It’s often said that Napoleon was doomed after the failure of the Russia Campaign but I don’t believe that was the case.
Firstly, it wasn’t obvious that Russia would continue fighting Napoleon beyond its borders. Although Russia repelled the Grande Armee, its own army and people were exhausted and many close to Alexander thought it unwise to continue the fight. This meant that although Alexander was determined to defeat Napoleon and continue the war, Napoleon still had the possibility to come to an agreement with the tsar if the war ended becoming too costly and unpopular in Russia.
Secondly, Russia was alone at first. Prussia was very hesitant to join Russia and still feared Napoleon. There were also disagreements about Prussia’s old possessions in Poland being returned to it which Alexander didn’t agree to at first. So although Prussia ended up joining Russia, this shows that Napoleon was still very much feared and respected and it wasn’t an obvious decision for Prussia to break its alliance with France.
Even together, Russia and Prussia alone suffered several defeats in the Spring of 1813 which brings me to maybe the most crucial part: Austria. Francis I was extremely reluctant to declare war to France due to Marie-Louise’s marriage to Napoleon. Moreover, the Austrians and Russians, although they’d been allies in the past didn’t like each other that much and Austria in particular was weary of Russia becoming too powerful. Additionally, like the Prussians, they still feared Napoleon. What ultimately swayed them toward the coalition was France’s refusal to make any concessions to Austria, particularly with regard to the restitution of the Illyrian provinces.
So all of that to say that in the Spring of 1813, you have the Russians and the Prussians that still very much respect Napoleon and have lost several battles against him. They know they can only beat him if Austria joins which was not a foregone conclusion. Napoleon could have very well have made concessions to Austria to keep them on his side but he instead chose a maximalist policy which ultimately caused his fall. And finally, even after Austria joined, the coalition still struggled tremendously and was still open to letting France keep its natural borders after Leipzig (Frankfurt proposals) which shows how costly the war was and that victory was far from easy for the allies. There’s something almost tragic about the last years of Napoleon’s reign because at so many points I find myself thinking he could have stopped and negotiated a more than honorable settlement but he just would not quit.
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Napoleon very nearly won the 1813 campaign in crushing victories that were turned into regular victories at the last moments by his subordinates (Ney at Bautzen for example). Dresden also could’ve been a sweeping victory.
Napoleon could’ve crushed the allies once again in 1813 but suffered too many setbacks beyond his control. The idea that he was defeated forever after 1812 is reductionist and false. It’s conveniently assuming that what happened was always destined to happen. Determinism at its worst.
Well, neither Lutzen or Bautzen were regular victories. At both the French took significantly greater casualties than the Russian & Prussian opposition - so much so that Napoleon agreed to an armistice (which then allowed the Russians to persuade the Austrians to come in). Also, he drew troops from Spain, and Wellington took full advantage there.
Napoleon's great flaw was (as one historian put it) that he could never see a jugular without going for it. His whole history was going for it, and he was not going to change in 1813.
Yes - if he had kept Austria on side and conceded Poland to Russia he might have had a continental peace (although he would still have had to contend with Britain). The downside is that Russia was not going to come back into the Continental System, nor maybe Prussia, so his main weapon against Britain was lost. But it was not in character for him to do so.
Napoleon could not have kept Austria out of the war on the allied side, as Metternich and Francis had already decided to side with the allies before the conference with Napoleon in June 1813.
He may have had a brief window before then. Austria was the least fervently committed to the Coalition.
And what 'window' was that? Austria still wanted revenge for her defeats in 1797, 1800, 1805, and 1809 and to regain what territory she had lost to France and the allied German states.
In early 1813 there was still an opportunity for Napoleon to keep Austria on his side through concessions such as returning the Illyrian provinces. Plus, i wouldn’t underestimate the importance of family ties. Marie-Louise being the Empress of France played a considerable role in Austria’s hesitation to join the coalition. The problem was that it was against Napoleon‘s nature to make such concessions
IIRC, Emperor Francis was very reluctant to enter into the Coalition and was actualy more in favor of a mediation more favorable toward Napoleon, Metternich has to walk thin ice to push Austria in the Coalition by small steps.
Metternich himself was more pondering the weight of each solution in 1813 to sold Austria to the one who could bring the most, notably hearing Napoleon's proposal to give back Illyria and Silesia (from Prussia) while leaking this proposal to the allied at the same time to see what they bring at the table.
I honestly think that if Napoleon drag down Metternich's proposal for a mediation in June and choose to continue his march on Berlin, I believe that Austria would still remain neutral the time to enact their mobilisation. By that point, if Napoleon succesfuly root the Russo-Prussian from Brandebourg that Metternich will accept Napoleon's proposal to gain Silesia and Illyria without having to fire a single shot.
I kinda agree with Jomini when he said that the Armistice of Pleiszwitz was the biggest mistake of Napoleon's military career. Even if, of course Jomini wrote this knowing how the story has end (and switch side during said armistice).
Jomini, who was a deserter and a renegade, should be taken with a very large salt pill. He also had proven himself an incompetent corps chief of staff and military governor in 1812-1813.
Neither Metternich nor Francis had any inclination to support Napoleon in 1813.
100% agree
You forgot about the Peninsular Campaign. Napoleon had basically no control over the Iberian theater. It was unsalvageable and by 1813 the combined Spanish and British forces were already occupying Southern France. Iirc there was actually a siege of Bordeaux which occurred after Napoleon surrendered but before word of the surrender had reached the south of France. Even if Napoleon won in the East against Prussia and Austria and Russia (extremely unlikely given that his veterans had nearly been wiped out) he would have to turn around and fight Wellington in the South of France. At that point, western France and Southern France would’ve been lost and occupied. With no allies of his own, even If he did manage to defeat the Coalition in the East (probably at an extremely high cost), they probably would invade again as soon as Napoleon confronted Wellington in the south, capturing Paris. All wasn’t lost after 1812 but the military situation for France was basically doomed. Had Napoleon any talent at all for diplomacy he probably could’ve saved his regime, but he was a poor diplomat and generally detested by the European monarchs.
In my opinion after Leipzig Naploean had truly lost however one way I could see Napoleon winning a total victory in the battle of Leipzig Is by capturing the three coalition monarchs and Schwarzenberg during Murats cavalry charge with Coalition command captured Napoleon could defeat the Coalition army within three days The army of Bohemia retreating and the army of Silesia getting smashed. after the battle it would be considered Napoleons Masterpiece
There are wargames that show that Waterloo was winnable if sufficient French blocking forces were used to keep the Prussians seperate. But geopolitically a French victory would only prolong the inevitable.
The Waterloo Campaign, not just the battle, was definitely winnable and should have ended in the destruction of the Prussian army, at the very least. The problem was that Soult fudged up the dispositions of the army, mistaking Napoleon's intentions. Napoleon had to come and fix the placement of his corps to properly advance upon Charleroi. This wasted a precious day which could have been used to get into position.
Secondly, D'Erlon failed to heed Napoleon's directive to arrive and turn the Prussian flank at Ligny, but instead heeded Ney's recall of him for Quatre Bras. He should have listened to the former order, as the French Emperor's decree supersedes that of a marechal. The end result was that he arrived at neither location and failed to participate in both battles due to his incompetence.
Thirdly, here's where Napoleon himself deserves criticism which will only apply to a general of his caliber. After winning at Ligny, he should have immediately marched that evening on Quatre Bras, and therefore, would have been in a position the morning of the next day to force an engagement on Wellington there before he could get the retreat underway towards Mont St. Jean (Waterloo battlefield). This would allow him to still defeat Wellington in detail without Blucher ever arriving in time to succour the British-Allied army.
Of these, the former two blunders are the heaviest, for if the first mistake was not made, Napoleon would have reached the Ligny-Quatre Bras crossroads before Blucher had concentrated the bulk of his army there and smash it up in detail. He would have also had a spare day to move on Quatre Bras and smash Willem II up before Wellington could arrive and save him.
The second mistake could have ensured the destruction of Blucher's army, even if the first mistake was made, which would have battered them enough that they would be put out of action, even if Napoleon had to fight at Mont St. Jean. Had neither of these two mistakes occurred, then you can be guaranteed of a major Napoleonic victory and Flanders being overrun.
The third mistake is, as I said, something which is only bad when tried by Napoleon's own yardstick for generalship. Not moving just a few hours faster can certainly affect the flow of a campaign, but most generals react in days, sometimes even weeks. If Napoleon was just a couple hours slower, even when he was as out of his prime and sick as in 1815, that's still a very good performance. However, the Napoleon of his prime would not have missed such a beat and would have been able to achieve it, such that even with the two other mistakes by his subordinates, he would have still won the campaign against all odds.
I think it is easy to blame Soult but you must remember he had not been a Chief of Staff in many years. He inherited Berhtier's system and was now Napoleon's right hand man. This was a Marshal would had been mostly in independent command the last 8 years. I do not know who the best choice was available but it certainly was not Soult and that was Napoleon's choice.
IIRC Napoleon was also extremely casual and waited 10 hours after Ligny before sending Grouchy to follow them, Grouchy did not know where they were going and he had limited knowledge of Quatre Bras.
He famously waited how many hours before moving the artillery because of the mud before the Battle of Waterloo?
He refused to aide Ney in taking La Haye Sainte only to issue orders to do it hours later in a last ditch effort.
I do not remember all the details but I know many sources detail Waterloo as one of Napoleon's sloppiest campaigns (with the exception of the battle of Ligny and the idea of and speed at which he split Wellington and Blucher) where he made the most mistakes. Even Andrew Roberts said so in his famous book.
I personally think that he made the most mistakes in Russia 1812 and can list them all by events. Though, that's a whole nother thing. Regarding the decision to postpone moving up the artillery until the ground had settled, I think that was a reasonable choice. Azincourt tells us well enough what difficulties men encumbered by mud could face, especially against an enemy in a strong defensive position. The post held by Wellington was stronger than that of Henry V's and the technology of the time made any attacks far more costly.
Regarding him waiting so long after Ligny... Yes, this was part and parcel with what I criticized about him delaying hours post-battle. Also why I praise Blucher for his movements. Despite being in his seventies and badly wounded, he still led his army on a brilliant forced march through rain and mud to Wavre through the night and morning of the 17th, then arrived at Plancenoit-Papelotte on the 18th. I say that Napoleon was sick and out of his prime (and if you study his past performances and compare them, it is truly like night and day), but when compared to Blucher's energetic display in this campaign, I have more reason to criticize the Corsican.
Regarding him not supporting Ney's attacks, this is because the attack on La Haye Sainte occurred shortly after Bulow's Prussian Korps was attacking Plancenoit. Napoleon already had to divert 16,000 men (most of the Young Guard, elements of the Old Guard, two-thirds of Lobau's Corps, and some cavalry brigades) to guard his right flank against 32,000 Prussians. That's not counting how much of a superiority in guns the Prussians had in this sector. At this point in time, Napoleon was already outnumbered, but I do have my own criticisms on the matter here as well.
Personally, I think that the him of his prime would have seen this as an opportunity instead. He should have put up a screen before Wellington, who was remaining on the defensive, and amass local superiority to smash Bulow first before the other Prussian korps had arrived. This was what he almost always did in the past, so it strikes me as strange that he did not do it here (and this is also where my argument for him being out of his prime comes from). Instead, he split his forces on two fronts without concentrating superiority in either sector.
So, if I were to gauge Napoleon's performance the entire campaign, his planning was very good, but his execution of operations was lacking at the final stretch (post-Ligny). Tactically, it was one of his worst performances. I still think it isn't as bad as Russia 1812, though. He has a pretty bad tactical performance at Smolensk there, but his operational execution of what was otherwise a good strategy makes me cringe when I remember what he was truly capable of in past years. The only brilliant manoeuvre he evinced was in the crossing of the Dnieper, but then he totally botched it by launching frontal assaults against Smolensk, rather than immediately recrossing the Dnieper further east and closing off the Smolensk-Moscow road. That would have allowed him to basically Ulm the Russian army group and win a spectacular victory. What an opportunity lost!
Napoleon could have recovered from 1812 but knowing his ambition he would have tried something again, and France was running low on men. In 1815 Napoleon had to call up mostly teenagers and face a horse shortage, had it not been 1812 he would've lost somewhere else unless he seriously committed to staying at peace.
Troops were not in short supply even in 1814. In point of fact, France's population had grown during the wars. In 1815 there were no call-ups as before, because conscription had been abolished by the Bourbons in 1814 (their one popular act). Napoleon did not want to reinstate it because it was popular. Instead, he made a decree recalling discharged veterans, stating that they had been on leave and were subject to recall. The Armee du Nord was a largely veteran army, not 'mostly teenagers.' And the comment on Napoleon's 'ambition' is nonsense.
They were definitely in short supply in 1814. His personal army was only about 100,000 at most, and all in all France was heavily outnumbered by the coalition. That’s why, when the Austrians didn’t immediately retreat at Arcis-sur-Aube, Napoleon lost the battle; he didn’t have the troops to engage in a full on battle with them. There was a reason he attacked them separately, and took on corps and divisions at a time, never he entire army.The population of Russia was just a bit short of all of the rest of Europe, so all of Europe against Napoleon definitely meant his men were outnumbered.
What was in short supply was arms to issue to the troops. The loss of weapons in Russia was serious and the supply of any seasoned hardwood was lacking. There were troops enough, but the weapons to arm them was not.
France alone was more populated than Russia at the time: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_population_in_1800
It’s only during the remainder of the 19th century than Russia’s population increased considerably while France’s stagnated with France having less than 40 million inhabitants in 1914 while Russia had more 120 million
The French Empire in 1812 had a population 44,000,000, whereas the Russian was 42,000,000. In 1814, after Napoleon had lost so many men and allies, he was definitely outnumbered by the coalition.
Na the jig was up unfortunately. The Austrians knew they wouldn’t have another chance to truly defeat France if they remained neutral or accepted some minor concessions. Metternich knew Napoleon would never be satisfied with being an equal partner with the other European nations, which therefore meant there could not be a long term peace as long as Napoleon was emperor.