Keywords

Introduction

In the introduction of this book, I underscored the prevalent influence of an internalism and a methodological nationalism in the existing literature on the genesis and development of modern Chinese international thought. This chapter takes inspiration from key concepts in Anglo-American IR historiography, such as international thought, Leon Trotsky’s uneven and combined development (UCD), and Kees van der Pijl’s analytical notion of ‘contender states.’ Building upon these foundations, I advocate for an analytically informed approach with an international perspective to scrutinize the origins and transformation of modern Chinese international thought from 1912 to the present day. This internationally informed approach offers a nuanced understanding of how modern Chinese international thought has been shaped through the dynamic interplay of IR knowledge production, state formation, and geopolitical contestation.

I argue that this internationally informed approach facilitates a comprehensive understanding of the geopolitical dynamics that have influenced the production of modern Chinese international thought from 1912 until the present day. By doing so, it transcends the limitations of the internalism and the methodological nationalism prevalent in mainstream literature. This analytical approach not only enables us to trace the ‘international’ and structural factors contributing to its genesis and development but also sheds light on the diverse forms modern Chinese international thought has assumed throughout the twentieth century. In essence, this internationally informed analytical approach provides a novel, historicist, multilinear, and ‘international’ account of the evolution of modern Chinese international thought.

The argument of this chapter is presented in four sections. First, I discuss how using the analytical concept of ‘international thought’ in the context of modern China can help us address some of the conceptual and analytical challenges associated with the political charged notion of ‘International Relations theory.’ Second, I delve into the identities of the producers of modern Chinese international thought spanning from the Republican era to the present day. Moving forward, I outline the fundamental principles of Leon Trotsky’s concept of Uneven and combined development (UCD), illustrating how it aids in historicizing modern Chinese international thought by placing it within specific ‘historical constellations’ (Ten Brink 2014, 116). Lastly, I employ Kees van der Pijl's analytical concept of ‘contender states’ to clarify how state-society complexes of this kind tend to generate distinct forms of international thought, driven by their specific structural position within evolving geopolitical structures.

Locating Modern Chinese International Thought

The analytical concept of ‘international thought’ has been extensively explored in the historiography of Anglo-American IR academia (Wight 1987; Ashworth 2013; Armitage 2013; Jackson 2005; Keene 2005; Schmidt and Guilhot 2019; Owens and Rietzler 2021; Specter 2022). For instance, David Armitage (2013, 7) defines international thought as,

the theoretical reflection on that peculiar political arena populated variously by individuals, peoples, nations and states and, in the early modern period, by other corporate bodies such as churches and trading companies. Such reflection treats the nature of the interactions between these actors and the norms that regulate – or should regulate – them.

In a similar fashion, Patricia Owens and Katharina Rietzler (2021, 5) define international thought as a ‘reflection on the relations between peoples, empires, and states.’ In contrast, Matthew Specter (2022, 2) characterizes international thought as the ‘political theory that explicitly or implicitly subtends the academic discipline of international relations, elite foreign policy discourse and journalistic discourses on what constitutes “realism” in international affairs.’ All in all, the literature has offered various definitions of what this type of knowledge is. As we have seen, David Armitage (2013, 7) and Patricia Owens and Katharina Rietzler (2021, 5) described it as a ‘reflection,’ while Matthew Specter (2022, 2) views it as a ‘political theory’.Footnote 1 However, it is important to recognize that these common and useful definitions have primarily been deployed to analyse the historiography of the Western IR cannon.Footnote 2

Paradoxically, the concept of ‘international thought’ (guoji sixiang) is noticeably absent from the literature on the historiography of Chinese IR. In part, the limited utilization of this analytical category within the Chinese IR tradition can be attributed to the central challenge of assessing and defining what ‘international thought’ has been or could be within the context of modern China’s intellectual history. Another challenge pertains to the question of whether Chinese intellectuals have consciously generated a distinct Chinese international thought, and if they have, which thinkers can be considered as the architects of this particular body of knowledge.

Moreover, within the tradition of modern Chinese political thought, Chinese revolutionaries drew a clear distinction between the analytical notions of ‘theory’ (lilun) and ‘thought’ (sixiang). In this respect, Franz Schurmann (1968, 23) argued that ‘the Chinese communists use words of ‘theory’ and ‘thought’ (…), theory is pure ideology, and thought is practical ideology.’ This assessment by Franz Schurmann highlights the dual nature of knowledge production in modern China, establishing a differentiation between practical and abstract knowledge. This dichotomy presents a potential challenge for the study of modern Chinese international thought, particularly during the Maoist era.

From a historical-cultural perspective, Qin Yaqing (2007) expressed doubt about the existence of an ‘international’ awareness within traditional Chinese political thought. Qin Yaqing (2007, 322) argued that (Chinese) IR theory did not have roots in traditional China because ‘the traditional Chinese intellectual mindset lacked a concept similar to ‘international-ness.’’ In fact, Qin Yaqing (2007, 324) pointed out that ‘when the first professorship was established at the University of Wales at Aberystwyth immediately after World War I, most Chinese still believed that Half of The Analects is enough to govern the whole world.’ This observation suggests that in the early twentieth century, notions about ‘the international’ were not widely embraced among the Chinese intellectual elite.

This raises the question of whether we can aptly discuss modern Chinese international thought if the traditional Chinese intellectual mindset did not conceptualize the world in international terms. It also underscores the potential challenges associated with imposing external analytical categories when studying Chinese intellectual history, emphasizing the need to discern when Chinese conceptions about the ‘international’ became widely ingrained among the Chinese intellectual elite in the early twentieth century.

Despite the Chinese communists’ differentiation between ‘theory’ and ‘thought’ and Qin’s historical-culturalist caution regarding the absence of an ‘international’ awareness among traditional Chinese elites, this book unequivocally asserts that the production of international thought has been a persistent presence in China, spanning both imperial and modern eras. However, it has assumed unique forms when compared with the tradition cultivated in European and North American political contexts. These distinctions can be attributed to the interplay and amalgamation of various social forces, socioeconomic development, imperial and nomadic ideologies, diverse state-society formations, and geopolitical factors throughout Chinese history.

With this perspective in mind, the perceived ‘inward,’ ethnocentric, and hierarchical nature of Confucianism, embraced by successive imperial dynasties in China—both Han and non-Han—should not automatically lead us to the conclusion that such a political and cultural worldview hindered the emergence of Chinese political thought acknowledging the existence of other ‘communities’ (van der Pijl 2007a, 2010, 2016) or ‘societal multiplicity’ (Kurki and Rosenberg 2020; Rosenberg 2010, 2013, 2019). On the contrary, throughout Chinese history, a diverse group of Chinese thinkers from various traditions, including Confucianism, Daoism, Legalism, have contributed to the body of knowledge concerning ‘communities occupying separate spaces and dealing with each other as outsiders’ (van der Pijl 2007a, vi). In other words, different traditions of Chinese political thought have been concerned with how the Chinese Empire/state interacted with ‘external’ communities.Footnote 3 In this context, the Confucian cosmovision of the Tianxia (Dreyer 2015; Chu 2020) and the widely debated and polemic ‘tributary system’ (zhonghua chaogong tixi) (Fairbank 1968; Huang 2020; Kang 2010; Park 2017; Spruyt 2017) serve as clear examples.

Drawing on the work of the Gramscian IR scholar Kees van der Pijl regarding ‘modes of foreign relations’ (2007a, 18; 2007b, 2010, 2016), I define international thought as the political thought ‘that makes sense of the different forms in which political communities occupy the space, protect it and conduct exchange relations’.Footnote 4 In the context of modern China, especially since the early twentieth century, I claim that this international thought has manifested in numerous forms, including diplomatic thinking, multiple normative visions of world order, several ideas about international trade, strategic thinking, some forms of state propaganda aimed at an international audience, and the new strands of ‘IR theory’ that emerged after 1978, some of which paved the way for the ‘Chinese School of IR’ and Global IR.

Certainly, I aim to elaborate on the conceptualization of the term ‘international thought’ by emphasizing its broader intellectual scope. This perspective transcends the conventional dichotomy between ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ spheres. Essentially, international thought denotes a form of knowledge that endeavours to comprehend the interwoven dimensions of our social reality. This entails delving into geopolitics, socioeconomic development, and the societal repercussions arising from the dynamic interplay between both the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ spheres.

In the context of modern China, the application of the analytical concept of international thought proves essential for overcoming the analytical, theoretical, and conceptual limitations associated with the reception and utilization of the notion of ‘International Relations theory’ since 1978. Conventional wisdom suggests that the introduction of the purportedly value-free ‘International Relations theory’ (guoji guanxi lilun) arose from the eagerness of Chinese IR scholars to analyse world politics through genuinely scientific methods, providing a toolkit for ‘making organizing generalizations about international politics’ (Weber 2021, 2). However, in the Reform era, the emergence of ‘International Relations theory’ not only reflected the scientific outlook of Chinese IR scholars but also signified a deliberate ideological eagerness to ‘anxiously escape from a past that incarcerated them within the prison-house of ideology’ (Dirlik 2010, 151).

While acknowledging the traumatic experiences such as the Cultural Revolution that might have compelled some Chinese IR scholars to distance themselves from the Maoist era and past forms of IR knowledge—perhaps with valid reasons—and embrace an external form of ‘International Relations theory,’ it's essential to recognize the highly ideological nature of this shift. Consequently, even as Chinese IR scholars have gradually adopted more flexible and broader definitions of what constitutes IR theory, their ideological foundations often lead them towards an analytical presentism when studying China's foreign relations, especially in ancient times, or an inevitable theoretical dead-end. This dead-end restricts their capacity to transcend the confines of Anglo-American materialist empiricism and idealism.

In this context, utilizing the concept of ‘international thought’ enables us to address the ideological foundations shaping the mobilization and production of International Relations theory in China. It assists in challenging the assumption that IR theory is universally objective, value-free, and purely scientific. This evaluation does not imply that the production of IR theory is solely ideological, nor does it reduce IR theory to a mere ‘collection of stories about the world of politics’ (Weber 2021, 2), as some post-structural IR scholars have proposed.

Instead, it introduces an alternative analytical category, such as international thought, acknowledging that ideology and culture play integral roles in how communities interpret their space, safeguard it, and engage in exchange relations with other polities. Simultaneously, it recognizes the universal and historical concern of different polities in generating specific knowledge to comprehend the existence of other polities perceived as ‘external.’ This means that international thought is not a mere ideological construction but an intellectual construction that ‘carries’ ideology and culture. Essentially, this analytical stance posits that despite the ebb and flow of various forms of understanding world politics in modern China, encompassing diverse and conflicting ‘pre-theoretical’ and ‘theoretical,’ epistemological, and ontological positions, there has been an evolving hybrid Chinese international thought manifested in various ways.

The characterization of Chinese international thought as ‘modern’ is rooted in its revolutionary origins, alignment with ideologies of modernity, and its intimate connection with China's early 20th-century state formation—a direct response to the geopolitical pressures stemming from the uneven and combined development of global capitalism and colonialism. It is crucial to note that the infusion of modernity and capitalism into China did not follow a linear trajectory; instead, it underwent a complex, uneven, and multilinear transformation with distinct periods of resistance and eventual acceptance, notably in 1911. Amid this transformative phase, late Qing thinkers grappled with the formidable challenge of preserving imperial state structures and cosmologies at the turn of the twentieth century. This struggle materialized in the form of resistance against the forces of the ‘great transformation’ (Buzan and Lawson 2015), exemplified by the Self-Strengthening Movement (1861–1895) (yangwu yundong). According to Jason Qu (2016, 150), ‘the Movement itself was a haphazard attempt to preserve the Qing Empire and forestall its continued decline…(its) sole purpose was to protect and shield the old systems of tribute, isolationism, and Sino-centrism in a rapidly evolving and changing world dictated not by China’s terms but by the Occidental powers.’

As emphasized by Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2020, 200), during the late nineteenth century, ‘China made relatively little progress in transitioning from an agrarian economy and a dynastic polity to industrial capitalism based on nationalism and popular sovereignty…(it) resisted both the ideologies of progress and the introduction of modern forms of technology and organization.’ Throughout this period, the production of international thought remained influenced by traditional ideologies. For instance, Kang Youwei's international thought, characterized by the utopian and Confucian concept of ‘Great Unity’ (Datong), aimed not only to restore internal unity within a declining Qing Empire but also to present an alternative vision of world order distinct from the Westphalian state-system (Huang 2002).

The socio-political and ideological foundations of modernity began to coalesce during China’s revolutionary period from 1905 to 1911, marked by a concerted emphasis on ‘national revolution, political revolution, and social revolution’ (Wang 2020, 32). In this context, Barry Buzan and Lawson (2020, 200) highlight that ‘the 1911 revolution, spearheaded by Sun Yat-sen, not only unleashed the force of Han nationalism in Chinese politics but also brought an end to government resistance to modernization.’ The establishment of the Republic of China in 1912, characterized by its contender position and China’s gradual integration into the Westphalian international system, along with a political economy featuring a new core and diverse peripheries, witnessed the solidification of Chinese nationalism and ideologies of modernity. This period marked the inception of modern Chinese international thought. According to Barry Buzan and Lawson (2020, 197),

Up to 1911, resistance to modernisation was stronger than support for it, meaning that most reforms were superficial. By 1911, supports of modernisation had the upper hand, but the country sank into a protracted and destructive civil war between two versions of modernity that dominated its domestic politics up to 1949, and a major invasion by Japan between 1931 and 1945. The two periods cover China’s ‘century of humiliation’. From 1949 to the late 1970, China underwent Mao’s radical attempt to accelerate development using a communist model.

Having elucidated the utility of the analytical concept of international thought in analysing the formation of modern Chinese international thought during the twentieth century, let us now shift our focus to identifying the key architects who played pivotal roles in its inception and transformation.

Locating the ‘Producers’ of Modern Chinese International Thought in Modern China

Recognizing the architects of modern Chinese international thought is crucial for a comprehensive examination of this intellectual pursuit and its evolution across the twentieth century. My approach to identifying these contributors takes a broad perspective. Rather than limiting the analysis to conventional IR scholars or traditional intellectuals, I encompass policymakers, statesmen, diplomats, and practitioners whose endeavours have revolved around how modern China navigates its space, safeguards its interests, and engages in relations with other communities and states during the twentieth century.

This comprehensive definition serves a dual purpose. Firstly, it allows us to trace and illuminate the structural continuities and overarching intellectual trends that have shaped the development of modern Chinese international thought from the early twentieth century to the present day. This approach transcends the limitations of viewing the history of modern China as a series of historical ruptures marked by cultural, political, and ideological transformations. Secondly, it facilitates the examination of unconventional figures such as the military official Yuan Shikai (袁世凯) or the communist revolutionary Chen Duxiu (陈独秀). While their ideas may not conform to the traditional mould of thinkers who typically generate international thought, their intellectual contributions addressed the relationship between modern China and other external communities, as well as the challenges arising from these ‘international’ relations. Consequently, they can rightfully be considered as ‘producers’ of modern Chinese international thought.

I consider these thinkers as ‘organic intellectuals’ (Gramsci 1971, 6). Organic intellectuals are tasked with ‘developing and disseminating dominant ideas, making ‘common sense’ out of ideas that essentially uphold the interests of the ruling class’ (Parmar 2012, 7). Despite transformations in China's knowledge production sphere and the gradual opening of the intellectual landscape after 1978—facilitated by an ideological shift within the state, the market transition, and the emergence of a middle class with increased access to both domestic and international higher education (Gu and Goldman 2005)—the prominent Chinese thinkers shaping modern Chinese international thought have historically occupied relatively privileged positions due to their social and economic capital. Even after the reform era, some of the IR thinkers analysed in this book maintained membership in the CCP. This has allowed for their close integration with the mechanisms of state power in China.

Consequently, the Chinese thinkers explored in this book have channelled their ideas and aspirations to legitimize a specific state hegemony within a particular social group and a distinctive configuration of state development, encompassing its international dimension. These thinkers have been responsible for producing what Kees van der Pijl (1989, 7–8) described as ‘comprehensive concepts of control,’

Hegemonic cycles are to be explained by specific ruling class configurations united behind largely implicit, but no less definite, common programs, or comprehensive concepts of control. Such concepts are political formulas that lend cohesion and cogency to the rule of particular classes and fractions of classes by translating idealized class and fractional viewpoints into a strategic orientation.

While the intertwining of power and knowledge has been a salient characteristic of modern China’s history and its intellectual landscape (Goldman et al. 1987; King 2018), it is crucial to recognize that not all contributors to modern international thought have merely functioned as propagandists for the Republic of China and later the People’s Republic of China. Although Chinese thinkers engaged in the production of international thought have been closely connected, to varying extents, with the Chinese state class, they have not adhered to a uniform approach in shaping knowledge or proposing normative guidelines for China’s conduct in world politics. This divergence in approach may have been influenced by their specific roles within different institutions, their participation in intricate intellectual and political networks or factions within the Chinese state, as well as ideological disparities. However, it's important to note that this book does not undertake an exhaustive analysis of how the specific positioning of Chinese intellectuals within the state and its public sphere might have shaped their production of modern Chinese international thought.

It is notable that the extent of theoretical and cultural pluralism has varied depending on the historical context. For instance, the production of modern Chinese international thought during both the Republican and post-reform eras exhibited a level of theoretical pluralism that was absent during the Maoist era. On the one hand, in the Republican era, Marxist, Confucian, and Liberal approaches to the study of world politics coexisted and were amalgamated. On the other hand, the post-reform era witnessed the introduction of Anglo-American IR theory and the emergence of ‘IR with Chinese characteristics’ and the ‘Chinese School of IR.’

It is also crucial to acknowledge that while the Republic of China continued to exist on the island of Taiwan after the conclusion of the traumatic Chinese Civil War in 1949, the intellectuals examined in this book have primarily been situated in mainland China. This choice is not an assertion that ‘Chineseness’ is exclusively associated with mainland China as a national identity. Extensive literature explores the intricate facets of the Chinese identity, with diverse expressions found in Taiwan, Southeast Asia, and the United States. Although beyond the scope of this study, it is noteworthy that an exploration of international thought produced in Taiwan between 1949 and 1980s by thinkers associated with the Nationalist Party (KMT), who identified themselves as Chinese, could provide additional insights.

Now, let's explore how Leon Trotsky's concept of Uneven and combined development can assist us in contextualizing the development of modern Chinese international thought throughout history and offer a genuine international perspective on knowledge production.

China’s Geopolitics and Uneven and Combined Development: Historicizing Modern Chinese International Thought

In his work History of the Russian Revolution, Leon Trotsky (2017 [1930]) formulated the concept of uneven and combined development (UCD). This idea was born out of his analysis of the Russian history and its unique path towards modernity. Trotsky aimed to comprehend why ‘state-led industrialisation in Russia was producing quite different social structures from those of Western Europe. And since the Russian Marxist drew their worldviews from the Manifesto, they were increasingly left without a coherent political analysis and strategy’ (Rosenberg 2016a, 141). Leon Trotsky’s conclusion was that historical development followed multiple paths, and the ‘historical backwardness’ experienced by certain social formations held a generative power. To put it differently, as Justin Rosenberg (2010, 165) argues, ‘its fundamental innovation was to analyse the peculiarities of Russia’s social structure as outcomes of a wider and specifically inter-societal process of historical development.’

Leon Trotsky’s concept of UCD posited that the social world was characterized by the coexistence of multiple polities and societies, each with different social, institutional, and economic features (Rosenberg 2010, 2013, 2016a; Anievas and Matin 2016, 7; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015; Duzgun 2022, 41–42). As Justin Rosenberg claims (2022, 295) that,

UCD brings into focus the specifically multiple and interactive quality of social reality. It pictures the human world in terms of different things going on, at different speeds, in different places (…), but all of them happening in parallel in real time. And that the simultaneity means they can also interact and combine with each other produce hybrid effects and non-linear outcomes (…)

Within the framework of uneven and combined development, ‘relations of unevenness create structural competitive conditions among societies themselves – the ‘whip of external necessity’’ (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, 45). These competitive conditions between more advanced societies and those experiencing ‘historical backwardness’ often compel the ‘less developed’ societies to replicate a similar developmental trajectory as their more powerful capitalist counterparts (Rosenberg 2010, 2013, 585; 2016a; Anievas 2014; Anievas and Matin 2016, 7; Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015; Duzgun 2022, 41–42). This emulation is primarily pursued to avoid dominance by the latter. Consequently, in this dynamic process of development involving interaction, combination, and dialectical change among different societies (Rosenberg 2016b, 17–30), a ‘backward country assimilates the material and intellectual conquests of the advanced countries’ (Trotsky 2017, 4).

Certainly, the process of assimilation should not be construed as a passive adoption by ‘less advanced’ societies of all political and cultural elements from more advanced countries. UCD accentuates the agency of ‘less developed’ societies in shaping the assimilation process and determining its outcomes. Through a process of substitution, these societies can ‘learn from and selectively combine with local social sources the ‘best’ aspects of geopolitically more ‘advanced’ societies (…)[to] attempt to make up for the institutions and relations that, while available to geopolitical enemies, are missing at home’ (Duzgun 2022, 42). This substitution process influences various societal spheres, including the political, intellectual, ideological, economic, and bureaucratic realms (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, 50). A noteworthy consequence of this geopolitically driven process of combination is the emergence of ‘amalgams of archaic with more contemporary forms’ of development (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015, 48–49). In the intellectual and ideological spheres, this phenomenon results in the rise of new forms of knowledge and ideologies in tension, illustrating the coexistence and amalgamation of new and old cultural and ideological elements.

By employing UCD, we can provide a genuine internationally informed and geopolitically grounded narrative of the genesis and evolution of modern Chinese international thought. As argued by Kamran Matin (2010, 111–112),

The theory of Uneven and combined development best captures the dynamics of this historical process through its conceptualisation of ‘the international’ and ‘the social’ as coextensive and co-constitutive. Accordingly, the specificities of modern non-Western political thought cannot be derived from hermetically conceived cultural traits and idioms (…) nor would they be seen as representing a mere resistance to cultural corrosion (…). Modern non-Western political thought should be rethought as essentially attempts to mediate capitalist modernity, as an international and intercultural process, through the rearticulation of Western intellectual products and their transformative incorporation into the native, ideological and political discourses.

In essence, Robbie Shilliam (2007, 301) suggests that UCD offers a framework to grasp the ‘international dimension of knowledge production. Recognizing this dimension necessitates a reimagining of context, not as confined to a specific society or universally applicable, but rather as delineated through a specific society's interaction with other differentially developed societies.’ UCD, in this context, facilitates an understanding of how and why non-Western international thought circulates and undergoes transformation over time, placing particular emphasis on the role of geopolitics and multilinear development. This approach addresses much of the methodological nationalism and internalism prevalent in mainstream historiography, as discussed in the introduction.

Furthermore, the application of the UCD theory allows us to contextualize the emergence of modern Chinese international thought within specific historical conjunctures and (geo)social relations. Against the backdrop of modern China's uneven and combined development throughout the twentieth century, the evolution of modern Chinese international thought has been shaped by various ‘historical constellations’ (Ten Brink 2014). These constellations are characterized by significant processes of economic catch-up, state formation, and geopolitical competition involving China and other advanced states, such as Imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, and the United States.

Tobias Ten Brink (2014, 116) suggests that a ‘concrete historical constellation describes the totality of development and social forces in a specific historical situation.’ According to Tobias Brink (2014, 116), such a constellation can be ‘understood as the crystallisation of international, inter-societal and intra-societal processes.’ Recognizing the existence of distinct historical constellations allow us to explore the development and materialization of ‘strategic projects, resource dependencies, specific inter- and intra-societal power relations, and normative dimensions’ (Ten Brink 2014, 116).

In the framework of modern China's historical trajectory spanning from 1912 to the present day, I have delineated four distinctive historical constellations, each marked by specific geopolitical rivalries, economic catch-up processes, state formation, and the production of international thought: the Republican era (1912–1949), the Maoist era (1949–1978), the Reform era (1978–2008), and the post-reform era (2008–2022).Footnote 5 It is essential to note that these historical constellations do not represent discrete and isolated historical epochs; instead, they are interconnected historical ‘ideal types.‘ These ‘ideal types’ provide a framework for analysing the evolution of knowledge production throughout the twentieth century and placing it within historical conjunctures.

China’s Structural Position Within the Modern Geopolitics: The Chinese Contender State and the Defining Features of Modern Chinese International Thought

While UCD is valuable in aiding our understanding of how the production of modern Chinese international thought has been influenced by structural and international dynamics, and in illuminating the mechanisms governing knowledge production, it has limitations in precisely elucidating the expressions of modern Chinese international thought and the reiteration of its defining traits in various historical contexts throughout the twentieth century. To address these limitations, I employ the analytical concept introduced by Kees van der Pijl—that of ‘contender states’ (van der Pijl 1998, 2006, 2012).

I characterize modern China as a ‘contender state’ (van der Pijl 1998, 2006, 2012; Fusaro 2017). According to Kees van der Pijl (1998, 2006, 2012), contender states historically arose in response to the geopolitical pressures exerted by Western imperial powers and the ‘historical backwardness’ resulting from the uneven and combined development of capitalism. However, the geopolitical rivalry between these more advanced states and contender states cannot be understood in a diffusionist and unilinear manner. Instead, ‘all contender states not only had to confront the strongest core states directly, but the prime contenders had to fend off weaker Hobbesian rivals’ (van der Pijl 1998, 86). This implies that China had to contend geopolitically not only with Western great powers but also with imperial Japan and the Soviet Union. Recognizing this dynamic is crucial for transcending West–East binaries and diffusionist narratives of world history.

The analytical concept of contender states goes beyond the traditional notion of the nation-state; instead, it encompasses what Robert Cox (1986, 205) referred to as ‘state/society complexes.’ Therefore, contender states like China embody a distinctive form of a state/society complex with specific patterns of development and accumulation, the formation of ruling classes, and modes of regulation and expansion (van der Pijl, 1998).

Kees van der Pijl (1998, 80) argues that ‘the specificity of the Hobbesian configuration resides in the paramountcy of the state as the institution driving forward the social formation and pre-emptively shaping, sometimes through revolution from above.’ This specificity is tied to the fact that contender states must initiate, from within their national boundaries, a process of economic catching up to emulate more advanced states to avoid domination by them. Contender states exhibit a distinct power structure governed by a hegemonic state class, whose continued existence relies on its control of the state (Van der Pijl 1998, 2006, 2012, 2019). This state class determines how the socialization of labour and economic development is organized. Furthermore, the state class influences the direction of knowledge production, often directed towards achieving national economic development and defending the national state in the context of uneven and combined development.

Contender states, as exemplified by modern China, exhibit specific characteristics, including the central role of the state in world affairs, a ‘concentric development driven from above, using the state as a lever’ (van der Pijl 2006, 12), and a ‘revolutionary’ ideology mobilizing a social base (van der Pijl 2006, 7). In the Chinese context, societal mobilization is articulated through a Chinese nationalism, evolving from developmental nationalism prevalent from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s, to a cultural nationalism that gained prominence with China's opening up in 1978 and its ‘capitalist turn’ (Wu, 2009). These states also tend to adopt a nationalist foreign policy that ‘backs up the claim of sovereign equality’ as the only means to protect national economic development (van der Pijl 2006, 7). It is crucial to recognize that these features do not solely derive from modern China's ideological or cultural development, nor do they reflect an ahistorical inclination towards revisionism. Instead, they stem from China's intricate and dialectical relationship with modern geopolitics within the context of UCD.

These defining elements are not only essential for understanding the geosocial dynamics of China's state formation and its geopolitical relations but also for comprehending the foundational aspects that have shaped the production of modern Chinese international thought from 1912 to the present day. In his earlier work, Vordenker der Weltpolitik: Einführung in die internationale Politik aus ideengeschichtlicher Perspektive, published in 1996, Kees van der Pijl already highlighted that contender states tended to produce ideas about world politics from a realist perspective due to their structural position within the dynamics of uneven and combined development.

Building upon Kees van der Pijl's preliminary assessment (1996), initially developed for Western contender states, this book posits a crucial idea: modern Chinese international thought has been shaped by internal factors similar to those of contender states. Specifically, these influences encompass: (1) the ontological primacy of the state, (2) Chinese nationalism, (3) a realpolitik perspective on world politics, considering China’s structural position within modern geopolitics and its developmental lag compared to more advanced states, and (4) a collective determination to safeguard China’s sovereign equality and political autonomy in world politics as a result of defending its national development and processes of economic catch-up. It is essential to recognize that these defining elements are treated as ‘ideal types’ and analytical tools.

It is noteworthy that these characteristics have, to some extent, undergone a gradual softening due to the introduction of Anglo-American IR theories after 1978, along with postmodern ideas regarding the state and world politics, which have brought cosmopolitan elements of liberal internationalist philosophy to China. Additionally, it is worth acknowledging that the works of the thinkers analysed in this book may not fully exhibit all these characteristics. However, the paramount importance lies in recognizing that understanding the connection between China’s contender position in a context of uneven and combined development and the development of modern Chinese international thought is crucial for transcending internalist approaches to the production of IR knowledge. These features do not solely emerge from internal cultural dynamics within China but are rooted in geopolitical, structural factors, and processes of economic accumulation.

Allow me to delve into a more intricate exploration of the distinctive features of modern Chinese international thought. Regarding the ontological primacy of the state, the formulation of modern Chinese international thought has predominantly revolved around emphasizing the ontological centrality of the Chinese state. This emphasis is intricately tied to the historical role the state has played in China’s military and socioeconomic development throughout the twentieth century. Since the Republican era (1912–1949), the Chinese state has consistently maintained an activist stance, mobilizing all available resources and its social base to embark on catch-up efforts while diligently safeguarding its autonomy against potential subordination by more advanced states. This dynamic has unfolded within the framework of uneven and combined development at various historical conjunctures.

The emphasis on statism, a prominent feature of contender states, has exerted a profound influence on Chinese intellectuals throughout the twentieth century. As we explore in this book, modern Chinese international thought draws inspiration from cultural sources that prioritize the primacy of the state. These sources encompass Mao Zedong thought, Marxism-Leninism, Confucianism, Anglo-American Realism, and a unique form of liberalism with Chinese characteristics operating within the ideological constraints imposed by the Chinese state. It is noteworthy that this emphasis on statism began to wane after the 1990s, coinciding with the rise of postmodern and globalist interpretations of world politics (Shambaugh 2011, 344; Wang 2001, 110). While gradually diminishing, it has not entirely dissolved the ontological primacy of the state in the formulation of IR knowledge.

The role of Chinese nationalism, encompassing both a developmental and culturalist forms, has been pivotal in shaping the production of modern Chinese international thought. As Timothy Cheek (2016, 320) claims,

The twentieth century has been the nationalist century in China’s long history. No longer an empire, or tianxia, the identity, preservation, and perfection of this new version of “China”—Zhongguo, the nation-state in a Westphalian international order of nation-states—has dominated intellectual, as well as political, life across China’s long twentieth century. Nationalism, in one form or another, has been the overriding concern of modern China’s intellectuals.

These nationalisms have provided essential cultural and ideological foundations that Chinese intellectuals consistently draw upon to formulate normative conceptions of world order and IR theories. It is essential to note that not all the thinkers examined in this book have adhered to staunch and hawkish nationalist viewpoints on world politics. For instance, Qin Yaqing (2020, 13) wrote against what he characterized as ‘pop-realpolitik,’ which he defined as ‘the combination of radical nationalism and hard realism that is haunting the world.’

Since 1912, Chinese intellectuals have consistently approached world politics through the prism of realpolitik, influenced by China’s distinct position within contemporary geopolitics and its historical context of ‘historical backwardness.’ This intellectual inclination has been a driving force in shaping modern Chinese international thought, extending from the Republican era to the present day. The realpolitik perspective was evident in the embrace of Marxism-Leninism and Mao Zedong thought before 1978, and it persisted with the adoption of Anglo-American Realism in the post-reform era. Notably, this orientation aligns with the sentiments of noted Realist IR scholar John Mearsheimer (in Jacobson 2023), who remarked in an interview for the New Statement that ‘when I go to Beijing, I feel more intellectually at home, especially in terms of foreign policy thinking, than I do in Washington. The Chinese are realists to the core.’ While this assertion might be considered somewhat provocative, it does hold a kernel of truth. Throughout history, modern Chinese international thought has undeniably been significantly influenced by realpolitik perspectives on world politics.

In light of China's contender status and a historical context marked by a ‘historical backwardness,’ Chinese intellectuals have consistently operated under the assumption that the paramount goal in producing modern Chinese international thought is to safeguard China’s sovereign equality and its political autonomy on the global stage. Throughout the twentieth century, both implicitly and explicitly, these two concerns have played a pivotal role in shaping Chinese international thought. According to Samuel Kim (1994, 428), China has steadfastly adhered to a sovereignty-centric stance on fundamental global issues, making sovereignty ‘the lingua franca of its international comportment’ (Kim 1994, 428). It is crucial to emphasize that this inclination towards prioritizing sovereignty in the production of modern Chinese international thought does not arise from a revisionist agenda within China, as realist scholars might argue. Instead, it emerges from China's geopolitical positioning deeply rooted in the dynamics of uneven and combined development. These dynamics have compelled China to initiate processes of economic catch-up, promoting national development to shield itself from geopolitical pressures exerted by more advanced states.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I have advanced an internationally informed theoretical approach, I have emphasized the significance of analysing the production of modern Chinese international by considering the influence of geopolitics and the interplay between the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ spheres. This approach, rooted in Leon Trotsky’s theory of uneven and combined development, Kees van der Pijl’s analytical concept of ‘contender states,’ and the broadening of the notion of international thought beyond the Western experience, provides a means to move beyond the limitations of the internalism and the methodological nationalism that have traditionally characterized mainstream literature on the emergence of an indigenous IR theory in China.

This internationally informed approach proves invaluable not only for unveiling the structural factors that have influenced the emergence and transformation of modern Chinese international thought from 1912 to the present day but also for comprehending the diverse forms this thought has assumed throughout the twentieth century. Moreover, this approach allows us to challenge prevailing assumptions that frame the development of modern Chinese international thought as a teleological progression marked by various ideological, political, and cultural ruptures within modern China. Instead, the internationally informed approach enables us to grasp how the development of Chinese international thought has predominantly been shaped by a multitude of causal factors deeply rooted in modern geopolitics.

Furthermore, I have emphasized the significance of comprehending the concept of international thought in a comprehensive manner. Instead of viewing international thought as an intellectual practise that looks at the ‘international’ dimension of social reality, understood as the space beyond the domestic limits of the state, I mobilize it as an analytical category that denotes an intellectual practise of making sense of how political communities interpret how they safeguard their territory, exert influence over it, and engage in exchange relations with other communities (i.e. nation-states, empires, nomadic groups). In essence, international thought makes sense of the interplay between the ‘domestic’ and ‘international’ spheres and forms of thinking that addresses various interconnected aspects of social reality, such as geopolitics and socioeconomic development.

Moreover, this broader definition not only facilitates the identification of epistemological and thematic continuities within the development of modern Chinese international thought but also invites critical examination of the introduction of the concept of International Relations theory in China after 1978. This approach allows for the examination of modern Chinese international thought in its own historical context, helping to avoid the pitfalls of presentism when studying knowledge production during the Republican era and the Maoist eras. In the subsequent empirical chapters, I employ this internationally informed approach to analyse the genesis and transformation of modern Chinese international thought, spanning from the Republican era to the emergence of the ‘Chinese School of IR’ and Global IR.