Posted for fair use......
Vol 7, Iss 2 Spring 2024
History
-
Luke J. Schumacher
In his survey of American statesmanship, Herbert Storing identified a tension between authentic statesmanship — with its “‘way of life’ setting” scope and “character-forming” ambition — and modern constitutional government, which is designed to tame executive prerogative.1 Because “true statesmanship lives in a space outside of any constitutional order and would be a threat to constitutionalism,” Jeffrey Tulis later posited looking to “the idea of a constitutional officer,” rather than a statesman, “as the solution to the problem of statesmanship and emergency power.”2 Recently, Partick Overeem likewise observed that the American Founders “relegated statesmanship to a secondary role after constitutionalism” and thereby “emptied it as a moral ideal.” As such, the American constitutional order leaves few opportunities for the exercise of statesmanship.3 Still, each concedes at least the “possibility” of a modern, circumscribed brand of American rulership called “constitutional statesmanship.”4
While statesmanship receives little scholarly and popular attention today, some has been written about the place for statesmanship, in theory, in the American constitutional design. Much less has been said about its historical presence or absence.5 Whether constitutional statesmanship is a chimera, a rarity, or a recurring reality remains an empirical question. To address it, we should examine political practice. To that end, and to help color in the content of constitutional statesmanship, this article probes the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) at home as America readied for and later waged war abroad. I argue that FDR’s exceptional domestic leadership under extraordinary geopolitical circumstances evinced constitutional statesmanship. More specifically, I contend that Roosevelt applied constitutional statesmanship to prepare his country for war. However, his wartime leadership also exposed some of the limits and ambivalences of constitutional statesmanship as a means of resolving the tension between the demands of war and the dictates of constitutionalism.
This article proceeds in six parts. First, I urge the rehabilitation of “statesmanship” as an evaluative standard, a standard undervalued in presidency studies and ill understood in American public discourse. To this end, I define constitutional statesmanship and posit a method of evaluating leadership against its standard. Because evaluating a leader against this standard requires an appreciation for the conceptual relationship between constitutionalism and statesmanship, I also illustrate how distinct notions of constitutionalism generate distinct expectations of statesmen. Second, I discuss my case selection, Roosevelt in World War II, the sources dictated by that case, and the intellectual and historical contexts that framed prevailing understandings of American constitutionalism and statesmanship in that era. Third, I outline FDR’s own conceptions of the U.S. Constitution and the place for statesmanship within it.6 Fourth, I explain FDR’s prewar, national defense–oriented leadership in terms of those conceptions and then evaluate his leadership against the standard of constitutional statesmanship.7 Fifth, I likewise explain and appraise his wartime actions. Finally, I conclude by comparing Roosevelt’s contemporaries’ evaluations of his constitutional leadership, demonstrating what the standard developed herein adds to those evaluations, and illustrating how precedents Roosevelt established have been used and abused by his successors.
Statesmanship is political leadership that combines power and prudence to realize the common good.8 Affixing the qualifier “constitutional” to it implies that both the ends (the common good) and the means (power and prudence) are at least in part shaped by the state’s constitutional form. Thus, a (ideal-typical) constitutional statesman exercises power and prudence to secure the common good, as that good is defined by the constitution, in a manner consistent with the state’s constitutional arrangements.9
The word “statesmanship” sounds quaint, even foreign, today. Because contemporary political scientists often treat politicians as self-interested agents guided by parochial constituencies,10 it may seem anachronistic to resurrect statesmanship — a form of leadership celebrated in classical antiquity and oriented toward the public interest — as a standard against which to judge FDR, arguably the first “modern president.”11 Amid presidents’ promises of transformational leadership, it may also seem odd to judge a president’s success in preserving, rather than altering, the established constitutional order.12
Statesmanship, constitutional or otherwise, is never only about preserving something, however. A statesman who merely reaffirms the existing constitutional order would not be worthy of the name.13 Reaffirming an underperforming constitutional order in crisis is the presidential equivalent of fiddling while Rome burns. For this reason, few have James Buchanan (on the eve of the Civil War) or Herbert Hoover (at the onset of the Great Depression) in mind when thinking of American statesmen. Yet few think of Donald Trump either, who seemingly aimed to shatter an order he scarcely understood — if he thought of it all. This is because constitutional statesmen must reaffirm as they revise. As Landy and Milkis observe, “great presidents,” like constitutional statesmen, reconcile their constitutional revisions with the existing constitutional order. They superimpose constitutional amendments on the existing order to fill gaps exposed by changing circumstances.14 They do not cite constitutional features as excuses for political paralysis, but neither do they ignore the inconvenient features. They “think constitutionally” about what present circumstances demand, and they justify constitutional changes “in terms of fundamental principles and constitutional norms.”15
What it means to justify constitutional changes in constitutional terms depends, of course, on the state’s constitutional form (a point explained more fully below). While all constitutions constrain the exercise of power, they do so by different methods.16 Thus, a monarch of a constitutional monarchy faces different limits on her statesmanship than an elite aristocrat of an aristocracy, a democratic leader of a democracy, and so forth. Distinguishing the constitutional statesman of a democratic republic such as the United States, then, is her embrace of the democratic and republican character of her office, which shapes the way she introduces constitutional change.17 Since she “commands a view of the whole ground,” as Thomas Jefferson thought only a national executive could, a constitutional statesman may sometimes deliberately disregard the people’s more myopic preferences.18 But she always facilitates their judgment. Put differently, although the constitutional statesman of a democratic republic may flex her first-mover advantage, she does not deprive the people of their “retrospective advantage.”19 Instead, she explains her use of power and submits herself to the people for judgment.20 Constitutional statesmen are not exempt from democratic politics.21
But neither do they capitulate to the vicissitudes of public opinion. Constitutional statesmen appreciate their office’s representative basis without subjecting it to plebiscite. They do what Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 71 said constitutional guardians do: “When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations,” constitutional statesmen “withstand the temporary delusions in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.”22 In short, they aim at the public good, even when the public is not good at discerning its collective interest.
What justifies statesmanship in a rule-bound constitutional order is necessity — the fact that the common good would be imperiled but for such leadership. Statesmanship in a rule-bound constitutional order is the act of supplementing, skirting, bending, or breaking the rules, when required to secure the public good, without sacrificing the benefit of rules in the first place.23 Because the object of statesmanship is the public good, a constitutional statesman cannot ignore the effects his leadership will have on a constitutional order designed to promote the public good. Therefore, to identify constitutional statesmanship, as opposed to executive aggrandizement, we must assess the necessity of circumventing the rules to secure the common good as well as the consequences of circumvention on the rules’ future functioning.
A leader can fail to harmonize statesmanship and constitutionalism in three ways. First, he can supplement the rules when existing rules are adequate to secure the common good, or skirt the rules when the situation does not warrant it, thereby substituting the rule of law for his own rule. This undermines constitutional government — hence the requirement of necessity. Second, he can bend the rules so badly that they cease functioning once the necessity subsides. This sacrifices the long-term benefit of rules for expedience — hence the need to assess the consequences of circumvention. Finally, he can fail to break the rules when necessary, for example, to preserve the state within which the constitutional order operates. Here, a “scrupulous adherence” to the rules would “absurdly sacrific[e] the end” of those rules “to the means.”24
Continued......(Long)
Franklin D. Roosevelt, World War II, and the Reality of Constitutional Statesmanship - Texas National Security Review
Is statesmanship compatible with constitutional government? Scholars have posited the possibility of “constitutional statesmanship” in America but have done little to probe its historical reality or to evaluate its consequences. To illustrate some of the limits, possibilities, and ambivalences...
tnsr.org
Vol 7, Iss 2 Spring 2024
History
-
Franklin D. Roosevelt, World War II, and the Reality of Constitutional Statesmanship
Luke J. Schumacher
Is statesmanship compatible with constitutional government? Scholars have posited the possibility of “constitutional statesmanship” in America but have done little to probe its historical reality or to evaluate its consequences. To illustrate some of the limits, possibilities, and ambivalences of constitutional statesmanship in practice, this article examines Franklin Roosevelt’s leadership on the home front as the country contemplated and later waged war abroad. I argue that, while the president applied constitutional statesmanship to prepare his nation for war, this brand of circumscribed statesmanship later struggled to resolve the tensions between the demands of war and the dictates of constitutionalism. After explaining how distinct notions of constitutionalism generate unique expectations of statesmanship, I show how Roosevelt’s own conceptions of the U.S. Constitution and American statesmanship, developed before World War II, elucidate his leadership decisions during wartime. His leadership, for good or ill, indelibly shaped the powers of the U.S. president and the constitutional order we live under today.
In his survey of American statesmanship, Herbert Storing identified a tension between authentic statesmanship — with its “‘way of life’ setting” scope and “character-forming” ambition — and modern constitutional government, which is designed to tame executive prerogative.1 Because “true statesmanship lives in a space outside of any constitutional order and would be a threat to constitutionalism,” Jeffrey Tulis later posited looking to “the idea of a constitutional officer,” rather than a statesman, “as the solution to the problem of statesmanship and emergency power.”2 Recently, Partick Overeem likewise observed that the American Founders “relegated statesmanship to a secondary role after constitutionalism” and thereby “emptied it as a moral ideal.” As such, the American constitutional order leaves few opportunities for the exercise of statesmanship.3 Still, each concedes at least the “possibility” of a modern, circumscribed brand of American rulership called “constitutional statesmanship.”4
While statesmanship receives little scholarly and popular attention today, some has been written about the place for statesmanship, in theory, in the American constitutional design. Much less has been said about its historical presence or absence.5 Whether constitutional statesmanship is a chimera, a rarity, or a recurring reality remains an empirical question. To address it, we should examine political practice. To that end, and to help color in the content of constitutional statesmanship, this article probes the leadership of President Franklin D. Roosevelt (FDR) at home as America readied for and later waged war abroad. I argue that FDR’s exceptional domestic leadership under extraordinary geopolitical circumstances evinced constitutional statesmanship. More specifically, I contend that Roosevelt applied constitutional statesmanship to prepare his country for war. However, his wartime leadership also exposed some of the limits and ambivalences of constitutional statesmanship as a means of resolving the tension between the demands of war and the dictates of constitutionalism.
This article proceeds in six parts. First, I urge the rehabilitation of “statesmanship” as an evaluative standard, a standard undervalued in presidency studies and ill understood in American public discourse. To this end, I define constitutional statesmanship and posit a method of evaluating leadership against its standard. Because evaluating a leader against this standard requires an appreciation for the conceptual relationship between constitutionalism and statesmanship, I also illustrate how distinct notions of constitutionalism generate distinct expectations of statesmen. Second, I discuss my case selection, Roosevelt in World War II, the sources dictated by that case, and the intellectual and historical contexts that framed prevailing understandings of American constitutionalism and statesmanship in that era. Third, I outline FDR’s own conceptions of the U.S. Constitution and the place for statesmanship within it.6 Fourth, I explain FDR’s prewar, national defense–oriented leadership in terms of those conceptions and then evaluate his leadership against the standard of constitutional statesmanship.7 Fifth, I likewise explain and appraise his wartime actions. Finally, I conclude by comparing Roosevelt’s contemporaries’ evaluations of his constitutional leadership, demonstrating what the standard developed herein adds to those evaluations, and illustrating how precedents Roosevelt established have been used and abused by his successors.
Constitutional Statesmanship as a Concept and Standard
Defining Constitutional StatesmanshipStatesmanship is political leadership that combines power and prudence to realize the common good.8 Affixing the qualifier “constitutional” to it implies that both the ends (the common good) and the means (power and prudence) are at least in part shaped by the state’s constitutional form. Thus, a (ideal-typical) constitutional statesman exercises power and prudence to secure the common good, as that good is defined by the constitution, in a manner consistent with the state’s constitutional arrangements.9
The word “statesmanship” sounds quaint, even foreign, today. Because contemporary political scientists often treat politicians as self-interested agents guided by parochial constituencies,10 it may seem anachronistic to resurrect statesmanship — a form of leadership celebrated in classical antiquity and oriented toward the public interest — as a standard against which to judge FDR, arguably the first “modern president.”11 Amid presidents’ promises of transformational leadership, it may also seem odd to judge a president’s success in preserving, rather than altering, the established constitutional order.12
Statesmanship, constitutional or otherwise, is never only about preserving something, however. A statesman who merely reaffirms the existing constitutional order would not be worthy of the name.13 Reaffirming an underperforming constitutional order in crisis is the presidential equivalent of fiddling while Rome burns. For this reason, few have James Buchanan (on the eve of the Civil War) or Herbert Hoover (at the onset of the Great Depression) in mind when thinking of American statesmen. Yet few think of Donald Trump either, who seemingly aimed to shatter an order he scarcely understood — if he thought of it all. This is because constitutional statesmen must reaffirm as they revise. As Landy and Milkis observe, “great presidents,” like constitutional statesmen, reconcile their constitutional revisions with the existing constitutional order. They superimpose constitutional amendments on the existing order to fill gaps exposed by changing circumstances.14 They do not cite constitutional features as excuses for political paralysis, but neither do they ignore the inconvenient features. They “think constitutionally” about what present circumstances demand, and they justify constitutional changes “in terms of fundamental principles and constitutional norms.”15
What it means to justify constitutional changes in constitutional terms depends, of course, on the state’s constitutional form (a point explained more fully below). While all constitutions constrain the exercise of power, they do so by different methods.16 Thus, a monarch of a constitutional monarchy faces different limits on her statesmanship than an elite aristocrat of an aristocracy, a democratic leader of a democracy, and so forth. Distinguishing the constitutional statesman of a democratic republic such as the United States, then, is her embrace of the democratic and republican character of her office, which shapes the way she introduces constitutional change.17 Since she “commands a view of the whole ground,” as Thomas Jefferson thought only a national executive could, a constitutional statesman may sometimes deliberately disregard the people’s more myopic preferences.18 But she always facilitates their judgment. Put differently, although the constitutional statesman of a democratic republic may flex her first-mover advantage, she does not deprive the people of their “retrospective advantage.”19 Instead, she explains her use of power and submits herself to the people for judgment.20 Constitutional statesmen are not exempt from democratic politics.21
Statesmanship in a rule-bound constitutional order is the act of supplementing, skirting, bending, or breaking the rules, when required to secure the public good, without sacrificing the benefit of rules in the first place.
But neither do they capitulate to the vicissitudes of public opinion. Constitutional statesmen appreciate their office’s representative basis without subjecting it to plebiscite. They do what Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 71 said constitutional guardians do: “When occasions present themselves in which the interests of the people are at variance with their inclinations,” constitutional statesmen “withstand the temporary delusions in order to give them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.”22 In short, they aim at the public good, even when the public is not good at discerning its collective interest.
What justifies statesmanship in a rule-bound constitutional order is necessity — the fact that the common good would be imperiled but for such leadership. Statesmanship in a rule-bound constitutional order is the act of supplementing, skirting, bending, or breaking the rules, when required to secure the public good, without sacrificing the benefit of rules in the first place.23 Because the object of statesmanship is the public good, a constitutional statesman cannot ignore the effects his leadership will have on a constitutional order designed to promote the public good. Therefore, to identify constitutional statesmanship, as opposed to executive aggrandizement, we must assess the necessity of circumventing the rules to secure the common good as well as the consequences of circumvention on the rules’ future functioning.
A leader can fail to harmonize statesmanship and constitutionalism in three ways. First, he can supplement the rules when existing rules are adequate to secure the common good, or skirt the rules when the situation does not warrant it, thereby substituting the rule of law for his own rule. This undermines constitutional government — hence the requirement of necessity. Second, he can bend the rules so badly that they cease functioning once the necessity subsides. This sacrifices the long-term benefit of rules for expedience — hence the need to assess the consequences of circumvention. Finally, he can fail to break the rules when necessary, for example, to preserve the state within which the constitutional order operates. Here, a “scrupulous adherence” to the rules would “absurdly sacrific[e] the end” of those rules “to the means.”24
Continued......(Long)