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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 16 December 2008
Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rittberg is generally recognized as the principal architect of the “Diplomatic Revolution” of 1756 and as one of the greatest statesmen of his day, yet there have been curiously few attempts to describe and analyze the process by which he rose to such eminence. In the available historical literature Kaunitz usually first appears on the scene at the peace congress of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748), although there are occasional references to his earlier diplomatic career. Nineteenth-century historians assumed that Kaunitz's experiences at Aix-la-Chapelle provided the insight which finally led him to propose the reversal of alliances. Adolph Beer, for example, asserted that Kaunitz's enmity towards England was born at Aix-la-Chapelle and that the policy of 1755 first entered his mind in 1748. Though twentieth-century historians have tended to de-emphasize the revolutionary nature of the reversal of alliances and so have been less willing to accept the easy equation that Aix-la-Chapelle produced the diplomatic change of 1756, there has been no systematic examination of the development of the new diplomatic policy in Kaunitz's own mind. While it might be said that the development of that policy represents merely the ordinary maturation of a diplomat, the growth of understanding, the fact is that few of his contemporaries possessed such understanding. It therefore seems of some value to know how this master diplomat matured.
1. There have been three “biographies” of Kaunitz: von Arneth, Alfred, “Biographie des Fürsten Kaunitz. Ein Fragment,” Archiv für österreichische Geschichte (hereafter AÖG), LXXXVIII (1900), 5–201Google Scholar; Kuntzel, Georg, Fürst Kaunitz-Rittberg als Staatsmann (Frankfurt a.M., 1923)Google Scholar; and Novotny, Alexander, Staatskanzler Kaunitz als geistige Persönlichkeit (Vienna, 1947)Google Scholar. Arneth's work, which deals exclusively with the period before 1750, is the only one which examines his early career in any depth and at the moment remains as the standard source for Kaunitz's early career. An Austrian scholar, Grete Klingenstein, is currently engaged in extensive research in the Brnô Archives which may supersede Arneth's work. This article is principally based on the author's own research while preparing his thesis, “The Political Education of Wenzel Anton von Kaunitz-Rittberg” (unpub. diss., Harvard, 1961).
2. “Zur Geschichte des Frieden von Aachen im Jahre 1748,” AÖG, XLVII (1871), 72, 93.Google Scholar
3. The best study of the background to the “Diplomatic Revolution” is Braubach, Max, Versailles und Wien von Ludwig XIV bis Kaunitz (Bonn, 1952)Google Scholar, which argues that the reversal of alliances was the result of a long development.
4. He had apparently been offered the same position earlier (in mid-1741), but had demurred on the grounds he was not wealthy enough to bear the expense of such a role. The Venetian ambassador to Vienna, Pietro Andrea Capello, asserted to the Venetian senate that his real reason was that he feared to commit himself too closely to Maria Theresa at a time when it appeared likely that the estates to which he was heir might fall under Prussian control. Arneth, “Kaunitz,” pp. 33–34.
5. Both parties also agreed to seek settlement of questions not treated by the Convention—that is, the problem of territorial claims. Austria was willing to concede Sicily to Sardinia, but Carlo Emanuele and Ormea demanded lands in Lombardy. For text see Der Österreichische Erbfolge-Krieg, VIII, von Hoen, Maximilian Ritter, Der Krieg in Italien gegen Spanien, Neapel und Frankreich, 1741–1744 (Vienna, 1905), pp. 549–51.Google Scholar
6. Complicating the situation was the ambiguous position of the Grand Duchy of Tuscany. Though Tuscany was regarded as neutral by all powers, its bond with Austria created the constant danger that Spain might renounce the guarantee and confiscate the Grand Duchy, thereby gaining an important military advantage. Kaunitz was certain that the Spanish could not be trusted to honor the guarantee, and in fact believed that the invasion of Tuscany was already being planned. Kaunitz to Austrian military staff, August 18, 1742; Sardinien Berichte (hereafter SB) Fasz. 3, Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv, Vienna (hereafter HHStA).
7. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, November 5, 1742, SB 3, HHStA.
8. SirLodge, Richard, Studies in Eighteenth Century Diplomacy (London, 1930), p. 44.Google Scholar
9. Throughout his career Kaunitz was seemingly obsessed with the desire or need to be in the center of things. Thus he seemed always to be convincing himself that the particular problem with which he was concerned at any given moment was the most pressing problem for the entire monarchy, and he was apparently unable to deal with questions he regarded as peripheral.
10. “Receuil d'objections qui pourroient être faites dans la prochaine conference sur l'expedition de Naples et de Sicile avec les Reponses” [sic], with report of Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, January 1, 1744, SB 5, HHStA.
11. Ibid.
12. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, November 17, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
13. “Objekta der Unterredung des Grafen Kaunitz mit dem Herrn Fürsten von Lobkowitz,” October 26, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
14. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, August 17, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
15. “Zweytes Pro Memoria tiber die Unterredung mit Herrn Fürsten von Lobkowitz,” October 26, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
16. Kaunitz to Villettes, December 7, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
17. “Reflexions” accompanying the report of January 11, 1744, SB 5, HHStA.
18. “Zweytes Pro Memoria,” October 26, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
19. Lodge, Richard, Great Britain and Prussia in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1923), p. 43.Google Scholar
20. Kaunitz to Ulfeld, March 18, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
21. “Rohe Gedancken und Reflexionen über den Zustand von Italien,” and “Fernere Gedancken,” submitted with his report of March 18, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
22. “Rohe Gedancken.”
23. Ibid.
24. From this point we are dealing with the second and longer memorandum, “Fernere Gedancken.”
25. These expositions were not so much arguments as they were pronouncements. Their logical analytical construction left the impression (as it was meant to) that all alternatives had been considered and therefore the conclusions were logically inevitable. There were no such things as inherent flaws, rather the plan was set against exterior forces which alone could prevent its fulfillment. In Kaunitz's view the most common “exterior force” was the inability of others to recognize their true interests.
26. “Rohe Gedancken.”
27. Arneth, , Maria Theresa, II, 289–90.Google Scholar
28. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, August 10, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
29. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, August 23, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
30. Ibid.
31. “Objekta der Unterredung,” October 26, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
32. “Extrait de la Relation du Comte de Kaunitz-Rittberg à S. M. la Reine d'Hongrie et de Boheme de Turin le 8e Janvier 1744,” SB 5, HHStA.
33. Although Kaunitz matriculated at Leipzig and in 1732–33 traveled to Holland, he appears to have had no contact at all with Protestant circles during his youth. The contacts which he made during his European tour were almost exclusively Roman Catholic and aristocratic. Further his family had long been Francophile in sympathy and tastes. Cf. Arneth, “Kaunitz.”
34. Frederick, to Klinggraffen, , 05 29, 1753, Politische Correspondenz Friedrichs des Grossen (Berlin, 1879– ), IX, 439.Google Scholar
35. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, November 5, 1742, SB 3, HHStA.
36. “Fernere Gedancken,” March 18, 1743, SB 4, HHStA.
37. Ibid.
38. Kaunitz at first regarded the transfer as an effort to “promote him out of his influence” by making him a mere decoration at the Brussels Court (Kaunitz to Ulfeld, November 23, 1743, SB 4, HHStA). It is true that the tension between Kaunitz and Sardinian leaders provoked criticism of Kaunitz in Vienna. Kaunitz himself had acknowledged the strain, but placed the blame for it on Ormea and to a lesser extent on Villettes (Kaunitz to Ulfeld, September 21, 1743, SB 4, HHStA). Whatever the cause, the breakdown of relations certainly had something to do with the transfer, but it in no way indicated a lack of faith on the part of Maria Theresa. Since Charles would be involved in the military campaigns, she wanted her sister to have the most competent adviser possible and in commending Kaunitz to Maria Anna, the queen made clear the confidence she had in him (Maria Theresa to Maria Anna, [n.d.] 1744, in Arneth, Maria Theresa, 11, 562, n. 125). His role became even more important because of Maria Anna's untimely death in December 1744.
39. Kaunitz to Silva-Tarouca, November 10, 1744, Belgien Berichte (hereafter BB) 48, HHStA.
40. Kaunitz to Marquis de Poal, BB 48, HHStA.
41. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, November 18, 1744, BB 48, HHStA.
42. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, March 12, 1745, BB 51, HHStA.
43. Kaunitz to Arenberg, March 11, 1745, BB 51, HHStA.
44. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, July 23, 1745, BB 52, HHStA.
45. Kaunitz to Ulfeld, June 23, 1745, BB 52, HHStA.
46. Kaunitz to Silva-Tarouca, November 27, 1744, BB 48, HHStA.
47. Kaunitz to Poal, January 12, 1745, BB 50, HHStA.
48. Arneth, , Maria Theresa, III, 160–62.Google Scholar
49. Kaunitz to Silva-Tarouca, January 15, 1746, BB 55, HHStA.
50. Kaunitz to Francis, August 12, 1745, BB 53, HHStA.
51. Kaunitz to Wurmbrand, September 17, 1745, Grosse Korrespondenz, IX/67, 405 B, HHStA.
52. Kaunitz to Silva-Tarouca, January 1, 1746, BB 55, HHStA.
53. Kaunitz to Silva-Tarouca, January 5, 1746, BB 55, HHStA.
54. Kaunitz to Silva-Tarouca, March 23, 1746, BB 56, HHStA.
55. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, March 16, 1746, BB 55, HHStA.
56. Kaunitz to Ulfeld, April 3, 1746, BB 56, HHStA.
57. Most contemporaries and most subsequent historians have dismissed his complaints of ill-health as a ruse to allow him to escape an uncomfortable situation. To be sure he was a hypochondriac, but the symptoms of his illness even if psychologically induced were nonetheless real and genuinely debilitating. In this instance the sorry state of affairs in the Netherlands and the persistence of some displeasure over the assignment when combined with the climate in the Low Countries were the primary causes of his “illness,” but his symptoms—fever, head pains and the partial paralysis of his left arm—were undoubtedly real. See n. 9 above.
58. Kaunitz to Maria Theresa, September 9, 1746, BB 56, HHStA.
59. “Meynungen des Graffen von Kaunitz,” Vorträge 102, HHStA.
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