The concept of meaning has a long past but a short history. A long past in the sense that ever since the emergence of the earliest communities, human beings have been seeking to understand the meaning of that which is happening around them (Peterson, 1999). A short history in the sense that the scientific study of meaning did not begin until the mid-20th century and did not fully come into its own until the current century.
This articleaims to understand the psychological nature of meaning and how it can be considered a need in human life. To this end, it explores the cognitive, emotive, and conative components of meaning and discusses the status of meaning as a basic psychological need (e.g., Baumeister & von Hippel, 2020; Martela & Ryan, 2020; Park, 2010; Park & George, 2020). It is argued that a person’s search for meaning can be understood with reference to basic existential conditions, as formulated by existential thinkers, and as the reflection of a psychological need for meaning, as proposed by meaning research. The argument that meaning can be viewed as a basic psychological need must be evaluated against established criteria for obtaining status as a basic need. Most notable in this regard is the set of criteria proposed by basic psychological need theory (BPNT), which stipulates that a need must fulfill the criteria of being (1) psychological, (2) essential, (3) inherent, (4) distinct, and (5) universal for it to be deemed a basic need (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, 2023). The discussion of the need for meaning against these criteria will follow after having provided the arguments of how and why it is suggested that meaning is considered a basic need. Following this discussion, the article will introduce the meaning, autonomy, relatedness, and competence (MARC) model as a model of the dynamic relations between the needs for meaning, autonomy, relatedness, and competence. In addition to its theoretical significance as a model depicting the relationships between the four needs, the MARC model also has practical usability in conversations about experiences of meaning and need realization in different life settings.
The article positions itself in the field between the general psychological conceptualization of meaning on the one hand (e.g., Baumeister, 1991; Park, 2010) and research in self-determination theory (SDT) on the other hand, more specifically as the BPNT subtheory of SDT theorizes about basic needs. It takes up the invitation from Martela and Ryan (2020) to continue the investigation of the status of meaning as a need, with the aim of providing new perspectives to the exploration of the subject.

What Is Meaning?

Meaning is a psychological and philosophical concept that most people are familiar with, although they might struggle to explain exactly what it entails if asked, “Meaning seems to fit the quip that everyone wants it, but nobody knows quite what it is” (Baumeister & Landau, 2018, p. 1). The first attempt at formulating a coherent theory of meaning was made by the Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl (1905–1997), who considered meaning the most central existential theme in human life and regarded the quest for meaning as the most fundamental existential need (Frankl, 1946/2011b, p. 80).
Since then, the meaning research literature has been operating with different understandings of the concept of meaning and its role in human life (Leontiev, 2017b). A framework for the systematic effort to define the concept of meaning was offered by Baumeister (1991), according to whom meaning can be defined as “mental representations of possible relationships among things, events, and relationships. Thus, meaning connects things” (p. 15). This concept applies to meaning in life, as stated by Baumeister:
The meaning of a life is the same kind of meaning as the meaning of a sentence in several important respects: having the parts fit together into a coherent pattern, being capable of being understood by others, fitting into a broader context, and invoking implicit assumptions shared by other members of the culture (Baumeister, 1991, p. 16).
The common denominator of the meaning of a sentence and the meaning of a life is that both deal with the cognitive understanding of connections. Both involve registering meaning, so to speak. However, registering the meaning of something is not quite the same as experiencing something as being meaningful. Thus, to understand what meaning is also about, we must identify the additional relevant components of the concept.

Meaning in Life

An additional component essential for understanding what existential meaning or meaning in life is about is the notion that something is of value and carries significance in life. According to Frankl (1966/2019c), values that matter are an integral part of experiencing meaning in life. Values provide purpose and direction, enabling people to discern right from wrong and take a stance in challenging life situations (Frankl, 1964/2019d, p. 118). Baumeister (1991; Baumeister & Vohs, 2001) also stressed the significance of values and coined the term value bases to encapsulate people’s need to comprehend what fundamentally matters as good or bad in their experiences of meaning in life. Taken together, these theories converge on the notion that people need values as a reference for understanding differences between right and wrong and for perceiving the significance and purpose of the lives they are living.
Regarding significance, Steger et al. (2006) explicitly defined meaning in life as “the sense made of and significance felt regarding the nature of one’s being and existence” (Steger et al., 2006, p. 81). If this is considered, it seems that, in addition to the cognitive component of registering connections, meaning in life involves an existential component that pertains to the perceived significance of the phenomenon that is understood, that is, how it matters (George & Park, 2014; Park, 2017).
Regarding purpose, Wong (2017), for instance, explicitly acknowledged Frankl’s concept of the will to meaning, which implies that by our very nature as human beings, we reach beyond ourselves to find meanings to fulfill (1964/2019d, p. 113). In Wong’s view, “Purpose is the most important component in the meaning structure because it serves several functions as the engine, the fuel, and the steering wheel” (Wong, 2017, p. 10).
A similar emphasis on purpose is found in Emmons’ (1999) theory of personal striving and ultimate concerns: “A meaningful life is one that is characterized by a deep sense of purpose” (p. 138). Likewise, purpose is also considered in relation to the search for meaning by Steger et al. (2006, p. 81). Furthermore, Baumeister and von Hippel (2020, p. 13) determined purpose as one of the components of experiencing meaning based on the assumption that purpose generates experiences of meaning by connecting present action with future outcomes (see also Baumeister, 1991; Baumeister & Vohs, 2001). Schnell (2021, p. 7) pointed to a similar understanding when using orientation as a general term for the availability of direction or purpose in experiences of meaningfulness. Finally, Martela and Steger (2016) showed that meaning in life involves coherence, significance, and purpose, while George and Park (2016) argued that the core components of the concept are comprehension, mattering, and purpose. Shared among these viewpoints is the notion that experiences of meaning in life have three components: comprehension (or coherence), significance (or mattering), and purpose.
Although values are crucial for the experiences of meaning, this article proposes that they are crucial in the sense that they provide necessary references for the experiences of significance, purpose, and comprehension but that they do not constitute an experiential component of meaning in and of itself. The point is that the experience of a value as such differs from the experience of significance when acting in accordance with the value. Indeed, people can reflect on their values and attempt to comprehend the meaning of these values in relation to specific situations. When they grasp the meaning, the experience is one of comprehension rather than the value itself. The value thus serves as a reference for the comprehension experienced. Similarly, when acting with a purpose in accordance with a value of, for instance, treating other people well, it is the mattering (or significance) of the purposeful action that is experienced. This also implies that when something is experienced as having value, it is the mattering, purpose, and/or comprehension of that something that is being experienced.
In summary (and to the extent that values are considered as a framing condition for meaning rather than an experiential component of meaning), central works in meaning research agree that meaning in life has three components. For the sake of clarity, the terms comprehension, significance, and purpose will be used in the following.1

Meaning and the Trilogy of Mind

From a general psychological perspective, it is worth noting that the three components of meaning in life seem to align with the traditional tripartite view of the three basic aspects of the human psyche: the cognitive, emotive, and conativedomains (Hilgard, 1980). As pointed out by Mayer et al. (1997, p. 31), “most classification systems for [psychological] components employ one or more of three categories of mind that have a centuries old tradition: the conative, affective, and cognitive—what Hilgard (1980) has referred to as the trilogy of mind.”
Generally speaking, the cognitive domain concerns thinking and perception and is related to the comprehension component. The emotivedomain concerns emotion and sensation and is related to the significance component. The conative domain concerns volition and motivation and is related to the purpose component. To summarize:
  1. In the cognitive domain, the comprehension component of meaning concerns tendencies to perceive coherence and connections in experiences and to integrate them with mental representations and one’s self-concept.
  2. In the emotivedomain, the existential significance component of meaning concerns experiences of the significance of things, events, and relationships and the experience that one’s life has inherent worth.
  3. In the conativedomain, the purpose component of meaning concerns the sense of purpose and direction in life in the form of aspirations and strivings toward valuable goals.
Through its three basic components, it appears that the concept of existential meaning (in life)—in a general sense—reflects the basic mental domains in psychology according to Hilgard’s (1980) trilogy of mind. This indicates that the concept has sufficient structural range to capture the key phenomenological aspects of different experiences of meaning.
The assumption that the components of meaning reflect different mental domains does not imply that they are isolated from each other in the functioning of the mind. Rather, it implies that the components serve different functions regarding meaning. Experiences of purpose, for instance, likely do not occur without cognition being involved. To experience purpose, one must understand how a future outcome links to that which is happening in the present. However, cognition in itself cannot account for the conativedirectedness when experiencing purpose. There is more to purpose than cognition, so to speak. This principle also applies to those cognitions that turn into “hot cognitions” when they are entwined in experiences of affectivesignificance within the emotive domain (Hilgard, 1980, p. 115).

Objective Aspects of Meaning

The three components of the concept of meaning described above all relate to its subjective (phenomenological) aspect, that is, how meaning is understood existentially and how people experience it. The question, however, is whether meaning also can be assumed to have an objective side, that is, whether there are objective manifestations of and references for experiences of meaning. This issue is debated within both philosophy and psychology (e.g., Baumeister & Landau, 2018; Baumeister & von Hippel, 2020; Leontiev, 2017a, 2020; Louden, 2013; Wong, 2017).
Regarding objectivemanifestations of meaning, Baumeister and Landau (2018) argued that subjective meaning also produces objective meaning. This is explained with reference to the understanding of meaning as nonphysical connections that generate potential physical organization. In other words, although meaning is not physically detectable, it does leave physically detectable imprints in the human world—which then contain the meaning of their creation: “We arrive at two keys to understanding the nature of meaning: nonphysical connection and potential organization. Together, they explain how meaning is detached from the material world yet nevertheless exerts a real impact on physical phenomena” (Baumeister & Landau, 2018, p. 3).
Regarding objective references for meaning, Leontiev (2017a) argued that “Meaning is neither objective nor subjective; or, on the contrary, it is both objective and subjective at the same time” (p. 51). It is objective in the sense that it exists in the world and has to be discovered or grasped, as, for instance, when a person is traveling in another culture and discovers the meaning of specific actions, attitudes, and values in the cultural context. Meanwhile, it is subjective in the sense that it refers to an individual’s experience of something as being meaningful. To capture the difference between objective and subjective aspects of meaning, Leontiev (2020, p. 31) has proposed a distinction between C-meanings (cultural meanings) and P-meanings (personal meanings).

Meaning and Culture

Human beings are born with a capacity for experiencing meaning, but meaning is not naturally constituted in the individual. Meaning is experienced and found in relation to the lives people live together with others (Schnell, 2021). Cultural, social, and physical environments are filled with potential C-meanings that people with varying degrees of existential insight and freedom find ways to actualize as P-meanings (Leontiev, 2020).
The more general point is that social communities, cultures, and societies continuously provide meaning references and standards (ideologies, belief systems, social conventions, visions, norms, discourses, and so forth) that people accept, attune to, embrace, or reject through the way they live their lives. Through their upbringing and socialization, people develop an existential capacity to glean meaning from the wide range of life situations and contexts they engage in. It is a result of human coexistence, embedded in culture and community.
Even though the experiential reference of meaning is the individual who experiences meaning (and the reference, in that sense, is individual), meaning in particular relies on shared language, cultural codes, and the contexts that people meaningfully manage together (Baumeister & Landau, 2018, pp. 6–7). Thus, meaning is also conditioned by how it is negotiated and understood in encounters between people with different perceptions, interests, and interpretations of context, as pointed out by the poststructuralists (Dilley, 2002). Over time, these encounters in themselves also change dynamically, as do human lives.

Meaning and Stability

Human life is continually exposed to change, both existentially, through the practice and developments of life, and biologically, through the body’s development and decline. In order to handle these constant changes, people need references of stability and permanence. The unique quality of meaning is that it brings a sense of stability to complement the changing processes of a human life: “Meaning helps impose stability” (Baumeister & von Hippel, 2020, p. 9). For example, religiosity typically has wider implications than merely relating to the larger dimension of meaning in one’s own life. It also involves being part of a congregation and a community that, in addition to the overall significance of the religion itself, helps bringing structure and stability to life (Emmons, 1999; Wulff, 1997).
In everyday life, experiences of meaning are stabilized or disturbed in accordance with the relation between global and situational meaning (Park, 2010). Global meaning refers to the mental orienting system that provides people with the cognitive, emotional, and motivational meaning frameworks with which they interpret their actions and experiences (p. 258), while situational meaning refers to meaning in the context of a specific situation. According to Park (2010), experiences of the presence, absence, or disturbance of meaning are manifestations of the relationship between global and situational meaning. When there is a mismatch between the two, the result may be cognitive dissonance, which one can attempt to reduce through different “meaning-making efforts” (Park, 2010, p. 259). While meaning-making efforts refer to the processes in which people engage to establish and restore meaning, the results of these processes are termed the meanings made (Park, 2010, p. 260). In that respect, meanings made are the content reference for experiences of meaning.
In more specific relation to the three basic components of the concept of meaning (comprehension, significance, and purpose) outlined so far, it is proposed that the stabilizing function of meaning has relevance in three different ways, each of them shielding the person from discomfort:
  1. In relation to the cognitive component of meaning, the function is to stabilize against chaos. This can be achieved through meaning-making processes that creates coherence, understanding, and organization.
  2. In relation to the emotive component of meaning, the function is to stabilize against emptiness. This can be achieved through meaning-making processes that creates content, depth, and mattering.
  3. In relation to the conative component of meaning, the function is to stabilize against stagnation. This can be achieved through meaning-making processes that creates direction, development, and striving.

Search for Meaning

While the presence of meaning may bring stability in the form of coherence, content, and direction, the absence of meaning can bring chaos, emptiness, and stagnation. This may stem from circumstances in people’s surroundings or from a lack of purpose and perceived significance, and the result can be despair and a lack of psychological well-being (Ryan et al., 2008; Ryff & Singer, 2008). In existential psychology, meaninglessness is considered a basic existential condition (Yalom, 1980). This view has to do with the conflict or ambivalence between, on the one hand, the basic human search for meaning and, on the other hand, existing in a world with no pregiven meaning. The premise for the existentialists is that there is no pregiven meaning in the human world, as famously stated by Sartre: “Life has no meaning a priori. Before you live it, life is nothing, but it is for you to give it a meaning. The value of it is nothing other than the meaning that you choose” (1956, p. 309—here, quoted from Louden, 2013, p. 25). Other researchers, including Frankl, Baumeister, and Leontiev, argued that meaning does exist and that human beings have the task of finding the given meaning(s) or paths in life. The common denominator between Frankl (2019a) and the existentialists is that people’s search for meaning is fundamental and that lack of meaning is the paramount existential stress a person can experience (Yalom, 1980, p. 421). This crucial function of meaning emphasizes the importance of understanding the psychological nature and significance of the concept.

Psychological Needs and Meaning

While existential psychology explains the search for and experience of meaning with reference to basic existential conditions (Yalom, 1980) or so-called tensions in basic existential dimensions (Van Deurzen, 2010), needs psychology considers the search for and experience of meaning manifestations of psychological needs. One of the discussions in needs psychology concerns whether the search for and experience of meaning should be considered a direct consequence of a need for meaning or if it should be considered a result of the activation and satisfaction of basic psychological needs other than a need for meaning. The latter viewpoint is held by Weinstein et al. (2012/2017), Ryan and Deci (2017), and Martela and Ryan (2020). They argued that experienced meaning is an outcome of the satisfaction of the three needs considered to be basic (autonomy, relatedness, competence). In their opinion, meaning is thus not a need in itself. At the same time, however, Martela and Ryan (2020, p. 130) have discussed whether beneficence actually should be considered a basic need in itself.
In the following sections, the article will continue this discussion by providing new reflections on meaning as a potential basic need. It will discuss the criteria from Ryan and Deci (2017, p. 251) that needs must specify a specific content to be considered needs in a basic sense. The argument will be that basic needs—as aspects of the structure of the psyche (e.g., Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 229; see below)—will determine specific structural forms in which different kinds of meaning content are organized. Viewed this way, it is proposed that the question about meaning as a basic psychological need can be answered in the affirmative.

Needs Psychology

Ever since Murray’s (1938) extensive effort to catalog human needs, there has been an ongoing discussion in psychology about which psychological needs are the main drivers of motivation in human existence. Central parts of the mainstream literature have identified the so-called big three: need for achievement (McClelland et al., 1953), need for power (Winter, 1973), and need for intimacy (McAdams, 1982). Maslow (1954) distinguished between psychological deficiency needs (safety, belongingness, and esteem) and growth needs (self-actualization). Baumeister and Leary (1995) considered the need to belong to be the most fundamental psychological need. Nohria et al. (Lawrence & Nohria, 2002; Nohria et al., 2008) focused on acquiring, bonding, learning, and defending as basic needs (termed “drivers” in their framework).
In recent years, the self-determination theorists Edward Deci and Richard Ryan have reached a central position in needs research with their theoretical and empirical work concerning three basic psychological needs, namely autonomy, relatedness, and competence (summarized as ARC by Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, p. 4). According to Deci and Ryan, these three psychological needs are basic in the sense that they relate to deep structures of the human psyche, with competence, relatedness, and autonomy referring “to innate and life-span tendencies toward achieving effectiveness, connectedness, and coherence” (Deci & Ryan, 2000, p. 229).
Based on their extensive work, Deci and Ryan argued that the satisfaction of these three needs is “essential for the healthy development and well-being of all individuals regardless of culture” (2000, p. 231; see also Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 255; Ryan & Vansteenkiste, 2023, pp. 16–17).

Will to Meaning

As mentioned earlier, Frankl identified a need for meaning, formulated as a will to meaning related to human beings’ self-transcendent nature. To Frankl (1966/2019c, p. 177), being human implies being directed toward something other and bigger than oneself, reaching out for meaning and purpose in life. The basic foundation for reaching out for meaning is considered an intrinsic need for meaning, which in Frankl’s terminology is manifested as a will to meaning: “I have circumscribed this most human of all human needs by the motivation theoretical term will to meaning” (1985/2011a, p. 139). According to Frankl, the need for meaning is not derived from other needs or drives. It exists in its own right as a fundamental basic component in the human constitution: “the will to meaning is really a specific need not reducible to other needs, and is present in all human beings to a greater or lesser degree” (1972/2019b, p. 43).
Elsewhere, Frankl (1964/2019d, p. 113) underscored the importance of understanding that the will to meaning does not subside in the same way as deficit needs and drives do once they are satisfied and homoeostasis is restored. In Frankl’s theory, the need for meaning is of the same kind as Maslow’s (1954)growth needs or Deci and Ryan’s basic psychological needs, which do not stop being functionally active after they have been realized (Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 251). In this light, the will to meaning is founded in a basic psychological need for meaning, which does not stop being active when a person experiences meaning. Driven by their self-transcendent nature, people continue to orient themselves towards seeking and satisfying meaning in and of their lives. In Frankl’s words, “Will to meaning is fact, not faith” (Frankl, 1961/2019e, p. 61).

Meaning as a Basic Psychological Need—in Discussion With SDT

Different scholars have expressed skepticism of the view that meaning is an independent need. Most relevant to the present discussion are Deci, Ryan, and colleagues, going back to the work of Weinstein et al. (2012/2017). In an argument for (what is now termed) the BPNT in SDT, they claimed that there are just three basic psychological needs, thereby rejecting the notion of meaning as an independent need. Their rejection of meaning as an independent need occurred in a discussion about whether meaning in itself is a source of well-being in people’s lives. This discussion was based on a study of relationships between search for meaning, satisfaction of basic needs (autonomy, relatedness, and competence), satisfaction in life, and (absence of) anxiety and depression (Weinstein et al., 2012/2017, p. 91). The study found that the positive impact of perceived meaning (on life satisfaction and absence of anxiety and depression) was mediated by the perceived satisfaction of the needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence. It was, thus, not a direct result of the experience of meaning. Based on these findings, Weinstein and colleagues argued that the satisfaction of SDT needs is a source of meaning and, thus, of health and well-being. Accordingly, they concluded that perceived meaning is an outcome of something other than a need for meaning itself (Weinstein et al., 2012/2017, p. 98). Later, this conclusion was confirmed by Ryan and Deci (2017, p. 251) with the statement that meaning is an outcome rather than a specified nutrient.
It is worth noting that Weinstein et al. (2012/2017) based their discussion of the need for meaning on data derived from Steger and colleagues’ Meaning in Life Questionnaire and its dimensions of presence of meaning and search for meaning (Steger et al., 2006). The empirical reference for their conclusion in the study—that the experience of meaning is derived from or a product of the satisfaction of the other three needs and thus does not rely on a need for meaning in itself—thus rests on this methodological basis.
A potential challenge of the conclusion reached by Weinstein and colleagues may draw inspiration from the work of Zhang et al. (2018), who demonstrated an independent factor structure for a need for meaning that is not accounted for by the two categories of presence of meaning and search for meaning in Steger and colleagues’ Meaning in Life Questionnaire. Based on this, Zhang et al. argued that the need for meaning motivates the search for meaning, while the presence of meaning reflects the degree to which the need for meaning has been satisfied (2018, p. 192). They proposed that the need for meaning, the search for meaning, and the presence of meaning are independent empirical categories that mutually influence and reflect each other. Zhang and colleagues’ analysis of a specific need for meaning as an empirical category is in accordance with the theoretical assumptions about the existence of a will to meaning as reflecting an irreducible need in Frankl’s theory of meaning.
More recently, however, SDT-theoretician Ryan, in collaboration with Martela and Steger, also connected with Frankl’s theory of meaning (Martela et al., 2018). This happened in a context where they identified a need for beneficence as a candidate of a fourth need in addition to the three original SDT-needs. Beneficence, in this regard, refers to the quality or state of doing or producing good. Indeed, studies have shown how various forms of beneficence are associated with greater experienced meaning in life (Martela et al., 2018, p. 1263). As they also noted, there is wide spread support in the literature for the notion that meaningfulness arises from connecting with other people and the wider world and from being dedicated to a cause greater than oneself (Martela et al., 2018). They pointed out that this is in accordance with Frankl’s theory and argued that the satisfaction of relatedness and beneficence is associated with larger dimensions of meaning in a person’s life. On this basis, the authors conclude that in addition to the needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence, beneficence is a key factor in laying the basis for people to experience their lives as meaningful (Martela et al., 2018, p. 1264).
Thus, in addition to inspiration from parts of Zhang et al.’s (2018) work, which invites a reconsideration of Weinstein et al.’s (2012/2017)rejection of meaning as an independent need, Martela et al. (2018) offered further support for the notion that the need for beneficence is a potential fourth need. However, Martela and colleagues did not go as far as to acknowledge that the need constitutes a basic need with the same status as the other SDT needs. Instead, they concluded that although beneficence may be an independent well-being-enhancing element in human motivation, it is not a candidate for a basic need on par with the other SDT needs. As stated by Vansteenkiste et al. (2020, p. 9), beneficence might potentially be considered a “giving” facet within relatedness, if relatedness is understood in a broader sense as extending to feelings of inclusion and harmony at the group and societal level.
While it is worth recognizing the potential benefits for the understanding of beneficence from a broader conceptualization of relatedness (that extends to the group and societal level—and potentially to the universe and nature; Vansteenkiste et al., 2020), the assessment in this article is different. It proposes that beneficence, more specifically, should be considered a purpose component in the general meaning structure (which, in addition to purpose, also includes comprehension and significance). The general meaning structure then connects to a need for meaning as a basis for the search for meaning. With the aim of following up on the invitation from Martela and Ryan (2020, p. 130) to continue the investigation of the status of meaning as a need, the next section will turn to an elaboration of this.

Meaning With a Capital M and Meaning With a Small m

Given that existential meaning as a concept includes a comprehension component, a significance component, and a purpose component, it seems appropriate to consider beneficence as less than a basic need. However, this is not because beneficence is not an aspect of a basic need but rather because it only makes up one element of one of the components of the concept of meaning: the purpose component of doing good as a kind of prosocial behavior. An alternative way of understanding this is to consider meaning as a psychological need underlying the meaning structure as a whole, including the comprehension component, the significance component, and the purpose component of meaning. The point is that if meaning is to be considered a basic need (on par with other basic needs), it must incorporate all three components of the concept: the cognitive, the emotive, and the conative component.
In line with this perspective, Park and George (2020, p. 43) proposed that the need for meaning can be conceptualized as a need for possessing a functional meaning system. Park and George elaborated on this point in a discussion with Baumeister and von Hippel (2020), who—for their part—proposed that it is only the cognitive comprehension component of the meaning concept that reflects a need. According to Baumeister and von Hippel, the purpose component and the significance component should really be seen as “wants” rather than “needs” (p. 13). Their considerations of the relation between “wants” and “needs” rest on an evolutionary rationale that the cognitive aspect of meaning is of an earlier formation in human evolution than the evolution of purpose and existential significance. Park and George (2020, p. 45) provided a counterargument to Baumeister and von Hippel in that respect. They claimed that Baumeister and von Hippel overlooked the significance of the earliest religious worldviews, which included all three components of existential meaning in the form of a coherent explanatory system (in relation to the comprehension component), specific values, goals, and purpose (in relation to the purpose component), and a sense of transcendence that goes beyond mundane, ordinary life, in relation to the significance component—which is termed mattering by Park and George (2020). On this basis, they concluded that “all three components of existential meaning—comprehension, purpose, and mattering—are deeply seated human needs, given that, without them, humans do not flourish, effectively reducing their adaptation and reproductive success” (Park & George, 2020, p. 43).
From the perspective of the present article, one point attracts attention in relation to the understanding of meaning as a potential basic need, namely that the need for meaning is not in itself the same as either meaning-making, meanings made, or search for meaning. The need for meaning is a basic condition for different experiences of meaning to occur. The need for meaning is anchored in the self-transcendent nature of human beings as a structural condition (a basic propensity) that makes different forms of meaning-making and search for meaning possible. Meaning-making (as process) and meanings made (as content) are results of this. The tricky thing, however, is that meaning-making, meanings made, and search for meaning can also occur in a variety of other ways, including as an outcome of the satisfaction of the other SDT needs, as described by Weinstein et al. (2012/2017; Ryan & Deci, 2017, p. 254). In some circumstances, the search for meaning may be driven by the activation of the other basic SDT needs, for instance, in seeking meaningful relationships with others (activating the need for relatedness) or through a creative approach to job tasks (activating the need for competence) or through self-recognition and experiences of self-volition (activating the need for autonomy).2 However, what is proposed for reconsideration is the possibility that the search for meaning, meaning-making, and meanings made also stem from a need for meaning as such. The suggestion is that “human beings are hardwired to seek meaning” (Baumeister & Vohs, 2001, p. 613) and that this hardwiring manifests itself as a deep psychological structure that corresponds to the functional necessity for human beings to
  1. As such have ideals and values to live and develop by (Riker, 1996, p. 71)
  2. As such have horizons of significance outside the self to help orient one’s existence and knowing one’s personal stance and significance (Taylor, 1991)
  3. As such have general frames of reference to be able to make sense of the tragedies of life (Andersen et al., 2000, p. 270)
  4. As such have the opportunity to organize communities in societies based on “Sharing convictions about the good life” (Redfield, 1960, p. 347)
The argument for the as suchcharacter of the need for meaning assumes that human beings cannot live meaningfully and in communities without having values and shared convictions about the good life. In correspondence with the basic needs for competence, relatedness, and autonomy, which according to Deci and Ryan (2000) reflect life-span tendencies toward achieving effectiveness, connectedness, and coherence, the assumption with regard to the need for meaning as such is that it reflects a lifelong tendency to acquire orientation (in the form of values and shared convictions and so forth) that makes it possible for human beings to differentiate between good and bad, right and wrong, and live together in communities.
To signify the distinction between the fundamental need (as such) for having values, ideals, and shared convictions about how to live (as a reference for meaning in life) on the one hand and the notion of the phenomenological experiences of meaning in various forms of meaning-making, meanings made, and search for meaning on the other hand, the suggestion is to distinguish between meaning with a capital M and meaning with a small m.
  1. Meaning with a capital M refers to the need for meaning as a structural concept that pertains to the self-transcendent nature of human beings and reflects their inevitable tendencies toward acquiring orientation in the world in which they exist (the as suchcharacter of the need).
  2. Meaning with a small m is a concept related to process and content that refers to human beings’ multitude of different experiences of meaning-making, meanings made, and search for meaning as manifestations of various ways in which meaning is acquired and experienced phenomenologically.
The distinction between meaning with a capital M and meaning with a small m is the distinction between the basic need for meaning in the form of a deep structure (M) of the human psyche versus content-based searches for and experiences of meaning (m) in various ways and at different levels of abstraction in human lives. As will be suggested in the following section, the basic structure of the need for meaning (M) can be conceptualized in terms of intentionality, that is, as a basic directedness toward orientation as such. For now, it suffices to say that the distinction between M and m has nothing to do with whether, in terms of content, a person experiences what we would consider big meaning (e.g., in the form of religious beliefs or ultimate concerns and values) or small meaning (relating to the events and activities of everyday life). Experiencing big meaning (e.g., in the form of religious belief) is a big experience of meaning with a small m.
In reflecting upon the criteria provided by SDT for evaluating whether a need is a basic need or not, this article proposes that the need for meaning must be evaluated as a unified concept of the cognitive, the emotive, and the conative components. With this in mind, the article will now turn to the next part of its endeavor, which is to outline some of the perspectives and possibilities for the future investigation of meaning as a basic need in a more specific relation to the criteria of SDT as they have been elaborated since the publication of Ryan and Deci (2017).

Meaning and the Basic Need Criteria in SDT

As mentioned in the introduction to this article, SDT (or BPNT, if the focus is on BPNT as a subtheory in SDT) provides a set of criteria for evaluating whether a candidate for a need can be considered a basic need. As a refinement of the criteria originally set up by Ryan and Deci (2017, p. 251), Vansteenkiste et al. (2020, p. 4) and Vansteenkiste et al. (2023, p. 86) have set up nine criteria that a need has to meet in order to be considered basic. Five of these are mandatory basic criteria characterizing the needs studied at a more basic level, while four are associated criteria, derived from the basic criteria and providing deeper insights into how basic needs operate (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, p. 5). In the following sections, the focus will be on the basic criteria, according to which basic needs shall meet the criteria of being (1) psychological, (2) essential, (3) inherent, (4) distinct, and (5) universal. At the same time, the differentiation between meaning at a structural level and meaning at a content level will be used to reflect back on the character of the need criteria from SDT. To this author the criteria appear to be primarily functional in the sense that they are concerned with the content consequences of needs (n), while they seem to be less concerned with the structural character of the needs (N). A few suggestions as to how aspects of Criteria 1, 2, and 5 may be reconsidered will be proposed.

Meaning Is Psychological

According to Criterion 1, meaning must concern the psychological, not the physical, functioning of human beings if it is to be considered a basic need (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, p. 5). This criterion is met since, as argued throughout this article, meaning is a nonphysical concept (Baumeister & Landau, 2018). One cannot point to meaning. Meaning is not physically located in space. It must be grasped, understood, and experienced. Thus, it definitely concerns the psychological functioning of human beings. However, meaning can also (like autonomy, relatedness, and competence) have physical consequences. This was documented, for instance, by Frankl (1946/2011b) in the concentration camps, where prisoners who stopped relating to a larger purpose became more vulnerable to their horrible living conditions, lost resilience, and physically perished.

Reflections on the Criterion

To the extent that psychological functioning can have physical consequences, it seems relevant to ask if the criterion regarding the psychological character of a need is sufficient in itself if it solely concerns the functional aspects of the need. If we take into consideration that meaning (M) refers to the structural level of needs, it seems relevant to supply the functional criterion with a structural criterion. Doing this would add specificity to what defines the need for meaning (and other needs) as psychological in structural terms in contrast to their physical aspects. This is not to say that there is anything wrong with the existing criterion regarding meaning or needs in general at a content level. The question is whether something is missing regarding needs at a structural level.
To help answer this question, inspiration may be found in the phenomenological tradition dating back to Franz Brentano (1874/1973), who established a criterion to distinguish between mental and physical phenomena with the aim of defining psychology as a scientific discipline distinct from physical disciplines. Brentano proposed intentionality as a criterion in the sense that mental phenomena are defined by the intentional directedness they contain because of their structure of intentionality (Brentano, 1874/1973, p. 88). With the concept of intentionality, it is specified that there is a structural relationship between the experiencing subject and the objects of experience. In phenomenology, the terms noesis and noema are used to refer to the correlated elements of the structure of intentionality. While noesis refers to the acts of experience, noema refers to the objects of experience, the point being that in intentional acts, there is always an experiencing I-pole (noesis) as well as an experienced object-pole (noema). Physical phenomena do not have intentionality.
With regard to the need for meaning (and the other needs), the consequence of understanding psychological needs in terms of intentionality at a structural level is that if psychological needs are to be understood as psychological needs in contrast to physical needs, they must contain a directedness towards (noesis) something or someone (noema)—in a person’s imagination or physical life—that they can be nurtured by. If psychological needs are structured as intentionality, they contain a directedness—as such. This also explains why the need for meaning (like the other basic psychological needs) is not one that pushes the person from behind (as drives do). In accordance with the self-transcendent nature of human beings (Frankl, 1966/2019c), the need for meaning propels people to be directed toward and reach into the world in order to be influenced (directed) by the potential possibilities of meaning that exist there (Tønnesvang, 2006).
By including the premise of mental phenomena as being intentional under the existing Criterion 1, the criterion will be more definitive as to what makes a psychological needpsychological up against physical needs. Intentionality, or, more precisely, intentional directedness, makes the difference.

Meaning Is Essential

According to Criterion 2, if meaning is to be considered a basic need, its satisfaction must contribute to growth, well-being, and adjustment, whereas its frustration will predict problem behavior, lack of well-being, and psychopathology (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, p. 5).
As mentioned, the article proposes that an empirical evaluation of the status of meaning as a basic need has to take into consideration that it must be evaluated as a unified concept of cognitive, conative, and emotive components. Thus, when the need for meaning is evaluated empirically with regard to Criterion 2, this must be done with data from people who are in situations in which they (a) can or cannot understand the conditions under which they are living (cognitive component), (b) do or do not experience purpose and direction in their life situations (conative component), and (c) do or do not experience that there are things of value and significance that matter to them (emotive component). It is hard to imagine that people who cannot understand the conditions around them, who have no purpose, and to whom nothing matters will thrive. At the same time, it is also difficult to imagine that well-being—at least in its eudaimonic form (e.g., Ryan et al., 2008)—will be absent in the lives of people who do understand the contexts that they are living in, who do have purpose in life, and who are dedicated to values that matter to them. Although future empirical investigations are needed to further qualify the decisions about the empirical status of these questions, this article has provided some of the theoretical argumentation needed for a continuation of the empirical work.

Reflections on the Criterion

Considering the premise that basic psychological needs are intentional and concern growth, development, and adjustment, it may be beneficial to change the terminology around what is achieved in relation to these needs. Perhaps it would be more in tune with the existential character of basic psychological needs if the terminology were changed from “satisfaction” to “realization,” the point being that basic psychological needs are realized while deficit needs are satisfied.

Meaning Is Inherent

According to Criterion 3, meaning must represent an evolved aspect of our psychological nature, reflecting that there are adaptive advantages associated with need satisfaction if it is to be considered a basic need (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, p. 5).
To meet this criterion, the article has argued that there are adaptive advantages of cognitive comprehension, emotivesignificance, and conative purpose in meaning, with reference to Baumeister and von Hippel (2020) and Park and George (2020). In addition, it can be argued that meaning as an evolutionary phenomenon can be understood as a manifestation of communion, which is a basic existential modality through which human beings merge with the larger whole of which they are part in order to secure the survival of the species (Bakan, 1966). According to Bakan (1966), all living organisms (including humans) survive and develop by agency and communion as basic existential modalities in the existence of living forms. While agency concerns the organism as an individual entity, communion concerns the organism as part of a larger whole. As argued by Tønnesvang (2012, pp. 234–235), needs for autonomy and competence can presumably be considered agency manifestations, while needs for relatedness and meaning can be considered communion manifestations.
To the extent that communion includes affiliation and social belonging, meaning might potentially also be considered a facet of relatedness, as it is proposed in connection with beneficence by Vansteenkiste et al. (2020, p. 9). However, for this to be the case, relatedness must include ideals, values, and beliefs about organizing communities, frames for grasping the meaning of life, death, and tragedies, early cave paintings, mythology, and story-telling in general, which might broaden the concept too much with the risk of blurring it.
With this in mind, it is perhaps more profitable to continue the investigation of beneficence as being a part of the more encompassing cognitive–emotive–conative structure of meaning (M).

Meaning Is Distinct

According to Criterion 4, if meaning is to be considered a basic need, it must concern a distinct set of experiences, and its emergence must not be contingent upon or derivative from the frustration of other needs (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, p. 5).
Two premises have to be in place before it can be investigated whether meaning can satisfy this criterion. First, the differentiation between the structural (M) and functional (m) aspects of the need should be considered before investigating the distinctness of meaning in relation to the other needs. To that end, it should be carefully outlined which aspects of the three (cognitive, emotive, and conative) components of the concept are operationalized for investigation. In other words, it has to determine which aspects of comprehension, significance, and purpose should be chosen for investigation.
Next, it is proposed that we should consider the potential of differentiating SDT needs in the same way as differentiating meaning, that is, between autonomy, relatedness, and competence (with capital initials; A, R, C) as intentional structures with cognitive, emotive, and conative components, on the one hand, and autonomy, relatedness, and competence (with small initials) as experiential phenomena that occur to people in the form of experiences of autonomy, relatedness, and competence on the other hand.

Meaning Is Universal

According to Criterion 5, the felt satisfaction and frustration of meaning should predict the thriving and ill-being of all individuals, regardless of differences in sociodemographics, personality, cultural background, or need strength (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, pp. 5–6).
Due to the historical significance and the universality of the search for and experience of meaning in general (Peterson, 1999), it is expected that the need for meaning—to the extent that it is confirmed in accordance with the other four criteria—will show the same universality as the other three needs. As with Criterion 2, it is proposed that the term felt satisfaction in Criterion 5 should be replaced with the term felt realization.

From ARC to MARC

Based on the theoretical argumentation for meaning as a basic psychological need presented in this article, it is proposed that what is summarized as ARC (Vansteenkiste et al., 2020, p. 4) should evolve to MARC, as illustrated in what accordingly is called the MARC model (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. The MARC ModelNote. The oval in the figure shows the four basic psychological needs for meaning (M), autonomy (A), relatedness (R), and competence (C). As illustrated by the figure, each need may be viewed as a basic structural category (with a capital initial) or as a phenomenological experiential category (with a small initial). On the one hand, the needs are dynamically related to each other. On the other hand, each need is related to need-supporting or need-thwarting responses from the environment. These environmental responses are complementary to the manifestations of the psychological needs. This is in accordance with Tønnesvang (2012, p. 234) and the conceptualization of the need-based vitalizing model (Tønnesvang & Hedegaard, 2015). MARC = meaning, autonomy, relatedness, competence.
Figure image
The MARC model distinguishes between basic needs (in structural terms), written with capital initials, and the manifestation of needs as phenomenological experiences of meaning, autonomy, relatedness, and competence, written with small initials. As also seen in the model, each need is related to (directed toward) supporting aspects in the environment by which they are influenced (directed by). Through processes of transmuting internalizations (Kohut, 1971), aspects in the environment influence and sustain the development of organizing structures and styles in the individual’s regulation of the needs. To the extent that the environmental conditions in general are supportive of need realizations, the individual will not just internalize external regulatory aspects but also integrate these into self-determined styles of need regulation (Deci & Ryan, 2000), thus providing good conditions for balanced need realization in the life lived. On the contrary, environmental conditions that undermine need realization will counteract the development of self-determination and result in more controlled regulation of needs (Deci & Ryan, 2000), which will lead to more contingent and unbalanced need realizations in the individual’s life.
The psychological needs in the MARC model are dynamically interconnected, in the sense that they mutually influence the functioning of each other. Phenomenological experiences of meaning, autonomy, relatedness, and competence, then, will arise as a result of the dynamic relationships between the needs for meaning, autonomy, relatedness, and competence. In accordance with Vansteenkiste et al. (2020, p. 6), the needs (with a capital N) in the MARC model are dynamically involved in phenotypically diverse phenomena, and they are context-responsive, directing people to seek out and prefer certain types of activities under different circumstances.
Also, in accordance with Deci and Ryan (2000), needs in the model “are the basis of—indeed, they require—dynamic theorizing that links varied phenotypic desires and goals to underlying needs that the person may not even be directly aware of at the time” (p. 232). Thus, a superficialexamination cannot determine with certainty whether what seems like a person’s search for meaning is in fact a cover for an activated need for relatedness in a particular context with other people or an activated need for self-expression (autonomy) in the process of painting a picture. Determining which needs are activated, how, and when in an individual’s aspirations and actions requires phenomenological examinations conducted in collaboration with the individual involved. Such examinations can benefit substantially from measurements with validated batteries and questionnaires that provide valuable insights into the understanding of the what and why of people’s mental lives. However, none of them can stand alone. Accordingly, the theoretical understanding of psychological phenomena must develop in complementary relations with empirical investigations of the phenomena. This article proposes a theoretical model of basic needs in which the need for meaning (M) at a structural level is equated in status to needs for autonomy (A), relatedness (R), and competence (C). It is the aspiration of the article that the model will stimulate further discussion and investigation of the subject.

Practical Applications

Other than holding theoretical significance in the ongoing exploration of psychological needs, the MARC model has demonstrated applicational value as a practical tool for analyzing work situations and environments where the psychological needs of employees are more or less realized (Tønnesvang et al., 2023). Tønnesvang et al. (2023) also illustrated how the model may serve as a valuable tool for engaging in dialogues with employees regarding the experiences of meaning and need realization in their work–life situation. Operationalized as a “vitalizing compass,” the model may help structuring dialogues to focus on reflections and conditions relevant to needs. Tønnesvang and Schou also demonstrated the applicability of the vitalizing compass as a tool for dialogues in educational settings (2018a) and with troubled youth (2018b).

Concluding Remarks

The main goal of the present article is to examine the core definition and structural components of the concept of meaning and whether there might be a basis for understanding meaning as a basic psychological need on par with other basic needs in psychological research. It is the proposal of the article that a need for meaning has the same core significance in human existence as the needs for autonomy, relatedness, and competence. Meaning is thus argued to be a fundamental category in human existence, and the significance of living in an environment that contains the potential for human beings to experience “good” meaning can hardly be overstated. The point is that the need for meaning at a structural level (M) does not in itself contain narrowly specified content. Instead, it should be considered in its systemic qualities as composed of cognitive, emotive, and conative components (regarding comprehension, significance, and purpose, respectively). Thus, stating that human beings have a need for meaning (M) says nothing about whether the meaning a person seeks or experiences is constructive and wise or destructive and wicked. All it tells us is that human beings have a fundamental need for meaning and that they cannot live without the orientations and stabilizations that are provided by meaning. If their general environment does not offer “good enough” potential for experiencing meaning, the need for meaning will call upon them to find alternative ways to be fulfilled. The article was concluded with a brief note on the practical usability of the MARC model as a tool for organizing dialogues about experiences of meaning and the realization of needs in diverse life settings.