The initial momentum of the Great Leap Forward (GLF) policy and the People’s Commune (PC) movement was tremendous, but the flaws and contradictions of this “radicalization” soon became apparent. There was no easy way to double steel production as the GLF policy initially expected. It was impossible to increase total foodgrain production from less than 200 million tons to 350 million tons. From the end of 1958 to the beginning of 1959, the Communist Party of China (CPC) held a series of meetings to correct the exaggerated reports generated by the GLF policy and the excessive communization movement, and tried to propose corrective measures. Mao Zedong himself came to recognize the excesses of these policies, to some extent, and began to seek modifications toward more realistic policies. Thus, the overall atmosphere of the Party was shifting “from left to right,” or more precisely, from fantasy to reality.

Although there are quite a few published documents on the Lushan Conference itself, Lushan Huiyi Zhenmianmu (The True Features of the Lushan Conference) (Li 1999a, hereinafter, Li’s Notes (3)), a memoir by Li Rui, in my view, is the richest in content and analysis. Li Rui was a close friend of Peng Dehuai and his associates. He was also deeply involved in this incident. He himself came under heavy criticism and condemnation at the Lushan Conference, was subsequently sent to a remote area and even to the Qincheng Prison outside Beijing, which is well known for its incarceration of political prisoners. In this Chapter, I will focus on his memoir and supplement it with other sources to describe the major changes in the direction of the GLF policy up to the time of the Lushan Conference. First, I will examine Peng Dehuai’s personal letter to Mao, the so-called “Opinion Letter” at the Lushan Conference, which in a sense marked a major turning point in the GLF policy. Next, I will consider Mao’s fierce criticism of it, and how and why the subsequent war of accusations against the “Peng Dehuai group” started. Then, I will review the relationship between Peng and Mao after the Lushan Conference. Finally, I will try to consider the significance of the Peng tragedy in my own way.

Those who were involved in this incident, including Li Rui, were restored to their honor after the death of Mao Zedong. Still, when we read Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter, it is hard to imagine why his policy criticism and advice to Mao, which were very restrained from an ordinary person’s point of view, would have infuriated Mao Zedong. I feel that this dramatic incident demonstrates and condenses the idiosyncrasies of Mao’s way of thinking and behavior.

1 The Reversal of the Great Leap Forward Policy

As soon as the GLF policy and the establishment of the PC system began, various problems became apparent. One of the major policy changes initiated by the Party and the government was to lower the basic accounting unit of the PC to the level of a production brigade. When the Commune was first established, the scale of production and distribution was several to dozens of times larger than the previous advanced producer cooperatives, that is, almost equivalent to a production brigade consisting of approximately 200–300 households. Public mess halls were also established where people could eat for free. Thus, the illusion was created that a “communist” society was imminent. The biggest problem, as pointed out in the previous chapter, is that as the production as well as distribution unit expands, the problem of the reduced motivation of member farmers arises—the fate of collective farming—and becomes more and more serious. When a large number of people work together and the fruits of their labor are distributed, there is always a sense of dissatisfaction among the members, who may say, “I worked so hard, but I am only paid this much.” In the case of a business corporation, there are established rules for distribution like a wage system and a management or supervisory function for the members works appropriately. In the case of collective farming, however, the more the number of members increases, the more difficult it becomes to manage or supervise them. The fact that the old individual farm system was naturally restored when the government allowed collectives to be dismantled after the reform and opening-up of the country in 1978 clearly suggests the inherent fragility of collective farming. The reduction of the basic unit of production to the level of a production brigade was not enough, and then, after 1960, when famine spread and the number of deaths from starvation exploded in rural areas, the pendulum of the policy swung back even further, as the unit of production was reduced to the level of production teams, or the level of the previous elementary cooperatives of about 20–30 households.

Another shift was the review of small-scale and indigenous production (tufa), such as that of steel, to lower the excessive production targets to a more realistic level: The cost of producing one ton of pig iron was 100 yuan for a large blast furnace, while a small blast furnace cost 345 yuan, whereas the state procurement price for pig iron was only 150 yuan. According to an estimate by the National Bureau of Statistics, the deficit (the difference between the cost and procurement price) caused by the indigenous steel and iron production amounted to 5 billion yuan in 1958 (Li’s Notes (2), p. 234). As for the production of steel for 1959, Mao proposed, at the First Zhengzhou Conference in November 1958, to lower the target from the previous 30 million tons to 22 million tons, and then still not confident, he suggested lowering the target further to 15 million tons. He stated:

“Are you confident about the 18 million tons (proposed by Bo Yibo)? The prospect will open only when you can persuade. I don’t agree at all with the basis for this or that you are saying now. I’ve decided to take an opportunistic standpoint and to struggle for it …. Others have opposed my rash advance (maojin) stance before, but now I oppose their rash advance.” (ibid., p. 362)

In 1956, Mao Zedong had sharply criticized the “anti-rash-advance” views of Liu Shaoqi, Zhou Enlai, Chen Yun, and others (see previous chapter), but now he probably inwardly wondered, “Did I say too much at that time?” Did he reflect a little on these criticisms? No, he had never sincerely criticized himself before or after, so it is very unlikely he did at this time.Footnote 1

2 The Lushan Conference: Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter

At the enlarged meeting of the Party’s Political Bureau held in Shanghai from late March to early April 1959, Mao Zedong addressed 16 issues. I will concentrate on three of them that anticipate the Lushan Conference and might even indicate a strategy on his part to invite criticism of Peng Dehuai (Photo 6.1).

Photo 6.1
A photograph of Mao Zedong on the right and another man on the left, in overcoats and caps. People in overcoats, buildings, and trees are in the background.

Source https://news.sina.com.cn/c/p/2006-08-30/160810874009.shtml

Peng Dehuai and Mao Zedong. Peng Dehuai (left) and Mao Ze Zong. They clashed at the Lushan Conference in 1959.

Full size image

First, Mao spoke as if he were admonishing himself, calling for “being resourceful and decisive” (douomou shanduan):

“Some comrades are very subjective and arbitrary, thinking that their opinions are correct, and the result of practice may fail, and may even create meaningless phenomena. We must listen to opinions from all sides, especially opposing opinions, [and] different opinions” (Li’s Notes (2), p. 456).

Next, he admonished everyone to “communicate with others” (yuren tongqi), exclaiming:

“Everyone must communicate with each other. The center and the regions must consult and communicate with each other, the Party committee members must consult and communicate with each other, as well as with their secretaries. We have not communicated well in the past, and we must think of ways to communicate …. Comrades, I want you to use your brain a little more and listen carefully to opposing opinions.” (Ibid., p. 462)

He then continued:

“We must listen to the views of the majority. We must also pay attention to the opinions of minorities and individuals. Within the Party, we must create an atmosphere where if there is a problem, we discuss it, and if there is a flaw, we fix it. Being criticized for flaws can often be a bit painful, but if we correct them after being criticized, it gets better. It is often a little painful when our shortcomings are criticized, but it gets better when they are corrected through criticisms. Some comrades do not speak their mind or they adopt the golden mean of the Confucian school (zhongyong zhi dao).” (Ibid., p. 463)

As a matter of fact, however, he lost his temper in the Lushan Conference. When he received a letter from Peng Dehuai.

Mao advocates the need to create an atmosphere of freer exchange of opinions and mutual criticism within the Party, but do the Party members who have seen Mao’s behavior up to that point dare to criticize him? He points out that one person sometimes outweighs many, that the truth is in his hands, not in the hands of many (ibid., p. 463), so he stresses that it is possible for one person to be correct. By his standards, he alone was always the “monopolizer of truth”, suppressing the opinions of many, at least in matters of the grand national scheme. One of the governing principles of the communist parties since Lenin has been “democratic centralism,” but who is it then who decides what is democratic, or what is centralized, and how it should be decided? Under this principle, usually very few people, or in the extreme case, one absolute leader, decide(s).

Finally, Mao Zedong made a profound statement regarding Peng Dehuai:

“Many people resent me, especially Comrade Peng Dehuai, who resents me very much. Don’t you think so? Even if he doesn’t resent me terribly, he does resent me a little, though, because he and I do not get along with each other very well …. My position on Comrade Peng Dehuai is like this. When others do not offend me, I do not offend them. When others offend me, I will certainly offend them.” (Ibid., pp. 467–468)

It is a frightening warning that foreshadows Peng Dehuai’s impeachment four months later. At the same time, it suggests that the confrontation between Mao and Peng was not something new, but one with deep historical roots. It also demonstrates Mao’s tenacity.

Mao Zedong sent Peng Dehuai a copy of the History of Ming Dynasty, Biography of Hai Rui, recommending that he read these books. Hai Rui was a Ming dynasty’s prime minister who wrote a letter to Emperor Jia Jing, but was imprisoned for his direct advice. Mao said, “Who is as brave as Hai Rui among our comrades? I don’t know which is excellent, Hai Rui or Bao WenzhengFootnote 2 (ibid., p. 469).

According to Li Rui, Peng Dehuai was a man of very honest character, so that he seriously read Biography of Hai Rui as Mao Zedong had recommended. It was because he was so deeply impressed by the spirit of Hai Rui that he sent a personal letter to Mao at the Lushan Conference (ibid., p. 474). Peng could not have foreseen at the time that this would prove fatal to him.

As argued above, in the spring of 1959, the failures of the GLF as well as PC policies became increasingly apparent. The Party leadership, too, became aware of the extreme crisis over the entire countryside when they visited farming villages in various regions and recognized the spread of hunger and heard about strong calls for the abolition of mess halls. They also saw the terrible economic imbalance caused by the unreasonable steel production campaign, and so the political atmosphere changed dramatically from anti-rightist to criticism of the left. At the Party meeting held in July in the scenic summer resort of Lushan, most of those in attendance believed that such a trend would be confirmed and advanced further. In fact, at the regional subcommittees held in the first half of the Conference, the participants talked about the current misery and problems. To ostensibly save face for Mao it was said that the GLF policy had been successful, but one policy after another was listed that needed improvement or correction. Peng Dehuai also attended and talked at a subcommittee. Perhaps because he had just visited his home village in Hunan Province with the devastation and the earnest appeals of the farmers strongly etched in his mind, he made up his mind to write a personal letter to Mao Zedong on July 14 during the Conference, calling for drastic correction of past policies. Having received the letter, Mao immediately printed it out, distributing it with the title “Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter“ to all the participants at the July 16 meeting. This was his signal for the impeachment of Peng. Below I summarize the main points of this letter, adding my own comments.

The Opinion Letter begins by noting that China has achieved high growth in 1958 and praises the great achievements of the GLF policy. Peng Dehuai states:

“This is not only a great achievement for the country, but will also have positive long-term effects on the socialist camp in the world.”

Nevertheless, he warns that certain projects in basic construction have been implemented too hastily and too much, and have led to a dispersion of funds, yet still this trend is continuing in 1959, so the situation will get worse if those projects are not stopped in order to correct such economic malaise.

Next, he admires Mao’s PC strategy for its significant role in lifting China’s peasants out of poverty, speeding up socialist construction, and providing the correct path to communism, so acknowledges that although there was some confusion, things are basically back on a normal track after a series of meetings.

He also takes up the issue of the small-scale indigenous blast furnace—how such a steel-making movement was effective in educating many technical personnel as well as training cadres, although it wasted a lot of resources.

In light of the above performances, he concludes, the GLF and the PC policies have been successful, but following points need improvement. First, a tendency toward aggrandizement has run rampant in various regions and sectors, and many comrades have become inflamed by information about the imminent arrival of a communist society. Many leaders, including himself, did not properly understand Chairman Mao’s instructions to combine great enthusiasm with scientific analysis.

Second, he claims, because of our “petty bourgeois fanaticism,” we have made errors of the left. We have forgotten the mass line and the way of seeking truth from facts that our Party has cultivated for many years. We have confused the long-term policy with immediate measures, the whole with the part, so that the “catch up with the United Kingdom in 15 years” policy has become a goal that we want realized immediately, even though it is a long-term one. Some comrades also think that we can ignore economic laws as long as they do “politics in command” (zhengzhi guashuai). These subjectivist errors of the left are more difficult to correct than right-leaning conservative ideas.

Finally, he concludes by saying that if we can unite all Party members from now on and learn lessons from our past mistakes, the future will be bright as Chairman Mao has said, and the goal of catching up with the U.K. in 15 years will basically be realized within four years.

Having examined this letter, we can see that Peng Dehuai, while suppressing his true feelings and showing his obedience to Mao Zedong, was quite blunt in pointing out the fundamental flaws inherent in and resulting from the GLF and PC policies. Although he had intended to send these comments only to Mao personally, the reaction of many participants at the meeting who read this was relatively positive, as Bo Yibo (then Deputy Prime Minister) wrote in retrospect:

“A great many people were very much in favor of Peng Dehuai. Many people agreed with Comrade Peng Dehuai’s letter, seeing it as affirming the achievements of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ while pointing out a number of serious problems and lessons. However, some of the terms, such as ‘petty bourgeois fanaticism,’ are not appropriate and should be reconsidered. Comrade Peng Dehuai’s spirit of boldly presenting his views was almost unanimously affirmed by everyone.” (Bo 1993, p. 858)

Certainly, some had different views. For example, Chen Zhengren, Minister of Labor, stated that “even though there were problems, they were being improved.” A well-known marshal, He Long, criticized Peng for taking the problem too seriously. Many, however, supported Peng’s opinion, at least in principle. Probably some of the positive reactions were unexpected for Mao, who was about to distribute the Opinion Letter so as to launch an attack on Peng Dehuai. Alternatively, perhaps Mao would have been satisfied if more members were negative towards Peng, or if most had gently criticized his stance and views in which case the matter might not have become so serious. No, that would be a misjudgment of Mao’s true character. He is the type to go all out once he decides to do something.

Peng Dehuai’s Letter was strongly supported by Zhang Wentian, then Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, at a group discussion meeting. Ignoring the restraints of Party Secretary of Shanghai City Ke Qingshi, known as a loyal follower of Mao Zedong and chairman of that meeting group, he continued his speech for a whopping three hours. His manuscript contained more than 8,000 characters, of which only 270 talked about the achievements so far, with 39 “but” (dan) adverbs (Li’s Notes (3), p. 153). In other words, the entire statement was a broad list of flaws, problems, and reevaluations of the GLF and PC policies. Finally, he referred to Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter and praised its central part as an attempt to summarize the past experiences, saying that its main intention was very good, though regarding the most sensitive expression, petty bourgeois fanaticism, “it would have been even better if he had not said it. [But] even if he had said it, it would have been fine. We can think about what we should do in the end. However, it is probably petty bourgeois fanaticism that makes the communist wind blow” (ibid., p. 158). In this way, he firmly defended Peng and his opinion.

Zhang Wentian, who was far more learned and theoretical than Peng, who was from a poor peasant family and low educational background, sorted out the policy problems and developed a sharp discussion. Possibly it may have been Zhang’s frank, bold, and convincing criticism that infuriated Mao Zedong more than Peng’s restrained opinions had.

Soon after the Lushan Conference had begun, Mao Zedong appointed Hu Qiaomu, Yang Shangkun, Chen Boda, Wu Lengxi, and Tian Jiaying to form a drafting committee to prepare a type of conference bulletin. He later added six more members, including Lu Dingyi and Li Rui, and ordered them to prepare a “Protocol Record on Various Issues of the Lushan Conference” of up to 5000 characters. Based on the discussions of each group, 18 issues were organized into this “record” to be used as discussion material for the meeting. However, in the middle of this process, Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter was distributed, and as a result the discussion turned to the Letter. In this way, a review of the policies promoted by Mao Zedong, including the GLF movement, escalated from consideration to criticism, from this Protocol to Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter, then to Zhang Wentian’s quite harsh evaluations of Mao’s policies as a whole. Mao Zedong may have felt that an all-out attack on him had finally begun. So, during a plenary session on July 23, having been silent and absent from the Conference until then, Mao launched a bitter and fierce attack on Peng along with those who sympathized with him, and on the “right-leaning” climate of the Conference.

3 Mao’s Criticism of Peng Dehuai

Mao started off by saying, “Since everyone has talked so much, now let me talk, too.” He continued to say, “I have taken sleeping pills three times, but I can’t sleep well.” His words were a glimpse of his excitement, seething frustration and anger over the past few days. Perhaps because of his lack of sleep, or perhaps because of his excitement, this talk is repetitive in content, therefore not well organized and poorly prepared for a discourse by Mao Zedong. Ignoring the actual order of his statements and arranging them in my own way, he roughly states the following:

“First of all, it is true that the past policies have lacked balance and have not considered comprehensive equilibrium, but this is also because we have focused their energies on revolution rather than construction, and because we did not understand, including Mao himself, what planning is in the first place.”

“They say we have separated ourselves from the masses, but that is only temporary; now we are together with the masses. If there is petty bourgeois fanaticism, it is only a little. They are trying to do communism in rural Henan and Hebei (Provinces), but this is because they are so poor that all this enthusiasm of the masses cannot be called petty bourgeois enthusiasm. We must not dampen the enthusiasm of the masses. Even mess halls should be open where they can. One third of the mess halls should remain at the very least in the whole country.”

“I have two charges against me. One is that I asked the masses to make 10.7 million tons of steel, which mobilized 90 million people, spent 4 billion yuan in subsidies, and consequently lost more than it gained. The other is the People’s Commune, which was indeed my proposal at Beidaihe Conference, and although there was a bit of petty bourgeois enthusiasm, everyone agreed to the proposal, so it is everyone’s responsibility.”

“Some comrades are shaken. They were shaken in 1956 and 1957 in terms of ‘opposition to the rash advance.’ Now they are inclined, although they do not say so, against the Great Leap Forward. In fact, they say they have ‘something to lose but also something to gain,’ and they first set ‘something to lose.’ They are not rightist, but they are close to being rightists, ‘only 30 km away,’ that is, they are almost rightists.”

“If you do ten things and nine are bad [the ‘one finger and nine fingers’ theory, discussed below] and put them all in the newspaper, society will perish. If that happens, I will go to the countryside and lead the peasants to overthrow the government. If the People’s Liberation Army does not follow me, I will go and find the Red Army or organize another Liberation Army. The People’s Liberation Army will follow me [not Peng Dehuai].”

And finally, he concludes his talk by saying, “if you have complaints and opinions, you should not keep them to yourself, but express them.”Footnote 3

Hearing this talk, those who had actively defended Peng Dehuai were surprised, nervous, and fearful. For Li Rui, too, Mao’s discourse was a bolt from the blue. Probably Li was frightened that he might too be condemned as a “rightist.” After the meeting, he went outside with Chen Boda, Tian Jiaying, and Wu Lengxi to walk along the mountain path, but no one spoke; everyone fell into a depressed mood (Li’s Notes (3), p. 174). Li Rui and others could feel Mao’s anger quite easily. They felt threatened by Mao, who had implied, “If you don’t listen to me, I will start a revolution again.”

The most depressed was, of course, Peng Dehuai. He could not sleep that night and kept thinking about this and that until dawn. He may have been thinking “Why did Chairman Mao criticize me when I had not said anything wrong? Even if there was a serious mistake in the letter I wrote, why didn’t he call me to talk about it instead of making it public?” He finally came to the following conclusion:

“If the prestige of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, headed by Comrade Mao Zedong, is damaged, it will cause even greater damage to the international proletarian movement. With this thought, my original belief that my opinion was correct began to waver.” (Peng 1981, pp. 277–278)

This clearly reflects the typical psychology of “self-criticism” by Party members in China, a tendency to rationalize justification for their actions. As a Party member, Peng probably thought that when a Party member clashed with the Party, it was the Party member’s mission to prioritize the Party’s dignity and interests over sticking to his own thoughts. He was likely convinced that the truth was on his side and he would eventually be proven right, but for the sake of the Party and the nation, he told himself that the truth was with Chairman Mao.

In the first place, why was Mao Zedong so outraged by Peng Dehuai‘s Opinion Letter? As far as his July 23rd talk is concerned, it is obvious that Mao, the supposed originator of the GLF as well as PC policies, was dissatisfied with the Letter because Peng emphasized too many failures and defects (nine fingers) and too few achievements (one finger) of these policies. However, he would have been aware of such an assessment of the situation without being told by Peng since he had already heard it from several people personally. However, when Peng boldly and frankly pointed it out to him, perhaps the flames of Mao’s prideful anger flared up. In Chinese, it might have been “naoxiu chengnu” (getting angry out of embarrassment). No matter how much Peng praised Mao at the beginning of his Opinion Letter, stressing that “The Great Leap Forward was a great achievement,” Mao saw through Peng’s innermost thoughts. Mao must have wanted to say, “I know your true feelings are against the GLF and PC policies that I have been promoting. If you are opposing me, you should just say so.”

Or perhaps Peng Dehua’s use of the term “petty bourgeois fanaticism” was the trigger. This expression had been called into question by Zhang Wentian and other participants even before Mao’s talk. No need to say, Peng did not mean to say that Mao himself had been affected by such fanaticism. He must have meant to say, “Chairman Mao was calm, but the other people were moved by petty bourgeois fanaticism,” whether he truly meant it or not.

Mao Zedong, while ostensibly acknowledging that “there was a bit of petty bourgeois fanaticism,” was particularly enthusiastic about “criticizing the bourgeoisie” and advocating class struggle theory, and may have felt as if he were being attacked for being bourgeois.

Moreover, Mao Zedong was suspicious of Peng Dehuai’s relationship with the Soviet Union. By that time, relations between China and the Soviet Union had begun to deteriorate, and Mao was also quite angry at Khrushchev’s refusal to provide China with nuclear weapons technology. In addition, Khrushchev was critical of China’s PC policy. He had made a speech in Poland in July 1959, pointing out, “The Soviet Union once created a similar commune organization that failed. It is wrong for China to declare [at the Beidaihe Conference in August 1958] that the People’s Commune is the path to communism,” thus pouring cold water on the People’s Commune so praised by Mao. Defense Minister Peng and Zhang Wentian had visited the Soviet Union as well as Eastern Europe just prior to the Lushan Conference, where they also met with Khrushchev in Moscow. It is no wonder that skeptical Mao suspected that Peng and his group may have been secretly connected behind the scenes with the Soviet Union or Khrushchev.

At the enlarged meeting of the CPC Central Military Commission held in Beijing immediately after the Lushan Conference, Mao Zedong again sharply criticized Peng Dehuai and others, by saying:

“We will not allow Chinese Communists to go abroad and destroy foreign communist organizations, to seduce some people to oppose others. At the same time, we will not allow them to defy our Center and accept foreign provocations.” (Mao Zedong Sixiang Wansui, p. 312)Footnote 4

Peng, who could no longer endure Mao’s persistent criticism, pleaded with Mao after the meeting, “Chairman Mao, please stop,” but Mao retorted, “This is not just your problem.” When Peng asked, “Is this the last time I will see you?” he was coldly dismissed with the words, “Is that your wish?” (Mao Zedong’s Secret Records, Vol. 1, pp. 287–288)

Certainly, the phrase “petty bourgeois fanaticism” and the alleged Soviet connection may have ignited Mao’s anger. But are these the only factors that enraged Mao? There may have been other factors in this instance. One is that Mao perceived several opponents criticizing him together, forming a group, in his view, to challenge his authority, and more precisely, his power. Huang Kecheng, People’s Libertion Army (PLA) Chief of the Staff and known for speaking very frankly, attended the meeting late, but expressed his views on the negative sides of the GLF and PC policies. Party Secretary of Hunan Province Zhou Xiaozhou, who attended the meeting from the beginning, was well aware of the plight of his Province, so called for fundamental policy changes. They were all regarded as “dissenters” in the eyes of Mao. In the end, the so-called “Peng (Dehui), Zhang (Wentian), Huang (Kecheng), and Zhou (Xiaozhou) group” was created regardless of their will, to the effect that they were collectively labeled as an “anti-Party counterrevolutionary group,” lost their positions, and were later persecuted, criticized and deprived of their political power. By the same token, Li Rui and many other Party members who were either close to the group or supported Peng’s Opinion Letter were criticized and fell from power.

The other factor is historical resentment. Let me recall Mao’s criticism of Peng Dehuai at the Shanghai Conference as referred to above. Mao, it seemed, had not gotten on well with Peng for a long time. The Opinion Letter may have served to ignite the fuel of underlying tensions between the two communist heroes.

According to Lin Ke, one of Mao’s secretaries, the Central Standing Committee meeting on the evening of July 26 was to discuss Mao’s talk of July 23, but Peng brought up historical issues, using the following violent language towards Mao:

“You cursed me for 20 days at the Luochuan Conference [the enlarged Political Bureau meeting held in Luochuan, Shaanxi Province, in August 1937 during the revolutionary struggle] Why is it wrong for me to curse you for 20 days now?” (Lin and Ling 1994, p. 153)

Regarding this issue, Su and others give a slightly different account:

“On the night of the 26th, during the Standing Committee meeting held on the second floor of Meilu [Mao’s residence], Peng Dehuai, brimming with enthusiasm, confronted Mao Zedong and uttered those famous harsh words: ‘In Yan’an, you scolded me for 40 days. Is it not permissible for me to scold you for 20 days?’ Peng Dehuai’s outburst served as evidence of his ‘unforgettable grudge,’ forever etched in Mao Zedong’s memory.” (Su et al. 1992, p. 295)

It does not matter whether Mao cursed in Luochuan or Yan’an, whether he cursed for 40 days or 20 days. What is more important is that the cursing over 20 years ago foreshadowed the deterioration of their relationship.Footnote 5

Originally, Mao Zedong and Peng Dehuai had opposite personalities, and moreover they did not get along well ideologically. In colloquial terms, the former was far left while the latter was further right. An event that typifies this contrast occurred during the Yan’an period, so let me look back on it with reference to He (2011).

In December 1942, Peng Dehuai, as Secretary of the CPC Northern Bureau, delivered a speech entitled “How to steadfastly maintain and strengthen the Anti-Japanese democratic bases” addressed to the military cadres of battalion-level and above as well as to Party cadres of county-level and above, in Taihang District. In the speech he stressed that postwar Chinese politics be directed toward peaceful founding and democratic freedom, pointing out:

“Today’s democracy in China lies in equality among classes within the country and in the acquisition of rights that the oppressed classes should obtain for themselves as protagonists.”

He criticized those within the Party who lacked a true democratic spirit, who were not accustomed to the customs of democratic life, and could not cooperate well with non-Party persons. The speech was later published on March 19 in the North China edition of the Xinhua (New China) Daily, in which he specifically developed his democratic theory.

His message can be summarized in the following way. What is the democratic spirit? Simply put, it is the spirit of freedom, equality, and fraternity. This has been the common slogan of national democratic revolutions since the French Revolution and a unanimous assertion of progressive, righteous people. He makes the following several specific points about what freedom means. It is freedom of thought, freedom of voice and publication, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of residence and movement. Finally, he brings up freedom from feudal restrictions, such as freedom of marriage, since most peasants in many areas have no right to choose their partners freely, while workers and students are still in bondage to feudal customs.

Next, Peng Dehuai explains what equality means. First, in addition to political rights such as the right to vote and the right to be elected, people should equally possess the right to recall, the right to reconsider, the right to establish systems, and the right to submit criticisms and suggestions to the state. Second, he advocated equality in law, that is, equality before the law for both the emperor and the common people, and personal equality, regardless of status, Chinese or degree of consanguinity.

Finally, regarding fraternity, in relationships between people, he preached that the spirit of fraternity and the spirit of democracy are to demonstrate the spirit of “mutual love, mutual respect, mutual aid, and not doing to others what you do not want done to yourself,” not to regard the pain of others as one’s own pleasure, and to have a high degree of sympathy for others.

In short, the democracy that Peng Dehuai preached in this speech was the universal value of modern civil society, and from our point of view, he was merely stating something quite natural. He must have had strong expectations that victory in the Anti-Japanese War and success in the Chinese Revolution would lead to the creation of a modern society that could realize such natural values. However, from his point of view, the order in Yan’an at that time was not in line with these natural values. For example, there existed not only the “feudal” status relations, but also the atmosphere in which one could not speak freely. Peng Dehuai understood that this was contrary to what Mao Zedong had advocated.

More than two months after this speech by Peng Dehuai was published, Mao Zedong wrote a letter to Peng in Yan’an, severely criticizing this “theory of democratic education.” The content of the letter can be summarized and translated as follows:

“Peng Dehuai talks about democracy, freedom, equality, and fraternity, but he is not speaking from the political necessity of the current Anti-Japanese struggle. For example, he does not distinguish between revolution and counter-revolution by saying, for example, equality before the law, etc. Can we give freedom, equality, and fraternity to the enemy or class to be overthrown? He advises ‘not doing to others what you do not want done to yourself’ and so on, but what must be done now is to overthrow the enemy by war and other means, and since the present social basis is the commodity economy, it is necessary to do to others what you do not want done to you.”

This criticism of Peng Dehuai is like Lenin’s criticism of Karl Kautsky, discussed in Chap. 3. From Mao’s point of view, Peng Dehuai is the Kautsky of China. He is “apostate” to Marxism and to Mao himself. Following Lenin, Mao Zedong disliked the “bourgeois” democracy, because it did not guarantee his own power.

Mao’s criticism of Peng escalated further, and from February to July 1945, Peng was involved in a struggle meetings held intermittently for 43 days in North China on local and military affairs. He was forced to self-criticize the “freedom, equality, and fraternity” theory in the Xinhua Daily, which, in Mao’s view, was nothing but a “bourgeois worldview.” Besides that, Peng’s every action during the liberation struggle became a target of criticism. Criticism of Peng at that time was reminiscent of the Lushan Conference 14 years later. According to Gao Hua, Mao saw Peng as a man who had a strong self-esteem, self-righteousness and arrogance, so he could not allow a general with very high prestige in the military to rebel against him, given Mao’s narrow-minded jealousy (Gao 2000, p. 623).

Peng Dehuai’s theory of democratic education seems to have remained in Mao’s mind for a long time, and came to the fore again during his August 11 talk at the Lushan Conference. Li Rui recorded Mao’s remarks as follows:

“I think, their [referring to Huang Kecheng, Peng Dehuai, Zhou Xiaozhou, Li Rui, Zhou Hui, etc.] bourgeois standpoint has not changed for more than 30 years. Why has it not changed? With regard to comrades who made the mistake this time …. Comrade Peng Dehuai as their main leader has not changed his bourgeois position for more than 30 years. This is because this bourgeois worldview of his cannot be Marxist. That is why for 31 years since 1928 (when the revolutionary struggle began) he has been incompatible with us. …. They were not Marxists, but bourgeois democrats, and they joined the Communist Party as bourgeois-democratic people. Peng Dehuai talks about ‘freedom, equality, and fraternity,’ but he either does not understand or pretends to understand what Marxism is, what the superstructure is, and what the economic foundations are.” (Li’s Notes (3) pp. 350, 355)

According to Mao, Peng was a “bourgeois democrat” even before the founding of the People’s Republic, and his criticism of Mao’s policies in the Opinion Letter was considered an act of opposition to the Party from a class perspective, and moreover part of a collective challenge to Mao’s power, thus making Peng and his followers an “anti-Party group.” In other words, they were hypocrites as well as being “counterrevolutionary.” No matter how heroic Peng was in the liberation struggle, no matter how much he contributed to the Chinese Revolution and the founding of the New China, no matter how much he achieved as the supreme commander of the Chinese army in the Korean War, once he got under Mao’s skin and was excluded from his class division, the fate of this “hero who was anti-people” became nothing but pitiful.

4 The Tragic End of Peng Dehuai

The group meeting started that afternoon and continued until July 26th, but after Mao’s criticism of Peng Dehuai began, the atmosphere changed dramatically with a swing back from right to left. By noon on the 26th, Peng was “self-critical” in the group meeting. He admitted that statements in his Opinion Letter such as “there are both positive and negative aspects to the GLF policy” were “political,” that such phrases as “petty-bourgeois fanaticism” were “wrong,” and demonstrated his obedience and reverence to Mao by saying, “I thank Chairman Mao for correcting my mistakes.” Zhu De, an elder revolutionary who was present at the meeting, was relieved by Peng’s self-criticism and comforted him. Everyone thought this would settle the matter and the meeting would end quickly. However, it did not turn out that way. A fierce “class struggle” against the “Gang of Four”—Peng, Zhang, Huang, and Zhou—was waiting. The meeting was extended, and a terrifying public criticism, or rather, a harsh face-to-face criticism, even a witch hunt, of Peng and “his group” by the participants was about to begin.

For example, at the August 1st meeting of the Standing Committee of the Party’s Central Committee, Lin Biao said:

“Many people say you tell lies and have ambitions [Mao Zedong interjected here and said, lies that appear in the form of true stories]. [You] once said during the Long March ‘If not me, then who will save China?’ before joining the Party …. You despise all thoughts within the Party and often defy your superiors. You are rebellious, have [your own] ideas, aspirations, and goals, always think you are correct. You have [your own] policy, program, and worldview, and you are conceited.” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 247)

Zhou Enlai criticized Peng in line with Lin Biao’s criticism. He asked:

“Does being obedient mean lacking backbone? All leaders must be obedient. How can you win if you are not so? Your backbone is to defy your superiors.” (Ibid.)

Thus he suggested that Peng be more obedient to his superiors, namely, Mao Zedong. As Chap. 9 explains, this was Zhou Enlai’s style of criticism. After the Zunyi Conference in 1935, Zhou was determined to be Mao’s loyal servant for the rest of his life (Wilson 1984, p. 296).

Even leaders such as Liu Shaoqi, Peng Zhen, Tao Zhu, and Luo Ruiqing, who were all to be severely beaten by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, joined together in a chorus of criticism against Peng Dehuai. Until Mao’s criticism, many of the participants had been favorable towards Peng’s Opinion Letter, as Bo Yibo put it, but once Mao became furious, they changed completely and cooled off toward Peng. It was like “throwing stones at a person who has fallen into a well” (taking advantage of a person’s crisis to add insult to injury (luojing xiashi) or “beating a dog that has fallen into the water (da luoshuigou)” (adding insult to injury to a fallen enemy). They might have hidden their true feelings, but they all, nonetheless, criticized or condemned Peng. Were they driven by herd mentality? Probably most of them took such an action for their own self-preservation.

Tao Zhu, then the First Secretary of Guangdong Provincial Committee, added criticisms attacking Peng Dehuai’s personal character:

“He strikes others and elevates himself. If there is merit, it’s his, if there is a mistake (failure), it’s others’. This is Comrade Peng Duhuai’s consistent manner …. On the surface, he looks full of hardship and modest, with a serious face, but if you peel back the surface, it’s not like that at all.” (Li’s Notes (3), pp. 292–293)

Luo Ruiqing, then Vice Minister of Defence, also chastises Peng by saying:

“His political ambition is extremely large, attributing all good things to himself and blaming others for the bad. This proves that he lacks Party spirit, is extremely selfish, is neither honest nor selfless, and that his individualism is very serious.—Before the Zunyi Conference, you opposed Comrade Mao Zedong, but this may have been due to your lack of knowledge, so I can forgive you a little. [But] after the Zunyi Conference, you rebel whenever you have the opportunity, and you still want to rebel now. Why is this?” (Ibid., p. 287)

Huang Kecheng, who was criticized along with Peng Dehuai during the Conference, recalls in later years:

“I was labeled a ‘conspirator,’ ‘ambitious person’ and a ‘hypocrite.’ No matter how much I tried to defend myself, I could not prove my innocence in that situation. I really don’t know what to say about the pain in my heart. However, the meeting had to continue, so I had to make more self-criticisms (jiantao), one after another, and no matter how many times I did, I was still told that I was being dishonest.” (Re-quoted from Zhonggong Zhongyang Wenxian Yanjiushi et al. 2003, Vol. 2, p. 1005)

In his memoirs, Peng Dehuai’s Autobiography, Peng does not write anything about how he must have felt, suffered, and regretted, even though he was criticized much more severely than Huang.

Just before the end of the Lushan Conference, Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian, and others sent a letter to Mao Zedong, “admitting their mistakes” and surrendered to him totally, but they were nevertheless officially condemned as an “anti-Party group.” Peng was removed from his position as Defence Minister, and replaced by Lin Biao, who had criticized him heavily at the Conference but would be slammed as an “ambitious person” himself after his downfall in 1971. Huang Kecheng, Chief of Staff, was also dismissed and replaced by Luo Ruiqing, who had been a leading critic of the Party and who would also be ousted during the CR movement. As the campaign criticizing the “Peng Dehuai Anti-Party group” erupted, a movement “against right-leaning opportunist elements” was launched throughout the Party and the military, and the number of cadres and Party members classified as “right-leaning opportunist elements” reached more than three million, while the number of cadres, Party members, and masses who were considered “hidden enemies within the class” amounted to as many as six million. The number of people in the People’s Liberation Army who were labeled as “right-leaning opportunists” and the like reached 17,200 (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 388; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, pp. 297–298).

After the Conference, Peng Dehuai requested to return to the countryside in Hunan Province to become a peasant, but his wish was not granted, nor was he removed from his duties as a member of Central Committee as well as the Political Bureau. He was virtually under house arrest in Beijing, rarely participated in important Party activities and stayed at home. He himself had a strong desire to go to rural areas to conduct research, so he wrote a letter to Mao, expressing this desire. Unexpectedly his desire was supported by Mao, who said “You can go anywhere. It doesn’t matter if it’s for half a year.” In early November 1961, he went to his hometown in Hunan Province and began his research, which was scheduled to last three months (Wang 2012). He may have wanted, in my view, to confirm with his own eyes and ears the disastrous results of the GLF as well as PC policies in the rural areas, in order to report back to Mao on the actual situation.

At the end of January 1962, the Party’s enlarged Central Working Conference, called “Seven Thousand Cadres Conference“ was held, at which Liu Shaoqi summarized the GLF policy and delivered his famous speech, “30% natural disaster, 70% man-made disaster” (see Chap. 7 for more details). In that speech, Liu Shaoqi virtually affirmed the content of Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter, saying that even if there were some mistakes in it, it was not so much that he had made serious errors, but he condemned Peng as having been a long-term member of a small group, the Gao Gang-Rao Shushi anti-Party group,Footnote 6 and assumed “they (Peng and Gao) had an international background, and their anti-Party activities were related to a plot with certain foreigners to overthrow the regime. Therefore, most of those who were criticized at the Lushan Conference and afterward can have their honor restored, but Peng Dehuai alone should not have his honor restored,” and thus he justified Peng’s punishment (ibid.).Footnote 7 Peng was so furious upon hearing Liu’s decision that he immediately called the Party’s Central Office, saying:

“Please tell Chairman Mao and Liu Shaoqi. I am making a solemn statement that there is no such thing [referring to Liu Shaoqi’s accusation above].” (Ibid.)

He spent three months writing a letter to Mao Zedong in June 1962, a letter of a frightening length of “80 thousand characters,” claiming that the charge against of him of plotting to seize Party power or having foreign relations was absurd, and that if this were true, “I would be willing to be executed for treason” (Luo 1998). He requested that his punishment at the Lushan Conference was unjust and that his honor be restored, but this request went unheeded.Footnote 8 If Peng’s request were granted, Mao would be formally admitting that he had been wrong, and such a thing was absolutely unacceptable to him. Mao could never accept such a request because the truth as well as justice must always be on his side.

After this letter was sent, the Peng Dehuai Review Committee was established in the Tenth Plenary Session of the Eighth CPC Central Committee held in September 1962, and the scrutiny of Peng and those around him became increasingly severe. This also led to Peng divorcing his wife, Pu Anxiu,Footnote 9 no doubt out of concern for her safety.

Shortly before the start of the Cultural Revolution, Peng Dehuai was suddenly called by Beijing Mayor and Political Bureau member, Peng Zhen, to hear that, as “a decision of the Party Central and Chairman Mao,” Peng would be appointed to head the Third Front Construction projectFootnote 10 of the Southwest region. Then Mao contacted him and the two met after a long interval. Peng received a call from Mao early in the morning on September 23, 1965, and rushed to Zhongnanhai. Mao jokingly said while holding Peng’s hand nostalgically:

“You, never show your face, but when it comes to letters, you write tens of thousands of characters.”

They talked until 3:00 p.m. when Mao said:

“It seems I was too critical of you. It was a mistake. Let’s talk about it again in a few years. But you don’t have to wait. You should devote yourself to your work.”

He then instructed Peng to go to Sichuan Province to take on the task of the Third Front Construction (Yan and Gao 1996, Vol. 2, pp. 196–197).Footnote 11 Considering the tragic injustice that Peng Dehuai would suffer ten months later, I may wonder what kind of affection Mao showed at that time. Was this, as typical of Mao, an “open plot” (yangmou)? Some say that he moved Peng far away so as to prevent a coup in advance.Footnote 12

At the end of 1965, after six years of house arrest, Peng Dehuai was appointed to head a national defense equipment company, the site of the Third Front Construction in Sichuan Province, but as soon as the CR movement began, he was called back to Beijing and confined to military quarters, after which he was thoroughly tortured by the Red Guards. He was forcibly dragged to a struggle meeting, and the way he was abused, with his neck held down, often appears as a representation of the madness of the Cultural Revolution, along with photos of the struggle meetings opposing Peng Zhen and Luo Ruiqing (see Photo 6.2).

Photo 6.2
A photograph of an elderly man with a painted board around the neck that has text in a foreign language. 2 younger men hold the elderly man's hands behind his back.

Source https://mil.news.sina.com.cn/2015-01-12/1802817875.html

Peng Dehuai tortured by the Red Guards. Peng Dehuai being physically abused at a mass assembly during the Cultural Revolution.

Full size image

At a struggle rally held at the Beijing Institute of Aeronautics in July 1967, Peng Dehuai was assaulted by Han Aijing, leader of the Red Guards of this Institute, and knocked to the ground seven times. He broke two ribs and was left paralyzed in the lower half of his body as a result. According to his niece, Peng Meikui, Peng Dehuai, who found it difficult to walk, was later taken out with Zhang Wentian to a rally of 100,000 people, beaten, tied with rope, and made to walk through the crowd with a nameplate on his back to make an example of him (Peng 1990). He was then confined to a hospital under the supervision of a special task force and spent eight years in a room with the windows covered with newspaper. He died of rectal cancer in November 1974 without anyone knowing it. His body was cremated without the consent of his family, and his ashes were secretly taken to Chengdu, Sichuan Province, labeled with the pseudonym “Wang Chuan.”

Miserable and tragic—there are no better words to describe the death of Peng Dehuai, one of the heroes of the Chinese Revolution and the supreme commander of the Chinese army in the Korean War. But once judged as an “enemy” by the supremo, his last years of life would be ruined. The circumstances of his death show us how he had been abandoned and how he ended up. After the reforms and opening-up policy arrived, Peng’s honor was restored, and in December 1978, the Party held a grand memorial service under the auspices of the CPC Central Committee. However, in this service, even his niece, whom Peng loved like a daughter, did not question who was ultimately responsible for this tragedy, even though they criticized the Cultural Revolution and “Gang of Four” including Jiang Qing.

5 The Tragedy of Peng Dehuai: My Interpretation

If Peng Dehuai’s Opinion Letter had been accepted at the Lushan Conference, the famine and starvation that had already begun might have been put on hold and a significant portion of the victims might have been saved. The PC policy might have been revised, mess halls might have been abolished, the crazy steel-making campaign might have been stopped, and possibly the government might have actively appealed to foreign countries for food aid. But no one dared or was able to put a stop to Mao Zedong’s despotism. Li Rui, looking back on the Lushan Conference in later years, lamented and wrote:

“To tell the truth, my psychological state during the dozen days of the Conference was extremely complicated and very gloomy. I wonder why there was not a single person who had the courage to come out and speak a little bit of justifiable (gondao) truth at this Central Committee, which is the meeting of our Party’s top leaders.” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 325)

In February 1956, at the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev made his historic criticism of Stalin, it is said that someone from the audience asked, “What were you doing when Stalin was alive?” Khrushchev then asked, “Who are you to ask this?” There was no answer, and he went on to say, “You see, it is the same thing.” Just as all members of the Soviet Communist Party had prostrated themselves before Stalin, so too had members of the Chinese Communist Party feared Mao Zedong.Footnote 13 Or perhaps I should say that there was not a single adherent of Maoism who could stand up to the divine Mao.

Members of the Communist Party not only feared Mao Zedong and prostrated themselves before him as their leader. They also integrated themselves with the Party, that is, with Mao Zedong; they tied their own interests to the interests of the Party, namely Mao Zedong, and prioritized protecting the Party and Mao above all else. The criticism of Peng Dehuai at the Lushan Conference, which I covered above, is a typical example of the behavior and thought patterns of the CPC members. Qian Liqun has brilliantly pinpointed the essence of the situation:

“The Communist Party had become a vested interest group. When a contradiction arose between interests and principles, when a conflict arose between the interests of the Party and the interests of the people—as was the case at the Lushan Conference—they had to submit to the interests of the Party without hesitation.” (Qian 2012a, Vol. 1, p. 390; Qian 2012b, Vol. 1, p. 299)

Ideology became formalized, power became the goal, and interest groups and vested interests were formed around it. The same can be said of contemporary China, which I will review in the final chapter.

It is not hard to understand Li Rui’s lament as above. No doubt, there were persons who tried to speak righteously at the Lushan Conference. These included Peng Dehuai, Zhang Wentian, Huang Kecheng, and Zhou Xiaozhou, all of whom were criticized by Mao Zedong and all of whom were broken by a single word from Mao. This was not just due to fear, but probably due to the idea of: “Let’s sacrifice ourselves for the unity of the Party, for Chairman Mao. Let’s agree with Chairman Mao rather than justice.” During the Lushan Conference, Tao Zhu sent a letter to Huang Kecheng, writing as follows:

“Loyalty to the Party is like a married woman in the old society, and you are never allowed to ‘cheat’ for a lifetime. Otherwise, you will not be called a ‘chaste wife’. .... Is there anything we can’t do to protect Chairman Mao and the Party Center?”

To put it differently, Tao Zhu advised Huang to cut ties with Peng, maintain political integrity, even if it goes against his sense of justice; like a wife obeying her husband, he should “protect Chairman Mao and the Central Committee of the Party.” According to Li Rui, “Political chastity, such as this feudal morality demanded of women’s chastity, was certainly a common psychology that the absolute majority of people at the time longed for.” (Li’s Notes (3), p. 309)

It is extremely strange that a cadre of self-identified Marxists and communists would try to persuade their fellow cadres using feudal morality as a tool. What is to be stressed is, no one, including Tao Zhu, even thought about which was more important and more righteous—to protect the prestige of Mao Zedong and the authority of the Party, or to protect the lives of tens of millions of people. The idea of “the Party first” was extended to “Mao first,” and then became the personality cult of Mao Zedong. This is not only the tragedy of Peng Dehuai, but also the root of the ruthlessness of revolutionary China.

After the Lushan Conference, policy again swung from right to left, and the Party that was supposed to put the brakes on the GLF policy ended up promoting it in the opposite direction, thus economic chaos continued and the famine as well as starvation grew worse. No one pursued the question of how great a price was to be paid for the downfall of Peng Dehuai and his colleagues until after the end of the Cultural Revolution. The tragedy of Peng Dehuai was not only his own tragedy, but the tragedy of China and the entire Chinese people.