1 Historical Perspective

It is important to understand the historical connotations of the Rohingya issue; otherwise, one can be swayed by various narratives. Arakan (now Rakhine) was detached from the Irrawaddy Valley (central Burma) due to the presence of hills (Arakan Yama), jungle terrain, and poor communication infrastructure and was politically independent or self-ruled for most of its history (Bahar, 2010). Commercially and socially, the region was more connected with the southeast of Bengal (present-day Bangladesh). When the Pagan Kingdom was established around 800 CE, it was powerful enough to push east and west of the Irrawaddy Valley (Aung-Thwin, 1986). During this period, the Rakhine people crossed into Arakan and settled there (Gutman, 2001). The kingdom collapsed after a Mongol invasion in 1286, and Arakan broke away from Burma as the region became fragmented. However, in the 1750s, the Burmese Kingdom again acquired strength and became a powerful kingdom. In the process, it conquered Arakan in 1784 (Ibrahim, 2016, p. 5). “It has been estimated that around 30,000 Muslims fled Arakan during the brief forty years of Burmese rule.” Meanwhile, this annexation of Arakan brought Burmese rule to the border of British India. Eventually, in 1826, after the first Anglo-Burmese War, Arakan was annexed by the British, and by 1886, the whole of Burma came under British India (Ibrahim, 2016). In 1937, it was made a full colony in its own right (on the basis of the pre-1824 borders), and it became independent in that particular geographical form in 1948 (Ibrahim, 2016).

From the thirteenth to the end of the seventeenth centuries, there were periods of Burmese dominance, periods when Arakan was independent, and even when regional kings were powerful enough to conquer part of modern-day Bangladesh (Ibrahim, 2016). During the rule of the Mrauk-U dynasty, Arakan experienced the confluence of multicultural and multi-ethnoreligious groups of people (Ibrahim, 2016). The Afghan Muslims, known as “Kaman,” arrived in the 1660s as recruited mercenaries of the Arakan Kingdom and, over time, settled there (ÇAKMAK, 2022). They have been accepted as one of the official ethnic groups in Myanmar. However, the Rohingyas, who have lived in Arakan since 1000 CE, have not been recognized as an official ethnic group. The Myanmar establishment’s narrative holds that this group of people arrived in Burma during British rule and even as late as the War of Liberation of Bangladesh in 1971 (Steinberg, 2021). Nonetheless, multiple nineteenth-century British reports recorded the name of local Muslims as “Rooinga” (Ibrahim, 2016). As Ibrahim (2016) records, “Francis Buchanan suggested in 1799 that there were two groups of communities native to Arakan, one who called themselves ‘Rooinga’ and Muslims, and the other is ‘Rakhing,’ who are Buddhists” (p. 24). Yet Kaplan (2010) observes that “the Rohingyas were part of a beautiful hybrid Buddhist Hindu-Muslim civilization in Arakan where the influence of Persia and India cross-hatched with those of Siam and the rest of Southeast Asia” (p. 179). Islam (2022) explains in his book that the Arab Muslims first came into contact with Arakan through trade and commerce during the eighth century CE, and some of them settled in Arakan villages. Islam (2022) also confirms that Rohingyas have been living in Arakan for more than 1000 years. The famous historic mosque built in 1433 at Kawalon, named “Sandi Khan Mosque,” was demolished by the Myanmar military in September 1996 under the orders of former Prime Minister General Khin Nyunt (Islam, 2022). These are only some of the references that suggest the Muslims have been residing in Arakan (Rakhine) for a considerable period of time throughout history. Burmese authorities may term them Bengali (or Kalar; that is, black), but the greater community of Muslims living in Rakhine call themselves Rohingya.

Rohingyas have long been part of Rakhine society and have contributed to economics as well as the social and political life of Myanmar. They have been members of Parliament and ministers (Islam, 2022). The first parliamentary government of Myanmar (1948–1962) officially declared Rohingya as one of the indigenous ethnic groups of Burma. The declaration made by then-Prime Minister U Nu reads: “The people living in Maungdaw and Buthidaung regions are our national brethren. They are called Rohingyas. They are on the same level of nationality as Kachin, Karen, Mon, Rakhine, and Shan. They are one of the ethnic races of Burma” (Radio speech by prime minister U Nu, September 25, 1954, at 8:00 p.m.). In the failure of people’s collective memory, they forget how dangerous the distortion of history is and that they distort history at their own peril.

However, from time to time, Rohingyas faced organized massacres that are sometimes called Rohingya Pogroms; the most notable ones were in the 1780s (1784), 1940s, 1978, 1991–92, 2012, 2016, and 2017 (Saber, 2022). Recently, the persecution took on an institutional shape when Rohingyas were denied citizenship under the 1982 Myanmar Citizenship Act. The 2017 pogrom on Rohingyas by the Burmese Military has been viewed as a textbook example of ethnic cleansing by the UN (Samad, 2023). Rohingyas have also been identified by this organization as the most persecuted minority group in the world (Blackmore, 2019). The genocide of 2017 compelled about a million Rohingyas to flee their homes to seek refuge in neighboring Bangladesh. This has been termed a genocide as well as a crime against humanity by the US (“Myanmar Rohingya Violence Is Genocide, US Says,” 2022). The Rohingya refugee population has become a challenge for Bangladesh and the world community and has taken the shape of a global crisis. This chapter will highlight the actors who are responsible for the crisis that precipitated in August 2017 and consider how this event was orchestrated to such a magnitude. The study also focuses on the geopolitical context as well as relevant security ramifications. Finally, a way forward will be suggested at the conclusion.

2 The Actors Responsible for the Crisis of August 20171

Senior General Min Aung Hlaing. He is a Bamar (the majority ethnic group in Myanmar) who grew up in the military with mediocre performance but became known as a tenacious, composed soldier and a pursuer of lofty aims. His personality has been described as egoistical (“Myanmar Spirit,” 2018). He enjoys immense power granted by the 2008 constitution (orchestrated by the military) to the extent that he actually granted himself a five-year extension, which would have expired in 2021. After becoming commander-in-chief of the Defense Services in 2011, he said, “We have an unfinished job to be done” (Rahman, 2021a, 2021b). Following this, a heightened persecution of Rohingyas in Myanmar was observed. After the ethnic cleansing of the Rohingya from Rakhine in 2017, when the West and the world community were pursuing repatriation of the Rohingya, his comment to the media was, “There are no options to bring them back” (Rahman, 2021a, 2021b). This powerful man in Myanmar leads a military organization—possibly more than just the armed forces—called the Tatmadaw.

The Tatmadaw. Directly or indirectly, the Tatmadaw has ruled Myanmar for seven decades (Myoe, 2014). A military under a military over time turns into a monster, and the Tatmadaw is no exception. It is a meritocratic organization with immense institutional strength, possibly the only institution that outshines all others in the country. When a monstrous organization is combined with a meritocracy, the mix is very dangerous. They maintain huge business interests, control the economy to a great extent, and look after the ministries of the Interior, Defense and Security, and Immigration (i.e., the border), having influence also in external ministries. The constitution allocates 25% of seats in Myanmar’s parliament to the military, besides their supported political party. The National Defense and Security Council is the highest executive body in the country and has the power to dissolve the parliament if situation demands; this council is led by a military majority. Myanmar’s generals were canny in the way they handled the Rohingya issue and took both the regional powers on their side as well as two permanent members of the UN Security Council (UNSC), so that UNSC could not condemn the crackdown on the Rohingya. Their manipulation of geopolitics and geostrategy is praiseworthy. As Kaplan (2010) suggests, “China, India, and other Asian nations are jockeying for position with one of the world’s worst, weirdest, wealthiest, and most strategically placed rogue regimes” (p. 257). When someone is sitting across the table from a Tatmadaw general, he is not sitting across from a mere security official but also an intellectual, a diplomat, a businessman, a politician, and a leader of a meritocratic organization (all in one) who has institutional knowledge of having run the country for several decades. They talk less and listen more, and their expressions seldom reveal their conclusions. In the case of the Rohingya issue, one needs to understand that they are dealing with a smart set of cunning professionals.

Aung San Suu Kyi. She became world-famous for leading campaigns for the restoration of democracy in the’90s. She spent almost 15 years under house arrest between 1987 and 2010 and was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1991. In the 2015 election, her party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), was victorious for the first time in 25 years in a contested election in Myanmar. She fell from grace when she failed to condemn the military atrocities against the Rohingyas in August 2017. Her background and connection with the West and her apparent heroism in fighting for democracy and peace influenced the West to put her on a high pedestal. It may be suggested that she is just a racist, power-hungry politician, and the rationales are as follows:

  1. (i)

    In 2013, BBC presenter Mishal Husain interviewed Suu Kyi, pressing her with questions about political challenges she was not handling well and specifically mentioning the Rohingya persecution issue. Suu Kyi came up with her baffling “Both sides in fear” stance and became defensive, and she rarely fared worse in public than in her interview with Husain. After the interview, Suu Kyi did not realize that the microphone was on and expressed her anger to an aide: “No one told me I was going to be interviewed by a Muslim” (Fisher, 2016). This is not the attitude of a mother of democracy, an icon of humanity, or a bona fide Nobel laureate on peace. This is purely racist. Afflicted by Bamar supremacy, she showed no sympathy toward the Rohingyas. However, she may be a smart politician, but Tatmadaw is smarter. At the end, she failed to recognize the “no-go areas” of the Tatmadaw.

  2. (ii)

    In 2014, members of England’s Royal College of Defence Studies went to listen to her talk at Sandhurst Military Academy, UK. After her address, a Bangladeshi participant, Captain Mohammad Musa, asked her position on the persecution of minorities in her country—specifically Rohingyas. She answered that “both the majority and the minority are in fear,” and this situation is a ramification of fear, so she has no comments about it (Md. Musa, personal communication, May 22, 2023). This “both in fear” arithmetic is not difficult to understand. She is just a politician, and the election was coming up in 2015; she could not afford to annoy her majority or the Tatmadaw by speaking in support of the Rohingyas.

  3. (iii)

    In December 2019, she went to The Hague’s International Court of Justice (ICJ) to defend Tatmadaw against allegations of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Her decision to attend the ICJ had won her huge popularity back home. There were billboards in every corner of Myanmar with Suu Kyi in front and the Tatmadaw generals’ pictures behind her, and the caption read, “We are with you” (Rahman, 2021a, 2021b). She was ready to compromise her fame as a hero of democracy and peace in favor of power-hungry politics. An election was again upcoming in 2020. In that ICJ courtroom, the present author was sitting some 20 feet away from her. She was calm and indifferent to the evidence of genocide displayed by the Gambian side. When a Gambian lawyer showed pictures of genocide at “Inn Din” village (no less terrible than Mai Lai of Vietnam) on the screen in which kneeling Rohingya men were grouped together in one picture and all were beheaded in the next, it touched almost everyone in the courtroom. Some Rohingya widows were in the courtroom too, their sobbing adding to the somber atmosphere of the room, but it was clear that Suu Kyi, the so-called “mother of democracy and peace,” was unmoved. She was wearing a smile of indifference on her face.

3 How Was the Rohingya Massacre of 2017 Orchestrated?2

In answering this, it is very pertinent to discuss Myanmar’s strategic culture in relation to the Rohingyas. Here, an attempt has been made to analyze their strategic culture from the viewpoint of Jack Snyder and Colin Grey (who brought this vocabulary into the security lexicon) (Gray, 1999; Neumann & Heikka, 2005).

Myanmar Strategic Culture constitute (Selth, 2021) of their (national strategic community, dominant elite in polity) shared belief (Rohingyas are non-ethnic to Myanmar), their assumptions (Rohingyas have migrated in recent past), and modes of behavior (hostile to Rohingyas) derived from common experiences (growth rate of Rohingya population is high and inter-marriages with ethnic locals are on the rise) and accepted narratives (there will be Islamization from the western border) that shapes collective identity (collective security anxiety) in relationship to other groups (Rohingyas) and which determines their appropriate end (goal), ways (method of military operations) and means (resources in the hands of government: military) for achieving security objectives (Myanmar free of Rohingyas). Now, let us examine some facts about the orchestration of the 2017 Rohingya genocide. In doing this, a few dots would be put at the discretion of the readers to connect.

In 2011, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing took over as Myanmar’s Chief of Defense. In one of his strategic directives, he categorically mentioned that “there is an unfinished job.” Following his takeover, it was observed that hate speeches against Rohingyas intensified. Myanmar’s media started demonizing the Rohingyas and building aggressive public opinion that Rohingyas are basically Bengali and have migrated to Rakhine State in the recent past. Some militant Buddhist monks under the leadership of Ashin Wirathu and his anti-Muslim 969 Movement kindled further upheaval (Islam, 2022) by professing that in future there would be an Islamization of Myanmar from the west (Rakhine/Bangladesh).

In 2014, a group of senior Bangladeshi military officers attended an international strategic-level course in Beijing. In one of the discussions, a very senior Chinese general asked one of the course participants about the importance of the Rohingya in Bangladesh’s domestic politics. The Chinese general wanted to know whether, if a serious situation developed, Bangladesh was determined enough to enter into armed conflict with its neighbors on the Rohingya issue (participant officer’s personal communication, October 28, 2017).

In 2013/14, a Myanmar–China gas pipeline was commissioned from Kyaukphyu (Sittwe, a Rohingya-dominated area in Rakhine) to Kunming (China). China has spent a lot of resources and effort on this project. Energy is the “center of gravity” for China. Energy security is very important for rising China. There was a similar situation with the Yadana gas pipeline from offshore Myanmar in the south overland to Thailand (Bulletin 36, 2000). In that episode, thousands of Karens were tortured and expelled by the Myanmar military from around the gas pipeline—either internally displaced or compelled to take shelter in refugee camps in Thailand (Human Rights Watch, 2007). Along with the gas pipeline, a multi-billion-dollar oil pipeline project in Rakhine was under construction and completed in 2014/15 and is awaiting commission.

In 2016, in the name of a “clearing operation” in the hills of Rakhine, Myanmar Security Forces carried out various brutalities against Rohingya civilians, and around 90,000 Rohingyas took shelter in Bangladesh (Behrens & Henham, 2013). In retrospect, we understand that this was a preliminary operation to observe the global reaction and study the pulse of world bodies (and specifically Bangladesh) prior to the broader 2017 Rohingya atrocities.

In May 2017, the oil pipeline was commissioned (running parallel to the gas pipeline), considered the more important of the two pipelines. In July 2017, information reached the Bangladeshi intelligence community that a military buildup was in process in Rakhine State. Bangladesh’s security concerns were expressed to their Myanmar intelligence counterpart (Defense Attaché Brigadier General Aung Zaw Ooa at the Myanmar Embassy, Dhaka). The 2016 incident was also mentioned, particularly how, in the name of a clearing operation, Rohingya civilians were targeted, and there was an influx of refugees. However, the Myanmar counterparts confirmed that there would be a security forces operation on Mayu Range against insurgents and dissident groups in the second week of August 2017. It was explicitly stated that this had nothing to do with civilians and there would be no repetitions of the 2016 situation (Ooa, personal communication, August, 2017).

In June 2017 and July 2017, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited Russia and India, respectively, and met with strategic leaders for discussions.

Myanmar’s military buildup was completed by the third week of August 2017. The Kofi Annan Commission Report, charged the previous year with recommending solutions for the unrest in Rakhine State, was published on August 24, 2017 (“Kofi Annan Foundation,” n.d.). A number of issues relating to the Rohingyas were addressed in the report. This was what the Rohingyas had been waiting decades for—finally, their civil and political rights might be recognized. Despite this positive development, Myanmar claimed that the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) carried out attacks at over 30 security forces camps simultaneously in the early morning of August 25, 2017, in which some members of their security forces were killed. (Wade, 2017) Following this, Myanmar’s forces—who were already concentrated there—carried out a massive ethnic cleansing operation against Rohingya civilians in the name of an operation against Islamist terrorists. There are four questions about this so-called ARSA attack that raise serious doubt as to the official explanation:

  1. (i)

    ARSA did not attack thinly held and less equipped Myanmar Security Forces camps held by paramilitary forces, but ostensibly waited to attack Myanmar Security Forces camps until their full buildup had been completed with regular forces.

  2. (ii)

    ARSA allegedly waged its attack against these well-prepared camps, augmented by regular forces, with only machetes and locally made guns (ARSA weapons were exhibited by Myanmar Security Forces in the media).

  3. (iii)

    Myanmar claimed they suffered a number of casualties. However, there was never a military funeral service after this announcement. In April 2021, a Karen group killed and injured some members of the Myanmar Security Forces at the Thailand border, and the Myanmar media reported on the customary military funeral ceremony.

  4. (iv)

    ARSA conducted its attack in the very early morning of August 25, 2017, and Myanmar’s military conducted their large-scale coordinated operation in the morning of August 25, 2017 (in the military, such a large-scale operation takes quite some time for planning, preparation, and logistics buildup). After this so-called ARSA attack on the morning of August 25, Myanmar was very quick to come on record, saying that since the situation is unstable in Rakhine, the recommendations of the Kofi Annan Report now cannot be followed. At the same time, they convened a national committee, co-opting some members of ASEAN to prepare their own report.

In the first week of September 2017, Prime Minister Modi of India visited Myanmar. He spoke of his appreciation to Myanmar for the measures taken toward peace and national reconciliation. He also expressed concern about various incidents of terrorism and extremist-inspired violence (Pulipaka et al., 2017).

In November 2017, Senior General Min Aung Hlaing visited China. During discussions with President Xi Jinping, the general thanked China for standing at the forefront of Myanmar’s side on the Rakhine issue (i.e., the Rohingya issue).

Discussing historical events is important for learning lessons, but equally important is anticipating what is coming next. Senior General Min Aung Hlaing reiterated in an international media interview in May 2021 that there is no option for taking back the Rohingyas (“Myanmar Junta Leader,” 2021). Meanwhile, the NLD (Aung Sun Suu Kyi’s Party)-led National Unity Government (NUG) continues to express that once democracy is restored and they are back in power, they are willing to absorb the Rohingyas into their society and even take legal action on the atrocities committed against the Rohingyas. This is a positive gesture, but one has to remember that the NUG is offering this under certain circumstances and in exchange for support from Muslim countries as well as the egalitarian community of the world.

It should be remembered who is calling the shots in Myanmar. The understanding is that, as long as the two permanent members of the UN Security Council support the military junta in Myanmar, it will remain in power there. A case in point is Bashar al-Assad in Syria. We can foresee an unfolding of events when the dust settles in Myanmar and the junta is stable, whereby the remaining Rohingyas (possibly 400–600,000 people) in Myanmar, especially in Rakhine State, could be expelled in due course.

4 Geopolitical Context

In this part of the world, big power relationships and regional power rivalries dominate geopolitics, and this has ramifications for many world events. A brief example is found in the headline “Indian Ocean relationship between US and China in the Pacific interlocks with the regional rivalry between China and India” (Kaplan, 2010, p. 21).

Both India and China are energy-hungry powers for whom energy security plays a key role. In particular, China’s energy security is their central focus for economic development. China needs Myanmar as a vassal state for its energy security, for the oil and gas pipelines where it has spent billions of dollars in energy infrastructure, essentially to avoid the Malacca Strait and the precarious South China Sea (Church, 2017). India also invested almost a billion dollars in the Kaladan Multi-Modal Transit Transport Project, which is strategic for its connectivity to the eastern states through the Bay of Bengal and Myanmar (Pattanaik, 2018). India, including her allies, does not want Myanmar to totally fall into the fold of China, for clear geostrategic reasons.

In the Indian Ocean region, China is vertically expanding and India is horizontally expanding (Kaplan, 2010). This is a kind of geopolitical and geostrategic “Tectonic Plate” movement in different directions, causing geopolitical and geostrategic tremors, in which Bangladesh is trying to balance its relationship with all. This has caused it to be a kind of buffer state that has built-in side effects. Besides, it is easier to tame smaller countries with security anxiety, instability, and the absence or deficiency of democracy, and Bangladesh is no exception. For the Indo-Pacific idea and appearance of Quad (the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue between Australia, India, Japan, and the US), the presence of China in the Indian Ocean and the issue of containing China could create a tense situation even in the Bay of Bengal. Here, issues like the Rohingya crisis have seemingly been sucked into the vortex of global and regional geopolitics, where finding a solution could be complex. It is already being linked to the global and regional geopolitical landscape.

On the global stage, China and Russia have sided with Myanmar on the Rohingya issue, whereas the West has a different position. At a regional level, both China and India have taken the side of Myanmar that is also for geostrategic purposes. However, the future may turn out differently, as the junta in Myanmar seems more and more likely to enter the fold of China due to international pressure. At the local level, the dynamics are a little different. The National Unity Government (NUG) (after the military coup in Myanmar in February 2021, Aung San Suu Kyi’s party gathered all dissident ethnic organizations together to form NUG) would like to resolve the Rohingya issue at the union level under present circumstances. However, the United League of Arakan (ULA) and the Arakan Army (an armed ethnic organization in the Rakhine State of Myanmar; the ULA is the political wing of the AA) practice internal politics that are not so welcoming to the idea of Rohingya repatriation (Lintner, 2019). AA, though quite powerful and controlling 60–70% of Rakhine (where ultimately the Rohingyas will return), relies on China as their source of power. So the repatriation of the Rohingyas does not depend entirely on AA alone. Lately, some drama has occurred regarding the repatriation initiative with Chinese mediation. China wants to show Bangladesh who is calling the shots. If Bangladesh wants to resolve the Rohingya refugee issue, it would be difficult without China. In the big picture, by tilting more toward India, Bangladesh is likely to face an arm twist with the Rohingya repatriation issue.

5 Security Ramifications of the Conflict: An Analysis3

In the southeastern part of Bangladesh, bordering India and Myanmar, where the Rohingya refugees are staying, there are perfect geophysical conditions for insurgency. The insurgents and separatists can melt away quickly, while it is a nightmare for regular forces. Though India claims to have a peace deal with separatist groups in Mizoram and Tripura states, having borders with the Chittagong Hill Tracks (CHT) of Bangladesh means it is not all that peaceful. There are movements by separatist groups. The same holds true in the case of Bangladesh. Though a peace deal has been in place in the CHT since December’97 with the insurgent groups, there are now four political groups whose armed wings are active. In the Chin and Rakhine states of Myanmar bordering Bangladesh, there are ethnic armed groups like the Chin National Army and the Arakan Army (AA). A peace deal was signed in Myanmar too, but now AA has become enormously powerful, causing serious headaches for the junta (Rahman, 2022). Then, there are other complex issues; for example, there are differences between the central government and outlying states on particular issues in the case of India. On some issues, there is organizational inertia, and the outlook of “intelligence organizations” may not fully tally with the center or the states. In the case of Myanmar, the situation is a little different. The AA runs a parallel administration in most parts of Rakhine, whereas the junta mostly controls the cities. Having relations with one may antagonize the other. Add to this conundrum, the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army, an armed Rohingya Islamist group, which the Myanmar junta claims, is destabilizing Rakhine. About the Rohingya repatriation issue, Myanmar’s Chief of Defense, General Min Aung Hlaing, and the Arakan Army Chief at Rakhine, Major General Tun Myat Naing, have opposing and dubious viewpoints. Above all, there is the geopolitics of regional and global powers. So how Bangladesh should navigate in this murky water is a complex question.

What is obvious now is a complicated combination of risks. Bandarban (located in the southeast adjacent to the Rohingya camps) is the only district of Bangladesh that has a border with two countries (India and Myanmar). This is also possibly the only district where drugs (opium and marijuana) are cultivated, with the cooperation of exotic groups operating there. Teknaf (close to the Rohingya refugee camps) is the transit hub for drugs. Drugs are the mother of all other evils, like arms smuggling and human trafficking (Rohingya refugees are a readily available target group). Of late, Rohingya involvement in drug proliferation and related violence has greatly increased. There is a potential that this community may be sucked into “Narco Terrorism” in future if this situation is not addressed. In addition, there is the specter of violent extremism and terrorism. However, these kinds of non-traditional security issues do not take place in a vacuum. Interestingly, they have the potential to destabilize bilateral relations with neighbors and turn into more traditional security concerns. Separatist and exotic groups themselves are sources of non-traditional security threats.

The traditional and non-traditional threats to Bangladesh emanating from the security environment in the southeast are fairly easy to comprehend, and as such, various agencies are preparing for the future to avoid being surprised. It can be said they are preparing based on what is happening now, possibly not what is lurking around the corner. When the Islamic States of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) surfaced in the Middle East, the foreign fighters became a headache not only to the West but almost to the entire world. The question is, how many of them were there? Maybe 10,000, 20,000, or 30,000 created havoc, but they mostly came from a pretty decent background. They or their families did not suffer; they experienced only feelings of injustice before adventurism drew them there, and the world has experienced what monsters they became. Now, we need to fathom that there are more than 400,000 children growing up in the Rohingya camps inside Bangladesh without proper education, hopes, or dreams. They have seen horrors all their lives. In 2017, many of them saw their mothers being violated; for them, there is no rock bottom. By 2030, most of them will be adults. Homeless, with trauma in their minds and hatred in their hearts, and without proper education, hopes, and dreams, it is unthinkable what monsters they might turn into if they are exploited and if this issue is not addressed. There are two options: We can address it now or wait for it to be addressed later when it turns into a full-blown security situation. The choice is with us and the global community. Students of security studies would understand that it is coming, and it is not going to affect Bangladesh alone. It will have regional and global ramifications. It is going to be too much of a burden for Bangladesh to handle in a situation where it is just a victim of geopolitical circumstances.

6 The Way Forward

The Rohingya issue cannot be reconstructed on a bilateral basis. It has to be considered on a global basis. This is a political problem created by Myanmar, and it has been militarily perpetrated by the junta. Bangladesh is not a party to it; she is just a prisoner of geography. It is recommended that the Rohingya issue be addressed in three tiers within the ambit of global governance and international legal frameworks and principles to arrive at a political solution. At a regional level, the involvement of regional organizations (i.e., ASEAN, BIMSTEC) would provide dividends far out of proportion to the effort expended. The involvement of China, India, Japan, and Korea (all major investment partners of Myanmar) could be instrumental. At the bilateral level, Dhaka should maintain engagement with Naypyidaw, however traumatic it may be. Meanwhile, for sustainable peace in this part of the world, addressing non-traditional security concerns (i.e., drug trafficking, arms smuggling, and human trafficking) should also be addressed simultaneously. Since they are transnational phenomena, a single-country solution will fall far short of the desired result. India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar must work together to address it.

Notes

  1. 1.

    Material in this section originally appeared in an article by the author in Bangladesh’s Daily Sun. See Rahman, Md. M. (2021, May 12). Myanmar coup and Bangladesh perspective. Daily Sun. https://www.daily-sun.com/post/552356/Myanmar-Coup-and-Bangladesh-Perspective. ↑

  2. 2.

    Material in this section originally appeared in an article by the author in Bangladesh’s The Daily Star. See Rahman, Md. M. (2021, July 7). Rohingya refugee crisis: putting the pieces of the puzzle together. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/views/opinion/news/rohingya-refugee-crisis-putting-the-pieces-the-puzzle-together-2124331. ↑

  3. 3.

    Material in this section originally appeared in an article by the author in Bangladesh’s The Daily Star. See Rahman, Md. M. (2022, March 6). Watch out for trouble in southeast Bangladesh. The Daily Star. https://www.thedailystar.net/views/opinion/news/watch-out-trouble-southeast-bangladesh-2976326. ↑