Adam Etinson

Human rights have a rich life in the world around us. Political rhetoric pays tribute to them, or scorns them. Citizens and activists strive for them. The law enshrines them. And they live inside us too. For many of us, human rights form part of how we understand the world and what must (or must not) be done within it.

The ubiquity of human rights raises questions for the philosopher. If we want to understand these rights, where do we look? As a set of moral norms, it is tempting to think they can be grasped strictly from the armchair, say, by appeal to moral intuition. But what, if anything, can that kind of inquiry tell us about the human rights of contemporary politics, law, and civil society ― that is, human rights as we ordinarily know them?

This volume brings together a distinguished, interdisciplinary group of scholars to address philosophical questions raised by the many facets of human rights: moral, legal, political, and historical. Its original chapters, each accompanied by a critical commentary, explore topics including: the purpose and methods of a philosophical theory of human rights; the "Orthodox-Political" debate; the relevance of history to philosophy; the relationship between human rights morality and law; and the value of political critiques of human rights.

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A rich collection of focussed dialogues ― a provocative gift for teaching ― in which the lively ferment over human rights in recent years is deepened, often by becoming refreshingly interdisciplinary, and exciting new formulations are proposed by a diverse range of leading scholars. (Henry Shue, author of Basic Rights (1996))

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights may be the single most influential document of the twentieth century, but is also one of the most controversial. In Human Rights: Moral or Political? Adam Etinson has brought together more than 30 leading legal, political, historical and philosophical commentators on human rights to discuss one anothers claims. The authors range from those who see human rights as successors to natural rights, so as providing universal moral standards, to those who see human rights as positive legal and political instruments that are changing the international order... this collection is seriously and usefully critical not only on these fundamental issues, but also on knotty questions about specific rights, about principles of legal interpretation and about the limits of juridification. (Onora O'Neill, author of Justice Across Boundaries: Whose Obligations? (2016) and winner of the 2017 Berggruen Prize)

This is an impressive collection of essays by outstanding human rights scholars from a variety of disciplines. It is certain to make a lasting impact on contemporary thinking about human rights. Taking off from the current debate on the proper status of human rights as "orthodox" or "political," the essays in this volume not only move this important debate forward but also enable a genuine dialogue across disciplines on fundamental philosophical, political and legal questions surrounding human rights and human rights practice. The collection thus excellently represents the depth and scope of engagement across disciplinary boundaries that understanding human rights in all their complexity requires. It will be mandatory reading for anyone interested in the past, present and future of human rights. (Cristina Lafont, author of Global Governance and Human Rights (2012))

Those of us whose work is focused on 'applied' human rights in law, politics, or ethics may nevertheless experience a need for fundamental reflection on the 'big' philosophical questions regarding human rights. Such craving can now be satisfied with a single book. With no less than 30 chapters and an unseen concentration of stars of the philosophical and other firmaments, it can also be read as a sample book, introducing readers to different ways of philosophical rights reasoning. The majority of the chapters engage in discussions at a very abstract or general level. While this may be off-putting to the practical-minded, it also guarantees relevance across the entire field of human rights scholarship, regardless of disciplines, jurisdictions and thematic specialisations. (Eva Brems, Professor of Human Rights Law, University of Gent)

Human dignity makes demands on us. It is something we’re supposed to respect. But how? What are these demands? Many consider human dignity to require respect for the moral status of human beings. Others think it requires respect for the autonomy or moral inviolability of persons. This paper argues that dignity’s fundamental concern is with social status – or what we sometimes call “honor.” What it requires is that we avoid humiliating or degrading others, and that we help protect them from such harm, too.

In his recent book, Andrea Sangiovanni raises various objections against what he calls the “aristocratic” conception of dignity – the idea that dignity represents a kind of high- ranking social status. In this short article, I suggest that Sangiovanni gives the aristocrats less credit than they deserve. Not only do his objections target an uncharitably narrow version of the view, Sangiovanni surreptitiously incorporates aspects of the aristocratic conception of dignity into his own (supposedly non- dignitarian) theory of moral equality.

- Submitted to the European Journal of Political Theory, for a special issue.

This article examines the value of exposure to foreign media and pop culture: a form of intercultural "conversation." As a case study, it focuses on North Korea, where citizens gain access to American and South Korean pop culture via illegal USB sticks, often smuggled in by balloon. The article identifies three possible transformative effects of such encounters: the humanization of the "Other"; the disruption of established systems of belief; and fresh awareness of the contingency of local beliefs and practices.

Ethnocentrism, it is said, involves believing certain things to be true: that one’s culture is superior to others, more deserving of respect, or at the “center” of things. On the alternative view defended in this article, ethnocentrism is a type of bias, not a set of beliefs. If this is correct, it challenges conventional wisdom about the scope, danger, and avoidance of ethnocentrism.

This article addresses the so-called ‘claimability objection’ to human rights. Focusing specifically on the work of Onora O’Neill, the article challenges two important aspects of her version of this objection. First: its narrowness. O’Neill understands the claimability of a right to depend on the identification of its duty-bearers. But there is good reason to think that the claimability of a right depends on more than just that, which makes abstract (and not welfare) rights the most natural target of her objection (section II). After examining whether we might address this reformulated version of O’Neill’s objection by appealing to the specificity afforded to human rights in international, regional and domestic law (in section III), the article challenges a second important feature of that objection by raising doubts about whether claimability is a necessary feature of rights at all (section IV). Finally, the article reflects more generally on the role of abstraction in the theory and practice of human rights (section V). In sum, by allaying claimability-based concerns about abstract rights, and by illustrating some of the positive functions of abstraction in rights discourse, the article hopes to show that abstract rights are not only theoretically coherent but also useful and important.

What are human rights? According to one longstanding account, the Naturalistic Conception of human rights, human rights are those that we have simply in virtue of being human. In recent years, however, a new and purportedly alternative conception of human rights has become increasingly popular. This is the so-called Political Conception of human rights, the proponents of which include John Rawls, Charles Beitz, and Joseph Raz. In this paper we argue for three claims. First, we demonstrate that Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights can accommodate two of the most salient concerns that proponents of the Political Conception have raised about them. Second, we argue that the theoretical distance between Naturalistic and Political Conceptions is not as great as it has been made out to be. Finally, we argue that a Political Conception of human rights, on its own, lacks the resources necessary to determine the substantive content of human rights. If we are right, not only should the Naturalistic Conception not be rejected, the Political Conception is in fact incomplete without the theoretical resources that a Naturalistic Conception characteristically provides. These three claims, in tandem, provide a fresh and largely conciliatory perspective on the ongoing debate between proponents of Political and Naturalistic Conceptions of human rights.

The establishment of distant historical facts and the articulation of aboriginal understandings of such facts are both vital to the legal cases of First Nations that confront the Canadian government with specific land claims as well as rights claims. This has made the appearance of oral history testimony a practical necessity for aboriginal claimants. Not only does oral history contain the aboriginal understanding of the past, it also refers to distant historical events for which little or no documentary evidence exists. Such testimony, however, has brought to the fore deep anxieties on the part of the Canadian judiciary regarding the rules of evidence and the value of oral accounts of history. The Canadian judiciary has made significant efforts to be fair and open towards oral history testimony, taking into consideration the unique difficulties of proving aboriginal rights and title cases, most notably in the 1997 Supreme Court decision, Delgamuukw. However, despite such efforts, the need to stretch oral histories to the limits of their reliability, the prevalence of suspicion and distrust between Native and non-Native parties, and the textual ‘bias‘ of the Western styles of doing history have led to the undermining of oral history evidence in court. What emerges from this survey of  the history of the legal reception of aboriginal oral history testimony in Canada is a sharper sense of the psychological and cultural damage that can result when folk tradition becomes an instrument of background economic, legal and political interests.

In the epilogue to his recent revisionist history of human rights, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History, Samuel Moyn considers the complex pressures exerted on the modern idea of human rights in light of its utopian status. One of these pressures, according to Moyn, consists in the “burden of politics,” i.e. the need for human rights to do more than offer “a set of minimal constraints on responsible politics,” but to present a bona fide political programme of their own. In this essay review, I reflect on an opposite problem: the complex pressures exerted upon our utopian imagination in light of its habitual association with the modern idea of human rights. In particular, I illustrate the impoverishing effect that a preoccupation with rights can have on our utopian ideals. These reflections form the basis for my argument that, far from aiming as Moyn does to preserve the utopian status of the idea of human rights, we ought to wrest utopian thought free from its preoccupation with rights.

This is a review article of Charles Beitz's 2009 book on the philosophy of human rights, The Idea of Human Rights. The article provides a charitable overview of the book's main arguments, but also raises some doubts about the depth of the distinction between Beitz's 'practical' approach to humans rights and its 'naturalistic' counterparts.

Many of us should do more – that is, more than we currently do – for others. We know we are morally imperfect. And yet many of us make no effort to change. Is it ever right to accept our own moral badness? Or is that an inherently irrational, even dangerous idea?

We are social creatures. As a result, we have to find a way to live together in various overlapping social groups: families, places of work, cities, nations, and so on. This requires near constant communication and frequently involves discussion of moral and political issues. It’s obvious, especially recently, that there are lots of potential pitfalls and key ethical questions about communicating with others in this way. This class aims to critically examine some of those issues. It covers interconnected topics in ethics, moral psychology, moral responsibility, political philosophy, and epistemology. And it encourages students to engage with material beyond academic journals.

This course explores what is perhaps the most fundamental question in philosophy: why is there anything at all? We will look at arguments about whether or not the question is a sensible one, whether, if so, it is answerable, and what knowledge we can draw upon in attempting to answer it. Besides its intrinsic interest, the question touches other deep issues in philosophy – the nature of explanation, the notion of ultimate purpose, the fundamental nature and structure of reality, the existence of supernatural beings, the presence of objective value in the universe, and so on. We will look at various approaches to the central question from within and without the Western philosophical tradition. By the end of the course, students should expect to have a decisive answer.

This module examines the philosophical dimensions of first encounters with alien phenomena, agents, and experiences. The first four weeks of the module examine the experiential component of such encounters, including the nature and aptness of relevant emotions such as wonder, awe, surprise, and admiration - and attendant events such as "epiphanies," ecstacy, and conversion. The remainder of the module examines specific instances of first contact, and their significance. These include (actual and/or possible) encounters with aliens, animals, foreign cultures and languages, as well as with death and profound social and environmental change. Because of its subject matter, each week combines readings in philosophy with readings in other sciences, as well as literary fiction.

This module explores a variety of especially timely topics in political philosophy. In its 2019 iteration, the module explores questions about the origins, dangers, and subversion of democracy – including worries about populism, fascism, and the tyranny of the majority. Alongside this, the module examines questions about structural injustice, identity politics, the nature of the “modern” condition, and the role of anger, civility, and hope in politics.

Many of the assigned readings lie outside the confines of philosophy. They include works of history, sociology, cultural anthropology, and psychology. Interdisciplinarity presents its challenges, but it also brings benefits: a chance to think about the real world, in its baffling complexity. Tackling “timely” topics does not mean ignoring the past. On the contrary, one of the main ambitions of the module is to show how history, and historical sources, can shed important light on the politics of the present day.

Few of us do as much as we should to help others, and this is often a powerful source of guilt and regret. At the same time, those of us who are fastidiously concerned with the needs of others, and who act accordingly (call them altruists, or " moral saints "), can sometimes seem almost inhuman and even misguided. Is the moral life a good life? Or is morality less demanding than is often thought? How should we balance our self-interest, let alone other goods (the survival of the planet, the interests of animals, etc.), against the interests of others? This course will take a close look at these fundamental questions of moral philosophy, using real-world examples of 'moral saints,' alternative archetypes, and a wealth of literature on the demands (and demandingness) of morality, as a focus of analysis. The course is designed to be of interest to both undergraduate and graduate students in any discipline, but most of the readings will be philosophical in nature, and of special interest to students of philosophy. Students of human rights are also encouraged to register, given their (admirable) interest in helping others.

This advanced undergratuate course explores philosophical questions about human dignity. What is the meaning of "human dignity"? Is this a moral, or a legal idea, or both? Is there a distinction to be drawn between dignity, on the one hand, and human dignity, on the other? What is the connection, if any, between having dignity and having rights? Is human dignity an inherently religious concept? What grounding might it have in secular ethics?

The course explores cutting-edge research on the history, nature, content, and justification of human rights.  We begin by examining the origins of human rights, and current debates about how this bears on the way in which we should conceive of human rights. We then explore methodological issues in theorizing about human rights, and turn to core contemporary debates in the philosophy of human rights, concerning orthodox and political conceptions of human rights; the relationship between their status as moral and legal norms; the significance of the fact that human rights are rights; and the nature of human dignity, to which the major human rights declarations appeal. We also examine critical perspectives on the human rights movement.

This module offers an in-depth study of the theory and practice of religious toleration in the Early Modern Period (16th & 17th centuries). The module covers classic texts, such as Locke's Letter Concerning Toleration, but also spends a good deal of time exploring the thought of lesser-known figures in this area: Mary Astell, Pierre Bayle, Jean Bodin, Bartolomé de Las Casas, Sebastian Castellio, Margaret Cavendish, Confucius, Lady Montagu, Roger Williams, etc. The main purpose of the course is to try to understand the variety of arguments offered both for and against religious tolerance in the Early Modern Period, the historical background or context informing these arguments, and the relationship between these arguments and the actual practice of religious tolerance or intolerance.