After five years, Xi made his first visit to Europe, marking a significant diplomatic engagement between China and the European nations. However, recent discussions have suggested that the visit may exacerbate divisions within Europe. Ravi Agrawal, the editor-in-chief of Foreign Policy, wrote that China aims to ‘divide and conquer’ Europe. The Brookings Institution posted a commentary saying that Xi’s visit exposes fault lines in European unity. DW News of Germany asked ‘Why European leaders are divided over the Chinese president’s visit’?

Putin visited China on May 16th. Europe faced divisions again on issues related to the Ukraine War: How should the relationships between Russia and China be evaluated? To what extent did the ‘normal’ trade between the two countries contribute to Russia’s war efforts? Is it reasonable to sanction certain Chinese companies involved in these trades? How should China’s peace plan be reacted to?

China Needs A Unified Europe

Well, Europe is already quite divided. Why does the CPC bother to deepen these divisions further if it wants to? After all, China didn’t invent the terms “New Europe” or “Old Europe”. Twenty years ago, it was Donald Rumsfeld, the Secretary of Defense of the USA at that time, who brought them into public opinion.

European nations quarreled over burden-sharing, border controls, and asylum policies in the migration crisis. China had nothing to do with the crisis in any way.

Poland fought with the European Commission over judicial reforms. Indeed, China has always emphasized the importance of national sovereignty on the international stage, but it never specifically instigated Polish politicians against the EU. In fact, China has repeatedly expressed its support for the European integration process.

Why? Is it merely diplomatic language? Theoretically, nations in a divided Europe could be influenced, manipulated, and coerced, but I’m afraid that China could not benefit from it at all.

At least since World War Two, the United States has had deep roots in Europe. If Europe is divided, the US would become the only entity capable of effectively manipulating European nations due to its overwhelming influence on media, scholars, think tanks, advisers, and politicians. Even if China attempted to employ a similar approach, the US would easily thwart China’s efforts in most European countries.

It seems that Putin’s Russia has somewhat found another approach to garner appreciation from so-called right-wing parties in Europe. However, this approach is defensive in nature. While America’s influence can be balanced in one or two election cycles, the issue cannot be fundamentally resolved. Furthermore, China lacks the resources to do so.

How about a more unified Europe? I optimistically presume that the sense of independence and autonomy in Europe will awaken further. The conflicts between the United States and Europe will become more apparent, and European countries will possess stronger willing and capabilities to resist the US interference and make more decisions independently.

When some people hype up the ‘China threat theory,’ they may talk about kowtowing to China, but that will never happen. Europe will continue to say ‘no’ to China on many issues. However, for China, a more independent Europe will offer a relatively fairer competitive environment than a divided Europe where the United States can manipulate almost freely.

Can the Ukraine War Help Europe to Unify?

There is no doubt that Putin’s visit to China has further solidified Sino-Russian bilateral relations and introduced a series of new cooperation initiatives. However, Xi Jinping’s warm reception of Putin should not be seen as a “threat” that will further tilt the scales of war in Russia’s favor, but rather as a demonstration of the proactive role that sovereign states can play on the international stage.

For Europeans, this is an opportunity for further reflection. Why has Europe lost the space for cooperation with Russia? Why has Europe lost access to cheap energy? It is  right for Europe to accept large numbers of Ukrainian refugees and provide substantial aid for humanity, but all of the tragedies could have been avoided.

Putin initiated the ‘special military operation’, but was the continuous provocation represented by NATO’s eastward expansion truly in Europe’s best interest? Europe’s support for NATO’s eastward expansion has just assisted the United States in increasing pressure on Russia, weakening its own strategic buffer instead. Looking at it from the standpoint of observers, merely betraying the promises made after the end of the Cold War, is sufficient to inflict significant moral damage upon Europeans.

As a leader of a major European power, Macron has a vision and awareness of strategic autonomy, but he also has to navigate relations with politicians widely considered pro-American, such as Ursula von der Leyen. Meanwhile, Serbia and Hungary, though relatively smaller countries, occupy unique political niches within Europe.

Xi Jinping’s choice to visit these three countries undoubtedly takes into account their autonomy, which forms the basis for meaningful dialogue. However, China’s expectation is not to highlight their differences from other European countries to “divide” Europe. Instead, the long-term goal is for more European countries to align themselves with the autonomy demonstrated by these three countries.

Russia has also repeatedly emphasized this point to Europe, often praising China, India, and even Brazil or Indonesia for having more sovereignty than Europe. If Russia is not concerned that a more independent and autonomous Europe would be detrimental to its interests, then China has even less reason to worry.

Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis travels to Ankara today to discuss a new chapter and a positive agenda with Greece. Technically, this is the counterpart of President Erdogan’s visit to Athens in recent months, but it does not look like an ordinary return visit. The Greek prime minister was interviewed by a Turkish newspaper (Milliyet, 12 May) and President Erdogan by a Greek newspaper (Kathimerini, 12 May). The tone of both leaders is cautious and attentive. Obviously, they are trying to achieve ‘something new’.

As someone who has been closely following the Turkish-Greek tensions, crises and periods of détente from time to time, I have no intention of adding water to the cooked pot; however, since I do not know exactly what the cooked pot is, for whom, how and by whom it is being cooked, I would like to share some of my concerns and my thoughts/evaluations on how these problems, which I have been pondering for years, can be resolved.

First of all, it is necessary to analyse why and how this period of softening was reached. As you may recall, after a series of crises in the second half of 2020 (the Idlib crisis with Russia in January-February 2020 and the Libya crisis with Egypt in the summer of 2020), we found ourselves in a full diplomatic-military crisis with Greece. As a result of the wrong and ideological foreign policy that we have been insisting on for years, we have turned the whole region against us, made enemies of countries like Egypt and Israel, which have always been neutral in the Greek-Turkish issues, and even made Athens dream of taking us on militarily. Why not?

How and why did Greece go from confrontating Turkey in the Aegean to confront Turkey today?

If Turkey clashes with Egypt over Libya – a very serious scenario in the summer of 2020 – and Israel supports Egypt in the armed conflicts, why should Greece not carry out a fait accompli operation in the Aegean against Turkey, which seems to be feuding with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates at the same time? Moreover, in such a scenario, even France could ‘sell’ Greece enough Rafale fighters overnight. Even Armenia could have extended its front against Azerbaijan through Tovuz, and Turkey could have been shown the error of its ways. When the 15 July coup attempt took place in the summer of 2016, Athens complained that it was not sufficiently prepared to carry out such a military operation. I should also note here that in those years, when I tried to explain that such isolation was contrary to the spirit of the art of foreign policy and that we needed a serious review, I was subjected to a lot of lamentations by the so-called foreign policy experts (!).

In the end, Ankara had to realise that the flawed policies it insisted on pursuing, as if it were a finalist in a competition to create the best example of the worst foreign policy, were unsustainable. The rapid transformation of normalisation between Turkey and Russia into ‘rapprochement’ led to the historic victory of Azerbaijan, which Turkey had fully supported in the forty-four-day war, while Ankara quickly restored its relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt and even Israel. What is more, it did so in the space of a year. Although Syria remains the limping leg in this series, its remarkably balanced and cautious policy towards the upcoming Ukrainian war, especially since the second half of 2021, has once again shattered Greece’s crude dreams.

For Mitsotakis and Greece, an adventure in the Aegean against a Turkey that has restored its relations with Egypt and Israel in the Eastern Mediterranean, opened new and clean pages with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and improved its relations with Russia in every field, while Athens’ relations with Moscow plummeted during the Ukrainian war, would have been literally suicidal. There is no doubt that Athens has studied what happened to Armenia when it attacked Tovuz. President Erdoğan’s statement that “we can come suddenly one night” should not be taken lightly. This is where the 2023 earthquake came to the rescue. Just as in 1999, this time Greece sent rescue teams, and both the Turkish and Greek media seized on the issue, making it the beginning of a positive agenda and a new page in politics.

New risks in a new period

In Turkey, where the Greek issue is not a serious agenda in domestic public opinion, decision-makers are always at ease when they talk about reconciling with Athens and solving the problems, because the problems with this country are not used to make a premium in our domestic politics. Even during the time of this government, which made foreign policy a domestic agenda, this issue was not used very much. But that is not the case with Greece. In what can be called an abuse of democracy, every party and every government has used the issue of Turkey to the hilt, publicising every problem with its content, Greek theses and red lines.

As a result, a negotiation process based on give and take has become almost impossible for Greek governments. That is why Greek governments always cling to this excuse. The worst thing is that Europe and America, which often mediated these negotiations, flattered all the politicians/decision-makers by saying ‘you are a big state, don’t compare yourself with Greece, you can be more generous’. This should not happen this time. If there is to be a positive agenda with Greece – and Athens knows very well that the reality of the multipolar world is in favour of Turkey and against Greece – then we should not allow our problems with Greece to be addressed within the Turkey-EU agenda or based on Turkey’s EU membership perspective, as if it actually exists. In short, the problems should be addressed through bilateral negotiations and outside the framework that has so far been polluted/poisoned by the Turkey-EU acquis.

As Dendias said in Ankara, the issue for Greece is simple: Ankara must recognise Greek Cyprus as the Republic of Cyprus, as enshrined in the EU-Turkey acquis through the efforts of Athens and with the complicity of all EU member states that do not want Turkey to become a member, and accept that the only problem in the Aegean, in line with Greek theses, is to refer the issue to the Hague Court of Justice or arbitration to determine where the continental shelf runs between the easternmost Greek-dominated islands and the Turkish mainland. Other issues, such as Greece’s claim to 12 miles of airspace in violation of international law, the arming of islands with non-military status, islands with undetermined status in the Aegean, the issue of adjacent islands and rocks, etc., are all fabricated by Turkey in order to open Greece’s rights to discussion, and Greece refuses to negotiate on these issues.

Wouldn’t it be nice to create appeasement?

It may be possible, but it also involves serious risks. For example, if we can achieve a détente with Greece in the Aegean, without compromising an inch on our thesis that the Cyprus problem should be solved on the basis of two states, so much the better! But such a détente should not take place if, as we have always done, we show unnecessary courtesy by saying that we should not frighten or offend Athens, and if we accuse each other internally of being those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, And if we start accusing each other internally as those who want a solution and those who do not want a solution, because it will lead to compromising the steps to be taken towards the recognition of the TRNC, as well as justifying the thesis of the pro-federationists within the TRNC that ‘we told you so, Turkey will say a few words about two states and then take a step back’.

It should not be forgotten that in the last century of the Empire, Greece always managed to win both when it was at odds with the Ottoman Empire and when it was friendly with it. The reason for this is that Europe often took a pro-Greek stance. Atatürk put an end to this cursed period. After the Second World War, Ankara was always vigilant on the Cyprus issue and the Turkish-Greek problems that spread from there to the Aegean and did not allow the West to take initiatives in favour of Greece. However, it must be admitted that this policy could be maintained until the second half of the 1990s, when the EU issue was sold to Turkey through a massive media campaign, and in the two decades that followed, Turkey’s Cyprus and Greece policies were almost turned upside down within the European Union process. The recent caution and the advantages and benefits of multipolarity should not be wasted on a non-existent EU perspective.

7 months have passed… The phrase “as much as necessary” used by American officials has been replaced by “as much as we can”… American Congressmen, who would have rushed to the Congressional benches in the morning to vote for the aid package if Netanyahu had been allergic to spring, were no longer able to show the same enthusiasm when it came to Ukraine. At least some of the Republicans…

Over time, this particular group started to get in the good graces of the rest of the Congress. They said, “You’re throwing Putin a lifeline.” “You’re siding with the enemies of the United States,” they said. They probably also said “the arms industry is hungry”, but they said it quietly. But this conservative faction did not say “Noah says Noah”. They even sacked Kevin McCarthy, their own Speaker, who had hinted that he would make a deal with Biden for future packages, without blinking an eye. Meanwhile, time was running out. Ukraine was running out of ammunition and was retreating a little further on the ground every day.

CIA director Burns issued a grim prescription: “If this package is not passed now, Ukraine will not live to see 2025”.

As you know, the leader of this group was Donald J. Trump. The populist leader argued that the unconditional money given to Ukraine should be spent on issues of direct concern to Americans, such as border security and infrastructure needs, and many thought this stubbornness would be short-lived. “After the first of the year, Ukraine will begin to feel the lack of ammunition,” the Pentagon said. Then it would be resolved somehow in December, wouldn’t it?

The meetings in Congress were very heated. The Republicans wanted extra money for border security and tax cuts for the rich. Both were unacceptable to the Democrats. Mike Johnson, the new Republican spokesman, who had arrived after a lot of fighting within his party, was stamping rejection on Biden’s monthly packages before he even opened his eyes.

By December, there was no sound from the package. By February, Johnson was still calling the new proposals “stillborn”. Ukrainian President Zelenski had already raised the tone of his complaint. At this rate, a Russian summer offensive could lead to a serious disaster.

Persuasion tours

If the four years of Trump’s rule have taught his opponents anything, it is that he is not a man of principle. If the conditions were right, the former president could be convinced of anything. They started with Israel. They put support for Israel and Ukraine in the same package. But who were they fooling? How many brave Democrats could there be who would say no to aid for Israel? Of course, this could not be an offer that would “scare” the Republicans in return for support for Ukraine. And it didn’t. Support for Israel reached the White House without much fuss at the Congressional tables.

The border security issue was a dangerous adventure for the Democrats. Caving in to the Republicans would have alienated their own voters. The Muslim vote had already been lost on the Israel issue, and Biden could not risk more.

The picture that now emerged was grave for Biden’s plans for Ukraine. Obviously, Trump’s intention was to prevent the approval of this package until after the elections. Thus, Biden would go into the elections with the Ukraine disaster on his back and would surely be defeated.

Then something happened. First, Mike Johnson’s language changed. Suddenly he started talking about “what would happen if we left Ukraine in the middle”. When Marjorie Taylor Greene (MTG), known as the radical Trumpist of Parliament, smelled “betrayal”, she gave Johnson an ultimatum: “Don’t forget McCarthy, don’t you dare!”.

But unlike MTG, Trump thought differently this time.

The former president said: “We’re tired of giving gifts.We might consider lending money to Ukraine”. Although this comment suggests that Trump was somehow persuaded, it still sounded odd. As the war entered its third year, Ukraine’s economy was in shambles. To pay its soldiers, it had to receive $8 billion a month from the West. If the war ended today, it would take $500 billion to rebuild the country. If I went to a bank in my situation and asked for a loan, I would probably be laughed at. But Donald Trump, the author of The Art of the Deal, is obviously convinced.

Who am I kidding, of course he wasn’t convinced. But he must have got something out of it. But what was it?

What does Trump want?

We are in a period where Biden and the Republicans, who were in favour of supporting Ukraine, have realised that nothing can be done despite Trump. Whether they like him or not, there is a populist figure they have to convince. To understand what Trump might want, we need to go back five years, to the Ukraine issue that started the debate about Trump’s impeachment in 2019.

While there was talk of Biden running in the 2020 election, Trump started going through old notebooks.Remember the famous Biden son laptop incident? Hunter Biden was working for an oligarch’s energy company in Ukraine and used the power of his father, who was Vice President at the time (i.e. the whole of the US), to get rid of the prosecutor who was after the company’s owner. Trump was aware of this at the time and made plans to beat Biden in the election.

Meanwhile, just like today, aid packages for Ukraine were waiting in Congress. The amount of aid was much smaller and the public did not focus on it. But the package was not approved simply because Trump did not want it.

He called Zelenski. “You had a very fair prosecutor.It’s a shame,” he said.He asked Zelenski to appoint a prosecutor to go after Biden. It was the only way he could get the aid he was holding up in Congress released. The incident escalated.Because of that speech, the question of Trump’s impeachment erupted.But it told us what Trump could demand in such a position.

Fast forward to today. The Wall Street Journal reports that Trump has had two important visits in a month. One was, of course, Johnson, the Speaker of the House, and the other was Andrzej Duda, the former President of Poland. Duda, a leader known as a Trumpite, was also a good friend of Trump’s. They must have thought that a right-wing populist would understand the language of the right-wing populist, so they organised such a meeting. Duda explained the gravity of the situation to Trump. Johnson found a more effective vein.

In fact, Trump said: “If I am elected, I will bring peace in one day”. How would he do that if Ukraine were defeated today? Ukraine had to hold out at least until Trump took office. For some reason, CIA director William Burns said the package would keep Ukraine alive until 2025. If Trump wins, his inauguration will be in January.

Before we forget, there are also Trump’s ongoing lawsuits. It is rumoured that the money he has earmarked for his campaign could run out as a result of these lawsuits. Trump may have made a deal over Ukraine in order to avoid both financial damage and the blockage of his electoral path.

In conclusion, although Trump is popular today because of his isolationist and “America First” ideology, his policies are based on his personal interests. While 101 Republicans supported the package that Trump did not oppose, 112 voted against it. So despite everything, the isolationist wing does not even listen to Trump when it needs to. The former president’s order of importance is as follows: Trump first, then America, and Israel can squeeze in depending on the situation. Ironically, even in this equation, America is ahead compared to Biden’s order of importance.