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Equality and Opportunity: Some Preliminary Considerations

In one of his well-known essays, “Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment,” the prominent British legal philosopher H.L.A. Hart made ​​an insightful comment on punishment, one of the most controversial and pressing public issues in the UK of the 1950s. As he eloquently emphasized, the “[g]eneral interest in the topic of punishment has never been greater than it is at present and I doubt if the public discussion of it has ever been more confused” (Hart 2008). Time and again, several issues that have been at the center of controversies dividing our societies have suffered from some sort of a “conceptual negligence” as identified by Hart. One contemporary issue fits Hart’s observation particularly well.

As one of the central ideas from our collective imaginary, equality of opportunity and the associated idea of “careers open to talent” has come to define much of what contemporary societies and their institutions stand for including nondiscrimination, equal access, deservingness, fairness, etc. The last few years have actually witnessed a resurgence of interest both among scholars and public intellectuals over issues associated with distributive justice and its gravitational orbit of concepts including the idea of equality of opportunity itself (e.g., Appiah 2018; Fishkin 2014; Lemann 2019; Markovits 2019; Putnam 2015; Wooldridge 2021). As Michael Sandel argued in The Tyranny of Merit (2020), the principled commitment to a fair distribution of advantaged social positions or the attainment of a particular social good, associated with equality of opportunity, has become part of the DNA of contemporary societies and the civilizational discourse of our time. Arguably, no other concept from the pantheon of political ideals has had a more profound impact on the distribution of advantaged social positions or the attainment of specific social goods across different spheres of life including education, employment, health care, housing, etc.

At face value, equality of opportunity has become, as Charles Frankel, the assistant US secretary of state in charge of education and culture, during the Johnson Administration in the 1960s aptly observed, “everybody’s girl, […], a ‘verbal formula’ which everybody employs, and which therefore creates the impression of general agreement of fundamentals” (Frankel 1971, p. 192). It therefore comes as no surprise that this social ideal, as John H. Schaar emphasized, has “few enemies – politicians, businessmen, social theorists and freedom marchers all approve it – and it is rarely subjected to intellectual challenge” (Schaar 1997 [1967]).

Nevertheless, John Rawls himself defined equality of opportunity as a “difficult and not altogether clear idea” (2001, p. 43). One of its problems, as Schaar succinctly accentuated, has been that it is “widely embraced by contemporary society, but typically not carefully explained” (Schaar 1997 [1967]). To complicate things further, several of its conceptions advocate a plethora of diversified or even conflicting commitments as various issues associated with equality of opportunity raise a number of important questions. Nevertheless, the only solid assumption different conceptions of equality of opportunity share in common, as Richard Arneson emphasizes, is their rejection of fixed social relations, “but not to hierarchy per se” (2015). It is this “illusion of fairness” that raises a range of conceptual tensions, problems, and challenges leaving equality of opportunity and its meritocratic rationality in an impasse. Anyone approaching equality of opportunity is therefore faced with an unlikely task of overcoming the consensus over its centrality as an important distributive mechanism on the one hand and the various complex issues in need of further clarification on the other (Elford 2023). How, then, to make sense of equality of opportunity?

Making Sense of Equality of Opportunity

If being characterized as “essentially contested” has been a household depiction most of the concepts have been grappling with (Gallie 1955), the last few decades have witnessed an exponential expansion of challenges that have come to the forefront while struggling to make sense of the various issues we encounter (Mason and Bellamy 2003). Alongside ambiguity and confusion, perhaps the most “stable” companions of any conceptual analysis (and the associated disputes), some of the most well-known concepts at the very center of issues we encounter today face very peculiar problems and challenges. For example, the “traveling” of a particular idea and the associated phenomenon of conceptual stretching (Sartori 1970), semantic confusion (Nathanson 2010), or appropriation (Sardoč 2021) as well as conceptual inflation (Bufacchi 2007; Miles and Brown 1989) are just some of the most pressing “transformations” plaguing normative theorizing on a particular phenomenon and the concepts associated with it (Zapata Barrero et al. 2022).

Each of these “complications” have been associated with concepts as diverse as political violence, radicalization, racism, responsibility, toleration, patriotism, neoliberalism, diversity, etc. For example, time and again, any definition of political violence faces a range of tensions and dilemmas that make it almost impossible to come up with a clear-cut definition that would turn out to be both conceptually coherent and practically useful. As has been emphasized by Arun Kundnani, when discussing the sense of disorientation when trying to provide a definition of radicalization and violent extremism, “confusion is an outcome of the institutional uses to which the term has been put. In these settings, the function of the term is to conceal as much as to reveal; to obscure as much as to elucidate” (Sardoč 2022a, p. 126). It is precisely this lack of a fixed definition of terrorism and political violence in general that has become a sort of trademark of the “War on Terror.” As Stephen Nathanson emphasizes, “[c]larity is not everyone’s goal, however, because confusion can be politically useful” (Nathanson 2010, p. 20).

Several concepts face yet another challenge. Although the slogan “we recognize violence when we see it” (Bufacchi 2009, p. 293) unequivocally illustrates all the brutality of its consequences, the concept of violence is neither simple nor unproblematic. Given the fact that it may encompass phenomena such as physical violence, cyber violence, mobbing, domestic violence, bullying, sexual, structural, symbolic, or cultural violence, etc., the concept of violence we employ in our analyses needs to be flexible enough to incorporate all its manifestations. Nevertheless, by leaving it open to as wide a definition as possible, one may ultimately end up with a sort of “conceptual inflation.”

Interestingly enough, equality of opportunity somehow does not fit any of the categories identified above. Its historical legacy as one of the ideas at the very center of major social and political events makes equality of opportunity a concept sui generis. For example, the idea of “careers open to talent,” equality of opportunity has been associated with, played an important role in both the American and French Revolutions. As Rafe Blaufarb emphasizes in his book, The French Army, 1750–1820: Careers, Talent, Merit, “the idea of careers open to talent is one of the most enduring legacies of 1789” (Blaufarb 2002, p. 2). In fact, the “openness of all positions in society to talent”—as highlighted by S.J.D. Green—has ultimately turned out to be “the most radical of the principles of 1789” (Green 1989, p. 5).

Over the last several decades, some of the defining emancipatory social movements, institutional reforms, or major policy initiatives have been fought under the banner of equality of opportunity. The US Civil Rights Movement and racial desegregation from the 1950s and 1960s (coupled with The Coleman Report published in 1966) alongside other progressive social movements and initiatives throughout the globe have aimed to achieve equality of opportunity for individuals regardless of race, gender, socioeconomic background, religion, ethnic origin, etc. This principled adherence to equality of opportunity came to dominate public policy including education, housing, employment, health and health care, etc.

As a form of “fair competition among individuals for unequal positions in society” (Fishkin 1983, p. 1) and as “a normative standard for regulating certain types of competition” (Jacobs 2004, p. 12), equality of opportunity has therefore been viewed as the single most important distributive principle governing the fair allocation of advantaged social positions or the attainment of a particular social good as well as a key mechanism of social mobility in contemporary societies. In fact, the legitimacy of existing distributive arrangements and the overall fairness of the institutional framework of our societies are rooted in our commitment to equality of opportunity as its overall justification is associated with two distinct outcomes. On the one hand, the allocation of advantaged social positions stemming from a commitment to equality of opportunity has a direct personal benefit for those who have been successful in the process of competition for advantaged social positions (the assumption of direct personal benefit). On the other hand, equality of opportunity also benefits the society as a whole: Anyone who ends as the most meritorious makes everyone else—indirectly, at least—better-off given the fact that the social effects of one’s performance will most likely be positive (the assumption of mutual benefit). On this interpretation, individuals who have been given an advantaged social position not only deserve it because of their efforts and hard work but will—most probably—be the best in performing the tasks required.

This idea of a “better and richer and fuller [life] for everyone” (Truslow Adams 2012 [1931], p. 317) associated with equality of opportunity has also been a pivotal mechanism imbrued in the national dream narrative of the American Dream, perhaps the single most recognizable symbol of US “national ethos” as well as a trademark of its global “soft power” (Sardoč and Prebilič 2022a). Its promise of upward social mobility (firmly grounded in the merit-based conception of equality of opportunity) is built on a vision, as Jennifer Hochschild accentuates, “that all Americans have a reasonable chance to achieve success as they define it – material or otherwise – through their own efforts, and to attain virtue and fulfillment through success” (Hochschild 1995, p. xi). On this interpretation, an individual’s success depends (largely, primarily, or even exclusively) on his efforts or hard work and is ultimately premised on individual merit. This very promise, as Roberth Hauhart points out, represents the “central motivating impulse in American life” (Hauhart 2015, p. 74). As Howard Schneiderman emphasizes,

[f]rom the start, therefore, the American Dream was not about the elimination of social class distinctions, but for mobility through those ranks based on hard work’. Indeed, any discussion of the American dream today still must hinge on the high value placed on work and achieving upward mobility through it’ (Schneiderman 2012, p. xiii).

Moreover, the last few years have witnessed another noteworthy phenomenon where equality of opportunity figures not only as an emancipatory social ideal but also as an important vehicle associated with the neoliberal “order of reason” (Brown 2015). From the 1970s onward, equality of opportunity and its gravitational orbit of concepts turned into one of the main assets of contemporary political rhetoric (dominated by a neoliberal agenda). Instead of using concepts and ideas that are part of its “standard” repertoire, e.g., mobility, effectiveness, deregulation, privatization, efficiency, commodification, competitiveness, financialization, entrepreneurship, marketization, consumerism, flexibility, accountability, performance, etc., neoliberalism turned to concepts and ideas that are part of the progressive egalitarian vocabulary, e.g., equality, justice, well-being, fairness, equality of opportunity, etc.

This semantic appropriation—largely based on a disfigured understanding of the idea of “careers open to talent”—has been imbued with meritocratic idealism including slogans (“Opportunity for all”), metaphors (“Level the playing field”) as well as other thought-terminating clichés (e.g., “Aspiration nation”). This “sloganization” of its emancipatory potential and the associated phenomenon of “governing by slogans” (Sardoč and Prebilič 2022b) have ultimately turned equality of opportunity into a poster image of political spin. As Michael Sandel accentuates in The Tyranny of Merit,

What if the rhetoric of rising no longer inspires, not simply because social mobility has stalled but, more fundamentally, because helping people scramble up the ladder of success in a competitive meritocracy is a hollow political project that reflects an impoverished conception of citizenship and freedom?

It therefore comes as no surprise that for more than a decade now major global intergovernmental (neoliberal) institutions have propagated a form of “progressive neoliberalism” (Fraser and Brenner 2017; Raschke 2019). As Rune Møller Stahl emphasizes, “[t]he annual summit of the World Economic Forum in Davos is now discussing inequality and political instability every year, and even traditional bastions of neoliberal orthodoxy such as the IMF or OECD have started to warn against inequality […]” (Stahl 2019, p. 334).

Alongside seismic changes in public policy and governmentality, this “rebranding of neoliberalism” (Sardoč 2022b) has led to a significant shift in the perception of the status, scope, and its justification of equality of opportunity, ultimately resulting in a twofold effect. On the one hand, critics (as well as several of its advocates) have started to question its emancipatory potential (e.g., Appiah 2018; Cavanagh 2002; Lemann 2019) as despite its principled commitment to fairness equality of opportunity is neither unproblematic nor unquestionable. Its alleged failure to live up to its emancipatory potential has made this social ideal prone to a number of objections claiming that it is either unjust, ineffective, or both. As William Galston pointed out eloquently, much of its social history “can be interpreted as a struggle between those who wanted to expand its scope and those who demanded that it be limited” (Galston 1997, p. 170).

In fact, decreased intergenerational mobility and the rising inequality coupled with the overall reduction of living standards have not only fueled distrust in existing distributive arrangements but have ultimately questioned the very foundations of equality of opportunity and its commitment to fairness. The “tyranny of merit” (Markovits 2019), “meritocratic hubris” (Sandel 2020), and the “opportunity gap” (Putnam 2015) are just some of its alleged negative effects that have severely undermined the overall legitimacy of distributive scenarios based on our commitment to equality of opportunity. It is precisely this gap between its idealized image and historical legacy on one side and a set of indicators suggesting that equality of opportunity ultimately fails to deliver that has given rise to a series of objections leading to the conclusion that it represents an empty or even a false promise. Some of its critics have even used metaphors as strong as that of the “Trojan horse” or “paper tiger” suggesting that equality of opportunity is a deceptive social ideal or one lacking of substance.

On the other hand, disagreements over the fundamental principles associated with equality of opportunity as well as the various objections regarding its alleged unfairness have contributed to the articulation of various alternative conceptions aimed toward a more equitable distribution of benefits and burdens of social cooperation. Interestingly enough, this development has not been a straightforward one as a number of tensions and challenges have ultimately led to divergent or even conflicting commitments associated with equality of opportunity (Lippert-Rasmussen 2016). For example, radical conceptions of equality of opportunity aim toward the neutralization, mitigation, or even elimination of all factors considered morally arbitrary (e.g., Segall 2013). In fact, some of its proponents have argued that individuals may not deserve the results of the “lottery of birth.” On this interpretation, talents are viewed as a form of unfair advantage. As Harry Brighouse explicates the radical conception of educational equality: “an individual’s prospects for educational achievement should be a function neither of that individual’s level of natural talent or social class background but only of the effort she applies to education” (2010, p. 29). While noble in intent, the radical egalitarian conception of equality of opportunity has problems of its own as it is premised on a reductionist understanding of talents’ anatomy leading to a distorted characterization of the idea of moral arbitrariness. To complicate things further, as T.M. Scanlon eloquently emphasizes, “[t]he idea of “arbitrariness from a moral point of view” has been widely misunderstood and often misused” (2018, p. 46).

Conclusion and Further Directions

In contrast to an alleged disillusionment by some of its advocates and critics, the problems, challenges, and other “complications” outlined above have ultimately had a galvanizing effect on both empirical research and normative theorizing over equality of opportunity and distributive justice in general. On the one hand, empirical research on equality of opportunity has been expanded by the quantification of research on issues as diverse as intergenerational mobility (Putnam 2015), education (Brighouse 2010; Coleman et al. 1966; Frankel 1971; Jencks 1988), housing (Chetty 2021), employment, health and health care (Daniels 1985; Ferreira and Peragine 2015; Jusot and Tubeuf 2019), etc.

On the other hand, this area of scholarly research has been invigorated by various normative and conceptual issues associated with distributive justice. These include talents (e.g., Harel Ben Shahar 2023; Robb 2021; Sardoč and Deželan 2021), “natural” and “social” inequality (e.g., de los Santos Menéndez 2021), the American Dream (e.g., Reeves 2014; Hauhart and Sardoč 2021, 2022), affirmative action (Lippert-Rasmussen 2020), etc. At the same time, some of the leading contemporary philosophers have advanced critical refinements to the nexus between moral arbitrariness and fairness as the ultimate distinction between “legitimate” (morally acceptable) and “illegitimate” (morally unacceptable) sources of inequality (e.g., Arneson 2018; Cohen 1989; Fishkin 2014; Lang 2021; Scanlon 2018; Segall 2013, 2016).

These and other issues outlined above are a testament to the fact that several issues associated with equality of opportunity raises a number of important questions, no single conception provides an unanimous answer to, e.g., motivational (why equalizing individuals’ opportunities), procedural (what are the principled bases of any process claiming to be based on equal opportunities), genealogical (what is a fair starting position within a process to compete for advantaged social positions), substantive (which criteria should qualify for equalizing individuals’ prospects), taxonomic (what type of inequality is eligible for compensation), and compensatory (how the process of equalizing individuals’ opportunities is to be carried out) questions (Sardoč 2016).

In fact, each of these questions has been addressed differently by various conceptions of equality of opportunity. For example, the question what is a “fair starting point to compete for advantaged social positions” differs considerably between various conceptions of equality of opportunity. At the same time, without clarifying a number of concepts associated with these questions, e.g., opportunity, equality, nondiscrimination, obstacles, fairness, effort, talent, merit, responsibility, chance, choice, excellence, desert, inequality, etc., the idea of equal opportunities is bound to remain—as Andrew Mason eloquently puts it—a “radically contradictory […] piece of political rhetoric” (Mason 2006, p. 1). It therefore comes as no surprise that despite the overall appraisal of equality of opportunity, the current social consensus over its meaning and value is “paper thin” and “subject to conflicting interpretations” (Arneson 2018, p. 152). As it turns out, any conception of equality of opportunity is therefore faced with a puzzle: How to ensure that the competition for advantaged social positions is fair and inequalities that are the result of a process of competition legitimate as the ideal of equality of opportunity and social inequality are ultimately not mutually exclusive.