Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential

Animal health

Global Avian Influenza Viruses with Zoonotic Potential situation update

25 April 2024, 08:30 hours; Rome

Overview

This update covers avian influenza viruses (AIV) with zoonotic potential occurring worldwide, i.e. H5Nx, H7Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza (HPAI) viruses and H3N8, H5Nx, H6N1, H7Nx, H9N2, H10Nx and H11 low pathogenicity avian influenza (LPAI).

Specific information is available for Avian Influenza A(H7N9) virus viruses and Sub-Saharan Africa HPAI in related FAO Avian Influenza situation updates.

HPAI outbreaks in animals officially reported since last update (28 December 2023): in total, 279 outbreaks/events have been reported in five geographic regions caused by H5Nx (12), H5N1 (255), H5N5 (6) and H7N6 (6). (see Table 1 for details)

LPAI events in animals officially reported since the last update (25 January 2024): 0 new event was reported.

Number of human cases officially reported since last update (25 January 2024): 2 new events were reported.1,2

1 https://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2024/p0401-avian-flu.html#:~:text=This%20infection%20does%20not%20change,CDC%20considers%20to%20be%20low
2 https://vncdc.gov.vn/thong-tin-ve-truong-hop-mac-cum-ah9-tai-tien-giang-nd17502.html

Map 1. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed since 1 October 2023 (i.e. current wave)

Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Map 2. Global distribution of AIV with zoonotic potential* observed in the period 1 October 2022 to 30 September 2023 (i.e. previous wave)

Note: Symbols may overlap for events in similar geographic locations.

Table 1. High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses with zoonotic potential

Virus Country/Area Last observed outbreak # events reported since the last update Total # events reported since 1 October 2023 Species affected during the reporting preiod

H5

Canada

01/01/2024

1
(in W)

4
(in W)

Great Horned Owl

Japan

12/04/2024

2
(in W)

2
(in W)

Large-billed crow, Mountain hawk-eagle

Norway

21/02/2024

1
(in W)

4
(in W)

Gryfalcon

South Africa

29/02/2024

8
(in W)

30
(incl. W9)

African Oystercatcher, Common Tern, Greater Crested Tern, Jackass Penguin

H5N1

 

Antarctica§

20/02/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Brown skua

Belgium

21/01/2024

1
(in W)

10
(incl. W6)

Herring Hull

Brazil

09/04/2024

2
(in W)

64
(incl. W52, M12)

Common Tern, Cabot's tern

Bulgaria

12/04/2024

5

14

Poultry

Canada1

26/03/2024

55
(incl. W51, M3)

201
(incl. W136, M8)

American Black Duck, American Crow, American green-winged Teal, American Wigeon, Anserinae, Bald Eagle, Barred Owl, Black-billed Magpie, Blue Jay, Cackling Goose, Canada Goose, Common Barn-Owl, Common Raven, Cooper's Hawk, Dunlin, Glaucous-winged Gull, Great black-backed Gull, Great Blue Heron, Great Horned Owl, Herring Gull, Hooded Merganser, Laridae, Mallard, Northern Pintail, Northern Shoveler, Peregrine Falcon, Red-tailed Hawk, Ross’s Goose, Snow Goose, Snowy Owl, Trumpeter Swan, Wood Duck; Striped skunk

China

12/04/2024

3

52
(incl. W5, E2)

Domestic chicken

Denmark

03/04/2024

6
(in W)

102
(incl. W89)

Common Buzzard, Lesser Black-backed Gull, Mute Swan, Peregrine Falcon

Finland

15/12/2023

6
(in M)

198
(incl. W4, M194)

American Mink, Arctic fox, Red Fox

Germany

09/04/2024

14
(incl. W12, M2)

196
(incl. W152, C2, M6)$

Anatidae, Charadriidae, Laridae, Strigidae; Red Fox

Hungary

13/03/2024

7

134
(incl. W51)

Poultry

India

29/02/2024

3

17

Domestic birds

Japan

11/04/2024

8
(in W)

132
(incl. W107, C2, E14)

Carrion crow, Large-billed crow, Ural owl, White-tailed eagle

Latvia

02/04/2024

1
(in W)

1
(in W)

Greylag Goose

Kingdom of the Netherlands

27/03/2024

1
(in W)

65
(incl. W30)

Ciconiidae

Republic of Moldova

19/02/2024

13
(in W)

45
(incl. W40, C1)

Barnacle Goose, Black-headed Gull, Canada Goose, Carrion Crow, Eurasian Wigeon, Greater white-fronted Goose, Greylag Goose, Mallard

Norway

04/04/2024

1
(in W)

4
(incl. W2)

Common Buzzard

Philippines

10/03/2024

4

15

Poultry

Poland

09/04/2024

1
(in W)

55
(incl. W19)

White Stork

Romania

26/03/2024

1
(in W)

38
(in W34)

White Stork

Timor-Leste

18/08/2022

1

1

Domestic bird

Ukraine

28/02/2024

1
(in W)

14
(incl. W7)

Mute Swan

United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland2

05/04/2024

1
(in W)

25
(in W19)

Sparrowhawk

United States of America3

19/04/2024

118
(incl. W63, C2, M38, EA, rNA)$

2 289
(incl. W1905, C86, M11)$

Chicken, Turkey, Unspecified Hachery, Poultry & WOAH-non-poultry, Live bird market; American crow, American green-winged teal, American wigeon, Bald eagle, Black vulture, Blackbird, Bufflehead, Canada goose, Canvasback, Common grackle, Common raven, Double-crested cormorant, Gadwall, Grackle, Great horned owl, Mallard, Northern pintail, Pigeon, Red-tailed hawk, Ruddy turnstone, Sanderling, Snow goose, Wood duck; American mink, Bobcat, Cat, Cattle, Raccoon, Red fox, Skunk

Viet Nam

April

>1

>=7

Unspecified poultry

H5N5

Canada1

06/03/2024

3
(incl. W1, M2)

14
(incl. W12, M2)

American Crow, Racoon

Japan

25/03/2024

1
(in W)

29
(in W)

Large-billed crow

United Kingdom

19*03/2024

2
(in W)

11
(in W)

Herring Gull, Peregine falcon

H7N6

South Africa

18/12/2023

6

97

Poultry

Data was retrieved from WOAH WAHIS portal, government websites. Data cut off time: reported on 22 February 2024 8:30 CEST. $:estimate.
The full list of bird and mammalian species affected by H5Nx HPAI are available HERE.
Notes: Only those reporting events in animals since 24 August 2023 are listed in the table, those reporting for the first time since 1 October 2023 in orange. Codes: D:domestic, C:captivity, W:wild birds, F: Feral, E:Environment, M: mammalian species other than humans, example: W123 indicates 123 wild birds affected. EA: Fully Eurasian; rEN: Reassortment Eurasian and North American.
1 the total includes events with sample collection date since 1 October 2023 data issued from the Canada Food and Inspection Agency dashboard [link]
2 a detailed list of wild bird species affected, consult weekly findings report on avian influenza in wild birds from Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA) [link]
3 for more information, consult dedicated webpage of the USDA Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (USDA/APHIS) [link]
§: British Antarctic Survey (BAS) [link]

Recent publications

MAMMALS

Ly, H. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1 virus infections of dairy cattle and livestock handlers in the United States of America. Virulence, 15(1):2343931. reference

Branda, F., Romano, C., Giovanetti, M., Ciccozzi, A., Ciccozzi, M. & Scarpa, F. 2024. Emerging threats: Is highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) in dairy herds a prelude to a new pandemic? Travel Med Infect Dis, 59:102721. reference

Kozlov, M., Mallapaty, S. 2024. Bird flu outbreak in US cows: why scientists are concerned. Nature, 628(8008):484-485. reference

Looi, M.K. 2024. Bird flu: Person with rare strain in US sparks alarm about cow transmission. BMJ, 385:q797. reference

Cohen, J. 2024. Worries about bird flu in U.S. cattle intensify. Science, 384(6691):12-13. reference

De Conto F. 2024. Avian Influenza A Viruses Modulate the Cellular Cytoskeleton during Infection of Mammalian Hosts. Pathogens, 13(3):249. reference

Murawski, A., Fabrizio, T., Ossiboff, R., Kackos, C., Jeevan, T., Jones, J.C., Kandeil, A., Walker, D., et al. 2024. Highly pathogenic avian influenza A(H5N1) virus in a common bottlenose dolphin (Tursiops truncatus) in Florida. Commun Biol. 7(1):476. reference

Runstadler, J.A. & Puryear, W.B. 2024. The virus is out of the barn: the emergence of HPAI as a pathogen of avian and mammalian wildlife around the globe. Am J Vet Res, 2024 Apr 13:1-7. reference

Stokstad, E. 2024. In Antarctica, scientists track a dangerous bird flu. Science, 383(6689):1281. reference

Muñoz G, Mendieta V, Ulloa M, Agüero B, Torres CG, Kruger L, Neira V. 2024. Lack of Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza H5N1 in the South Shetland Islands in Antarctica, Early 2023. Animals (Basel), 14(7):1008. reference

Huang, C., Yu, L., Xu, Y., Huang, J., Qin, Y., Guo, X., Zeng, Y., et al. 2024. Long-term co-circulation of multiple influenza A viruses in pigs, Guangxi, China. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2337673. reference

Wille, M., Atkinson, R., Barr, I.G., Burgoyne, C., Bond, A.L., Boyle, D., Christie, M., et al. 2024. Long-Distance Avian Migrants Fail to Bring 2.3.4.4b HPAI H5N1 Into Australia for a Second Year in a Row. Influenza Other Respir Viruses, 18(4):e13281. reference

WILDBIRDS

Puryear, W.B. & Runstadler, J.A. 2024. High-pathogenicity avian influenza in wildlife: a changing disease dynamic that is expanding in wild birds and having an increasing impact on a growing number of mammals. J Am Vet Med Assoc, 262(5):601-609. reference

Graziosi, G., Lupini, C., Gobbo, F., Zecchin, B., Quaglia, G., Pedrazzoli, S., Lizzi, G., et al. 2024. Genetic Diversity of Avian Influenza Viruses Detected in Waterbirds in Northeast Italy Using Two Different Sampling Strategies. Animals (Basel), 14(7):1018. reference

Mine, J., Takadate, Y., Kumagai, A., Sakuma, S., Tsunekuni, R., Miyazawa, K. & Uchida Y. 2024. Genetics of H5N1 and H5N8 High-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated in Japan in Winter 2021-2022. Viruses, 16(3):358. reference

Si, Y., Skidmore, A.K., Wang, T., de Boer, W.F., Debba, P., Toxopeus, A. G., Li, L. & Prins, H.H. 2009. Spatio-temporal dynamics of global H5N1 outbreaks match bird migration patterns. Geospatial Health, 4(1):65–78. reference

DOMESTIC BIRDS

Nidra, F.Y., Monir, M.B. & Dewan, S.M.R. 2024. Avian Influenza A (H5N1) Outbreak 2024 in Cambodia: Worries Over the Possible Spread of the Virus to Other Asian Nations and the Strategic Outlook for its Control. Environ Health Insights, 18:11786302241246453. reference

El-Shemy, A.A., Amer, M.M., Hassan, H.M. & Elaish, M. 2024. Epidemiological distribution of respiratory viral pathogens in marketable vaccinated broiler chickens in five governorates in the Nile Delta, Egypt, from January 2022 to October 2022. Vet World, 17(2):303-312. reference

Wolters, W.J., Vernooij, J.C.M., Spliethof, T.M., Wiegel, J., Elbers, A.R.W., Spierenburg, M.A.H., Stegeman, J.A. & Velkers, F.C. Comparison of the Clinical Manifestation of HPAI H5Nx in Different Poultry Types in the Netherlands, 2014–2022. Pathogens 2024, 13, 280. reference

Islam, A., Islam, M., Dutta, P., Rahman, M.A., Al Mamun, A., Khan, A.D., Samad, M.A., et al. 2024. Association of biosecurity and hygiene practices with avian influenza A/H5 and A/H9 virus infections in turkey farms. Front Vet Sci, 11:1319618. reference

Li, Y., An, Q., Sun, Z., Gao, X. & Wang, H. 2024. Multifaceted analysis of temporal and spatial distribution and risk factors of global poultry HPAI-H5N1, 2005-2023. Animal, 18(3):101085. reference

ENVIRONMENTAL

Okuya, K., Esaki, M., Tokorozaki, K., Hasegawa, T. & Ozawa, M. 2024. Isolation and genetic characterization of multiple genotypes of both H5 and H7 avian influenza viruses from environmental water in the Izumi plain, Kagoshima prefecture, Japan during the 2021/22 winter season. Comp Immunol Microbiol Infect Dis, 109:102182. reference

Kang, Y.M., Tseren Ochir, E.O., Heo, G.B., An, S.H., Jeong, H., Dondog, U., Myagmarsuren, T., Lee, Y.J. & Lee, K.N. 2024. Surveillance and Genetic Analysis of Low-Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Viruses Isolated from Feces of Wild Birds in Mongolia, 2021 to 2023. Animals (Basel), 14(7):1105. reference

Nadeau, S., Devaux, A.J., Bagutti, C., Alt, M., Ilg Hampe, E., Kraus, M., Würfel, E., et al. 2024. Influenza transmission dynamics quantified from RNA in wastewater in Switzerland. Swiss Med Wkly, 154(1):3503. reference

OTHER AI VIRUSES

Azeem, S., Baroch, J., Tewari, D., Pabilonia, K.L., Killian, M., Bradel-Tretheway, B., Sun, D., Ghorbani-Nezami, S. & Yoon, K.-J. 2024. Molecular Characterization of Non-H5 and Non-H7 Avian Influenza Viruses from Non-Mallard Migratory Waterbirds of the North American Flyways, 2006–2011. Pathogens, 13:333. reference

Tran, T.D., Kasemsuwan, S., Sukmak, M., Phimpraphai, W., Prarakamawongsa, T., Pham, L.T., Hoang, T.B., et al. 2024. Field and laboratory investigation of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N6 and H5N8 in Quang Ninh province, Vietnam, 2020 to 2021. J Vet Sci, 25(2):e20. reference

Lin, S., Zhang, Y., Yang, J., Yang, L., Li, X., Bo, H., Liu, J., et al. 2024. Cross-Species Transmission Potential of H4 Avian Influenza Viruses in China: Epidemiological and Evolutionary Study. Viruses, 16(3):353. reference

He, J., Deng, J., Wen, X., Yan, M., Liu, Y., Zhou, Y., Du, X., Yang, H. & Peng, X. 2024. Isolation and genetic characteristics of Novel H4N1 Avian Influenza viruses in ChongQing, China. Virol J., 21(1):85. reference

Guan, L., Babujee, L., Presler, R., Pattinson, D., Nguyen, H.L.K., Hoang, V.M.P., Le, M.Q., et al. 2024. Avian H6 Influenza Viruses in Vietnamese Live Bird Markets during 2018-2021. Viruses, 16(3):367. reference

Kutkat, O., Gomaa, M., Aboulhoda, B.E., Moatasim, Y., El Taweel, A., Kamel, M.N., El Sayes, M., et al. 2024. Genetic and virological characteristics of a reassortant avian influenza A H6N1 virus isolated from wild birds at a live-bird market in Egypt. Arch Virol, 169(5):95. reference

Tang, S., Han, B., Su, C., Li, H. & Zhao, S. 2024. Wild Bird-Origin H6N2 Influenza Virus Acquires Enhanced Pathogenicity after Single Passage in Mice. Viruses, 16(3):357. reference

Du, Y., Xia, J., Wang, Z., Xu, J., Ji, Y., Jin, Y., Pu, L. & Xu S. 2024. Evolution of H6N6 viruses in China between 2014 and 2019 involves multiple reassortment events. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2341142. reference

Sandhu, S., Ferrante, C., MacCosham, A., Atchessi, N. & Bancej, C. 2024. Epidemiological characteristics of human infections with avian influenza A(H5N6) virus, China and Laos: A multiple case descriptive analysis, February 2014-June 2023. Can Commun Dis Rep, 50(1-2):77-85. reference

Si, Y.J., Jang, S.G., Kim, Y.I., Casel, M.A.B., Kim, D.J., Ji, H.Y., Choi, J.H., et al. 2024. Evolutional dynamics of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N8 genotypes in wintering bird habitats: Insights from South Korea's 2020-2021 season. One Health, 18:100719. reference

Chokkakula, S., Oh, S., Choi, W.S., Kim, C.I., Jeong, J.H., Kim, B.K., Park, J.H., et al. 2024. Mammalian adaptation risk in HPAI H5N8: a comprehensive model bridging experimental data with mathematical insights. Emerg Microbes Infect, 13(1):2339949. reference

Liu, Y., Chen, Y., Yang, Z., Lin, Y., Fu, S., Chen, J., Xu, L., et al. 2024. Evolution and Antigenic Differentiation of Avian Influenza A(H7N9) Virus, China. Emerg Infect Dis, 30(6). reference

Hou, Y., Deng, G., Cui, P., Zeng, X., Li, B., Wang, D., He, X., et al. 2024. Evolution of H7N9 highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in the context of vaccination. Emerg Microbes Infect, 2024 Apr 17:2343912. reference

Bedair, N.M., Sakr, M.A., Mourad, A., Eissa, N., Mostafa, A. & Khamiss, O. 2024. Molecular characterization of the whole genome of H9N2 avian influenza virus isolated from Egyptian poultry farms. Arch Virol,169(5):99 reference

El-Shesheny, R., Franks, J., Kandeil, A., Badra, R., Turner, J., Seiler, P., Marathe, B.M., et al. 2024. Cross-species spill-over potential of the H9N2 bat influenza A virus. Nat Commun, 15:3449. reference

Halwe, N.J., Hamberger, L., Sehl-Ewert, J., Mache, C., Schön, J., Ulrich, L., Calvelage, S., et al. 2024. Bat-borne H9N2 influenza virus evades MxA restriction and exhibits efficient replication and transmission in ferrets. Nat Commun, 15:3450. reference

LABORATORY

Santos, J.D., Sobral, D., Pinheiro, M., Isidro, J., Bogaardt, C., Pinto, M., Eusébio, R., et al. 2024. INSaFLU-TELEVIR: an open web-based bioinformatics suite for viral metagenomic detection and routine genomic surveillance. Genome Med, 16(1):61. reference

Landmann, M., Scheibner, D., Gischke, M., Abdelwhab, E.M. & Ulrich, R. 2024. Automated quantification of avian influenza virus antigen in different organs. Sci Rep, 14(1):8766. reference

VACCINATION

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (AHAW), et al. 2024. Plain Language Summary of the Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - Part 2. Surveillance and mitigation measures. EFSA J, 22(4):ep220401. reference

EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Animal Welfare (AHAW), et al. 2024. Vaccination of poultry against highly pathogenic avian influenza - Part 2. Surveillance and mitigation measures. EFSA J, 22(4):e8755. reference

Tseng, I., Pan, B.Y., Feng, Y.C. & Fang, C.T. 2024. Re-evaluating efficacy of vaccines against highly pathogenic avian influenza virus in poultry: A systematic review and meta-analysis. One Health, 18:100714. reference

COMMUNICATION

Petersen, E., Memish, Z.A., Hui, D.S., Scagliarini, A., Simonsen, L., Simulundu, E., Bloodgood, J., et al. 2024. Avian 'Bird' Flu - undue media panic or genuine concern for pandemic potential requiring global preparedness action? Int J Infect Dis, 2024 Apr 15:107062. reference

OVERVIEW

EFSA, ECDC, European Union Reference Laboratory for Avian Influenza, et al. 2024. Avian influenza overview December 2023-March 2024. EFSA J, 22(3):e8754. reference

EFSA, ECDC, et al. 2024. Drivers for a pandemic due to avian influenza and options for One Health mitigation measures. EFSA J, 22(4):e8735. reference

Fusaro, A., Zecchin, B., Giussani, E., Palumbo, E., Agüero-García, M., Bachofen, C., Bálint, Á., et al. 2024. High pathogenic avian influenza A(H5) viruses of clade 2.3.4.4b in Europe – why trends of virus evolution are more difficult to predict. Virus Evolution, veae027. reference

Fauziah, I., Nugroho, H.A., Yanthi, N.D., Tiffarent, R., Saputra, S. 2024. Potential zoonotic spillover at the human-animal interface: A mini-review. Vet World, 17(2):289-302. reference

He, J. & Kam, Y.W. 2024. Insights from Avian Influenza: A Review of Its Multifaceted Nature and Future Pandemic Preparedness. Viruses, 16(3):458. reference

FAO's support to countries

Global level
  • FAO/WHO/WOAH to release the Joint FAO/WHO/WOAH preliminary assessment of recent influenza A(H5N1) viruses. [link]
  • OFFLU (WOAH/FAO network of expertise on animal influenza) has launched a webpage for collection of relevant links on HPAI Detections in Livestock. [link]
  • The second session of the UNESCO/CMS/FAO/Ramsar/IUCN webinar on AI and wildlife - How to protect wildlife from avian flu in UNESCO World Heritage sites, Biosphere Reserves and Ramsar sites [link] will be held on 26 April 2024, 11:00-13:30 CET (09:00-11:30 GMT) [register here].
  • The first session of the UNESCO/CMS/FAO/Ramsar/IUCN webinar on AI and wildlife - How to protect wildlife from avian flu in UNESCO World Heritage sites, Biosphere Reserves and Ramsar sites was held on 19 April 2024. [link]
  • The United States of America released the information on HPAI virus detection in cattle and goats, H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b from samples was confirmed at the National Veterinary Services Laboratory (NVSL). FAO is monitoring the situation through OFFLU in collaboration with other partners [link1, link2, link3].
  • The FAO Virtual Learning Centers have launched a new self-paced virtual learning course on avian influenza (AI). The course aims to raise awareness of AI and to develop capacity on its detection and prevention. This introductory course is intended to be useful for veterinarians, veterinary paraprofessionals and others working in the poultry industries. There are six short modules (15-20 minutes each), can be used as a ready-reference resource as needed. It supports multiple platforms including smartphones and tablets. [link]
  • OFFLU (WOAH/FAO network of expertise on animal influenza) contributed information on the genetic and antigenic characteristics of currently circulating avian and swine influenza viruses for pandemic preparedness purposes at the WHO Consultation on the Composition of Influenza Virus Vaccines for Use in the 2024-2025 Northern Hemisphere Influenza Season. [link]
Regional/country level
  • Americas
    • GF-TADs for the Americas held an informative electronic meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-AI) entitled ‘Detection of HPAI in Ruminants and Humans in the USA’ to share findings, ongoing research and future actions, following the detection and notification of Avian Influenza cases in dairy cattle and goats in the United States of America on 4 April. [link, recording]
    • FAO Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) has been implemented in Bolivia and Panama to estimate the economic impact of HPAI outbreaks.
    • A joint technical meeting on HPAI was held with countries under emergency technical cooperation programme (TCP) and Special Fund for Emergency and Rehabilitation Activities (SFERA) projects on 12-14 December 2023 [link], the emergency TCP project has been extended till June 2024. Under this TCP project, FAO has facilitated bi-weekly meetings between veterinary services of 10 countries in the region to discuss and exchange experiences on several HPAI topics including epidemiological updates, control measures, surveillance, economic impacts and risk communication.
    • FAO Emergency Center for Transboundary Animal Disease Control (ECTAD) at regional and country (Colombia, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Peru) levels are supporting activities to respond to HPAI outbreaks e.g. simulations exercises, HPAI diagnostic trainings, information materials.
    • Currently, Bolivia, Dominican Republic (for prophylaxis; no outbreak reported), Ecuador, Guatemala, Mexico, Peru and Uruguay are using vaccines to prevent and/or control HPAI, while some other countries are evaluating implementation.
  • Africa
    • FAO ECTAD regional offices in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) is supporting countries in the region to enhance biosecurity in poultry farms which contributes to minimising HPAI incursion. Poultry value chain risk assessment along the entire poultry value chain is planned in 10 countries namely Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Malawi, Mozambique, Rwanda, South Sudan, the United Republic of Tanzania, Uganda and Zambia as a part of ECTAD's ongoing support for HPAI risk mitigation/management.
    • Ethiopia updated the Multisectoral HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan. The multi-sectoral Emerging Pandemic Threats Technical Working Group (EPT-TWG) under the National One Health Steering Committee led review and finalization of the HPAI Preparedness and Response Plan, guided by recommendations from intersectoral SimEx and joint risk assessment exercises, as well as the existing one health organization structure. To facilitate this, a 5-day workshop was organized in March 2024 with subject matter specialists from key One Health sectors.
    • FAO ECTAD Western and Central Africa (WCA) held a Regional Training of Surveillance Evaluation Tool (SET) Evaluators in West and Central Africa in Abidjan (Cote D’Ivoire) from 25 to 29 March 2024.
    • FAO ECTAD regional office in WCA organized a regional training workshop on good sampling practices at the Veterinary School in Dakar (EISMV) from 23 to 26 January with special attention to biosafety and biosecurity. A total of 18 participants from 10 countries in West, Central and East Africa received theoretical and practical training in collecting diagnostic specimens from poultry.
    • The VLC in West Africa is providing a four-week Avian Influenza tutored course in English and French.
    • FAO ECTAD Benin supported epidemiological investigation of suspected avian influenza outbreak in Parakou. [link]
    • FAO ECTAD WCA is monitoring suspected and confirmed HPAI outbreaks in multiple countries in the region and providing various supports including provision of laboratory reagents and consumables as well as transport of diagnostic specimens to the reference laboratory (IZS-Ve) for further confirmaiton and sequencing.
    • Burkina Faso released an alert for poultry farmers regarding HPAI outbreak in Ouagadougou on 6 March 2024. FAO has supported the veterinary services to conduct field investigation and implement response measures (Stamping out, carcass disposal, disinfection, quarantine and awareness creation). Support for laboratory reagents, consumables, personal protective equipment (PPE), as well as transport of samples to the reference laboratory (IZSVe) for confirmation and sequencing has also been providing to the country.
    • In Guinea, FAO ECTAD has supported suspected HPAI outbreak investigation in Labé, setting up active surveillance in a high-risk area and raising community awareness [link].
    • Niger confirmed an outbreak of H5N1 HPAI by the Niamey Central Laboratory (LABOCEL) on 27 January 2024 on a family farm in Niamey, which has been the only confirmed case to date. In February 2024, six suspicions were reported in four regions, samples tested negative at the LABOCEL. The biosafety equipment (personal protective equipment [PPE], disinfectants, bags for biohazard waste), which FAO ECTAD prepared at the beginning of current influenza season under a HPAI prevention and control project, supported General Directorate of Veterinary Services in conducting rapid response.
    • In Nigeria, H5N1 HPAI was confirmed in peacock farm in Kebbi State and in geese in Plateau State. FAO ECTAD supported the Federal Ministry of Agriculture and Food Security and other One Health stakeholders in conducting follow-up outbreak investigations and ensuring disease containment, provided PPE, disinfectants, sampling equipment and biohazard bags for the field surveillance; awareness raising have been conducted in live poultry markets in neighbouring towns of biosecurity measures, in particular, the risk of mixing different species in the same space/location was emphasised.
  • North Africa and Middle East
    • FAO ECTAD Egypt in the Regional office for Near East and North Africa (RNE) is supporting the implementation of the targeted risk-based surveillance plan for 2024 to understand the prevalence of Avian Influenza sub-types currently circulating in Egypt and to detect incursion of new subtypes as early as possible.
    • FAO ECTAD Egypt supported the development of National One Health strategic framework which has been endorsed by the Government.
  • Asia
    • Since October 2023, Cambodia confirmed H5N1 HPAI in birds in seven provinces, while nine human cases reported. FAO Cambodia is collaborating National Animal Health and Production Research Institute (NAHPRI)/the General Directorate of Animal Health and Production (GDAHP) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, the Institut Pasteur du Cambodge (IPC), WHO and other partners, participated in joint risk assessment, and providing technical assistance, awareness materials for distribution, and some PPE. [link1, link2]
    • In Viet Nam, the Department of Animal Health and FAO ECTAD Viet Nam issued a joint press release ‘Stay vigilant with Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza A(H5N1)’ upon the detection of new re-assorted HPAI A(H5N1) viruses in chickens and muscovy ducks through active surveillance in Viet Nam [link]. In response to the finding, a vaccine efficacy test against the new virus and live bird market (LBM) surveillance is planned waiting the approval of the work plan. FAO ECTAD in Viet Nam participated in a joint risk assessment held on 4 April with inter-sectoral authorities, and provided updates on the HPAI situation in the country.
    • FAO ECTAD Myanmar in cooperation with Myanmar Livestock Federation organized two workshops entitled ‘Biosecurity, good animal husbandry practice (GAHP) and antimicrobial resistance (AMR) for farmers, feed sellers, and egg collectors’ in Ayeyarwady Region on 19 March and 9 April 2024. Similar workshops was also conducted in Yangon Region in January.
    • FAO ECTAD Myanmar plans to organize a workshop for private veterinarians to encourage reporting practices especially the notifiable animal diseases in Myanmar under USAID funded project ‘Global Health Security Program: Immediate technical assistance for animal health systems to address emerging and priority zoonotic diseases and health threats in Myanmar’.
    • FAO ECTAD Indonesia supported the participation of four animal health laboratories in a regional proficiency testing for avian and swine diseases being organized by the Australian Centre for Disease Preparedness (ACDP).
    • FAO ECTAD in the Philippines, in collaboration with the Bureau of Animal Industry, organized a Coordination Meeting and Simulation Exercise for Animal Disease Emergencies (Avian Influenza and foot-and-mouth disease for Visayas on 12-16 February and South Luzon on 18-22 March. The meeting specifically discussed the Philippine’s Avian Influenza (AI) Vaccination Guidelines to seek inputs and agreement of local veterinarians and animal health workers. To date, the same activity has been conducted in 13 regions covering 60 provinces across the country and will be conducted in North Luzon clusters in April to cover the remaining 22 provinces in 4 regions.
  • Europe and Central Asia
    • The Outbreak Costing Tool (OutCosT) to estimate the cost of outbreaks and their control is being adapted to poultry diseases and is being validated with real HPAI outbreak data from countries in three continents.

FAO Alerts
  • On 14 September 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Central America and South America regions on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in EnglishFrench, and Spanish].
  • On 8 April 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in Asia and the Pacific Region on the risk of a surge and spread of HPAI through increased poultry trade prior to and during Traditional New Year festivities in Asia.
  • On 4 March 2022, FAO an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices in the Americas Region on the risk of introduction and spread of H5NX HPAI [in English, French, and Spanish].
  • On 18 February 2022, FAO issued an alert to Chief Veterinary Officers, FAO offices, and wild bird partner organizations on the increased risk of HPAI outbreaks in wild bird populations in Africa.
  • On 29 October 2021, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI (re-)introduction along migratory flyways to Chief Veterinary Officers globally.
  • On 13 November 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5Nx HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices of at-risk countries in Africa region.
  • On 09 October 2020, FAO sent an alert message on the risk of H5N8 HPAI re-introduction to Chief Veterinary Officers of at-risk countries in Europe, Middle East, and Western and Central Asia regions.
  • On 17 January 2020, FAO released an alert on H5N8 HPAI in Eastern Europe to warn the Chief Veterinary Officers and FAO offices about the potential spread of the disease and advise on measures to take for prevention and control.
OFFLU
  • Information on the OFFLU avian influenza matching pilot project. [link]
  • OFFLU held an online discussion on 5 December 2022 to discuss the avian influenza situation in poultry and wild birds for experts to share experiences on the most recent wave of outbreaks in different countries. A summary is available. [link]
  • The OFFLU published reports for the Vaccine Composition Meeting on avian influenza and swine influenza for February – September 2022.
  • The Tripartite (FAO- WHO -WOAH) together with the WOAH/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenza (OFFLU) has conducted a joint rapid risk assessment addressing the recent influenza A(H3N8) human infection in China in May 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU annual report for 2021 is now available. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the WOAH/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period September 2021 – February 2022. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued a statement on 24 December 2021 addressing the recent introduction of H5N1 HPAI in Canada. [link]
  • The OFFLU network issued an avian influenza statement on 10 November 2021 addressing recent H5Nx high pathogenicity avian influenza virus reassortments. [link]
  • The OFFLU Network issued the summary of the OFFLU call for avian influenza global situation held on 8 November 2021. [link]
  • Avian influenza report of the OIE/FAO Network of expertise on animal influenzas (OFFLU) covering the period March – September 202. [link]
  • As part of the OIE/FAO Network of Expertise on Animal Influenzas, FAO attended the Zoonotic Influenza Sessions of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting held from 2 to 4 March 2021. The report is now available online. [link]
  • On 26 February 2021, the OFFLU issued a statement on High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in the Russian Federation relating to its detection in poultry workers. [link]
  • On 26 October 2020, the OFFLU issued a report on Highl Pathogenicity Avian Influenza in Kazakhstan describing the genetic characteristics of the latest H5N8 HPAI viruses detected recently in the country. [link]
WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting (VCM)
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2023. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2022. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – September 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2021. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – Sept/Oct 2020. [link]
  • Report of the WHO Vaccine Composition Meeting – February 2018. [link]
Global level
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available. [link]
Regional/country level

America

  • FAO organized a webinar on HPAI laboratory testing, under the framework of the GF-TADs and ‘Ask the experts’ for animal health laboratory staff in the region in March 2023. [link]
  • Between 21 and 23 March 2023, FAO held a meeting in Santiago, Chile with the participation of the heads of official veterinary services from 8 Latin American countries that are part of the TCP project, as well as specialists, discussed the epidemiological situation of HPAI in their territories and the control measures implemented.
  • The GF-TADs for the Americas hosted a technical meeting on HPAI vaccination: Approach, tools, knowledge and experience for the Americas held virtually in March 2023. [link]
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place online on 14 December 2022. Recommendations from this meeting can be found here. [link]
  • FAO’s emergency Technical Cooperation Programme (TCP) project provides support to manage the outbreak of avian influenza in the region, as well as its impact on the most vulnerable households in the affected countries.
  • FAO collated risk communication materials available at FAO in other regions globally and shared with FAO RLC.
  • The first virtual meeting of the Standing Group of Experts on Avian Influenza (SGE-IA) took place in December 2022. Recommendations available [link] Dec 2022.
  • FAO activated coordination and response protocols for the avian influenza outbreaks in the region. [link]
  • FAO conducted a qualitative risk assessment for introduction of the H5N1 HPAI clade 2.3.4.4b virus from currently known infected countries in the Americas has been conducted.
  • FAO is monitoring the situation closely through its network of decentralized offices and Reference Centers for Influenza to maintain close communication with members in Latin America and the Caribbean providing technical assistance and support as well as risk communication strategies and collaborating with resource partners to enhance preparedness and control of AI in the region. [link]

Asia

  • FAO participated to the 7th World One Health Congress held on 8-11 November 2022 and presented preliminary results of the Qualitative Risk Assessment addressing H5 HPAI risk of introduction in Central America, South America, and the Caribbean. [link]
  • International Alliance for Biological Standardization (IABS) held a meeting on 25-26 October 2022 addressing High Pathogenicity Avian Influenza Vaccination Strategies to prevent and control HPAI: Removing unnecessary barriers for usage. Conclusions and recommendations are now available [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 8 December 2022 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • The FAO-ECTAD Team in Viet Nam prepared a report entitled Economic analysis of enhanced biosecurity practices in three types of chicken farms in Northern Viet Nam [link].
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021. A summary can be found [link].
  • FAO ECTAD RAP organized a quarterly coordination call on 16 February 2023 with ECTAD countries in Asia to discuss progresses and challenges around avian influenza surveillance in the region.
  • FAO ECTAD RAP and IPC developed practical guidelines for field sequencing using MinIon.
  • FAO ECTAD Indonesia held a Joint Risk Assessment (JRA) training on zoonotic priority diseases in West Java Province and in West Kalimantan Province.
  • FAO ECTAD Cambodia organized AI surveillance review to share data from AI surveillance implementing partners, i.e. the results of AI surveillance in live bird markets, influenza-like illness (ILI) and severe acute respiratory infections (SARI) carried from 2020-2022 by CCDC, FAO, IPC, NAHPRI, NIPH and USCDC, to understand the challenges, lesson-learnt, and to do the AI surveillance resource mapping.
  • FAO ECTAD Lao organized a refresher training on avian influenza surveillance and response in Louangprabang Province with participants from various partners i.e. provincial livestock and fisheries section involved in the avian influenza surveillance, Central Veterinary Services and laboratory, Division of Veterinary Legislation, public health sector including the Department of Communicable Disease Control, Information Education and Communication Department, and other development partners namely US CDC, WHO, Wildlife Conservation Society.
  • FAO ECTAD Viet Nam organized a joint risk assessment (JRA) workshop for H5N6 (Dong Nai Province) and H5N8 (Lang Son Province).
  • FAO RAP organized a regional Avian Influenza virtual meeting in November 2021 [report].

North Africa and Middle East

  • FAO ECTAD Egypt and General Organization for Veterinary Services (GOVS) epidemiology unit updated the AI surveillance plan for January – December 2023 based on surveillance finding and risk mapping in 2022.
  • FAO organized a workshop on Highly Pathogenic Avian Influenza in Libya [link].

Sub-Saharan Africa

  • FAO ECTAD assisted Gambia sending samples to the reference laboratory (IZSVe-Italy) for sequencing. H5N1 2.3.4.4b was detected and the phylogenetic analyses confirmed that the H5N1 virus clusters with genotype BB recently detected in northern Italy in June 2023, suggesting a possible back-and-forth movement of viruses between Europe and Africa.
  • FAO Emergency Centre for Transboundary Animal Diseases (ECTAD) regional offices in Eastern and Southern Africa (ESA) and West and Central Africa (WCA) organized 5 day regional training courses on Infectious Substances Shipment in Nairobi (June), Abidjan (July), Abuja (August). A total of 32 particpants from 13 countries successfully completed the training and were certified to ship infectious substances by air, in compliance with the applicable international regulations.
  • FAO Ethiopia in collaboration with the Ethiopian Agricultural Research Institute has prepared a biosecurity brochure covering three key areas - conceptual, structural, and operational biosecurity measures. The brochure provides guidance to small and medium commercial poultry farms on implementing effective biosecurity measures for increased productivity, and a more sustainable and profitable industry, and is aimed to be used by Farmers Field School (FFS).
  • In Kenya, FAO is supporting Kenya Animal Biosurveillance system (KABS) disease reporting platform roll-out for syndromic surveillance and the refresher trainings.
  • FAO Burkina Faso trained 175 staff on HPAI epidemiological surveillance; conducted Training of Trainers (ToT) course on on good poultry farming practices, hygiene and biosecurity measures on farms; the 46 trainers conducted sensitization of 300 model poultry farmers from 10 regions, and also 30 communicators and journalists of the press on HPAI under TCP project.
  • In Togo, FAO is supported HPAI outbreak response by providing technical assistance and supporting field outbreak investigation missions. A training of 25 agents on disease reporting / early warning using FAO Event Mobile Application (EMA-i) takes place soon.
  • FAO Emergency Management Center (EMC-AH) expert mission in May 2023 visited Saint-Louis as a part of support to control HPAI emergency.
  • FAO ECTAD Côte d’Ivoire supported the disinfection of poultry markets in Abidjan.
  • FAO EMC-AH conducted field mission in Gabon from 4 to 8 July 2022 in response to the recent H5N1 HPAI outbreaks in Estuaire Province.
  • FAO ECTAD continues supporting annual proficiency testing schemes of national and sub-national level laboratories for AI diagnosis in Central East, and West Africam countries through USAID funded GHSA programme.
  • FAO ECTAD West and Central Africa Region, in collaboration with EMC-AH, supported the Government of Guinea to undertake a HPAI risk assessment mission to identify risk factors for introduction and spread.
  • FAO participated in the 2nd virtual meeting of Regional Incident Coordination Group (ICG) for West Africa on HPAI organized by FAO ECTAD-WCA in collaboration with ECOWAS Regional Animal Health Centre (RAHC) held in March 2022.
  • Taking stock of FAO-USAID partnership to control health threats in Kenya [link].
  • Stopping Avian Influenza in Togo [link].

Figure 1. Number of countries reported HPAI since 01 October 2023 by subtype (left) and by region (right) as of 25 April 2024 (territory/area for sub/Antarctic zone)

Source: WOAH WAHIS portal, government and publications.

Table 3. Epidemiological overview for avian influenza viruses viruses known to have caused zoonotic infections in the past 20 years

Subtype

Epidemiological situation overview

H5Nx Gs/GD* HPAI (1996)

High pathogenicity avian influenza viruses within the Goose/Guangdong/1/96- lineage (Gs/GD) were first detected in geese in Guangdong Province, China in 1996. They have persisted, as high pathogenicity viruses, since then and have caused outbreaks in poultry across all regions globally other than Oceania. The initial viruses in this lineage were of the A(H5N1) subtype but other subtypes (including H5N2, H5N3 H5N5, H5N6, H5N8) have emerged, mainly in the past 10 years, as a result of reassortment with other avian influenza viruses. The common feature of these viruses is an HA gene related back to the original Gs/GD/96 virus. The HA gene of these viruses has evolved over the past 28 years, initially into 10 clades (clade 0 to 9) of which descendents of clade 2 viruses are the only ones that continue to circulate. Multiple 5th order clades persist such as the one that is currently dominant globally – clade 2.3.4.4b - whereas others have emerged and disappeared.

Multiple genotypes carrying different combinations of the eight influenza A segmented genes have emerged presumably as a result of co-infection of birds with different avian inluenza viruses that also facilitated reassortment. Some important genotypes have been named unofficially (e.g. Z genotype in Hong Kong SAR, China in 2002, BB genotype derived from gulls in Europe in 2022 onwards). Of considerable significance has been reassortment with enzootic A(H9N2) viruses.

Some of these Gs/GD viruses have produced severe zoonotic infections in humans, first identified in 1997 when an A(H5N1) clade 0 virus in the Gs/GD lineage in Hong Kong SAR, China caused disease outbreaks in poultry in farms and markets as well as severe disease in humans. In several cases there was some evidence of limited onward transmission in humans and this event raised concerns that it might be the beginning of a human influenza pandemic. Despite the successful efforts to eradicate this particular strain, other viruses within this lineage persisted and evolved in China, becoming more adept at infecting domestic ducks. By 2003 spread of these viruses via wild birds and live bird trade occurred across East and Southeast Asia, resulting in additional zoonotic infection in humans [link].

The important role of wild birds in the transmission of these viruses over long distances became apparent in 2005 when a Gs/GD virus (clade 2.2) spread, primarily via wild birds, across Eurasia, and parts of Africa from western China. Most high-income countries eliminated this virus from poultry, but it persisted in several low and middle- income countries. Viruses within the Gs/GD lineage continued to evolve and spread. Additional intercontinental waves of transmission have occurred with the two most significant being those in 2014 (clade 2.3.4.4c) and from 2016 onwards (clade 2.3.4.4b) that also resulted in spread of these viruses to North America (2014-15 and 2021-22), with the latest outbreak extending through central and South America and to sub-Antarctic islands. These waves involved multiple N subtypes.

In 2022/2023, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused extensive infection in coastal seabirds and mass die- offs of numerous ecologically important wild bird species.

For an updated list of bird species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE

In 2024, H5N1 2.3.4.4b caused infection in goats and dairy cattle in the United States of America.

USDA shared the Whole Genome Sequences, see HERE.

Among the other Gs/GD virus clades that remain endemic in specific areas are clade 2.3.2.1a H5N1 viruses that have persisted in South Asia since 2010 and rarely associated with disease in humans.

Clade 2.3.2.1c/e viruses have been present in Indonesia since 2012 and related viruses are still circulating in Cambodia, Viet Nam and Lao People’s Democratic Republic with ten recent human cases, five of which were fatal recorded in Cambodia (4) and Viet Nam (1).

For an updated list of confirmed human cases with A(H5N1) see HERE

In addition, more than 80 human cases have been associated with clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5Nx/y) and 2.3.4.4h A(H5N6) viruses with most of these occurring in 2021 and 2022.

Clade 2.3.4.4b A(H5N1) viruses have caused few human cases but have resulted in multiple mammalian cases including aquatic mammals.

For an updated list of mammalian species affected with A(H5Nx) see HERE

Avian origin H3N8 LPAI

An Influenza A(H3N8) virus lineage emerged in live bird markets in southern China in mid 2021 [link]. Since then, three human cases of Influenza A(H3N8) have been reported: In April 2022, the first human clinical case associated with this lineage was reported in Henan Province, China and was associated with severe disease. In May 2022, a 5-year-old boy was diagnosed with a mild influenza A(H3N8) infection in Changsha City, Hunan Province, China. On 27 March 2023, a third human case was reported from Guangdong Province, China in a 56-year-old female with underlying illneses who subsequently died.

One of the A(H3N8) viruses isolated from a human was found to be transmissible by air in ferrets [link] but no evidence of sustained human transmission has been reported.

H7N4 LPAI (2017)

One human case in China with reported exposure to poultry.

H7N9 LPAI (2013) & HPAI (2017)

Reported only in China with over 1 000 human cases between 2013 and 2017 with a marked increase in 2017 compared to previous waves.

Most human cases exposed in live bird markets.

Nation-wide vaccination campaign in poultry since Sep 2017: Last reported human case in 2019 [link]. See FAO H7N9 situation update

H9N2 LPAI

First human case reported in 1998.

To date, about 100 influenza A(H9N2) human cases diagnosed worldwide, many of them were reported from China since December 2015. Most cases mild and involving children. Only two fatal cases reported [link]

Endemic in multiple countries in Africa and Asia, a cause of significant production losses and mortalities in poultry production systems.

Three major lineages and multiple genotypes.

H10Nx LPAI

To date, two influenza A(H10N3) human infections have been reported globally [link]. In May 2021, the first case in Jiangsu Province, China [link], in September 2022, a second case in Zhejiang Province, China [link]

The first influenza A(H10N5) human infection was reported in Zhejiang Province, China [link].
Influenza A(H10N7) infection have been reported in humans in 2004 in Egypt [link] and in 2010 in Australia [link].

Since 2013, three influenza A(H10N8) human infections have been reported in Jiangxi Province, China.

Recommendations for affected countries and those at risk

FAO recommends intensified surveillance and awareness raising by national authorities.

General recommendations
It is important to report sick or dead birds – both wild birds and poultry - or wild mammals to local authorities (veterinary services, public health officials, community leaders etc.). These should be tested for avian influenza viruses.

Recommendations to poultry producers
Farmers and poultry producers should step up their biosecurity measures in order to prevent potential virus introduction from wild birds or their faeces.

Recommendations to hunters
Hunting associations and wildlife authorities should be aware that avian influenza viruses might be present in waterfowl and some other species hunted and that hunting, handling and dressing of shot game carries the risk of spreading avian influenza viruses to susceptible poultry.

Recommendations to national authorities
Increase surveillance efforts for the early detection of influenza viruses in poultry and dead wild species including certain mammals.

For full recommendations including non-avian species please see [link].

FAO publication
EMPRES Watch/Focus On 
Online course/webinar
  • Avian Influenza Preparedness Course was held in April/May 2023 [link].
  • FAO RNE launched bilingual training course on Avian Influenza preparedness for NENA region on 17 January 2023 [link].
  • FAO through its Virtual Learning Center developed an Avian Influenza Preparedness Course in 2022 [link].
  • FAO, in collaboration with WOAH, organized a webinar on H5 HPAI occurrence and prevention in North Africa on 20 May 2021.
  • WHO developed an online training course entitled “Strengthening collaboration between human and animal health sectors for improved health security”. The course covers the Tripartite Zoonosis Guide and associated tools in Module 2 [link].
  • FAO held a webinar entitled Managing HPAI in wild birds on 10 February 2022 – recording part 1 & part 2.
  • FAO Webinar: Pros and cons on AI vaccination, presented by Leslie Sims, Ian Brown, Sergei Khomenko, Sophie von Dobschüetz (2018) [link].
  • FAO Webinar: Intercontinental spread of H5N8 highly pathogenic avian influenza – Analysis of the current situation and recommendations, for preventive action (2016) [link].
Risk Assessment 
Wild birds/mammals
Socio-economic / PPP
Tripartite/Quadripartite plan, guide, tool

Next issue: 23 May 2024

The disease situation updates are produced by the FAO Emergency Prevention System for Animal Health (EMPRES-AH) as part of its mission to increase global disease intelligence.
Disclaimer

Information provided herein is current as of the date of issue. Information added or changed since the last Global AIV with Zoonotic Potential situation update appears in orange. Human cases are depicted in the geographic location of their report. For some cases, exposure may have occurred in one geographic location but reported in another. For cases with unknown onset date, reporting date was used instead. FAO compiles information drawn from multiple national (Ministries of Agriculture or Livestock, Ministries of Health, Provincial Government websites; Centers for Disease Prevention and Control [CDC]) and international sources (World Health Organization [WHO], World Organisation for Animal Health [WOAH]), as well as peer reviewed scientific articles. FAO makes every effort to ensure, but does not guarantee, accuracy, completeness or authenticity of the information. The designation employed and the presentation of material on the map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of FAO concerning the legal or constitutional status of any country, territory or sea area, or concerning the delimitation of frontiers.

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