Keywords

1 Background

African regional organisations have become one of the decisive African mechanisms for enhancing governance and maintaining the peace and security of the continent. Following the third wave of democratisation in Africa in the 1990s, regional organisations have enacted policies and frameworks to cement pluralism in member states, as well as ensure adherence to the principles of liberal democracy. Notwithstanding the initial post-colonial politics (characterised by coups d’état, single-party governance, and strong dictatorial regimes) of the continent, these organisations have supported members in ushering a renewed hope and a promise for democratic governance founded on the rule of law, respect for human rights, equality in the distribution of state resources, justice in the adjudication of cases, and free and fair elections through their various states’ constitutions.

Member states were also admonished to sign up to protocols adhering to these principles, and ratifying sanctions for contravening collective norms. Significant progress was made in many countries in the region; however, a disturbing trend of democratic reversals threatens the gains that have been made. Thus, regional organisations are scrambling to determine the causes and remedies and whether their policy frameworks and institutional norms governing democracy and good governance are sufficient to curb the disturbing trend.

The concern is valid because coup d’états in Africa tend to have a contagion effect. Following the immediate post-colonial periods, there were successful coups in the Congo (later remained Zaire and the Democratic Republic of Congo), Nigeria, Ghana, and Burkina Faso, while several post-colonial rulers maintained power through single-party systems in their various countries. Thus, the third wave of democracy was welcome as it changed the narrative of regional organisations being a “club of dictators” (Reynolds, 2002).

This chapter discusses the role of African regional organisations in consolidating democracy on the continent. It briefly contextualises factors responsible for coups and interrogates democratic governance practices in the region, despite some successes in power transitions. The chapter asserts that perhaps the types of democracies that were normalised in the region, and cemented by regional policy frameworks, are the causes of these reversals and that fundamental problems remain which, if not curbed, could spread the contagion of coups d’état in Africa. The chapter also avers that regional organisations’ regime formation is threatened by their inaction and inconsistencies in decision-making when responding to unconstitutional regime changes.

2 Introduction

In the last decade, Africa has experienced coups and other forms of undemocratic changes in government. Mali (August 2020, May 2021), Sudan (October 2021), Chad (April 2021), Guinea (September 2021), Burkina Faso (September 2022), and Niger (July 2023) all experienced violent insurrections. In Guinea-Bissau, there were several failed attempts at forceful takeovers. Other subtle manipulations of the Constitution have taken place including amendments abolishing term limits, removing term limits, and other attempts to extend the limits placed on tenures. Where forceful military takeovers have not occurred, attempts at constitutional manipulation by civilian incumbents have led to political unrest, as was witnessed in Senegal in June 2023.

There is every indication that democracy seems to be failing on the continent. Or that to the ordinary citizen, the expectations they had of it have not come to fruition. Related to this is the high level of social inequality between individuals, groups, and regions, where the political class in several countries earn more than other societal groups and have access to contracts, patronages, and state resources; and where access to education, health, and social services is unevenly distributed both in quality and in quantity (Okon, 2022). Additionally, the type of democracy being practised remains questionable, ranging from autocratic to semi-democracy, to dictatorship (Birikorang, 2013). These are also characterised by exclusion, political marginalisation, and human rights abuses.

Although regional organisations in Africa have encouraged the establishment of a solid foundation for industrialisation and economic development in the continent, the recent rise in coups in Africa reflects a waning regional and international willingness to enforce anti-coup norms, as these coup d’états and subsequent instabilities have somewhat truncated development efforts.

Bad governance practices by some African countries such as Ghana have led to excessive borrowing and plunged them into debt crisis, raising governance concerns among civil society organisations (CSOs) and the broad masses of citizens. As a result, several countries are witnessing unprecedented labour agitation, demonstrations, and strike actions. Yet while regional organisations have policies regarding democracy and good governance, human rights, and access to justice, among others, they are silent on the punitive measures and sanctions when governments fail to abide by these norms. The biased emphasis on punishing coups d’état and other forms of unconstitutional regime changes demonstrates a weak regime formation, as regional organisations are unable to elicit compliance to shared norms and principles by the member states. The chapter asserts that those norms are not just the rejection of unconstitutional regime changes, but also the respect for the rule of law, human rights, access to justice, participation in decision-making, and freedom from fear and want.

3 Democratic Practice and Insecurity in Africa

Some countries in Africa like Ghana, Gabon, The Gambia, Nigeria, Botswana, and Zambia, among others, have made progress in entrenching democracy including the conduct of elections and peaceful transfers of powers. Over the years, these countries have remained committed to being positive influences on other African countries that continue to face challenges with democratic consolidation. While the struggle for change continues vis-à-vis the slow pace of the region towards a more participatory political transition, much remains to perfect democracy on the continent. These countries have tackled democracy-related issues differently; however, efforts have been marred by pockets of violence during election phases, as recently recorded in Nigeria and Kenya. These sometimes question the countries’ progress in consolidating democracy.

Elections in Africa are generally characterised by violence. A key concern relates to the perceived lack of independence of the Election Management Bodies (EMBs), which have been accused of bias in the collation and declaration of election results in some countries. Most of these acts are believed to be influenced by the government of the day in most countries in the region (Aning & Danso, 2012). For example, despite the use of highly sophisticated digital technology in the 2023 presidential electoral process by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) in Nigeria, there were accusations of irregularities due to the malfunctioning of the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (The Punch, 2023).

The practice of democracy in Africa was expected to bring dividends and address the existing socio-economic and governance challenges including poverty, unemployment, and corruption among many others. Although some governments have adopted several initiatives, the challenges of youth unemployment have not been completely addressed. In 2022, the rate of youth unemployment was estimated at about 12.7 per cent and the current rate stands at 12.3 per cent (Statistia, 2023). In addition, youth marginalisation in political and developmental processes has led to frustrations with the current systems of governance, leading to protestations and strike actions by labour unions.

The general difficulties and associated frustrations have resulted in despondency among young people, leading to large groups of people jubilating in the streets of Bamako (Mali), Khartoum (Sudan), Ouagadougou (Burkina Faso), and Conakry (Guinea) to welcome coup makers. These levels of frustration can potentially undermine democracy and security as was witnessed in the region. Several governments are embroiled in human rights violations despite their duty to abide by the international human rights instruments as well as those highlighted in their constitutions. Additionally, democratic rights are in jeopardy because of untimely constitutional amendments made to enable incumbent leaders to stay in power. Also, sham elections remain frequent, not to mention serious violations of human and people’s rights (Manirakiza, 2019). These are all undemocratic practices that should be condemned by the African Union (AU) and other regional bodies.

Yet, the basic democracy-prone AU instruments fall short on whether citizens are entitled to oppose undemocratic practices outside electoral processes. The reaction of regional organisations, especially the AU, to unconstitutional regime changes is often contradictory, uneven, and sometimes clearly biased. It presupposes that the AU itself is unable to live up to its regime status as it is unable to elicit compliance from member states or even abide by its own tenets.

4 African Regional Organisations as Regimes?

In the establishment of cooperation at the regional level, belonging to a regional institution and benefiting from the collective security initiatives requires that member states individually adopt and abide by several agreed procedures that guide and streamline their actions and for which all members may be identified. The application of regime theory is critical to this study as it provides the conceptual basis through which the AU and other regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) are discussed.

Rittberger and Peter Mayer (1993) describe regimes as “rules of the game agreed upon by members in the international arena (namely nation states) and delimiting for these actors the range of legitimate or admissible behavior in a specified context of activity.” A more nuanced definition of regimes is provided by Krasner (1983) who defines regimes as “a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.”

Elaborating further, Krasner (1983) posits that “principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Rules are specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective choice.” The African Union’s principles of “respect for the rule of law, fundamental human rights and freedoms, the sanctity of human rights and international humanitarian law,” and “respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of member states” are examples of this.

Additionally, its procedures for sanctioning misbehaviour against these agreed norms are clearly enumerated in its Constitutive Act, the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Governance (ACDEG). ECOWAS regimes are contained in its Revised Treaty, the Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance, and the Conflict Prevention Framework. The South African Development Commission (SADC) Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections also delineates roles and responsibilities, as well as the expected behaviour of member states and state institutions in ensuring participatory and truly democratic electoral processes. Regimes are thus a necessary condition for establishing effective regional orders which are capable of preventing and managing conflicts within a region.

In establishing regimes, ideals governing behaviour and expectations of members are spelt out. Norms are “collective expectations about proper behavior for a given identity” (Katzenstein et al., 1996). Social constructivists argue that norms may have lasting impacts on the conduct of war and may motivate intervention for humanitarian purposes; the perspective can also provide insights into international peace operations in general and peacekeeping missions in particular (Bjorkdahl, 2006). From a constructivist perspective, norms are generally considered a set of intersubjective understandings and collective expectations, regarding the proper practices of states and other actors in a given context or identity (Bjorkdahl, 2006) such as in elections, human rights principles, and governance criteria and even in the events of breaking of rules.

It is also possible to identify the existence of norms by exploring their institutionalisation in organisational and procedural structures. Institutionalisation is important because once an idea is embodied in institutions, these institutions facilitate the implementation of the idea by giving organisational support and means of expression (Bull, 1977). From this stage onwards, what remains is the formalisation of the norms into policy planning procedures for necessary action. Even though formalising norms into institutions and policy planning is not an indicator of the existence of a regime, it does signal a preparedness and commitment to regime creation and sustenance. Regimes are therefore institutions that assist in facilitating adherence to the agreed rules. Institutions help to secure adherence to rules by formulating, communicating, administering, enforcing, interpreting, legitimating, and adapting them (Bull, 1977).

However, much as regimes are central to the practical effectiveness of an organisation, their very existence becomes questionable when participants in the regime ignore their obligations. For a regime to be successful or effective, participants need to modify their behaviour in line with regime obligations (Haas, 1993). Thus, a regime is effective to the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules. It is also effective to the extent that it achieves certain purposes such as the enhancement of the ability of the states to cooperate in the issue area (Hasenclever et al., 1997).

For democracy and security regime creation in Africa, the political process through which the security regime was created is of particular significance. As later discussed, these processes have been challenging for the AU as sovereignty has been invoked to justify non-interference in the internal affairs of a member state, when norms and principles have been contravened. Additionally, the security imperative has been used to justify inaction by regional organisations when collective norms have been flouted by specific member states. It is with this in mind and in response to the prevailing security situation in Africa that the AU instituted norms on good governance and the rule of law, as well as the respect for the human rights of citizens. However, how these norms have been practised, the subjectivity of actions, and inconsistencies make it difficult to determine the type of regime being formed.

Another enabling factor that has helped the cause of regionalism in Africa is liberal democracy. In Africa, regionalism has evolved over many decades, from years of autocratic rule in several states to military dictatorships and democracy in some states. However, political liberalisation or “democratisation” that has swept through many countries has helped to produce an environment that is more hospitable to interdependence at the regional and global levels (Fawcett, 1997). Democracy and regionalism are thus mutually reinforcing processes, such that as states accept liberal democratic principles, they become more confident in joining membership with regional organisations. On the other hand, regional organisations also promote democracy and good governance through the establishment of norms and principles that uphold democratisation. The regional organisation also bestows on itself the right to intervene through suspensions, sanctions, mediation, or forceful measures in order to enforce norms within member states.

The development of norms within the AU involved two processes: norm socialisation and internalisation (localisation). This fosters an appreciation of how the institutionalisation of the norms of condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government and intervention in the internal affairs of member states in the event of a humanitarian crisis had an impact on state practice within member states. It also recognises the reaction of member states to any AU actions with respect to the contravention of these norms.

Norm localisation refers to the process of contestation between emerging transnational norms and pre-existing regional normative and social orders, in which local agents reconstruct foreign norms to ensure the norms fit with the agents’ cognitive priors and identities (Acharya, 2004). While transnational norms of condemnation of unconstitutional changes of government and intervention in the internal affairs of member states have been institutionalised within the AU Constitutive Act and in other protocols of the sub-regions, the internalisation of these norms has been uneven in member states. What this implies is that even though member states have signed and ratified these protocols, to a certain extent they do not expect the norms to be applied to their peculiar situations.

Even though the establishment of the AU was regarded as a crucial moment in the process of norm development and institutionalisation, this process has been reluctantly accepted and adopted by member states, in that, there had been growing pressure on African governments to be seen to conform to transnational norms of liberal democratisation and human rights (Williams, 2007). Therefore, the process of norm socialisation faces considerable challenges, especially with respect to unconstitutional regime changes and other forms of extension of term limits. Within Africa, several heads of state do not have or have amended, have attempted, or have recently abolished term limits (Togo, Rwanda, Niger, The Gambia, Burundi, Uganda, Cameroon, Guinea, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon). These are signatory countries to the ACDEG and to other sub-regional protocols on democracy and human rights; yet, heads of state rarely think these normative frameworks are applicable to them.

It is important to recognise that in the African context, there are variations to which norms are observed and rules complied with by member states—indicating that the existence of explicit rules and principles are not the only criteria for determining an international regime. This is not to proscribe that rules be broken and norms contravened, but the significant aspect is the consistency with which member states behave and, most importantly, consistency in the actions of the regional organisation and its ability to elicit compliance and shape behaviour.

5 The Role and Approaches of African Regional Organisations to Coups in Africa

The AU has adopted a “zero-tolerance” approach to military coups through the Ezulwini Framework of 2009 (see African Union Commission, 2009). The organisation has also put in place a comprehensive framework to respond to military coups and other forms of unconstitutional change of government. The major instruments that the AU relies on in this regard are the Constitutive Act, the Peace and Security Protocol, the Lomé Declaration, and the African Charter on Democracy, Elections, and Good Governance. In 2022, the Accra Declaration on Unconstitutional Regime Changes took a stance on all forms of unconstitutional regime changes in the region, setting in motion the process of plugging in all the loopholes in previous protocols and policies (African Union, 2022). All these instruments provide for the possible imposition of sanctions and/or suspension from the organisation’s activities following a military coup. In response to the military coups in Mali, Guinea, Niger, Burkina Faso, and Sudan, the AU moved swiftly to condemn the coups, call for the unconditional release of political leaders who had been detained by the military, and suspend the respective countries from the organisation’s activities until they had taken concrete steps to return to democratic rule. Yet, there has been inconsistency in the application of punitive measures, or that the punitive measures are not prohibitive enough (Table 1).

Table 1 AU/sub-regional responses to unconstitutional regime changes in Africa since 2010
Full size table

The above demonstrates that in several instances of coups d’état and other forms of unconstitutional regime change, the AU has mostly been consistent in condemning the actions of the military, suspending the actors, and imposing sanctions where needed. At the sub-regional level, however, actions have differed, sometimes contradicting the AU, leading to tensions. For example, in Sudan (after the April 2019 overthrow of President Al Bashir) and Chad (after the death of President Idriss Deby), both the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) failed to condemn the actions of the various protagonists, rather calling for continuous dialogue and peace. IGAD actively requested the AU to reinstate Sudan and lift the sanctions that had been imposed following a fact-finding mission that had been deployed by IGAD to the country. For Chad, the reasoning behind the lack of decisive action was the fact that the country was in the midst of its war on terror, supporting other countries such as Mali, Niger, and Central African Republic in their various battles against violent extremism and civil wars. Therefore, in the interest of regional security, ECCAS did not consider it prudent to suspend Chad and impose sanctions on the country.

With instability in West Africa, the practice has often been that the AU follows the lead of the sub-regional body, ECOWAS, which usually takes decisive actions following regime changes by suspending the member state, imposing immediate sanctions, calling for the return to constitutional order within a set timeframe, and supporting with dialogue and mediation. In September 2021, ECOWAS announced that it would impose targeted sanctions on the military leaders in Mali following their announcement that they could not meet the February 2022 deadline for holding democratic elections. These targeted sanctions took effect on 7 November 2021, the same day that the sanctions against Guinea took effect. Suspensions and sanctions can be effective tools in restoring democracy following military coups. In 2020, the imposition of sanctions by ECOWAS was one of the main reasons why the Mali military leaders moved to form an interim government, due to the crippling effect of the sanctions on the economy.

The coup d’état in Niger in July, however, brought several contradictions in terms of the regional approach. The only consistency of action between the AU and ECOWAS was the condemnation of the coup, calling for the return to constitutional order and for the release of the deposed president. Beyond these initial statements, effective actions were inconsistent. Within ECOWAS, there were calls for military action through the activation of the ECOWAS Standby Force (ESF) to forcefully reinstall the deposed president (ECOWAS, 2023). This was contained in the Second Extraordinary Summit of the Head of States and Government following an initial summit in which the military junta was given an ultimatum to return to constitutional order. Yet, even though sanctions had been placed on the members of the regime, the country had not yet been suspended. The economic and financial sanctions were imposed by both ECOWAS and the West African Monetary Union (UEMOA), cutting off the power supply to the landlocked country, closing borders, and restricting the movement of goods and persons. ECOWAS, in its Communique of 10 August 2023, called on the African Union to endorse all the decisions taken by ECOWAS on the situation in Niger. The AU subsequently expressed support for ECOWAS’ decisions on anti-constitutional change in Niger (AU, 2023).

Between the Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and the AU, technically, there is a hierarchy of authority. In practice, however, the RECs have autonomy, and evidence suggests that the position taken by the REC can determine the AU response. ECOWAS is especially muscular in the approach that it takes and acts swiftly in suspending the state and in establishing routes for a resolution of the crisis early on (Omorogbe, 2022). However, most of these actions are in respect of actions following a coup d’état. Preventive measures are often not prioritised.

In spite of this, the AU and sub-regional organisations often struggle to determine the necessary course of action following a popular protest which leads to the resignation, “overthrow,” or arrest of the democratically elected leader. This is a problematic situation as popular protests are “considered the people’s right to overthrow oppressive regimes” (ISS, 2023), therefore not unconstitutional or illegitimate. Yet, when these uprisings are successful in deposing oppressive leaders, a perceived vacuum is left, which is usually occupied by the entity that possesses the autonomy over the use of force, the military. As soon as the military assumes office, its action is considered unconstitutional. This dilemma reflects the loopholes in the various protocols of the regional and sub-regional organisations. Thus, in Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, and Sudan, following the resignations of the heads of state, the militaries have taken over power by suspending the constitution.

In most constitutions, when the president resigns, the vice-president (president of the National Assembly or prime minister if provided for under the constitution) is mandated to accede the presidency. Yet these officials usually belong to the same government against which the uprising is organised. Therefore, even though, constitutionally, a vacuum has not been created, for the mass population, a vacuum remains, because the remaining options are not acceptable to the people. The AU and the RECs need to fill this vacuum, without which the military would most likely take advantage of the situation. Increasingly the military in the region is making incursions into politics again. As was the case in Burkina Faso, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, and Niger, the military is given a timeframe within which to return the country to constitutional order. None of these deadlines has been respected.

A key issue around the discussion on norm localisation revolves around the fact that the rules and procedures governing behaviour are implementable and applicable to state-level actors. For example, under Article 3 of the ECOWAS Treaty, “Each member state understates to honour its obligations under the Treaty and to abide by the decisions and regulations of the Community.” This often places regional and sub-regional organisations on a collision course with local populations when they perceive sanctions and other punitive measures against unconstitutional regime changes to be too drastic. Norms need to be diffused below the state level, where civil society and other citizen groups would understand the need for such measures at the regional level. In Mali, ECOWAS struggled to get the support of the locals for the measure they instituted against the military regime. These measures included economic and financial sanctions, as well as the closure of land and air borders with Mali. This is against the backdrop of the ECOWAS protocol on Free Movements of Persons, in which citizens of West Africa can travel visa-free from one country to the other. Additionally, Mali is a landlocked country and therefore mostly relied on its littoral neighbours for its shipping needs.

While suffering from the almost crippling effects of regional sanctions, the military junta strategically pitted the Malians against ECOWAS. They stated that “the government of Mali deplored the inhumane nature of these measures, which are affecting populations already severally affected by the security and health crisis linked to Covid-19” (Kaledzi, 2022). In doing this, they called for more demonstrations against ECOWAS. It is instrumental to note that ECOWAS only tightened its sanctions when the military regime failed to meet the timelines for the restoration of democracy in the country. Yet due to the lack of norm diffusion, Malians perceived ECOWAS as a threat, with several calling for Mali to withdraw from ECOWAS. This problematic situation emboldens military regimes, in which case the military junta, in protest against sanctions, expelled the ECOWAS representatives from the country. In Niger, citizens called upon ECOWAS to lift the economic sanctions. Nigeria curtailed the supply of power to the country, affecting critical businesses. Having declared that it was an ECOWAS of the People rather than an ECOWAS of States, the regional body needs to devise mechanisms for the filtering down of their policy frameworks, norms, procedures, and governing mechanisms.

According to Article 24 of the ACDEG, “when a situation arises in a state party that may affect its democratic political institutional arrangements of the legitimate exercise of power, the Peace and Security Council shall exercise its responsibilities in order to maintain the constitutional order in accordance with relevant provisions of the protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union”. Additionally, under Article 4(j) and 4(k) of the Protocol Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council Protocol, the AU has the right to intervene in a member state in the case of a serious threat to legitimate order, in order to restore peace and stability in the member state upon the recommendation of the peace and security council (AU, 2002). These provisions highlight “the exercise of its responsibilities” and the “right to intervene” in a member state. Yet there is no mention of the type of intervention, beyond issuing statements, suspensions, sanctions, and mediation missions. These have, however, proved to be ineffective in preventing unconstitutional regime changes and reverting the country to constitutional rule within the shortest possible time. This has actually emboldened militaries in the region that are increasingly aware that in spite of the norms governing states’ behaviour, the lack of effective enforcement and the loopholes have rendered regional organisations ineffective.

This shows that there exists a positive relationship between the ability of and the degree to which a regime adequately fulfils its regulative capability functions and the extent to which order is maintained in the state (Chigozie & Oyinmiebi, 2022). It, therefore, follows that ECOWAS and its member states have not been able to exercise their regulative capability function, nor have the AU been able to rein in their recalcitrant member states. In Niger, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Mali, the military administration has continuously failed to heed the calls of ECOWAS to return to constitutional rule and further blames the regional body for the economic effects of the sanctions on the country, creating a dilemma for the effectiveness of the sanctions (Axelrod & Aning, 2020). How do regional organisations ensure that perpetrators of the coup d’état are punished for their actions and behaviours which negatively impact the broader population? This is a dilemma for which the regional organisations continue to seek solutions. The resurfacing of coups in Africa has come with several political, economic, and security implications for the region, especially for regional organisation’s capacity to preserve democracy in the region (Chigozie & Oyinmiebi, 2022). Therefore, effectively addressing this menace is a priority for African regional organisations if they are to redeem their image and ability to elicit acceptable behaviour from their member states.

6 Conclusion

The chapter has sought to delineate some of the dilemmas faced by African regional organisations in tackling the menace of coup d’état. Establishing strong regimes capable of eliciting compliance from member states requires a strong organisation with rules and procedures that are universally accepted by all. These norms need also be distilled to the local level such that the local population accepts that contravention by ruling elites brings consequences to all. The chapter has also recognised that while regional and sub-regional organisations have protocol and legal frameworks that address coups d’état and other forms of unconstitutional regime changes, there are major inconsistencies in the application of these frameworks, leading to undermining of efforts and a lack of effectiveness.

The extent to which citizens support democracy, democratic practice, and governance is fast eroding in Africa. This is because, beyond the usual cycles of elections and transitions, the public expresses low levels of trust in key democratic institutions such as the electoral commission and the judiciary. Moreover, excessive borrowing, corruption, and general mismanagement have further worsened the economic circumstances of countries in the region. Additionally, the practice of democracy and governance has not translated into addressing the socio-economic challenges that confront Africans. These difficulties will continue to create an unstable political environment characterised by agitations and protestations, generating fears of coups.

It is therefore essential that member states ensure that governance processes are open and transparent to all. Criticism from CSOs and media should be seen as part of nation-building rather than undermining the authority of the various governments in Africa. Strengthening electoral commissions; increasing citizens’ awareness about their rights and responsibilities; and eschewing ethnic-based politics, all contribute towards the deepening of democracy on the continent.

Although regional organisations have resorted to sanctions in response to military coups in Africa, the repeated occurrence of military coups does not always yield the desired effect on the targeted individuals. The prevalence of military coups, despite the existence of different sanctions regimes, is evidence that there is a need to adopt a proactive approach to the problem of military coups in Africa. A preventive framework is needed to curtail the occurrence of coups by addressing the root causes including the reluctance on the part of some African leaders to exit on their due term of office. Citizens need to be conscientised of the important roles that states play in abiding by agreed norms of behaviour, for which punitive measures are sanctioned when necessary.

On the other hand, regional responses have been overwhelmingly reactive. It is instrumental that these coups have often been predictable, occurring in countries where human rights and the rule of law are not respected, coupled with the prevalence of national security threats, and where the economic downturn has been apparent. It would seem that the major preoccupation of the regional group is the return to liberal democracy in name only. Regional organisations need to do more than just react and issue statements and ultimatums. As regimes, they are required to encourage proper behaviour and show the necessary strength to enforce rules and procedures.