Keywords

Introduction

This book has investigated how the interplay between knowledge production, geopolitical contestation, and state formation has influenced the genesis and transformation of modern Chinese international thought from the Republican era in 1912 to the post-reform era in 2022. The central argument posited in this book is that the development of modern Chinese international thought has been informed by the distinctive position of the Chinese state, characterized as a ‘contender state,’ in the global order from 1912 to the present day.

I have argued that despite variations in how Chinese intellectuals have conceptualized world politics across different historical periods from 1912 to the present, certain commonalities have persisted. These include a tendency to formulate international thought from a standpoint that prioritizes the ontological significance of the state, a collective commitment to generating knowledge as a tool for safeguarding China’s national sovereignty, an inclination to analyse world politics through a realpolitik lens, and a predisposition to embrace Chinese nationalism to varying degrees. The persisting commonalities, evident across diverse historical eras, can be traced back to China's structural position in the global order as a ‘contender state.’ This positioning has resulted in China trailing behind more advanced states, including imperial Japan, the Soviet Union, Western powers in the early twentieth century, and the United States post-1978, at various junctures in time.

This book has significantly enriched historiographic discussions surrounding the origins of modern Chinese international thought, spanning from the twentieth century to the first quarter of the twenty-first century. The significance of this exploration transcends its primary role in elucidating the intricacies of modern Chinese international thought production in the twentieth century. It also has provided valuable insights into critical debates within the field of IR, particularly those pertaining to non-Western IR theory and Global IR.

I have argued that prevailing historiographic narratives surrounding the emergence and evolution of modern Chinese international thought post-1978 are marked by a notable internalist perspective and a methodological nationalism. In this respect, I have identified four internalist historiographic narratives: (1) ‘the big bang of 1978,’ (2) the ‘paradigm shift’ of IR theory in China, (3) China’s peaceful rise, and (4) the impact of a Confucian culture on the development of indigenous IR theory. All these narratives reinforce the idea that intellectual shifts in Chinese IR thinking during the post-reform era, seemingly indicating a historical departure from earlier forms of Chinese IR thought, were primarily influenced by internal and cultural dynamics within the Chinese state. Furthermore, these narratives underscored the specific intellectual milieu that emerged within the Chinese IR community after 1978, characterized by the adoption of Anglo-American IR theories and a reduced emphasis on previous manifestations of Chinese IR thought.

Chapter 2 established an internationally informed analytical framework, drawing on Leon Trotsky’s idea of Uneven and Combined Development (UCD) and Kees van der Pijl’s analytical category of ‘contender states.’ I contended that this theoretical and analytical approach has enabled us to historicize the genesis of modern Chinese international thought within a truly international framework. By integrating the interplay between the domestic and international spheres into our analysis, we could effectively confront the prevalent tendencies of internalism and methodological nationalism inherent in much of the mainstream literature on the origins and evolution of an indigenous IR theory in mainland China.

Chapter 3 examined the multilinear and geopolitical origins of modern Chinese international thought. It illustrated how this emergence was facilitated by three global and interconnected processes: the introduction of ideologies of modernity, including Socialism, Social Darwinism, and Liberalism, through the migration of Chinese intellectuals to imperial Japan in the early twentieth century, the revolutionary events in Tzarist Russia from 1905 onwards, leading to the establishment of the Soviet Union in 1922 and China’s traumatic interactions with Western imperialist powers. The chapter highlighted how the Republican era marked a pivotal geopolitical moment, positioning China as a ‘contender state’ within modern geopolitics. This historical juncture witnessed the rise of a distinctive modern Chinese international thought, characterized by features that persisted beyond the Republican era.

Chapter 4 delved into the transformation of modern Chinese international thought within the triangular geopolitical relations involving the Soviet Union, the United States, and China. This chapter illuminated how the Maoist era was marked by two defining and interrelated geopolitical moments that significantly influenced the development of modern Chinese international thought. Firstly, during the period leading up to the Sino-Soviet split (1956–1966), Chinese international thought was primarily shaped by the dynamics of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the geopolitical contestation against Western great powers. Secondly, the chapter explored how the Sino-Soviet split became a pivotal moment for modern Chinese international thought. The geopolitical dispute with the Soviet Union and the eventual rapprochement with the United States compelled Chinese thinkers to devise alternative ways of conceptualizing world politics. It was during this period that a renewed ethnocentric sinocentrism and a growing political pragmatism emerged, laying the groundwork for the intellectual transformations that unfolded after 1978.

Chapter 5 explored the ‘Anglo-Americanization’ process of Chinese IR academia during the Reform era. I contended that the new geopolitical moment that unfolded after 1978, characterized by China’s capitalist restoration and a gradual, selective economic integration into the international liberal order, qualitative transformed the production of modern Chinese international thought. This emerging Chinese international thought embraced Anglo-American IR theory as a means to depoliticize the production of IR knowledge and consciously break with forms of knowledge from the Republican and Maoist past. However, the chapter also demonstrated that, despite the ongoing ‘Anglo-Americanization’ of IR theory production, the development of international thought was still marked by the contender position of the Chinese state within the global order. Therefore, this contender position was reflected through the ways in which Chinese IR scholars developed Realism, Liberalism, Constructivism, and the ‘English School of IR’ in Post-Mao China.

Chapter 6 explored whether the pursuit of establishing an indigenous IR theory during the post-reform era, under the ‘Chinese School of IR’ project, was still influenced by China’s contender position within the global order. I argued that despite the subliminal liberalism that informed the theoretical innovations promoted by the members of the ‘Chinese School of IR,’ these theoretical works have been shaped by China’s contender nature and its structural position within modern geopolitics. Beyond some exceptions, this complex and heterogeneous theoretical project has primarily been concerned with two key issues. On the one hand, it has aimed to safeguard China’s international autonomy in a landscape characterized by the resurgence of geopolitical rivalry between China and the West. On the other hand, it has focused on maximizing China’s position within the global economic order during the post-reform era to protect China’s economic development and the legitimacy of the CCP.

Lessons for Chinese IR, Non-Western IR Theory and Global IR

This book has offered an episodic intellectual history, employing an internationally informed approach that leveraged UCD and the analytical concept of “contender states.” By doing so, it provided novel insights into the ongoing debates within IR regarding Chinese IR, Non-Western IR theory, and Global IR. In the subsequent sections, I will underscore how we can navigate some of the conceptual, theoretical, and analytical challenges encountered by IR when delving into the production of IR knowledge beyond the Western context. Additionally, I will explore potential strategies to effectively address these challenges.

A Modern Chinese International Thought That Was Always There?

At the outset of this project, my primary focus centred on contemporary discussions regarding non-Western IR theory, particularly as articulated by renowned IR scholars Amitav Acharya and Barry Buzan. Simultaneously, I aspired to delve into the discourse surrounding the evolution of an indigenous IR theory in China during the Reform era, leading to the conceptualization of ‘IR with Chinese characteristics’ and the ‘Chinese School of IR.’ It became apparent that within Chinese IR academia, there existed an implicit assumption that the Reform era represented a historical rupture from previous forms of Chinese thinking about world politics. Consequently, the introduction of Anglo-American IR theory not only signified the adoption of novel approaches to understanding world politics—hitherto absent in China before 1978—but also introduced a new paradigm and framework for developing an ostensibly scientific and universally applicable indigenous IR theory.

In the early 2000s, discussions surrounding the emergence of a ‘Chinese School of IR’ often resonated with the prevailing belief that the reform era marked a crucial historical rupture, instigating a profound qualitative transformation in the production of IR theory within China. The fundamental assumption was that, through processes of ‘learning’ and ‘indigenization,’ a distinctive indigenous IR theory began to coalesce, embodied by the envisioned ‘Chinese School of IR.’ What intrigued me about these prevailing intellectual perspectives was the apparent reluctance or limited engagement of numerous prominent Chinese IR scholars in drawing upon the historical experiences of the Republican and Maoist eras to formulate innovative forms of IR theory. While acknowledging the qualitative transformation of IR theory post-1978, it was somewhat puzzling that prior modern perspectives on world politics were implicitly considered irrelevant to the development of the ‘Chinese School of IR.’

Beyond the ideological shifts of the CCP and the endeavours to revitalize a cultural nationalism through the resurgence of Confucianism within the context of a selective integration into globalization, I began to suspect that this particular stance was, in part, a motivating factor for Chinese IR thinkers in their pursuit of an authentic Chinese culture as a foundation for the development of an indigenous IR theory. When the production of IR knowledge during both the Republican and Maoist eras was regarded as a ‘no-go area’ due to political, ideological, and personal considerations—factors that warrant serious consideration—it becomes evident that the logical consequence of this perspective was the advocacy for a revival of traditional political thought of a distant past in Chinese history. This unintentionally resulted in an ahistoricism and a prevalent tendency to draw upon the Confucian tradition, contributing to the emergence of essentialist elements that permeated the production of IR theory in China after the 1990s.

To ensure fairness, similar intellectual dynamics surfaced in discussions related to the establishment of other ‘National IR schools’ and Global IR. Paradoxically, there appears to be a noticeable absence of engagement with anti-colonial and anti-racist political thought that emerged across the developing world from the early twentieth century to the 1970s. While acknowledging that some of these political traditions were problematic and contributed to human disasters such as the Cultural Revolution in China between 1966 and 1976, this presented an initial puzzle: Why did certain ‘National Schools of IR’ and the Global IR project, which purported to address the legacies of colonialism and racism, not actively involve themselves with anti-colonial and more historical materialist traditions of thought that inherently contain anti-imperialist and anti-racist critiques? Although this preliminary question wasn't the focus of my research, it prompted me to consider delving into modern China's intellectual history of the twentieth century to comprehend some of these intellectual dynamics that profoundly influenced the production of IR theory after 1978 and the paths that were not taken.

In contrast to prevailing historiographic narratives that have emphasized the significance of the ‘big bang of 1978,’ this book has presented an alternative historical account of the genesis and transformation of modern Chinese international thought. By delving into the interplay between China's evolving structural position in modern geopolitics, its state formation, and the development of its international thought, it has established a historical continuity between the Republican era and the post-reform era. Despite the domestic and ideological transformations in modern China, which might imply the existence of disconnected perspectives on world politics resulting from historical ruptures, I have argued that a distinctive form of modern Chinese international thought has persisted since the Republican era to the present day. This implies that a strand of modern Chinese international thought has been present continuously from 1912 to the present day. Essentially, I have demonstrated how specific defining epistemological positions and themes that have characterized the production of modern Chinese international thought have been replicated across different historical eras, albeit taking different forms.

The central assumption in this book, which has posited the presence of a structural continuation of the Chinese state within modern geopolitics as a ‘contender state’ influenced by a ‘historical backwardness’ as an organizing and transformative force in modern Chinese international thought, gives rise to two pivotal questions. Firstly, if a modern Chinese international thought has always existed, why did Chinese IR scholars after 1978 seem to actively ignore it, instead favouring the exploration of diverse traditions of Chinese traditional political thought, at the expense of succumbing to the pitfalls of ahistoricism and cultural essentialism? Secondly, if the reform era is understood as a historical rupture, does the notion of ‘theory’ itself carry an implicit ideological bias, despite the prevalent claims that IR theory is a scientific and universal construction?

The prevailing intellectual tendency among Chinese IR scholars to perceive the Reform era as a historical rupture, leading to the establishment of a scientifically grounded form of IR theory, has paradoxically hindered theoretical efforts aimed at alleviating the ahistoricism and cultural essentialism often criticized in their work. Despite the agency demonstrated by IR thinkers in formulating indigenous IR theory, particularly post-1978, the ‘Chinese School of IR’ appears to be entangled in the intellectual aftermath of embracing the historiographic narrative surrounding the ‘big bang of 1978.’

If the criteria for developing indigenous IR theory are dependent on the framework provided by Anglo-American IR theory, then Chinese IR scholars may find themselves ensnared within the confines of this specific knowledge paradigm, even if they draw on ancient political thought and Daoist epistemologies. Currently, Chinese IR remains constrained by an antinomy characterized by a Chinese version of materialist empiricism and a Chinese idealism influenced by the mobilization of Confucian and Daoist traditions. This antinomy, underpinned by a subliminal liberalism with Chinese characteristics, serves as the primary obstacle preventing indigenous IR theory from evolving into a more universally applicable form. Without effective resolution and transcendence of these methodological and theoretical challenges, there is a risk that Chinese IR scholars will persist in advocating for theoretical IR innovations that may be infiltrated by more sophisticated manifestations of cultural essentialism, legitimized by emerging postmodern Chinese IR theories.

While acknowledging that my intellectual standpoint does not confer the ethical authority to dictate how Chinese IR scholars should advance their ‘Chinese School of IR,’ and with no intention to actively contribute to its development, the insights gleaned from this book suggest that Chinese IR scholars might find value in shifting their focus from the initial inquiry of why a ‘Chinese School of IR’ is ‘a necessity’ (Lu 2012; Ren 2008; Su 2005; Qin 2006, 2007) to exploring what lessons could be drawn from the production of modern international thought during the Republican and Maoist eras. Although an external analyst without emotional ties to China’s traumatic history might easily adopt this perspective, I recognize that Chinese IR thinkers may have valid reasons for seeking to move beyond a painful past.

Nevertheless, I contend that both the Republican and Maoist eras witnessed moments of intellectual brilliance, with thinkers dedicated to universal forms of thinking about world politics, deserving consideration. Such insights could contribute to the development of the ‘Chinese School of IR.’ Only by transcending the limits of the self-imposed ‘big bang of 1978,’ can the production of IR theory in China potentially overcome some of its current challenges and shield itself against critiques of cultural essentialism and ahistoricism.

The Formation of Modern Chinese International Thought

This book has presented an account of the production of modern Chinese international thought throughout that has explored how the structural position of modern China within the global order, characterized by conditions of uneven and combined development, has not only facilitated the genesis and transformation of a distinct modern Chinese international thought but also profoundly shaped the perspectives of Chinese thinkers on world politics. From 1912 until the present day, despite the diverse manifestations of modern Chinese international thought, these structural dynamics have compelled Chinese IR thinkers to generate IR knowledge with a consistent primary focus. This focus has consistently revolved around the protection of China's national economic development and its autonomy in world politics, adapting to various historical conjunctures.

Even in instances where the production of modern Chinese international thought has reflected a revolutionary internationalism or a globalism with Chinese characteristics, notably observable in the post-2010s era’s more outward perspective, it is imperative to acknowledge the persistent influence of a deeply rooted nationalist perspective. This nationalist stance has remained pivotal in formulating concepts and ideas about world politics, consistently positioning the Chinese state at the core of intellectual formulations. For instance, in his article on globalism and major power diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, Chen Zhimin (2015, 112) advocated for a ‘nationalism in the light of globalism’ (quanqiu zhuyi guanzhao xia de guojia zhuyi). Chen Zhimin concluded that, ‘we must realize that the nation-state will remain the fulcrum of human life for quite some time, and that any viewpoint and behaviour that rush to fully transcend statism are contrary to reality’ (Chen 2015, 112).

This ‘nationalist globalism’ illustrates how academic discussions among Chinese IR scholars about what a Global China is and its role in world politics often reflect a more modest and, at times, a subliminal defensive posture. Even the most new assertive ideas about world politics that highlight the agential power of the Chinese state in ‘world ordering’ (Adler 2019), such as the propagandistic formulation of a ‘community of a common destiny for mankind,’ should be understood as distinct perspectives aimed at advancing China’s economic catching-up efforts or as the reflection of a reformist desire to maximize China’s position within the existing international order in a geopolitical context marked by China enduring ‘historical backwardness.’

Certainly, this assessment does not suggest that Chinese thinkers lack the capability or inclination to formulate ideas about hegemony and dominance. The work of the Confucian philosopher Zhao Tingyang (2009, 2012) on the Tianxia, although not explored in this book, could serve as an example. However, historically, prevailing ideas and theories about world politics have often mirrored the material status of the polities advocating them at a given historical conjuncture. For instance, ideas about liberal internationalism cannot be comprehended without acknowledging the pivotal role of the United States in serving as a ‘hegemonic organizer and manager of the liberal international order after World War II and the Cold War’ (Ikenberry 2011, 16). This implies that visions of a hegemonic world order are inherently intertwined with the specific historical development of a polity in a particular time and space. Likewise, the potential ascent of hegemonic visions of world order is not solely contingent on the voluntarism of Chinese thinkers but is shaped by the structural conditions imposed by uneven and combined development. However, it’s crucial to acknowledge that the dynamics of uneven and combined development inherently drive thinkers to generate knowledge that challenges the existing world order.

As the international system undergoes a profound geopolitical transformation propelled by China's rise and the resurgence of the Global south, influencing the generation of normative ideas about world order and knowledge of world politics, it may be necessary to exercise patience before witnessing the emergence of normative visions reflecting Chinese hegemonic perspectives on world order. Even if China's ascent contributes to the establishment of a new multipolar order, the advent of a Chinese polarity alone will not be adequate to fundamentally alter the geopolitical and structural dynamics underlying the production of modern Chinese international thought. In other words, it might be imperative to await the time when modern China can fully transcend its contender status and ‘historical backwardness’ to observe a qualitative transformation of the structural dynamics that have shaped the production of modern Chinese international thought from 1912 until the present day. Simultaneously, there is a risk that a Chinese voluntarism, if unaware of these structural impositions, could potentially lead to new human tragedies by pushing for war as an accelerationist means to attempt to break through the existing structural limits constraining China imposed by global capitalism.

Consequently, while Chinese intellectual elites may be advancing concepts of a ‘Global China’ with a global outlook, these same intellectuals are contending with the structural limitations imposed by modern geopolitics, thereby exposing a disparity between discourse and material capabilities. Hence, in the examination of Chinese ideas and IR theories about world politics, a fundamental question arises: Can Chinese thinkers and policymakers effectively develop and implement the ideas they advocate for within the historical conjunctures from which they have emerged? Acknowledging the considerable gap between political and intellectual willingness and the state's capacity to execute some of the ideas proposed by Chinese organic intellectuals in a context still marked by developmental unevenness is crucial. This aspect is frequently overlooked in current debates on Global China, potentially distorting the real capabilities of China and the impact of the production of modern Chinese international thought beyond its borders.

Contender States, the ‘Non-West,’ and the Structural Conditions Behind the Production of ‘Non-Western’ International Thought

This book has provided an ‘international’ account of the production of modern Chinese international thought, surpassing much of the internalism and methodological nationalism prevalent in mainstream literature on Non-Western IR and indigenous IR theory in China. The internationally informed theoretical approach advanced in this book has been instrumental in achieving this. In this regard, Leon Trotsky’s UCD theory and the analytical concept of ‘contender states,’ developed by the Gramscian IR scholar Kees van der Pijl, can help us understand how and why certain forms of IR thinking have been reproduced in different non-Western states due to the structural conditions of uneven and combined development within the international system and global capitalism.

The utilization of the approach presented in this book has contributed to the deconstruction of culturalist interpretations surrounding the genesis of modern Chinese international thought. This approach facilitates an examination of how the unique features influencing the development of modern Chinese international thought, their persistence, and evolution throughout the twentieth century, are rooted in China’s structural positioning within contemporary geopolitics. This contrasts with explanations solely attributing these features to cultural traits associated with an essentialized Confucianism or internal ideological shifts within the Chinese state. In this light, the identified characteristics that have endured from 1912 to the present day do not emanate solely from the position of a revisionist China operating within conditions of anarchy. Instead, they arise from the hierarchies and geopolitical dynamics established by the expansion of global capitalism and modernity since the late nineteenth century, challenges that modern China has had to confront.

Furthermore, framing the production of modern Chinese international thought as a manifestation of IR thinking emerging within a ‘contender state,’ such as China, amid conditions of uneven and combined development imparts a degree of universalism to its defining traits. This universalism aligns with patterns observed in other historical ‘contender states,’ including imperial Japan, Germany, and Italy in the early to mid-twentieth century, as well as the Soviet Union post-World War II.

By adopting this perspective, the ‘non-West’ is no longer perceived as a collection of distinct entities with sealed cultural spheres or civilizations, as some have suggested (Huntington 1996). Instead, it is viewed as a network of interconnected polities sharing internal commonalities derived from their structural positions within modern geopolitics and conditions of uneven and combined development.

The perspective presented in this book transcends the conventional West/East binary by asserting that a contender state like China may share similarities with Western states that assumed a contender posture in the past, exemplified by Germany and Italy in the early twentieth century. From this standpoint, it is contended that there is nothing inherently exceptional about the production of modern Chinese international thought. Consequently, this perspective not only facilitates a comparative analysis of the production of international thought between China and historical Western contender states but also enhances understanding of how a state’s contender posture and the subsequent decline due to geopolitical competition can influence the genesis and transformations of specific forms of international thought.

In conclusion, the internationally informed approach inspired by UCD and the analytical concept of ‘contender states’ provides a valuable framework for examining the rise and transformation of modern Chinese international thought, non-Western International Relations (IR) theory, and Global IR. This approach offers a unique international perspective, considering how the interplay between universal and local elements connecting various polities operating in conditions of uneven and combined development shapes the production of knowledge.

Theoretical Reflections

Reclaiming the Centrality of ‘International Thought’ as an Analytical Category

In this book, following the work of Kees van der Pijl, I have presented a broader understanding of the concept of modern Chinese international thought, defined as political thought encompassing the various ways in which political communities ‘occupy space, safeguard it, and engage in exchange relations among themselves’ (van der Pijl 2007, 18; 2010, 2016). I have demonstrated that within the context of modern China, this form of political thought has manifested in diverse forms, including diplomatic thinking, strategic thinking, various normative visions of world order, and the emergence of IR theories after the reform era, giving rise to the ‘Chinese School of IR.’

The conceptualization of the notion of ‘international thought’ employed in this book, encompassing the idea of IR theory as one of its potential forms, has enabled the identification of continuities in patterns, epistemological positions, and themes that have persisted in the production of modern Chinese international thought from the Republican era to the present day, despite purported historical ruptures within modern China. Consequently, when observing the emergence of a distinct IR theory after the Reform era in 1978, for instance, we no longer perceive this form of knowledge as a discrete cultural and ideological phenomenon disconnected from past ways of understanding world politics. Instead, even if it has materialized in a different form, it is viewed as an evolutionary cultural phenomenon that retains certain elements from previous forms of IR knowledge due to China’s particular structural position within geopolitics and the dynamics of uneven and combined development.

Furthermore, this analytical tool has assisted us in deconstructing the ideological bias inherent in the way IR theory has been embraced by Chinese IR scholars. As demonstrated in this book, the adoption of a somewhat restricted definition of what constitutes IR theory by Chinese IR scholars after the Reform era has inadvertently strengthened liberal interpretations of IR theory. This, in part, has caused Chinese IR thinkers to overlook modern political traditions of thought that could be utilized to formulate potent critiques of Eurocentrism without succumbing to the pitfalls of essentialism and ethnocentrism. Therefore, this assessment carries profound implications for Global IR.

While Global IR has embraced more flexible and expansive understandings of what entails the production of IR theory beyond the West, indigenous IR theory in China and the diverse IR theories constituting the Global IR project still contend with epistemological constraints rooted in a predominantly liberal perspective on the production of IR theory. This challenge persists even when influenced by cosmopolitan and multicultural viewpoints that claim to recover histories lost after the advent of Western colonialism and modernity. As discussed earlier, this perspective implicitly compels Chinese IR thinkers to categorize both the Republican and Maoist eras as ‘no-go areas,’ prompting them to resort to traditional political knowledge as the method for developing theoretical innovations.

In the contemporary landscape, Global IR represents a collective project that, in certain instances, incorporates ‘non-Western liberalisms’ that have emerged in authoritarian regimes. This introduces a paradox at the core of Global IR. While liberal Anglo-American IR theories face criticism for their eurocentrism, they are simultaneously reintroduced through a pluralist universalism that embraces novel forms of ‘non-Western liberalisms’ in the domain of the production of IR theory. It is crucial to note that my intention is not to provide a moral or ethical critique of the liberal positions held by Chinese IR thinkers; rather, it is essential to highlight how this paradox imposes constraints on the development of Global IR.

In contrast, I argue that the analytical concept of ‘international thought’ possesses the capacity not only to encompass diverse liberal perspectives on how to develop IR theory, as Global IR does, but also to embrace alternative cosmovisions and traditions that might be considered as ‘pre-theoretical.’ I acknowledge that this analytical manoeuvre might be construed as a critique of those positivist voices advocating for IR as a science. However, I do not view this move as an attempt to align with the post-structuralist camp. The underlying assumption behind my use of the concept of international thought is that it represents a universal form of knowledge seeking to understand the ways in which different polities engage with external communities. These understandings are informed by hybrid cultural and ideological forms embraced by these communities, shaped by their interactions with others.

This approach not only challenges the possibility of mobilizing an ‘authentic’ form of knowledge but also aims to alleviate the scientism that has characterized the production of IR theory, particularly in China after 1978. I believe that as Chinese IR endeavours to become a scientific enterprise, through broader understandings of what theory entails and the inclusion of postmodern inclinations, there is a risk of rendering the globalized IR enterprise inconsequential. Ultimately, a globalized IR might resemble an amalgam of ‘non-Western IR liberalisms.’ In 1985, William Olson and Nicholas Onuf already warned that ‘the globalization of IR may well indicate the successful diffusion of the Anglo-American cognitive style and professional stance rather than the absorption of alien modes of thought’ (in Acharya 2000, 18).

In conclusion, the analytical concept of international thought has empowered us to deconstruct the traditional conception of Chinese ‘IR theory’ and reintegrate it with broader historical and geopolitical dynamics inherent in the production of modern Chinese international thought throughout the twentieth century. Responding to the calls of Global IR and non-Western IR theory to diversify the production of IR theory, I contend that prioritizing the analytical concept of ‘international thought’ over IR theory, even if its origins are rooted in the Western IR cannon, may help overcome some of the theoretical and epistemological challenges facing these initiatives.

A Global IR Not So Global? What’s Next Then?

This book has offered an internationally informed perspective on the emergence and development of modern Chinese international thought, providing valuable insights for our understanding of Global IR. In the context of Global IR, the term ‘global’ is shaped by the vision that emerges from ‘a sparse environment made up of connections between pre-formed entities, which are infused with distinct cultural traits drawn from ‘local’ historical experiences’ (Barnett and Lawson, 2023, 501). From this standpoint, the fundamental methodological premise of Global IR involves ‘nurturing one disciplinary body of knowledge based on the idea of pluralistic universalism’ (Anderl and Witt 2020, 36). Using a metaphorical lens, the ‘global’ could be envisioned as a vast puzzle where diverse jigsaw pieces maintain their distinct identity while contributing to the overall picture. Consequently, Global IR embodies a compilation of diverse theoretical contributions emerging from different localities, representing a form of pluralist universalism. However, this methodological and epistemological stance introduces a kind of ‘identity politics’ within the IR discipline, potentially leading to a theoretical dead-end and the rise of more sophisticated forms of cultural essentialism. Despite the merits of innovative perspectives and the noble intentions of their advocates, there remains a gap in our understanding of how IR knowledge is globally generated beyond individual contributions to broader projects such as Global IR.

In contrast to the epistemological perspective embraced by Global IR, the internationally informed account of the production of modern Chinese international thought offered in this book presupposes that any form of international thought is inherently ‘international’ and even ‘global,’ shaped by the interactions of different polities within conditions of uneven and combined development. Consequently, this kind of knowledge is not ‘international’ merely because it might contribute to broader projects like Global IR but because it has been moulded by ‘the international’ itself. As demonstrated in this book, the production of modern Chinese international thought from the Republican era until the present day has always remained an ‘international’ and even ‘global’ affair. In this respect, one could argue that modern Chinese international thought has indeed been a form of ‘Global IR.’

Examining the challenges within Global IR and non-Western IR theory from this perspective yields distinct conclusions, especially concerning the collective efforts to address Eurocentrism and the legacies of colonialism that still inform the production of IR theory. If we assume that the production of international thought is inherently ‘international’ as a result of being produced in conditions of uneven and combined development, then it might not be wise to tackle the problems of Eurocentrism as if we were dealing with a mere problem of representation, although these limited tendencies are positive steps that need to be celebrated. Let us pause and think for a moment about the way in which Chinese IR scholars have dealt with the ‘problem of Eurocentrism’ and the after-effects of this intellectual position after the 1990s.

The concern about eurocentrism permeating IR theory, articulated as a collective response to the increasing ‘Anglo-Americanization’ of Chinese IR after the Reform era, did not emerge as an epistemological problem for Chinese IR thinkers until the late 1990s. This growing concern about ‘Anglo-Americanization’ coincided with the rise of a Chinese cultural nationalism, which revitalized Confucianism to distinguish China’s state ideology and its hybrid developmental model from Anglo-American political liberalism. This took place amid a geopolitical era characterized by a selective economic integration into globalization and a capitalist restoration, which had the potential to scrutinize the structures of power and the ideological limitations of the Chinese state.

In this specific geopolitical context, the issue of eurocentrism emerged as an ideological problem rather than a methodological or epistemological one, even though it was framed as such. Wang Yizhou argues that there is a ‘need for Chinese scholars to provide abstract theoretical ideas and guidance about how to integrate China’s own interests with world peace, sustainability, development, and an orientation for great-nation relations’ (in Do 2015, 31). As Thuy Do (2015, 31) pointed out, ‘Wang, therefore, strives towards building a new theory to reflect China’s diplomatic style and systematic world outlook.’ The growing ‘anti-eurocentric’ position of mainstream Chinese IR thinkers, informed by a profound nationalist stance, had significant implications for how they debated the possibility of overcoming the Eurocentrism of the IR canon.

The problem did not revolve around the methodological and epistemological concerns that Western IR was infused by the Western experiences; the problem was that Chinese IR needed theories to explain modern China and integrate its national interests. Consequently, most critiques from Chinese IR seeking to overcome the eurocentrism of the IR discipline through the mobilization of a cultural essentialism and ethnocentrism masked the defence of an economic and political project aiming to protect the status quo of global capitalism. They framed its unwanted effects as mere problems of representation, to be managed through Zhongyong dialectics, allowing the peaceful coexistence of two rival great powers in the same social totality through dialogical epistemologies.

In this context, despite recent calls for Global IR to adopt key principles from Global History to address issues of representation and avoid cultural essentialism (Barnett and Zarakol 2023; Barnett and Lawson 2023, 501), such moves may not be sufficient to overcome the deeply rooted challenges that Global IR aims to confront. Drawing on the insights presented in this book regarding the production of modern Chinese international thought, it becomes evident that Global IR should also incorporate certain methodological and theoretical assumptions from a materialist International Historical Sociology such as UCD, Political Marxism, global sociology or new forms of decolonial theory. The mobilization of a framework that already assumes that the production of international thought is inherently ‘international’ is crucial not only to address methodological issues related to ahistoricism, cultural essentialism, and methodological nationalism but also to include in its analysis a critique or, at least, an acknowledgment of the geopolitical and economic forces that have given rise to enduring racial, gender, and class inequalities that still inform much of the production of international thought in the West and beyond (Tansel 2015). This suggests that a materialist international historical sociology could provide Global IR with a more systemic view and a genuine international perspective on the roots of the challenges it endeavours to address.

On (Im)possibility of Transcending the Relation Between Power and Knowledge in Contender States: A Global IR from Below?

As observed, the majority of thinkers analysed in this book have had affiliations with the Chinese state and its nationalist endeavours for economic catching-up, defending China's autonomy, and safeguarding national interests in world politics. While this alignment should be expected, given that this book has primarily focused on thinkers considered ‘organic intellectuals,’ it underscores the (im)possibility of transcending the relationship between power and knowledge, especially in ‘contender states’ where the link between the two is apparent. Despite the links between power and knowledge and the complex revolving doors that exist in modern China, it is important to note that we should not perceive these thinkers as mere propagandists. The reality is that it is challenging to assess where the boundary between propaganda and scholarly work lies. While Chinese intellectuals have not been passive actors, they have been highly constrained by the context in which they have operated. Furthermore, it is essential to acknowledge that in the context of modern China, different intellectuals might have had distinct reasons to contribute to the production of modern Chinese international thought within the constraints imposed by the Chinese state.

Nonetheless, if the production of international thought remains entwined with power relations, the crucial question arises: What purpose should knowledge serve? The potential answers to this question carry significant implications for Global IR and the direction it should take, reminding us of Robert Cox’s (1981) distinction between ‘Problem-Solving theories’ and ‘Critical Theory.’

Despite its revolutionary origins, modern Chinese international thought has predominantly remained an affair of the national elite. From the Republican era in 1912 until the present day, a top-down modern Chinese international thought has focused on the survival of the state class and a Chinese nation that has been subsumed into a mere role of contributing to the national development of the state to defend it in a context of uneven and combined development. Assessing the ‘Chinese School,’ John Williams (2021, 140) argues that it has been ‘focused on elite behaviour (…). Consequently, the normative dimension of their analyses typically marginalizes non-elite perspectives.’ This underscores the persistent issue that, as long as the production of non-Western IR theory, including the ‘Chinese School of IR,’ remains confined to the elite sphere and mobilizes top-down IR theories, these ‘National schools,’ even when integrated into Global IR, may inadvertently reproduce similar hierarchies and inequalities that top-down Western IR theories have reproduced during the twentieth century given that these states are operating within global capitalism. After all, as van der Pijl (2007, 620) claims, ‘the state system does not exist as an undifferentiated singularity either in its own domain or in its relations with capital.’

Furthermore, while the rise of cultural essentialism is a result of multiple geopolitical dynamics, it does emerge as a result of mobilizing traditions of political thought that prioritize elites and top-down approaches in a context of a certain geopolitical convergence within global capitalism. After all, as we have already seen, cultural essentialism becomes a mechanism through which national elites and their organic intellectuals differentiate their national projects and assert state and ideological autonomy within the dynamics of global capitalism and uneven and combined development. While cultural essentialism has been common in the production of Western IR, it has also been a particularly entrenched practice in contender states like China. As argued by Arif Dirlik (1995, 230) concerning the revival of Confucianism in the 1980s,

In the case of Confucian revival, the relationship to contemporary structures of power is direct and explicit, as what is being revived is the ideological legacy of societies that can claim recent ascendancy within global capitalism and, indeed, in some measure, are responsible for creating the practices that characterise global capitalism, (…) the location for postcolonial intellectual are inhabited not just by radical literary and cultural critics but also by intellectuals (…) who serve as brokers of power within the new configuration of capitalism (…). “Borderlands” may serve as metaphorical locations for liberation; they serve also as sites for negotiation between diverse ideologies of power in a world where Eurocentrism has lost its credibility.

In this respect, while Amitav Acharya (2011) acknowledges certain tendencies towards exceptionalism within the ‘Chinese School of IR,’ and his Global IR project aims to counter the widespread exceptionalism found in various ‘National Schools of IR,’ the ‘pluralistic universalism’ underlying Global IR has its limitations to tackle this problem. Specifically, as long as it favours elite perspectives on non-Western IR theory, Global IR might become a platform for the intellectual elites of rising powers that only seek to defend an elitist multipolarity where non-Western nations will be subsumed into the passive role of contributing to the national development of these powers.

These challenges suggest that Global IR and non-Western IR should incorporate non-elite perspectives as a remedy to tackle their methodological and normative problems. Global IR could take different paths to address them. For instance, John Williams (2021, 150) suggested that Global IR should incorporate some of the tenets of decolonial theory as ‘accounts of relationality found in decolonial writing avoid the elite-level focus, (…) enabling the recovery of an alternative normative perspective.’ However, this move might not be enough to address Global IR shortcomings as some decolonial approaches, even in the form of relational approaches, may carry a subliminal cultural essentialism. As Veeran Naicker (2023, 220) claims, some decolonial approaches might be criticized for their ‘reductive generalizations’ of the historical experiences of non-Western societies. In the context of China, this might risk ending up embracing unwanted imperial relationalities that existed before the arrival of modernity. Alternatively, as mentioned earlier, another path could involve the mobilization of methodological and epistemological aspects of materialist historical international sociology, which tends to include inherent critiques of the different social hierarchies and their international dimension that have shaped the production of international thought.

Nevertheless, it appears that Global IR and non-Western IR face the inherent challenges akin to those identified by R. N. Berki (1971) when discussing the predicament of international thought within Marxist perspectives. R. N. Berki (1971, 105) highlighted that,

My conclusion, then, must be presented in this disjunctive form: the Marxian ideal of socialism appears either in the shape of hegemony, as the domination of strong nations over weak ones; in this case it is no longer tinged with the features of capitalism, but neither is it the realization of a higher human freedom. Or, it appears in the shape of a community of independent nations, in which case it may come to represent freedom and progress over capitalism proper, but remains a system still visibly bearing the birthmarks of capitalism.

It appears to me that the production of modern international thought, both in the West and beyond, is confronted with the dilemma articulated by R. N. Berki. On the one hand, if there is an acceptance of a community of independent nations representing freedom and progress, international thought would be still visibly marked by the birthmarks of capitalism and varying degrees cultural essentialism. It's worth noting that a multipolar world constituted by varying far-right authoritarian regimes could potentially emerge in the near future. On the other hand, there are the desires of strong nations to dominate weaker ones, under banners such as a ‘community with a shared future for mankind’ or a ‘rules-based international order,’ which might impede the realization of a higher human freedom and might potentially jeopardize the promotion of any pluralist universalism.

The challenge for modern Chinese international thought and Global IR lies in transcending this antinomy. If Global IR aspires to become an emancipatory discipline, it should avoid naturalizing power and knowledge relations that propel us towards these two opposing and problematic directions, which might lead us into the abyss. As a junior IR scholar still grappling with these fundamental issues shaping world politics, I sense that this is a titanic task. Nonetheless, I believe that keeping in check these tendencies could serve as a constructive starting point towards a more emancipatory IR.