What is Social Appropriateness?

Abstract

The principal objective of this chapter is to identify the most salient properties of social appropriateness or etiquette. First, the chapter contrasts the view of many contemporary Western philosophers, who reject a conceptual connection between etiquette and morality, with that of Confucianists, who argue such connections exist. Second, by identifying examples in which socially appropriate behaviour and morally justifiable behaviour conflict, we reject the Confucianist claim that adhering to norms of etiquette is essential to morally good action. Third, we then identify the prominent features of social appropriateness including interdependence of action, conformity, publicity, and overlooking slight noncompliance. Finally, we pose the question whether an individual’s past of grievous wrongdoing could render her morally undeserving of participation in the practices of etiquette. By emphasizing the importance of moral merit to our ordinary moral practices, we conclude that the norms and practices of socially appropriate behaviour are not completely divorced from morality as many contemporary Western philosophers argue, even if they are not inherent to morally good action as the Confucianists would have it.

This chapter examines social appropriateness from a philosophical perspective in the analytic tradition. Conceptual analysis in analytic philosophy has often proceeded with one of two methodologies. First, one can attempt to come up with a classical definition that seeks to identify a concept’s necessary and sufficient conditions. This methodology is perhaps most famously followed by Socrates illustrated by his frequent attempts to elicit definitions of concepts such as justice, knowledge, or piety from his various interlocuters. Alternatively, one can follow Wittgenstein’s suggestion that many concepts do not have necessary and sufficient conditions, but are rather connected by many overlapping similarities, or family resemblances, none of which is common to every single instance of the concept in question (Wittgenstein 1958, §66).

To provide an apt conceptual analysis that goes beyond a classical definition and family resemblances, one can adopt methodological lessons from Rudolf Carnap’s method of explication and Sally Haslanger’s ameliorative analysis. Both explication and ameliorative analysis focus on how we should understand a concept, not only on how we currently do, though the latter can serve as a starting point for the former. For Carnap, we define the meaning of a term with reference to a particular practical aim for which it is useful. Explication is a process whereby a vague, informal concept, either from everyday life or from more regimented contexts such as scientific contexts is given a more exact, often formalized formulation (Carnap 1947, pp. 7–8; Novaes 2018, p. 5). Drawing on Carnap’s methodology, W.V.O. Quine notes that in giving explicative definitions “the purpose is not merely to paraphrase the definiendum into an outright synonym, but actually to improve upon the definiendum by refining or supplementing its meaning” (Quine 1951, p. 25). For Haslanger, ameliorative analysis starts by asking what function or functions a particular concept has in the constellation of our practices and discourses. Once we begin to answer this question we can start to see whether the version of the concept we currently have in view is adequate for the job we expect it to do. If not, then an ameliorative, or revisionary, process is initiated and a more suitable version of the concept is established given the goals that were determined in the first stage of the process (Haslanger 2005, 367–368; Novaes 2018, p. 12). This is the methodology I follow in this chapter.

This methodology is particularly appropriate for understanding the concept of social appropriateness because labelling behaviour, utterances, and acts as socially appropriate (or inappropriate) has different meanings in different contexts. These differences appear both intraculturally as well as interculturally. That is, differences occur both within a single cultural context as well as among different cultural contexts.

Examples of intracultural variances include differing criteria for what is considered to be socially appropriate at the dinner table, at the office, in a stadium at a sporting event, at a wedding, or at a funeral within a single cultural context such as in Germany, in Bavaria, or in Oberpfalz depending on how narrowly or widely we define an individual culture. Clearly, how an individual, for example, comports her body, holds her cutlery, speaks to those standing or sitting adjacent to her will differ in the contexts mentioned above. What is more, expectations of social appropriateness can change within these individual settings as well, especially owing to location or the company one keeps. The expectations for appropriate behaviour at the dinner table at home with one’s family differ from those in a restaurant or at a wedding reception, as well as, for example, whether one is eating with friends, work colleagues, or the Queen of England.

Examples of intercultural variances are well known (and, it deserves mention, have much to do with why people find travelling to new countries and experiencing new cultures adventurous). However, one need not compare vastly different cultures to find differences among expectations for socially appropriate behaviour; subtle differences exist between cultures that otherwise share much in common. For example, Americans in Germany might be surprised to find out they sometimes ought to take off their shoes prior to entering someone’s home.

One might object that this wide variety of both intracultural and intercultural differences regarding the criteria and expectations of social appropriateness promises to make the current analysis a failure. One could make the argument that the question of what social appropriateness is cannot be asked because there is no single answer. It is simply too varied and too context dependent to be a proper subject of conceptual analysis.

However, it is precisely this diversity and variety of contexts and cultures that ought to motivate our inquiry rather than dissuade its pursuit. Owing to the wide variety of contexts of social appropriateness, the following investigation will proceed by examining the various salient attributes of socially appropriate behaviour, utterances, and acts, but will not seek to establish a static and immutable definition through formulating necessary and sufficient conditions. It is my hope, however, that this methodology does justice to the complex nature of social appropriateness while making some progress in expanding our comprehension of it.

The first step in this inquiry is to properly define our field of analysis by understanding what we mean when we refer to socially appropriate behaviour, utterances, or acts. “Appropriate” is defined as that which is “suitable, acceptable, or correct for the particular circumstances” (Oxford Advanced American Dictionary). Within a social context, behaviour, utterances, or acts deemed suitable, acceptable, or correct are codified and communicated through rules of etiquette. Etiquette is comprised of “the formal rules of correct or polite behaviour in society”(Oxford Advanced American Dictionary). Hence, an analysis of the prominent features of etiquette is simultaneously an analysis of social appropriateness.

The second step is to identify the connections, if any exist at all, between the expectations, criteria, and judgments of etiquette and those of morality. Insofar as both etiquette and morality are normative, it is reasonable to ask whether there are any conceptual or practical similarities between the two. In the literature concerning this question (e.g. Coleman 2013; Foot 1972; Martin 1993; Olberding 2016) mainly two contrary perspectives have been advanced: (i) there is no connection between etiquette and morality, and (ii) etiquette is an inherent part of morality¹.

Many contemporary Western moral philosophers have used etiquette as a foil to morality in order to identify why the latter ought to be understood as universal and obligatory, and the former culturally relative and optional. For example, this assumption underwrites Phillipa Foot’s thoughtful challenge to Kant’s assertion that the imperatives of morality are categorical (Foot 1972). In short, she argues that one finds categorical imperatives in rules of etiquette to which “no one attributes the special dignity and necessity conveyed by the description ‘categorical imperative’” (Foot 1972, p. 308). As a consequence, an imperative’s being categorical cannot grant a moral directive its dignified status. After all, even rules of etiquette can be categorical. Further showing that she is working under the assumption that rules of etiquette do not compare in stature to those of morality, she refers to an example of social appropriate behaviour – one ought to answer an invitation addressed in the third person with the third person – as a “piece of nonsense” (Foot 1972, p. 308). In similar fashion, Louis Pojman contrasts ethics and etiquette stating that the latter is primarily about style and determining whether behaviour is polite, whereas ethics concerns “the essence of social existence” and what is right “in a deeper sense” (Pojman 2007, p. 3 quoted in Coleman 2013, p. 70). Reflecting this sentiment, it is common practice in ethics textbooks written for students to distinguish ethics from societal standards and culturally relative norms (e.g. Beauchamp et al. 2008, pp. 3–4; LaFollette 2002, pp. 8–9; Shafer-Landau 2012, pp. 292–293). In short, many contemporary Western moral philosophers conceptually separate etiquette from morality because etiquette refers to what is socially appropriate or polite and therefore, they believe, it lacks the gravitas that issues of moral action and judgment possess. They conclude that there is no substantive or significant connection between social appropriateness and morality.

The second perspective, that etiquette is an inherent part of morality, is aptly represented by Confucianism.² Firstly, Confucianists believe that adhering to norms of etiquette is essential to moral training (Confucius 1998; Kupperman 2002; Olberding 2016)³. This pedagogical feature of etiquette can be observed in the methods parents use for inculcating their children with manners and appropriate decorum. Parents teach their children to say thank you after receiving a gift not only to be polite, but also to instruct them that gratitude is the morally proper cognitive and emotional response when receiving a gift. The fact that parents must repeat this instruction countless times throughout a child’s upbringing reveals that moral instruction is a lengthy process. It also reveals to the child the abundance of occasions on which one ought to express, but also cultivate the sincere feeling of, gratitude, beneficence, and considerateness toward others. “The rules thus doubly function to hone powers of observation, the ability to locate values such as beneficence that infuse myriad experiences, and to habituate the child to emotive responses appropriate to experience” (Olberding 2016, p. 430). Etiquette thus serves as essential moral training.

Moral training is not only relevant for the cultivation of virtuous characteristics internal to the individual. A significant consequence of instructing children in the rules of etiquette is that it helps to make them socially and morally acceptable to others in the wider community (Olberding 2016, p. 431). Providing the child with social and moral resources to interact with others is essential to that child’s prospects for establishing and developing throughout its life fulfilling and meaningful personal relationships with others.⁴ One cannot expect to find such relationships if one is indifferent to whether one’s speech or conduct offends or pleases the others with whom one interacts.

A further consequence of this training is that the child learns how to recognize expressions of friendliness or hostility so that she knows with whom to seek relationships. For example, ordinarily one can safely assume that a person who advances on you with an outstretched hand is going to treat you better than one who spits on the ground at the sight of you. Once learned and correctly interpreted, the symbols of etiquette permit one person to recognize in the attributes, gestures, and actions of other persons their intentions, status, friendliness or hostility, and thus to deal appropriately with a wide range of social situations and relationships (Martin 1993, p. 354).

Perhaps most significantly for Confucianists, etiquette is not only instrumental in evoking a moral sensibility in individuals, it is moral interaction itself. As both Amy Olberding and Joel Kupperman note, Western moral philosophy has been mainly concerned with “big moment ethics” (Kupperman 2002, p. 40; quoted in Olberding 2016, p. 427). One need only to think about the small cottage industry of books and articles concerning trolley problem cases to affirm their observation. Despite the insights into moral psychology we may indeed gain from such thought experiments, most of us will not find ourselves standing at a railway lever deciding to kill one person or let five die. However, most of us will find ourselves in continuous interaction with other people where gestures of respect or acknowledgement of others’ interests are called for. “Where we understand that the quality of our mundane interactions with others matter, more of our moments are moral moments. Indeed, from a Confucian perspective, it is rather difficult to say when, if ever, we are off the moral clock” (Olberding 2016, p. 427). Confucianists recognize these mundane moments of human interaction as moral ones, and it is the rules of etiquette that instruct us how to act appropriately and, therefore, morally in such moments.

Indeed, when we continue to reflect on rules of etiquette, Confucianists seem to have correctly identified their significant role. Our norms of socially appropriate behaviour, utterances, and acts are often meant to communicate respect for others. Many of the rules of etiquette are expressions of the acknowledgement that, from an objective perspective, my interests are not superior in importance to those of others. As Judith Martin states: “The reason-giving force commanding compliance with the imperatives of etiquette is provided by…part of our fundamental beliefs and interests that includes such notions as communal harmony, dignity of the person, a need for cultural coherence….” (Martin 1993, p. 351). Some of the more quotidian examples clearly support this perspective: saying thank you, saying excuse me, not allowing one’s body to take up more space than it needs, offering drinks or food to guests, wearing proper attire to ceremonies. These utterances or acts can all be symbolic gestures of respect and acknowledgments of human dignity in others. In participating in rules of etiquette one recognizes the respect that other people deserve, and then communicates this recognition by participating in acts, or refraining from certain acts, that have shared meanings of respect or disrespect.

Cheshire Calhoun emphasizes this communicative feature in her discussion of civility, which, as made clear in the passage below, is relevantly similar to the Confucianist understanding of etiquette, and our analysis of social appropriateness. She states:

[W]hat makes being civil different from being respectful,

considerate, or tolerant, is that civility always involves a display of

respect, tolerance, or considerateness. Thus civility is an essentially

communicative form of moral conduct. In addition, because

communicating our moral attitudes is central to civility, being

genuinely civil—unlike, say, being genuinely considerate or

genuinely tolerant—requires that we follow whatever the socially

established norms are for showing people considerateness, tolerance,

or respect. Only because there are such generally agreed upon, often

codified, social rules for what counts as respectful, considerate, and

tolerant behaviour can we successfully communicate our moral

attitudes toward others. Those rules create a common language for

conveying the attitudes of respect, willingness to tolerate differences,

and consideration. (Calhoun 2000, p. 266)

It is precisely through adherence to accepted and shared rules of etiquette that one can successfully express and communicate one’s respect for, or consideration of, others. If one were to choose behaviour, utterances or acts unfamiliar to one’s interlocutors as gestures of respect, the message would fall on deaf ears thereby countermanding the very purpose of the show of respect or consideration.

Calhoun makes an additional observation about the purpose of civility or adherence to norms of socially appropriate behaviour. She notes that civility may support self-esteem by communicating to others that we are worthy of the same gestures of respect that they are receiving from us (Calhoun 2000, p. 260; Coleman 2013, p. 76). Furthermore, some individuals may construct their self-identities and develop their character in relation to rituals of demeanor and deference. The codes of etiquette that enforce civility are a form of egalitarianism protecting individuals against indignity and humiliation (Coleman 2013, p. 77). By participating in communally-accepted rites of respect one fortifies one’s role as an equal member of that community showing respect to others but also demanding it in return. One comes to see oneself as a respectful and respect-deserving person interacting with co-equals through behaviour and gestures of shared meaning.

But following rules of etiquette, or expecting that others do so, is not always egalitarian. Rules of etiquette can be classist, further entrenching extant social inequalities. Despite the moral properties that rules of etiquette and their observance may possess, rules of etiquette are likewise notoriously fallible, imperfect, and often arbitrary. They have been used to identify those with a less “noble” or “civilized” upbringing in order to keep them from improving their societal or economic status, as well as to keep discriminated groups in the margins of society. For example, the Indian caste system exemplifies how only members of certain privileged groups are permitted to engage in particular social activities. If only the individuals with social and political power determine who is allowed to participate in practices of etiquette, then it serves as a tool to strengthen power asymmetries and to further marginalize the vulnerable.

There are well-known historical examples that illustrate a significant divide between social appropriateness and morality. In 1955 the Montgomery, Alabama City Code required that all public transportation be segregated and that bus drivers had the powers of a police officer while in charge of any bus. While operating a bus, drivers were required to provide “separate but equal” accommodations for white and black passengers by assigning seats. This was accomplished with a horizontal line roughly in the middle of the bus separating white passengers in the front of the bus and African American passengers in the back. When an African American passenger boarded the bus, they had to get on at the front to pay their fare and then get off and re-board the bus at the back door. On December 1, 1955 while Rosa Parks was riding on a bus, it began to fill up with white passengers. Eventually, the bus was full and the driver noticed that several white passengers were standing in the aisle. The bus driver stopped the bus and moved the sign separating the two sections back one row, asking four black passengers to give up their seats.

It is important to clarify that the city's bus ordinance did not provide bus drivers with the authority to demand that black passengers give up their seats for white passengers. In the middle of the bus was a “liminal space; it allowed space for paying black customers to sit, but that could be trumped on the discretion of the driver” (Theoharis 2015, p. 62). This use of this discretion to ask black passengers to give up their seats for white passengers became more widespread over time to the point where it became common practice, an accepted custom, among bus drivers and white passengers. The rest of the story is well-known. Rosa Parks refused to give up her seat to a white passenger and was subsequently arrested. Her courageous act served as an impetus for the Montgomery Bus Boycott, which lasted for almost a year and ended with the U.S. Supreme Court declaring segregation on public buses to be unconstitutional.

Although this event is already familiar to most readers, I have included a description of its details for a good reason. Note that the Montgomery City Code did not legally authorize the bus driver’s request for Parks to relinquish her seat (although it did authorize the segregation of passengers based on race). Rather, it was common practice, and it would have been socially appropriate, that is suitable, acceptable, and correct according to social norms, for her to comply. Parks refused to participate in this practice on justified moral grounds, namely that all persons are equal regardless of color. This example is a clear instance of a moral act and a socially appropriate act being in direct conflict with one another. As a consequence, contrary to the perspective of Confucianism, following norms of social appropriateness or rules of etiquette is not an inherent part of morality. As Rosa Parks showed, acting in direct opposition to socially appropriate norms can be morally justified, or even morally obligatory for some (such as the white residents of Montgomery). Indeed, this will be the case in any society governed by unjust and immoral rules of behaviour.

Although the conceptual and practical connections between etiquette or socially appropriate behaviour and morality remain conflicting, we can continue with our identification of further salient features of social appropriateness. Adhering to the explicative and ameliorative methodology described at the beginning of this chapter, we aim to delineate its prominent features and the function or functions the concept has in the constellation of our practices, rather than its necessary and sufficient conditions. The conventions of etiquette possess the following conditions: interdependence of action, conformity, publicity (Miller 1991, p. 440–441), and overlooking slight noncompliance.

It is difficult to conceive of rules of etiquette existing without interdependence of action. The rules exist precisely in order to regulate interaction between individuals in a shared community. Etiquette is inherently relational in this sense, since an individual adheres to norms of socially appropriate behaviour as a means of interacting, and as discussed above, as a means of communication with others. The condition of interdependence does not entail that a person could not continue to follow rules of etiquette if she were alone. We can imagine a person sitting down to eat at her dinner table without any guests at all, and yet still eating with the prescribed utensils, putting her napkin in her lap, etc. However, these practices originally acquire their meaning through interaction with others in a community. That is, the framework that underwrites the lone diner’s continued adherence to rules of etiquette is interaction among people, and this interaction was the initial catalyst for etiquette. This is made clear through our understanding the lone diner’s actions when we imagine the situation. We comprehend what she is doing, even if no one happens to be there as she is doing it.⁵

Interdependence of action is closely connected to conformity and the belief that others are conforming to the norms of socially appropriate behaviour. When individuals adhere to rules of etiquette they agree to conform to pre-established rules of behaviour recognized by their community as instantiating and communicating shared meanings (of respect, considerateness, or entrenching the status quo as discussed above). It should be made clear that conformity to a set of norms does not entail personal agreement with them. I might wear a tie to my brother’s wedding even if I find it uncomfortable and personally believe that the social practice of tie-wearing is absurd. Moreover, rules of etiquette may exist even if most people in the community do not have a preference for them (Miller 1991, p. 441). This lack of collective preference for a particular practice may predict its future demise as a social norm, but it does not mean that the practice will necessarily be abandoned.⁶ Some social practices continue owing to social, historical, or political inertia.

Rules of etiquette are, largely, public. I include “largely” because we can imagine a secret society comprised of rituals and particular rules of etiquette exclusive to their society such that knowledge of these rituals and rules is the necessary condition for membership. However, in considering society more generally, the norms that guide appropriate behaviour are publicly available. Furthermore, it is public that other members of the community are participating in the rules of etiquette and conforming to its practices. Indeed, Seamus Miller adds that in order for the condition of conformity to be satisfied, conventional rules must be public. “For conformity to a convention, qua conventional action, is not action an individual decides to undertake independently of knowing whether other agents have undertaken it” (Miller 1991, p. 441).

Finally, adherence to the rules of etiquette includes overlooking slight noncompliance with those rules on the part of others.⁷ This condition does not exist merely for instances of intercultural noncompliance – we certainly overlook a lack of adherence to the rules of etiquette from those individuals not expected to be familiar with the social appropriate norms of a particular culture – but also for intracultural cases of noncompliance as well. For example, imagine that two individuals from the same culture attend a conference. At one of the coffee breaks between talks, the two strike up a conversation about one of the presentations on the day’s agenda. In the shared culture from which both individuals originate and still reside, personal space etiquette prescribes standing approximately an arm’s length away, give or take several centimeters, from a conversational partner. In the case of the two conference goers, one of the individuals stands less than half an arm’s length away, clearly standing closer to the interlocuter than etiquette prescribes. The other individual attempts to reestablish the socially appropriate amount of personal space by taking half a step back, but the “close-talker” steps forward to close the gap. At this juncture, one possibility would be for the listener to explicitly ask the close-talker to step back and adhere to the norms of personal space commonly accepted in their shared culture, and there would be nothing inappropriate about doing so. However, and assuming a lack of perceived malicious intent on the part of the close-talker, in many cases the listener will simply endure the invasion of personal space until the conversation is over, ascribing the close-talker’s close talking as a personal foible. And there are many similar cases we experience in our interactions with others. We do not point it out every time someone forgets to cover one’s mouth when yawning, does not put one’s napkin in one’s lap at the table, or falls asleep during a lecture. A significant part of adhering to rules of etiquette is overlooking slight noncompliance with its rules. The reasons for overlooking are various – it might be impolite to focus on another’s faults, or it simply might not be worth the effort to make a comment – but whatever the reasons, moving past slight noncompliance with the norms of socially appropriate behaviour is an element of socially appropriate behaviour.

There is final set of questions worth addressing in this investigation that elicit a salient feature of social appropriateness: Can some people be morally undeserving of being on the receiving end of socially appropriate behaviour? If we can answer this question in the affirmative, which I believe we can, what does this tell us about the conceptual link between social appropriateness and morality?

By focusing the question on being morally undeserving, I am clearly not asking whether individuals might be undeserving based on race, education, sexual preference, gender, economic status, or any other quality for which people have been historically excluded from practices of etiquette in order to further marginalize them or entrench inequalities. The question asks whether an individual’s past of immoral behaviour can render that person undeserving of inclusion in the practices of etiquette.

This question raises several complex philosophical issues concerning the nature of blame and moral desert, but since the scope and space of this chapter do not permit a lengthy analysis of these concepts, I would like to address the question by focusing briefly on the notion of moral merit (Goldberg 2019, p. 335–336).⁸

Moral meritists argue that when it comes to our moral practices, an individual’s moral merit can affect one’s moral worth. This means that what an individually morally deserves is based on the moral character of one’s actions rather than solely on the kind of being one is (French 2001; Kekes 2009; Murphy 2003; Strawson 1993). Defenders of this position argue that although it can be debated whether a system of legal punishment is or ought to be consequentialist, expressivist, or retributivist, it is fairly uncontroversial that our moral responses are (at least minimally) retributivist. This claim is meant in a fairly straightforward and non-metaphysical way. It refers to the simple fact that people earn responses from others in the moral community by virtue of their actions or character. If our actions or character are good or morally neutral, then we deserve either good will or a lack of ill will from others. And if our actions are wrong or our character bad, then we deserve a hostile response (see, e.g. Strawson 1993.) Indeed, John Kekes notes that morality aims at human well-being precisely insofar as it maintains conventions meant to reward individual merit and punish demerit in an indifferent universe (Kekes 2009, p. 504). Peter French succinctly states the principal view of moral retributivism: “[T]he idea that evil, wrongdoing, requires a hostile response is the fundamental principle of morality” (French 2001, p. 187).⁹

If it is true that practices of etiquette recognize and communicate respect and consideration of others, and if moral meritists are correct, then one ought to conclude that certain individuals, especially those with pasts of grievous wrongdoing such as mass murder or torture, do not merit the respect and consideration that practices of etiquette are meant to convey. For if one’s past immoral actions affect one’s moral merit, then one is not always worthy of the respect and consideration that acts of social appropriateness seek to express.¹⁰

What does reflection upon the connection between past wrongdoing and present participation in rules of etiquette tell us about the conceptual connection between morality and social appropriateness? It shows that when we consider the question of who deserves to participate in practices of etiquette, it is unavoidable that we consider our moral practices. As we have done in this chapter, we must ask whether norms of social appropriateness are practices to recognize and communicate respect, and we must contemplate whether they are influenced by an individual’s past wrongdoing. In this way, Confucianists were correct that rules of etiquette are essentially tied to moral reflection, even if they may not be prerequisites for morally good action.

1 Conclusion

The objective of this chapter was to explicate and ameliorate the concept of social appropriateness. To this end we identified and refined some of its most salient properties. Through this process we established a framework for a more suitable understanding and use of the concept. First, we equated the norms of social appropriateness with codes of etiquette. Next, we analysed the practical and conceptual connections between social appropriateness and morality and contrasted the view of many contemporary Western philosophers, who reject any conceptual connection between etiquette and morality, with that of Confucianists, who argue such connections exist. By identifying examples in which socially appropriate behaviour and morally justifiable behaviour conflict, we rejected the Confucianist claim that adhering to norms of etiquette is essential to morally good action. We then identified the prominent features of social appropriateness including interdependence of action, conformity, publicity, and overlooking slight noncompliance. Finally, we posed the question whether an individual’s past of grievous wrongdoing could render that person morally undeserving of participation in the practices of etiquette. By emphasizing the importance of moral merit to our ordinary moral practices, we revealed that the norms and practices of socially appropriate behaviour are not completely divorced from moral reflection as many contemporary Western philosophers argue, even if they are not inherent to morally good action as the Confucianists would have it.