Frases de Ludwig Wittgenstein

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Philosophy is like trying to open a safe with a combination lock. Each little aajustment of the many dials seems to achieve nothing, only when all is in place does the door open.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, personal recollections - página 96, Rush Rhees, Editora Rowman and Littlefield, 1981, ISBN 0847662535, 9780847662531, 235 páginas

5.6
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

1.1
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

5.63
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

5.633
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Wir fühlen dass selbst, wenn alle möglichen wissenschaftlichen Fragen beantwortet sind, unsere Lebensprobleme noch gar nicht
citado em "Ludwig Wittgenstein: eine existenzielle Deutung"‎ - Página 58, Leo Adler - Karger Publishers, 1976, ISBN 3805523904, 9783805523905 - 110 páginas

The later Wittgenstein, on the contrary, seems to have grown tired of serious thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity unnecessary. I do not for one moment believe that the doctrine which has these lazy consequences is true. I realize, however, that I have an overpoweringly strong bias against it, for, if it is true, philosophy is, at best, a slight help to lexicographers, and at worst, an idle tea-table amusement.
Bertrand Russell; My Philosophical Development http://www.archive.org/details/myphilosophicald001521mbp
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, De terceiros sobre Wittgenstein

Die Philosophie ist ein Kampf gegen die Verhexung unsres Verstandes durch die Mittel unserer Sprache.
Philosophical investigations, Parte 1 - página 47, Volume 1 de Wittgenstein's works, Ludwig Wittgenstein, 3a. ed., Editora B. Blackwell, 1953, 464 páginas

6.4
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, De terceiros sobre Wittgenstein

On Certainty

6.42
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

7
Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus

On Certainty

On Certainty

As quoted in The Beginning of the End (2004) by Peter Hershey, p. 109
Also, as quoted in "The Relentless Rise of Science as Fun", by Jeremy Burgess, in New Scientist, Volume 143, Issues 1932-1945, originally published 1994.
Attributed from posthumous publications

6.4311
Der Tod ist kein Ereignis des Lebens. Den Tod erlebt man nicht. Wenn man unter Ewigkeit nicht unendliche Zeitdauer, sondern Unzeitlichkeit versteht, dann lebt der ewig, der in der Gegenwart lebt. Unser Leben ist ebenso endlos, wie unser Gesichtsfeld grenzenlos ist.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Variante: Death is not an event of life. Death is not lived through.
If by eternity is understood not endless temporal duration but timelessness, then he lives eternally who lives in the present.
Our life is endless in the way that our visual field is without limit.

Fonte: Culture and Value (1980), p. 39e

Fonte: Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore

6.522
Original German: Es gibt allerdings Unaussprechliches. Dies zeigt sich, es ist das Mystische.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

Fonte: Culture and Value (1980), p. 56e

Variant translation: The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is.
Original German: Nicht wie die Welt ist, ist das Mystische, sondern dass sie ist.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Variante: The mystical is not how the world is, but that it is.
Contexto: It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. (6.44)

Fonte: Culture and Value (1980), p. 76e

As quoted in "A View from the Asylum" in Philosophical Investigations from the Sanctity of the Press (2004), by Henry Dribble, p. 87
Attributed from posthumous publications

On Certainty (1969)

Journal entry (8 July 1916), p. 74e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexto: There are two godheads: the world and my independent I.
I am either happy or unhappy, that is all. It can be said: good or evil do not exist.
A man who is happy must have no fear. Not even in the face of death.
Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy.

Fonte: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy, p. 165
Corresponding to TS 213, Kapitel 87, 409

4.442
Original German: Ein Satz kann unmöglich von sich selbst aussagen, dass er wahr ist.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

5.632
Original German: Das Subjekt gehört nicht zur Welt, sondern es ist eine Grenze der Welt.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

Journal entries (12 March 1915 and 15 March 1915) p. 41e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexto: I cannot get from the nature of the proposition to the individual logical operations!!!
That is, I cannot bring out how far the proposition is the picture of the situation. I am almost inclined to give up all my efforts.

Original German:Die Logik erfüllt die Welt; die Grenzen der Welt sind auch ihre Grenzen. Wir können also in der Logik nicht sagen: Das und das gibt es in der Welt, jenes nicht.Das würde nämlich scheinbar voraussetzen, dass wir gewisse Möglichkeiten ausschließen, und dies kann nicht der Fall sein, da sonst die Logik über die Grenzen der Welt hinaus müsste; wenn sie nämlich diese Grenzen auch von der anderen Seite betrachten könnte. Was wir nicht denken können, das können wir nicht denken; wir können also auch nicht sagen, was wir nicht denken können.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Contexto: Logic pervades the world: the limits of the world are also its limits. So we cannot say in logic, "The world has this in it, and this, but not that." For that would appear to presuppose that we were excluding certain possibilities, and this cannot be the case, since it would require that logic should go beyond the limits of the world; for only in that way could it view those limits from the other side as well. We cannot think what we cannot think; so what we cannot think we cannot say either. (5.61)

Journal entry (11 June 1916), p. 72e and 73e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexto: What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
This meaning does not lie in it but outside of it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i. e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.

Journal entry (11 June 1916), p. 72e and 73e
1910s, Notebooks 1914-1916
Contexto: What do I know about God and the purpose of life?
I know that this world exists.
That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.
That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.
This meaning does not lie in it but outside of it.
That life is the world.
That my will penetrates the world.
That my will is good or evil.
Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.
The meaning of life, i. e. the meaning of the world, we can call God.
And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.
To pray is to think about the meaning of life.

He must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it.
6.54
Original German: Meine Sätze erläutern dadurch, dass sie der, welcher mich versteht, am Ende als unsinnig erkennt, wenn er durch sie—auf ihnen—über sie hinausgestiegen ist. (Er muss sozusagen die Leiter wegwerfen, nachdem er auf ihr hinaufgestiegen ist.)
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)

Variant translation: Philosophy is not a theory but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. The result of philosophy is not a number of "philosophical propositions." but to make propositions clear.
Original German: Der Zweck der Philosophie ist die logische Klärung der Gedanken. Die Philosophie ist keine Lehre, sondern eine Tätigkeit. Ein philosophisches Werk besteht wesentlich aus Erläuterungen. Das Resultat der Philosophie sind nicht „philosophische Sätze“, sondern das Klarwerden von Sätzen. Die Philosophie soll die Gedanken, die sonst, gleichsam, trübe und verschwommen sind, klar machen und scharf abgrenzen.
1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Contexto: Philosophy aims at the logical clarification of thoughts. Philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity. A philosophical work consists essentially of elucidations. Philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the clarification of propositions. Without philosophy thoughts are, as it were, cloudy and indistinct: its task is to make them clear and to give them sharp boundaries. (4.112)

Remarks to John Wisdom, quoted in Zen and the Work of WIttgenstein by Paul Weinpaul in The Chicago Review Vol. 12, (1958), p. 70
Attributed from posthumous publications

Fonte: Culture and Value (1980), p. 44e

Fonte: Culture and Value (1980), p. 53e

Fonte: 1930s-1951, Philosophical Occasions 1912-1951 (1993), Ch. 9 : Philosophy, p. 183

1920s, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922)
Contexto: This remark provides the key to the problem, how much truth there is in solipsism. For what the solipsist means is quite correct; only it cannot be said, but makes itself manifest. The world is my world: this is manifest in the fact that the limits of language (of that language which alone I understand) mean the limits of my world. (5.62)

Fonte: Culture and Value (1980), p. 50e