Defining Sociological Theory

The idea that sociological theory is a set of interconnected ideas to explain and predict the future of the social world is quite widespread. This, for example, is the definition of sociological theory proposed by George Ritzer: “Sociological theory can be more formally defined as a set of interrelated ideas that allow for the systematization of knowledge of the social world, the explanation of that world, and predictions about the future of that world” (Ritzer and Stepnisky 2019, 6).

Because I am involved in ethnographic research—ethnography implies first and foremost observing and describing (Orsini 2013a, 2013b, 2015, 2017, 2020)—I believe that a more inclusive formal definition of sociological theory must comprise Auguste Comte’s basic notion that sociology is based on observation. Sociological theories are like “lighthouses,” illuminating some portions of social reality while leaving others in the shadows. As Malinowski teaches, this lighthouse helps observe and describe reality in the most accurate and systematic possible way: “The field worker relies entirely upon inspiration from theory” (Malinowski [1922] 1932, 9). For sociological explanations and predictions to be reliable, they must be based on highly accurate observations and descriptions of the phenomenon being studied.

I rewrote Ritzer’s definition by adding and emphasizing the significance of observation and description. Here is my version influenced by Ann Swidler’s concept of “tool kit” (Swidler 1986):

Sociological theory is a repertoire or tool kit providing concepts and hypotheses to observe, describe, explain, and predict social phenomena.

I like to use the term “tool kit” because social theorists who, like Habermas, create their theories through a combination of different theories are increasingly numerous. Habermas ([1981] 1987), Luhmann ([1984] 1995), Giddens (1984) give the impression of using sociological theory precisely as a tool kit from which they take the concepts and hypotheses that they consider most useful for observing, describing, and explaining social phenomena.

On the other hand, I prefer to speak of “hypotheses” because many theorists do not test their theories with empirical research. They develop concepts, hypotheses, and theories that they leave for others to verify. Baudrillard never tested his theory of “the death of the real” with empirical research. Likewise, Habermas never conducted field research to test his theory of the colonization of the lifeworld.

Finally, I use the concept of “tool kit” because it expresses quite well the flexibility and freedom of action that characterizes ethnographers when doing field research (Silverman and Marvasti 2008; Gobo 2010; Patricia H. Collins 2019).

Scholars have no unanimous consensus regarding the difference between social theory and sociological theory. In my perspective, sociological theory is distinguished from social theory based on the weight it gives to the seven classical authors of sociology: Comte, Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, and Simmel, or to authors who refer to those theorists. Based on this perspective, Derrida is an example of social theory rather than sociological theory. The same can be said of other theorists I have included in this manual, such as Foucault. Fortunately, a “gray zone” exists between sociological theory and social theories; the boundaries between them are always uncertain and changing, making innovation possible via “hybridization” (Pieterse 1994). Anyway, we should never forget that disciplinary boundaries are decided by scholars and, sometimes, by the bureaucrats of the ministers of the University. I have lost track of how often the Italian Ministry of Universities has renamed sociological disciplines to implement reforms in public competitions for professorships. This redenomination process affects sociological research, making the universal bureaucratization problem raised by Weber always current (Weber [1922] 1978, Vol. II, 1401).

Although crossing disciplinary boundaries is always fascinating, as Parsons teaches, a manual is a “system.” A system cannot exist without developing a “code” and drawing a boundary between itself and the environment. By paraphrasing Luhmann, any textbook is a case of “complexity reduction.” Each textbook is “contingent.” It’s written one way but could be written in many other ways. Choosing to be one way rather than another involves a risk (Luhmann 1987, 179).

Three Parts, Four Decisions

This volume is divided into three parts.

The first is dedicated to classical sociological theory and includes seven authors: Comte, Spencer, Marx, Durkheim, Weber, Pareto, and Simmel.

The second is dedicated to five major perspectives of contemporary sociological theory: Functionalism, Marxism and conflict theory, symbolic interactionism, phenomenology, and rational choice theory.

The third part deals with postmodern theory, feminist theory, race, and postcolonial theory.

There are numerous ways to structure the contents of a sociological theory textbook. While some prominent scholars prefer organizing it by themes (Collins 1988), I chose a different approach that led me to make four main decisions.

First, I decided to bring back the significance of Comte, Spencer, and Pareto, who were excluded from sociological theory textbooks published in the last decades. Their ideas are no longer fully reconstructed in any introduction to sociological theory available in today’s market. The result is that classic and contemporary sociological theory textbooks are usually unbalanced in favor of contemporary theories. Spencer has disappeared from almost all sociological theory manuals. Yet, many concepts developed by Spencer are the foundation of contemporary sociological theory, and sociologists cite them constantly. I have yet to come across a contemporary sociologist who has presented a grand theory of political change as exciting and illuminating as Pareto’s. Equally, I have not encountered a theorist with a more insightful theory about the impact of sentiments on social life than Pareto.

Pareto is not a simple precursor of functionalism, not worth a chapter. Pareto is the only classical sociology author to study the role of sentiments in social life in depth. If Pareto had not written his Trattato di sociologia generale (Pareto [1916] 1935), classical sociological theory would be devoid of an in-depth reflection on sentiments, feelings, and emotions as factors of social change.

Understanding sentiments is crucial for understanding today’s society, particularly in a time marked by a massive increase in terrorist attacks, political hatred, and ethnic violence (Petersen 2011). It is hard to figure out how anyone can explain why a youngster blows him/herself up in the name of ISIS or al Qaeda without referring to his/her sentiments and how terrorist organizations exploit them to favor radicalization toward terrorism (Orsini 2011, 2012, 2017, 2023; Petersen 2017; Cottee and Hayward 2011; McBride 2011; Kruglanski et al. 2019). Fear, resentment, vengefulness, shame, and confidence matter in the social structure. Emotions are central to routine operations of social interaction (Barbalet 1998).

The final section of the chapter on Pareto is dedicated to his relationship with fascism. Investigating the relationship between Pareto and fascism will allow us to understand why Pareto is an author many sociologists dislike. Ample historical documentation induced me to believe that Pareto was one of the first victims of the politicization of sociological theory. In addition, investigating the relationship between Pareto and fascism will allow us to become more familiar with Pareto’s theory of knowledge, according to which sentiments dominate social action. Pareto believed his theory of knowledge had made him different from ordinary men by protecting his logical reasoning from the power of passions, including narcissism. Instead, I will use Pareto’s theory of knowledge to demonstrate that he was affected by his sentiments when he judged the rise of fascism. I will utilize Pareto’s theory of sentiments to criticize Pareto’s assessment of Mussolini.

The second decision concerns the chapter on conflict theory.

Organizing a coherent discourse on conflict theory is challenging because conflict studies is not an academic discipline but a multidisciplinary field of study (Demmers 2012, 2). Theoreticians differ significantly in how they view conflict (Bartos and Wehr 2002, 12). Marx, Weber, Simmel, and Coser are regarded as the founders of conflict theory. Pareto’s role is overlooked. I deem this a mistake since Pareto believed conflict is the primary factor in political change. The fact that no scholar has ever clearly explained the boundaries of conflict theory has given me considerable freedom in organizing this chapter. I decided to include Gramsci, Lukács, and the Frankfurt School theorists in the chapter in which Dahrendorf, a liberal author, Coser, and Bourdieu also appear.

My decision was for theoretical and teaching reasons.

Concerning the theoretical reason, two main approaches can be identified to expose the conflict theory in a textbook.

The first approach emphasizes the methodology or research philosophy, while the second focuses on the object of study or the conflict itself.

According to the first approach, Gramsci and Dahrendorf should have separate chapters because the former is Marxist and the latter is liberal. According to the second approach, which I favor, Gramsci and Dahrendorf belong to the same family as theorists who study conflict. Conflict is the main object of Marxist reflection. Marx states that humankind’s history develops from conflict and will end because of conflict. Some might argue that almost all sociologists say something about conflict, including Parsons. This objection seems weak since Gramsci, Lukács, the Frankfurt school theorists, Dahrendorf, Coser, and Bourdieu don’t just say something about conflict. Conflict is the center of their reflection, even when they deal with media, art, environment, mass culture, teaching at school, or consumerism. These authors almost wholly cease to exist once the conflict is removed from their theories.

Concerning the teaching reason, I feel that presenting liberal and Marxist theorists in the same chapter helps to bring out their similarities and differences more clearly in the study of conflict. I have structured this chapter based on my classroom teaching methodology. I always try to get conflict theorists to talk to each other. Dahrendorf’s seminal book, Class and Class Conflict in Industrial Society, is an intellectual dialogue with Marx.

The third decision concerns the chapter on symbolic interactionism.

Sociological theory manuals never explain qualitative research when discussing symbolic interactionism, Goffman’s dramaturgical approach, or phenomenological sociology. Yet, these perspectives are based precisely on qualitative research. I talked about ethnographic research techniques to better explain the work of symbolic interactionists or phenomenology sociologists in the field. Participant observation is the data collection method used by the authors I discuss in Chaps. 11 and 12.

There is another reason I decided to include a section on participant observation. It is linked to the definition of sociological theory I developed above, emphasizing the role of sociological theory in observation and description. The qualitative research section clarifies the meaning of my definition better as it shows the importance of theory in sociological observation and description. It is not by chance that the chapter on symbolic interactionism ends with an interview I conducted with a multiple murderer terrorist, “Adriano” (not his real name). All the questions I asked “Adriano” depend on Randall Collins’s microsociological theory of violence (Collins 2008). Collins’s sociological theory helped me observe terrorist behaviors I never noticed before and interview terrorists in ways I never imagined (Orsini 2015). As Bourdieu pointed out: “None of us live in the world without glasses to interpret it” (Bourdieu 2010, 75).

The fourth decision concerns the chapter on feminist theory.

The chapters comprising this book revolve around authors rather than themes. I only made one exception to this rule. This is the chapter on feminist theory, the only one organized by themes. Feminist theory is a revolutionary theory that aims to change the world by forcing public opinion to address specific issues. According to feminist theorists, society can only improve by agreeing to discuss specific issues, such as the issue of gender, to cite just one example. I confess that my students influenced how I organized the chapter on feminist theory. During a debate in the classroom on the killing of women at the hands of their husbands, a feminist student said: “We will not build a better society if we feminists are not able to impose certain issues on public opinion. I’m talking about those themes that public opinion wants to ignore for convenience and hypocrisy.” Classroom discussions helped me identify four crucial themes: (1) What is Women’s Malaise? (2) What is knowledge in a society dominated by male power? (3) What is gender? (4) Are black women more discriminated against than white women?

Social Theorists and Laypeople

Anyone who studies sociological theory has a broader view of society’s problems. Even when sociologists use a microsociological or individualistic approach, they aim to acquire a higher perspective of the problems, as demonstrated by the micro-macro link debate (Coleman 1990). Even when sociologists study the social world from below, they aspire to observe it from above, as the cover of this volume indicates, which shows a group of people seen from above.

Microsociology has the same ambitions as macrosociology. Macrosociology studies how societies change over long periods. It deals with vast spaces, complex structures, and large populations. Microsociology studies small groups, face-to-face interactions, individual behavior, cognitive processes, and consciousness.

The contrast between the sociologist and the “man in the street” (Berger and Luckmann 1966, 15), who base their knowledge on prejudices and common-sense ideas, is present in all sociological theories. Although they may profess humility, theorists think they observe the world from a peak, grasping facts and interconnections that laypeople lacking theory miss, as indicated by the cover of this book, which shows a group of people seen from above.

This exhilarating psychological sensation typically provides the primary motivation for studying sociological theory. It is good that this is the case. Motivation is the “energy factor” that drives individuals to act (Parsons 1951, 4). Whether they study international politics (Wendt 1999) or people picking their noses while eating before the development of table manners (Elias [1939] 1978), the masters of sociological thought want us to know they are looking at us from above even when they observe us from “below” by studying face-to-face interactions of everyday life (Goffman 1959).

Nietzsche, Marx, and Pareto do not profess humility and do not resort to feigning. According to Durkheim, sociologists should always worry when their ideas are the same as those of ordinary people (Durkheim [1895] 2013, 3). Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method is a set of rules for being different from laypeople, to the point that Durkheim even goes so far as to write a hymn to deviant thought, which he regards as a way of thinking opposite to that of ordinary people (Durkheim [1895] 2013, 64). Society penetrates all men and women with its prejudices, but only sociologists who follow The Rules of Sociological Method can recognize and discard them.

For Pareto, man is naïve and unaware, while the sociologist who embraces the sociological method manages to understand the world. Marx thought he had reached a height so high that he could foresee the future of humanity. Weber thinks that, in most cases, men and women act instinctively, on the basis of habit, in semi-consciousness, or the unconsciousness of the subjectively intended meaning. For Schütz, men and women act based on typification schemes that they unwittingly receive from the environment in which they grew up. At the same time, the sociologist who resorts to the phenomenological epoché understands society. Habermas argues that his critical theory does with social structures what Freud does with the unconscious: It reveals the hidden forces that influence our actions to favor man’s self-emancipation through the study of asymmetrical relationships (Habermas [1968] 1971). Marcuse, Adorno, Horkheimer, Fromm, and all the authors in this manual are convinced they have acquired superior knowledge compared to common-sense men and women.

However, more profound reflection led social theorists to conclude their cognitive processes are the same as those of laypeople. As Max Weber pointed out, the cognitive process leading to the causal imputation in a temperamental young mother who has to explain to her husband why she slapped her little child is the same as that of the most famous historians who explain why the Peloponnesian War broke out (Weber [1906] 1949b, 177). Ethnomethodology teaches that all men and women continually theorize (Collins 1988, 274).

If this is the case, what are the differences between how social theorists and ordinary people theorize?

Social theorists are systematic, coherent, reflexive, and original.

Each of these adjectives has a particular meaning in sociological theory.

First, systematic is synonymous with methodic, rigorous, scrupulous, and painstaking, but what matters most is that being systematic involves classification, which is the basis of scientific activity. Social theorists observe empirical reality to classify it. Laypeople, too, classify, but social theorists classify in a much more complex way, resorting to categories and subcategories, as Pareto’s classification of social actions demonstrates. The greater the complexity of a social theorist’s classification, the greater the divergence from the ordinary person’s way of theorizing.

Sometimes, theorists pursue order and clarity by assigning social phenomena to specific classes. For example, laypeople wonder why an al Qaeda attack hit a particular country while social theorists divide al Qaeda attacks into three categories—command and control, endorsed, and inspired plots—and then ask why that country was hit by only one of these three types of attacks, two, or all three (Silber 2011). By creating complex classifications, social theorists multiply the number of questions about social phenomena. Wherever there is sociology, there is classification.

Other times, social theorists try to bring order to the chaos of empirical reality by resorting to temporal sequences or “stages.”

Using observation to identify the phases that lead someone to become a terrorist is an example of systematicity (Moghaddam 2005). Furthermore, while laypeople base their theories on a limited number of cases, theorists collect as much data as possible (Malinowski [1922] 1932, 13). For example, studying the lives of all those who succeeded in carrying out an attack in the name of ISIS or al Qaeda in Europe and classifying them to compare their life stories takes years (Orsini 2023).

Systematicity also involves mapping every publication on the subject being studied. Only a person who receives a salary for research can spend months in an archive researching thousands of books and articles on a specific subject (Vergani et al. 2020). The more gaps social theorists have regarding previous publications, the smaller the difference between them and laypeople. It is no coincidence that scholars never give interviews on topics they have not studied in depth because they know they would almost certainly speak like common-sense people. Men and women rely on common sense when faced with a topic they have not studied. The less direct knowledge of a social phenomenon, the greater the need to rely on an external cognitive authority to understand it. The cognitive authority everyone has at their fingertips, ready to use, is common sense. In summary, a social theorist is an ordinary person who succeeded in being systematic on a certain topic.

Second, being coherent means theorizing coherently with a series of methodological premises. For example, a Marxist theorist will try to theorize according to the principle that the economic factor is the most critical in social change.

Third, social theorists are reflexive. Explaining reflexivity in sociology would require a separate treatise due to the conflicting interpretations of its meanings, as we will see in the chapter on ethnomethodology (Lynch 2000). For this introduction, being reflexive is synonymous with being self-critical. By reflexivity, I refer to the social theorist’s awareness that their thought is conditioned by the society to which they belong, what Bourdieu calls “sociology of sociology” (Wacquant 1989, 33). Reflexivity involves looking for critiques. The more social theorists eschew criticism, the more likely their arguments will resemble those of the men in the street. Social theorists equip themselves with procedural rules, including the peer-review process, to critically reflect on their ideas, searching for consistency and rigor (Ritzer 2008).

On the other hand, ordinary men and women are entirely disinterested in such cognitive procedures and do not care about the inconsistency or approximation of their knowledge if this ensures the desired practical results. In short, common-sense rationality considers the social world valid until proven otherwise (Schutz 1953).

Theorists constantly search for facts that might disprove their theories. They are obsessed with the fear of overlooking some relevant fact. Marx also had this obsession and, for this reason, was a voracious reader (Manuel 1995, 108). Ordinary people generally do not have this kind of obsession when theorizing because they are much more immersed in solving practical than intellectual problems (Schutz [1932] 1967; Berger and Luckmann 1966; Garfinkel 1967).

Fourth, social theorists are original. Unlike laypeople who theorize by repeating common-sense ideas rooted in popular wisdom—what Gramsci calls the “spontaneous philosophy” or the “philosophy of non-philosophers”—social theorists develop new ideas, hypotheses, and concepts. A man or woman who limits themselves to saying that limitless desire pushes individuals into a psychological condition that favors suicide is not a social theorist because Durkheim has already expressed this idea.

Examples Related to Ongoing Events

I present examples linked to ongoing events whenever possible to explain how sociological theory can explain the most tragic phenomena of our time, including the war in Ukraine, the Israeli-Palestine conflict, the US-China competition over Taiwan, nuclear proliferation, radicalization, neofascism, white suprematism, jihadism, and terrorism.

I sometimes provided examples from my previous studies to clarify complex sociological concepts, mainly when theorists didn’t offer their own. Additionally, I conducted two first-hand research specifically for this manual.

The first one examines the historical relationship between Pareto and fascism through reading his private letters between 1921 and 1923.

The second one is an ethnographic study I conducted in the pediatric ward of a public hospital in central Italy. This research aims to explore the relationship between Italian gynecologists and pregnant immigrants of the Islamic religion to gain a deeper understanding of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence.

At the end of each chapter, the “Self-Test Path” includes the questions I have been asked most frequently during my years of teaching. For example, my decision to study Weber’s theory of causality with particular care arises precisely from the difficulty many students experience in understanding the difference between “adequate” and “chance” causation. It is to answer their questions—to make another example—that I have delved into Durkheim’s Suicide to review all the types of suicides, including mixed suicides.

I am grateful to my students for all the stimuli they gave me.

I also used social media platforms to further my understanding of contemporary sociology theorists. I have never replaced their books with interviews, but I have used YouTube videos to supplement their works whenever they addressed issues not covered in their books.

My Ideal Student

All students have an ideal teacher, but professors also have their preferences. My ideal student does not practice the politicization of sociological theory, which manifests in two main ways. The first way is to classify the objects of study into right-wing (consensus) and left-wing phenomena (conflict). We should know that the social order can be studied to defend or overthrow it. Sociologists can study revolutions to promote or suppress them. Parsons can be helpful to revolutionary movements and Marx to reactionary ones. The sociological theory stands at a high level of generality and can justify different political programs and regimes. Historical materialism can legitimize dictatorships rather than democracy, while Pareto’s theory of élites can justify democracies while denying that they exist.

Parsons’s books on the functioning of the social system can be used to attack the system or to defend it. It is demonstrated by the fact that the Red Brigades decided to strike the heart of the bourgeois state after having developed a social system theory, which they called the theory of the imperialist state of the multinationals (ISM). The Red Brigades’ conception of the social system is identical to what we find in Parsons’s works. Capitalist society—the Red Brigades said in 1978—is a complex system of interconnected parts that revolutionaries must “disarticulate” because the state is an imperialist collection of multinational corporations. In the Red Brigades’ theory of the social system, “disarticulate” means separating the parts of the social system by pitting one against the other. The moment the revolutionary movement managed to paralyze the political subsystem, all the other subsystems would be shaken and go into crisis until the entire system was paralyzed.

My idea is that the ethical-political writings of social theorists should not be used to gauge the depth of their general theory of society. The essays in which Marx calls for violence against the bourgeois are fundamental for reconstructing the historical parable of revolutionary Gnosticism. Still, Marx’s ideas on revolutionary violence should not be used to evaluate the capacity of the historical materialism theory to explain social phenomena. Similarly, the writings in which Spencer urges to abandon the “least suited” to their misfortunes should not be used to judge his theory of evolution. The politicization of sociological theory runs through the history of this discipline from top to bottom, and Comte was his first victim. Pareto was another early victim of the politicization of sociological theory.

Second, my ideal student avoids judging sociological theories by what they don’t say. If we were to judge sociological theories by the elements they do not consider—Patrick Baert rightly points out—we would have to reject them all. According to Dahrendorf, studying consensus and conflict is equally important and has equal scientific value. However, due to the complexity of each topic, it’s impossible for scholars to cover both in-depth in a single book, which forces theorists to choose one over the other. No sociological theory can encompass every aspect of society, which means that the “height” on which theorists sit is always collapsible. It is no coincidence that sociological theory is the history of the continuous confutation or readaptation of someone else’s theory.

The history of sociological theory is a constantly evolving history of disproving, refuting, mixing, and adapting previous theories to fit new realities. This ever-evolving field is a testament to the power of critical thinking and innovation. It is through questioning and challenging established ideas that we can continue to move forward or have the illusion of moving forward, as pessimist Pareto would say.

Third, my ideal student does not fall in love with any theorist, electing him/her as a spiritual guide. We should never forget that the masters of sociological thought are full of contradictions. There is complete unity and coherence in none of them. Not to mention that their most prominent interpreters often reach opposite conclusions about even basic aspects of their work. To cite just some examples, Randall Collins wrote that the difference between Mead and Blumer is that the former mainly emphasizes the “Me” and the latter the “Ego” (Collins 1988, 268). George Ritzer states precisely the opposite (Ritzer 2008, 362–363). Patrick Baert is inclined to believe that Erving Goffman is a symbolic interactionist (Baert 1998, 75), while for Collins, Goffman is not (Collins 1985, IX, 215). According to Anthony Giddens, Goffman’s sociology is relevant to studying the social order; according to Baert, anyone who believes this is partially wrong (Baert 1998, 81). For Collins, Simmel is a modest sociologist committed to spreading false assertions (Collins 1985, 114). For others, Simmel is a “great mind” (Poggi 1993; Poggi and Sciortino 2011), and I present him as such.

On the one hand, my ideal student does not fall in love with any theorist; on the other hand, he/she recognizes the importance of emotions in studying and teaching sociology.

Sociologists must always distinguish between “value judgment” in empirical analysis and “reference to values” (Weber [1917] 1949a, 14). They should prevent their values and emotions from violating the rules of the research process. However, values and emotions are fundamental to writing a book that requires many years of study and writing. Marx almost certainly would not have written his books if emotions and values had not moved him against liberal society. Dahrendorf would not have written his books had he not been moved by a passion to defend liberal society. Very likely, feminist and postcolonial theory would not exist without passions, sentiments, feelings, and emotions that inspired those theorists. YouTube videos allow you to see the passion on Edward Said’s face for the Palestinian cause or Spivak’s for the oppressed.

I came up with the idea for this book while visiting the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). During my eleven years as a Research Affiliate (2011–2022), my MIT colleagues provided me with countless sources of inspiration for which I am incredibly grateful. MIT also allowed me to talk to and converse with leading scholars from all universities worldwide.

Finally, I would like to extend a special thanks to the four anonymous reviewers at Palgrave Macmillan for helping me improve this work with their criticisms.