different.
The Early Stages of the Campaign
In the early phase of the campaign, Stuart brilliantly screened Union cavalry from determining the location and strength of Lee’s army and hence its direction and ultimate destination in several battles:
Battle of Brandy Station (June 9, 1863): This was the largest cavalry battle of the Civil War and took place near Brandy Station, Virginia. It occurred in the vicinity of the Rappahannock River.
Battle of Winchester (Second Battle of Winchester) (June 13–15, 1863): This battle occurred in Winchester, Virginia, which was a strategic town in the Shenandoah Valley. Confederate General Richard Ewell's forces defeated Union General Robert Milroy's garrison, securing control of the area.
Battle of Aldie (June 17, 1863): The Battle of Aldie was part of the wider cavalry engagements known as the Battle of Middleburg, which occurred as part of the Gettysburg campaign. Union and Confederate cavalry clashed in fierce fighting as they vied for control of key positions.
Battle of Middleburg (June 17–19, 1863): The Battle of Middleburg took place near the town of Middleburg, Virginia. It involved both mounted and dismounted actions between Union and Confederate cavalry forces.
With this portion of the campaign over, Lee was ready to cross the Potomac River and enter Maryland. How he would deploy his cavalry was essential to his plan.
What did Lee Order?
The narrative begins on the morning of June 22, 1863, when Stuart asked Lee for guidance as to which route he should take while following the infantry into enemy territory. If he moved down the Shenandoah Valley west of the Blue Ridge Mountains, he might alert Union cavalry to Lee’s carefully screened advance. The alternative was to move east from Rector’s Cross Roads and cross the Potomac between Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s Union army and Washington, D.C. which might throw the Federals into confusion.
In fact, two written orders were given to Stuart:
On June 22, the first written order instructed Stuart to take 3 brigades and cross into “… Maryland and take position on General Ewell's right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy's movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army."
On June 23, a second order was sent to Stuart, which gave further orders for movement depending on whether or not Hooker was moving.
On the night of June 23, a letter was sent. This letter has never been found, but it was received by Stuart’s adjutant, Major Henry B McClellan, who recalled the contents in detail after the war which gave Stuart discretion and even encouragement to pass behind the Union army. The letter told Stuart he could move “if General Hooker’s army remains inactive” and simultaneously advised Stuart to enter Maryland west of the Blue Ridge Mountains or “pass around” the Federals east of the mountains and then “feel the right of Ewell’s troops.” Besides giving Stuart two different routes to take, Lee no longer was emphasizing the link up with Ewell and guard his flank.
Lee's instructions to Stuart were somewhat ambiguous and open to interpretation. Moreover, the conflicting nature and ambiguity surrounding the route Stuart was expected to take contributed to the resulting misunderstanding. Stuart was expected to guard the mountain passes with part of his force while the ANV was still south of the Potomac, and then to cross the river with the remainder of the army and screen the right flank of Ewell's Second Corps. Lee's specific orders to Stuart were to move northward, screen the Confederate army's right flank, and maintain contact with Lee's forces. Lee expected Stuart to gather information on the enemy's location, strength, and intentions, and to report back promptly.
Lee instructed Stuart to keep the Army of Northern Virginia informed of the movements and activities of the Union Army. Lee's orders emphasized the importance of timely and accurate information. He clearly wanted Stuart to leave enough cavalry behind to cover the mountain passes in the army's rear and cover Ewell's advance with the rest of his force. The order didn't give specifics how to do this, leaving Stuart much discretion as to how to accomplish these goals.
Stuart chose to accompany him his three best brigades, commanded by Brig. Gen. Wade Hampton, Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee, and Col. John R. Chambliss (replacing the wounded Brig. Gen. W.H.F. "Rooney" Lee). The brigades Stuart left behind included Imboden's Valley brigade temporarily attached to the army and more used to partisan activity and the two "regular" brigades of Robertson and Jones. Robertson was considered the weakest cavalry commander and Jones, while good, was appropriately nicknamed "Grumble" because he was not easy to get along with. Lee did not trust these brigades or their commanders as much as Stuart and the three brigades he took with him. Stuart sent General Robertson very specific orders as to what he was supposed to do.
Stuart sent his request for guidance to Lee through I Corps commander Lt. Gen. James Longstreet, who gave his recommendation on June 23: “I think your passage of the Potomac by our rear at the present will, in a measure, disclose our plans. You had better not leave us, therefore, unless you can take the route in rear of the enemy.” Later that day, Lee responded with his second order, stating: “If you find that he [Hooker] is moving northward, and that two brigades can guard the Blue Ridge and take care of your rear, you can move with the other three into Maryland, and take position on General [Richard] Ewell’s right, place yourself in communication with him, guard his flank, keep him informed of the enemy’s movements, and collect all the supplies you can for the use of the army.”
Stuart's interpretation of these conflicting orders, combined with his own decisions, led to his prolonged absence from Lee's main army and the subsequent lack of reliable reconnaissance and communication. Lee expected Stuart to gather information on the enemy's location, strength, and intentions, and to report back promptly. However, Stuart's interpretation of the orders, combined with his desire for personal glory and the allure of circumnavigating the Union army, led him to engage in an extended raid around the Union forces rather than maintaining close contact with Lee's army as Lee had intended.
Stuart Starts Out
Stuart and his three brigades departed Salem Depot at 1 a.m. on June 25. At this moment, the Union army's movement north had begun. Thus, his route was blocked by Hancock’s II Corps, forcing him to veer farther to the east than either he or General Lee had anticipated. This prevented Stuart from linking up with Ewell, which was part of his mission.
Stuart's decision to capture a wagon train at Rockville, Maryland on June 28, 1863, was based on several factors. Stuart believed that seizing the wagon train would yield valuable supplies and provisions for the Confederate army. It could have provided them with much-needed food, ammunition, and other resources that would support their operations. Rockville is indeed extraordinarily close to the city limits even today, about 20 miles. Stuart claimed that that were it not for his fatigued horses "he would have marched down the 7th Street Road [and] took Abe & Cabinet prisoners.
Additionally, Stuart may have viewed the wagon train capture as an opportunity to disrupt Union supply lines and create panic and confusion among the Union forces. By inflicting damage and depriving the enemy of vital supplies, Stuart aimed to weaken the Union's logistical capabilities and potentially hinder their ability to respond effectively. Furthermore, capturing such a large wagon train could have boosted Confederate morale and showcased Stuart's cavalry as a formidable force. It might have been seen as a way for Stuart to demonstrate his effectiveness as a commander and regain his reputation, which had suffered due to the earlier criticisms in southern newspapers.
However, it's worth noting that Stuart's decision to prioritize capturing the wagon train instead of gathering critical intelligence on the Union army's movements further delayed his reunion with General Robert E. Lee's forces. Although this train would be a logistical hindrance to Stuart's advance, he interpreted Lee's orders as placing importance on gathering supplies. This is entirely consistent with Lee’s objectives and goals of the campaign, and his own actions.
Stuart then attempted to ride around the Union army, starting in its rear, which to his surprise, turned out to become its east flank as the Union army moved north to meet the threat.
What happened to Stuart?
Part of the reason for Stuart’s tardiness was that he was caught up in the rear and flank of the Union army. From the time he crossed the Potomac to arriving at Gettysburg required nearly 8 days of non-stop marching for over 200 miles and fighting nearly every day. Stuart engaged in 4 skirmishes and 3 actual battles trying to make his way to find Ewell. Skirmishes occurred at Thoroughfare Gap June 25 , Fairfax Courthouse June 27, Rockville June 28, and Westminster June 29; Battles at Hanover June 30, Hunterstown July 2, and Carlisle July 2.. Few accounts of Stuart’s ride explains that he wasn’t lost or just lollygagging; he was in fact in real trouble and it took great shrewdness merely to get to Gettysburg at all with his command intact. His men marched incessantly for 8 days and nights.
Hooker’s movements during this time should not have been a surprise to him, Stuart sent a dispatch to General Lee on June 27 that Hooker had crossed the Potomac River. It never reached General Lee, but a copy did reach Richmond; no one there bothered to confirm this with the Commanding General.
Moreover, at least 5000 cavalry had been left behind with Lee. General Robertson the commander of that force knew that Hooker had crossed the Potomac June 25-27 but failed to inform Generals Longstreet and Lee. Further, despite the direct order by Stuart to join Lee in force when Hooker advanced, Robertson instead guarded mountain gaps and the baggage train and never arrived at the battle.
The ANV moves North
By June 27, 1863, General Lee had accomplished his objective of wrecking the B&O RR and was moving up the Cumberland Valley. JEB Stuart had torn up telegraph lines and rail north of DC. Gen. Richard S. Ewell’s forces, moving ahead of the main body of Lee’s army in south-central Pennsylvania, had already disrupted railroad operations on the Gettysburg Railroad east of Gettysburg and on the Northern Central Railway near York.
On June 30, Jubal Early, who would go on to blame every other Confederate general at Gettysburg for its loss, and was one of Stuart’s most vociferous critics after the war, heard the sound of the battle at Hanover. Yet, he did nothing to discover who was fighting, despite knowing that Stuart was supposed to be finding him. Maps show that Early was within 5 miles of the battle, and that had contact been made, Stuart could have been present at Gettysburg July 1.
Conclusion
General Lee gave Stuart vague and conflicting orders which modern historians believe he could not have achieved given Hooker’s interim movements. Had he given Stuart a specific route, though, or recognized that he would require the cavalry to perform reconnaissance, he should not have allowed Stuart to stray behind the Union lines.
Within the discretion General Lee gave to Stuart, Stuart can not be blamed entirely for his choice of mission or how he tried to accomplish it. No one had any idea that the Federal position was so fluid at precisely this time. The raid itself was somewhat successful, and in accordance with Lee’s orders. Stuart was fortunate to be able to fight his way out of a trap of his own making.
However, the loss of the cavalry as reconnaissance at this critical moment must be blamed on Stuart. He was not located to fulfill his obligations to inform Lee of the movement of the Union army. Lee, by his own fault, was as unaware of Hooker’s position as Hooker was of his as he moved north into Pennsylvania.
Stuart followed Lee’s orders but not perhaps in its spirit. Stuart’s raid did not deprive Lee of the cavalry needed to monitor his opponent’s movements. However, he left in command an officer who was not skilled enough to do so successfully.
He must share the blame for having affected the course of the campaign and the outcome of the Battle of Gettysburg in his quest for glory and redemption.
What do you think of General Jeb Stuart’s absence? Let us know below.
Now, if you missed it, read Lloyd’s piece on how the Confederacy funded its war effort here.
