25 April 2024, 08:30 hours; Rome
This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).
Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.
HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (28 December 2023): in total, 279 outbreaks/events have been reported in five geographic regions caused by H5Nx (12), H5N1 (255), H5N5 (6) and H7N6 (6). (see Table 1 for details)
LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update (25 January 2024): 0 new event was reported.
Number of human cases officially reported since last update (25 January 2024): 2 new events were reported.1,2
1 https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2024/p0401-avian-flu.html#:~:text=This%20infection%20does%20not%20change,CDC%20considers%20to%20be%20low
2 https://vncdc.gov.vn/thong-tin-ve-truong-hop-mac-cum-ah9-tai-tien-giang-nd17502.html
Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2023 (i.e. current wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023 (i.e. previous wave)
Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.
Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential
Virus | Country/Area | Last observed outbreak | # events reported since the last update | Total # events reported since 1 October 2023 | Species affected during the reporting preiod |
---|---|---|---|---|---|
H5 |
Canada |
01/01/2024 |
1 |
4 |
Great Horned Owl |
Japan |
12/04/2024 |
2 |
2 |
Large-billed crow, Mountain hawk-eagle |
|
Norway |
21/02/2024 |
1 |
4 |
Gryfalcon |
|
South Africa |
29/02/2024 |
8 |
30 |
African Oystercatcher, Common Tern, Greater Crested Tern, Jackass Penguin |
|
H5N1
|
Antarctica§ |
20/02/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Brown skua |
Belgium |
21/01/2024 |
1 |
10 |
Herring Hull |
|
Brazil |
09/04/2024 |
2 |
64 |
Common Tern, Cabot's tern |
|
Bulgaria |
12/04/2024 |
5 |
14 |
Poultry |
|
Canada1 |
26/03/2024 |
55 |
201 |
American Black Duck, American Crow, American green-winged Teal, American Wigeon, Anserinae, Bald Eagle, Barred Owl, Black-billed Magpie, Blue Jay, Cackling Goose, Canada Goose, Common Barn-Owl, Common Raven, Cooper's Hawk, Dunlin, Glaucous-winged Gull, Great black-backed Gull, Great Blue Heron, Great Horned Owl, Herring Gull, Hooded Merganser, Laridae, Mallard, Northern Pintail, Northern Shoveler, Peregrine Falcon, Red-tailed Hawk, Ross’s Goose, Snow Goose, Snowy Owl, Trumpeter Swan, Wood Duck; Striped skunk |
|
China |
12/04/2024 |
3 |
52 |
Domestic chicken |
|
Denmark |
03/04/2024 |
6 |
102 |
Common Buzzard, Lesser Black-backed Gull, Mute Swan, Peregrine Falcon |
|
Finland |
15/12/2023 |
6 |
198 |
American Mink, Arctic fox, Red Fox |
|
Germany |
09/04/2024 |
14 |
196 |
Anatidae, Charadriidae, Laridae, Strigidae; Red Fox |
|
Hungary |
13/03/2024 |
7 |
134 |
Poultry |
|
India |
29/02/2024 |
3 |
17 |
Domestic birds |
|
Japan |
11/04/2024 |
8 |
132 |
Carrion crow, Large-billed crow, Ural owl, White-tailed eagle |
|
Latvia |
02/04/2024 |
1 |
1 |
Greylag Goose |
|
Kingdom of the Netherlands |
27/03/2024 |
1 |
65 |
Ciconiidae |
|
Republic of Moldova |
19/02/2024 |
13 |
45 |
Barnacle Goose, Black-headed Gull, Canada Goose, Carrion Crow, Eurasian Wigeon, Greater white-fronted Goose, Greylag Goose, Mallard |
|
Norway |
04/04/2024 |
1 |
4 |
Common Buzzard |
|
Philippines |
10/03/2024 |
4 |
15 |
Poultry |
|
Poland |
09/04/2024 |
1 |
55 |
White Stork |
|
Romania |
26/03/2024 |
1 |
38 |
White Stork |
|
Timor-Leste |
18/08/2022 |
1 |
1 |
Domestic bird |
|
Ukraine |
28/02/2024 |
1 |
14 |
Mute Swan |
|
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland2 |
05/04/2024 |
1 |
25 |
Sparrowhawk |
|
United States of America3 |
19/04/2024 |
118 |
2 289 |
Chicken, Turkey, Unspecified Hachery, Poultry & WOAH-non-poultry, Live bird market; American crow, American green-winged teal, American wigeon, Bald eagle, Black vulture, Blackbird, Bufflehead, Canada goose, Canvasback, Common grackle, Common raven, Double-crested cormorant, Gadwall, Grackle, Great horned owl, Mallard, Northern pintail, Pigeon, Red-tailed hawk, Ruddy turnstone, Sanderling, Snow goose, Wood duck; American mink, Bobcat, Cat, Cattle, Raccoon, Red fox, Skunk |
|
Viet Nam |
April |
>1 |
>=7 |
Unspecified poultry |
|
H5N5 |
Canada1 |
06/03/2024 |
3 |
14 |
American Crow, Racoon |
Japan |
25/03/2024 |
1 |
29 |
Large-billed crow |
|
United Kingdom |
19*03/2024 |
2 |
11 |
Herring Gull, Peregine falcon |
|
H7N6 |
South Africa |
18/12/2023 |
6 |
97 |
Poultry |
Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal, government websites. Data cut off time: reported on 22 February 2024 8:30 CEST. $:estimate.
The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are available HERE.
Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since 24 August 2023 are listed in the table, those reporting for the first time since 1 October 2023 in orange. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:wild birds, F: Feral, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans, example: W123 indicates 123 wild birds affected. EA: Fully Eurasian; rEN: Reassortment Eurasian and North American.
1 the total includes events with sample collection date since 1 October 2023 data issued from the Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link]
2 a detailed list of wild bird species affected, consult weekly findings report on avian influenza in wild birds from Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link]
3 for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link]
§: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link]
MAMMALS
Ly, H. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus infections of dairy cattle and livestock handlers in the United States of America. Virulence, 15(1):2343931. reference
Branda, F., Romano, C., Giovanetti, M., Ciccozzi, A., Ciccozzi, M. & Scarpa, F. 2024. Emerging threats: Is highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in dairy herds a prelude to a new pandemic? Travel Med Infect Dis, 59:102721. reference
Kozlov, M., Mallapaty, S. 2024. Bird flu outbreak in US cows: why scientists are concerned. Nature, 628(8008):484-485. reference
Looi, M.K. 2024. Bird flu: Person with rare strain in US sparks alarm about cow transmission. BMJ, 385:q797. reference
Cohen, J. 2024. Worries about bird flu in U.S. cattle intensify. Science, 384(6691):12-13. reference
De Conto F. 2024. Avian Influenza A Viruses Modulate the Cellular Cytoskeleton during Infection of Mammalian Hosts. Pathogens, 13(3):249. reference
Murawski, A., Fabrizio, T., Ossiboff, R., Kackos, C., Jeevan, T., Jones, J.C., Kandeil, A., Walker, D., et al. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in a common bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) in Florida. Commun Biol. 7(1):476. reference
Runstadler, J.A. & Puryear, W.B. 2024. The virus is out of the barn: the emergence of HPAI as a pathogen of avian and mammalian wildlife around the globe. Am J Vet Res, 2024 Apr 13:1-7. reference
Stokstad, E. 2024. In Antarctica, scientists track a dangerous bird flu. Science, 383(6689):1281. reference
Muñoz G, Mendieta V, Ulloa M, Agüero B, Torres CG, Kruger L, Neira V. 2024. Lack of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in the South Shetland Islands in Antarctica, Early 2023. Animals (Basel), 14(7):1008. reference
Huang, C., Yu, L., Xu, Y., Huang, J., Qin, Y., Guo, X., Zeng, Y., et al. 2024. Long-term co-circulation of multiple influenza A viruses in pigs, Guangxi, China. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2337673. reference
Wille, M., Atkinson, R., Barr, I.G., Burgoyne, C., Bond, A.L., Boyle, D., Christie, M., et al. 2024. Long-Distance Avian Migrants Fail to Bring 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N1 Into Australia for a Second Year in a Row. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 18(4):e13281. reference
WILDBIRDS
Puryear, W.B. & Runstadler, J.A. 2024. High-pathogenicity avian influenza in wildlife: a changing disease dynamic that is expanding in wild birds and having an increasing impact on a growing number of mammals. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 262(5):601-609. reference
Graziosi, G., Lupini, C., Gobbo, F., Zecchin, B., Quaglia, G., Pedrazzoli, S., Lizzi, G., et al. 2024. Genetic Diversity of Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Waterbirds in Northeast Italy Using Two Different Sampling Strategies. Animals (Basel), 14(7):1018. reference
Mine, J., Takadate, Y., Kumagai, A., Sakuma, S., Tsunekuni, R., Miyazawa, K. & Uchida Y. 2024. Genetics of H5N1 and H5N8 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated in Japan in Winter 2021-2022. Viruses, 16(3):358. reference
Si, Y., Skidmore, A.K., Wang, T., de Boer, W.F., Debba, P., Toxopeus, A. G., Li, L. & Prins, H.H. 2009. Spatio-temporal dynamics of global H5N1 outbreaks match bird migration patterns. Geospatial Health, 4(1):65–78. reference
DOMESTIC BIRDS
Nidra, F.Y., Monir, M.B. & Dewan, S.M.R. 2024. Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Outbreak 2024 in Cambodia: Worries Over the Possible Spread of the Virus to Other Asian Nations and the Strategic Outlook for its Control. Environ Health Insights, 18:11786302241246453. reference
El-Shemy, A.A., Amer, M.M., Hassan, H.M. & Elaish, M. 2024. Epidemiological distribution of respiratory viral pathogens in marketable vaccinated broiler chickens in five governorates in the Nile Delta, Egypt, from January 2022 to October 2022. Vet World, 17(2):303-312. reference
Wolters, W.J., Vernooij, J.C.M., Spliethof, T.M., Wiegel, J., Elbers, A.R.W., Spierenburg, M.A.H., Stegeman, J.A. & Velkers, F.C. Comparison of the Clinical Manifestation of HPAI H5Nx in Different Poultry Types in the Netherlands, 2014–2022. Pathogens 2024, 13, 280. reference
Islam, A., Islam, M., Dutta, P., Rahman, M.A., Al Mamun, A., Khan, A.D., Samad, M.A., et al. 2024. Association of biosecurity and hygiene practices with avian influenza A/H5 and A/H9 virus infections in turkey farms. Front Vet Sci, 11:1319618. reference
Li, Y., An, Q., Sun, Z., Gao, X. & Wang, H. 2024. Multifaceted analysis of temporal and spatial distribution and risk factors of global poultry HPAI-H5N1, 2005-2023. Animal, 18(3):101085. reference
ENVIRONMENTAL
Okuya, K., Esaki, M., Tokorozaki, K., Hasegawa, T. & Ozawa, M. 2024. Isolation and genetic characterization of multiple genotypes of both H5 and H7 avian influenza viruses from environmental water in the Izumi plain, Kagoshima prefecture, Japan during the 2021/22 winter season. Comp Immunol Microbiol Infect Dis, 109:102182. reference
Kang, Y.M., Tseren Ochir, E.O., Heo, G.B., An, S.H., Jeong, H., Dondog, U., Myagmarsuren, T., Lee, Y.J. & Lee, K.N. 2024. Surveillance and Genetic Analysis of Low-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated from Feces of Wild Birds in Mongolia, 2021 to 2023. Animals (Basel), 14(7):1105. reference
Nadeau, S., Devaux, A.J., Bagutti, C., Alt, M., Ilg Hampe, E., Kraus, M., Würfel, E., et al. 2024. Influenza transmission dynamics quantified from RNA in wastewater in Switzerland. Swiss Med Wkly, 154(1):3503. reference
OTHER AI VIRUSES
Azeem, S., Baroch, J., Tewari, D., Pabilonia, K.L., Killian, M., Bradel-Tretheway, B., Sun, D., Ghorbani-Nezami, S. & Yoon, K.-J. 2024. Molecular Characterization of Non-H5 and Non-H7 Avian Influenza Viruses from Non-Mallard Migratory Waterbirds of the North American Flyways, 2006–2011. Pathogens, 13:333. reference
Tran, T.D., Kasemsuwan, S., Sukmak, M., Phimpraphai, W., Prarakamawongsa, T., Pham, L.T., Hoang, T.B., et al. 2024. Field and laboratory investigation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 and H5N8 in Quang Ninh province, Vietnam, 2020 to 2021. J Vet Sci, 25(2):e20. reference
Lin, S., Zhang, Y., Yang, J., Yang, L., Li, X., Bo, H., Liu, J., et al. 2024. Cross-Species Transmission Potential of H4 Avian Influenza Viruses in China: Epidemiological and Evolutionary Study. Viruses, 16(3):353. reference
He, J., Deng, J., Wen, X., Yan, M., Liu, Y., Zhou, Y., Du, X., Yang, H. & Peng, X. 2024. Isolation and genetic characteristics of Novel H4N1 Avian Influenza viruses in ChongQing, China. Virol J., 21(1):85. reference
Guan, L., Babujee, L., Presler, R., Pattinson, D., Nguyen, H.L.K., Hoang, V.M.P., Le, M.Q., et al. 2024. Avian H6 Influenza Viruses in Vietnamese Live Bird Markets during 2018-2021. Viruses, 16(3):367. reference
Kutkat, O., Gomaa, M., Aboulhoda, B.E., Moatasim, Y., El Taweel, A., Kamel, M.N., El Sayes, M., et al. 2024. Genetic and virological characteristics of a reassortant avian influenza A H6N1 virus isolated from wild birds at a live-bird market in Egypt. Arch Virol, 169(5):95. reference
Tang, S., Han, B., Su, C., Li, H. & Zhao, S. 2024. Wild Bird-Origin H6N2 Influenza Virus Acquires Enhanced Pathogenicity after Single Passage in Mice. Viruses, 16(3):357. reference
Du, Y., Xia, J., Wang, Z., Xu, J., Ji, Y., Jin, Y., Pu, L. & Xu S. 2024. Evolution of H6N6 viruses in China between 2014 and 2019 involves multiple reassortment events. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2341142. reference
Sandhu, S., Ferrante, C., MacCosham, A., Atchessi, N. & Bancej, C. 2024. Epidemiological characteristics of human infections with avian influenza A(H5N6) virus, China and Laos: A multiple case descriptive analysis, February 2014-June 2023. Can Commun Dis Rep, 50(1-2):77-85. reference
Si, Y.J., Jang, S.G., Kim, Y.I., Casel, M.A.B., Kim, D.J., Ji, H.Y., Choi, J.H., et al. 2024. Evolutional dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 genotypes in wintering bird habitats: Insights from South Korea's 2020-2021 season. One Health, 18:100719. reference
Chokkakula, S., Oh, S., Choi, W.S., Kim, C.I., Jeong, J.H., Kim, B.K., Park, J.H., et al. 2024. Mammalian adaptation risk in HPAI H5N8: a comprehensive model bridging experimental data with mathematical insights. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2339949. reference
Liu, Y., Chen, Y., Yang, Z., Lin, Y., Fu, S., Chen, J., Xu, L., et al. 2024. Evolution and Antigenic Differentiation of Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus, China. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(6). reference
Hou, Y., Deng, G., Cui, P., Zeng, X., Li, B., Wang, D., He, X., et al. 2024. Evolution of H7N9 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in the context of vaccination. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Apr 17:2343912. reference
Bedair, N.M., Sakr, M.A., Mourad, A., Eissa, N., Mostafa, A. & Khamiss, O. 2024. Molecular characterization of the whole genome of H9N2 avian influenza virus isolated from Egyptian poultry farms. Arch Virol,169(5):99 reference
El-Shesheny, R., Franks, J., Kandeil, A., Badra, R., Turner, J., Seiler, P., Marathe, B.M., et al. 2024. Cross-species spill-over potential of the H9N2 bat influenza A virus. Nat Commun, 15:3449. reference
Halwe, N.J., Hamberger, L., Sehl-Ewert, J., Mache, C., Schön, J., Ulrich, L., Calvelage, S., et al. 2024. Bat-borne H9N2 influenza virus evades MxA restriction and exhibits efficient replication and transmission in ferrets. Nat Commun, 15:3450. reference
LABORATORY
Santos, J.D., Sobral, D., Pinheiro, M., Isidro, J., Bogaardt, C., Pinto, M., Eusébio, R., et al. 2024. INSaFLU-TELEVIR: an open web-based bioinformatics suite for viral metagenomic detection and routine genomic surveillance. Genome Med, 16(1):61. reference
Landmann, M., Scheibner, D., Gischke, M., Abdelwhab, E.M. & Ulrich, R. 2024. Automated quantification of avian influenza virus antigen in different organs. Sci Rep, 14(1):8766. reference
VACCINATION
EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (AHAW), et al. 2024. Plain Language Summary of the Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - Part 2. Surveillance and mitigation measures. EFSA J, 22(4):ep220401. reference
EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (AHAW), et al. 2024. Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - Part 2. Surveillance and mitigation measures. EFSA J, 22(4):e8755. reference
Tseng, I., Pan, B.Y., Feng, Y.C. & Fang, C.T. 2024. Re-evaluating efficacy of vaccines against highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in poultry: A systematic review and meta-analysis. One Health, 18:100714. reference
COMMUNICATION
Petersen, E., Memish, Z.A., Hui, D.S., Scagliarini, A., Simonsen, L., Simulundu, E., Bloodgood, J., et al. 2024. Avian 'Bird' Flu - undue media panic or genuine concern for pandemic potential requiring global preparedness action? Int J Infect Dis, 2024 Apr 15:107062. reference
OVERVIEW
EFSA, ECDC, European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, et al. 2024. Avian influenza overview December 2023-March 2024. EFSA J, 22(3):e8754. reference
EFSA, ECDC, et al. 2024. Drivers for a pandemic due to avian influenza and options for One Health mitigation measures. EFSA J, 22(4):e8735. reference
Fusaro, A., Zecchin, B., Giussani, E., Palumbo, E., Agüero-García, M., Bachofen, C., Bálint, Á., et al. 2024. High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe – why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict. Virus Evolution, veae027. reference
Fauziah, I., Nugroho, H.A., Yanthi, N.D., Tiffarent, R., Saputra, S. 2024. Potential zoonotic spillover at the human-animal interface: A mini-review. Vet World, 17(2):289-302. reference
He, J. & Kam, Y.W. 2024. Insights from Avian Influenza: A Review of Its Multifaceted Nature and Future Pandemic Preparedness. Viruses, 16(3):458. reference
America
Asia
North Africa and Middle East
Sub-Saharan Africa
Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 01 October 2023 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 25 April 2024 (territory/area for sub/Antarctic zone)
Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.
Table 3. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years
Subtype |
Epidemiological situation overview |
---|---|
H5Nx Gs/GD* HPAI (1996) |
High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96- lineage (Gs/GD) were first detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. They have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses, since then and have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared. Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged presumably as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian inluenza viruses that also facilitated reassortment. Some important genotypes have been named unofficially (e.g. Z genotype in Hong Kong SAR, China in 2002, BB genotype derived from gulls in Europe in 2022 onwards). Of considerable significance has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses. Some of these Gs/GD viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in the Gs/GD lineage in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other viruses within this lineage persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link]. The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when a Gs/GD virus (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Viruses within the Gs/GD lineage continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b) that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. These waves involved multiple N subtypes. In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die- offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species. For an updated list of bird species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE In 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats and dairy cattle in the United States of America. USDA shared the Whole Genome Sequences, see HERE. Among the other Gs/GD virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans. Clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and related viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic with ten recent human cases, five of which were fatal recorded in Cambodia (4) and Viet Nam (1). For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE In addition, more than 80 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022. Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals. For an updated list of mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE |
Avian origin H3N8 LPAI |
An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid 2021 [link]. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illneses who subsequently died. One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported. |
H7N4 LPAI (2017) |
One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry. |
H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017) |
Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves. Most human cases exposed in live bird markets. Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update |
H9N2 LPAI |
First human case reported in 1998. To date, about 100 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported [link] Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems. Three major lineages and multiple genotypes. |
H10Nx LPAI |
To date, two influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], in September 2022, a second case in Zhejiang Province, China [link] The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link]. |
FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.
General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian
influenza viruses.
Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.
Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk
of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.
Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.
For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].
Updates on avian influenza infection in dairy cattle have been shared by USDA, US CDC and US FDA through the following sites:
Next issue: 23 May 2024
Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.
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