nuclear deterrents.

having recently served as a commissioner on the strategic, posture commission is incredibly urgent that we look at deterrence in a broader lens. looking at strategic deterrents of which of course nuclear deterrents is a key foundation. the reason we need to look at this more broadly is we are facing new threats. new threats of escalation. new domains that can lead to rapid or inadvertent escalation in competition or conflict with china and russia. new domains such as space, cyber. adversaries might be able to take more risks and we have strategic systems that are vulnerable, for example in space. and that could lead to miscalculation or rapid

escalation to nuclear weapons use. to deal with these new threats we need to also think about innovation in terms of concepts and technologies. this is why i'm excited about having our three panelists this morning to discuss those issues and the challenges and opportunities ahead. we will first hear from professor andrew ross who is currently at the bush school as a professor in the department of international affairs at texas a&m university. he was appointed to international policy studies and holds joint appointment with the los alamos national labs where he leads the strategic resilience initiative. looking at new concepts to make

deterrence more resilient. we also have colonel alexander rasmussen. ras is at the space development agency that was established in 2019 to leverage proliferated low-earth orbit architectures to increase resilience of our space architectures. this is a fundamental shift, not only in terms of increasing resilience of space satellites, numerous smaller satellites that launch more often. this reflects a new concept or acquisition within the department of defense for rapid acquisition and looking forward to hearing from ras and the importance of how that is enhancing deterrence. we are lucky to have steve

rodriguez join us today. he gives us a unique perspective from his understanding and deep engagement with the private sector, commercial startups and venture capital. he's a senior advisor at the forward defense atlanta counsel center for strategy and security. he founded one defense, a novel strategic advisory firm that leverages machine learning to identify advanced software and accelerate their transition to benefit defense will he was recently the study director for the commission on defense innovation adoption which was in the atlanta counsel and cochaired by former secretary of defense mark esper and former air force secretary deborah lee james. a seminole report that came out

-- seminal report that came out two weeks ago on looking at how we can improve leveraging commercial capability and innovation. three different aspects of urgent priorities to enhance strategic deterrence. let me turned it andy to kick it off. andrew: it works. good morning everyone. great to be here. thanks for the intro. leonor -- i will talk about a program that i have been engaged in. the inspiration for this. my manager john scott, theoretical design, is the real

lead for dsri. unprivileged have the opportunity to work on the policy and strategy site at the technical side for this. leonor thanked the panel for being resilient when responding to changes. the real person who should be thanked and her acknowledgment -- her resilience acknowledged is nancy berlin. where is nancy? [applause] scrambling this morning to make it with general cotton's prompt to make all this work this morning for everybody. her first email came through at 5:43. i did not see it at 5:43. i saw before 6:00. it is really nancy who should be acknowledged when it comes to resilience. i will provide a quick --

everything will be kind of quick, because i think leonor is giving us eight to 10 minutes. everything is pretty quick here. i will provide a quick overview of what dsri is all about. what we have been doing on the policy and strategy side. give you a flavor of the kinds of workshops we have put together. leonor also should be credited here. she has been part of dsri as well, participating in all but one workshop. we got here again in march. our next workshop. she could give this talk probably. an overview of dsri. i will talk about what resilience means. resilience has been used virtually every day here. cannot virtually. it has been used everyday here

by virtually every speaker. marv adams even included in the nsa mission. provide a resilient and responsive nuclear security enterprise. that hooks up with some of the things we have been working on. we use the term a lot in document. it's in the national security strategy and national defense strategy and national military strategy. the previous administration used it occasionally as well. until recently, nobody tried to tell us what it means. we have tried to define it and identify dimensions. i will lay that out for you quickly. then i will turn to other work i have done prior to my time at the lab on how to think about innovation. that is at the heart of what our panel is about. talk about what we have done in the nuclear business on that front.

where we are now, especially with the program of record. ok. i'll go back to that one. on the policy strategy side the emphasis has been on identifying the potential geopolitical and technological shocks and trends that might undermine the u.s. deterrent. this is the resilience part of it. push beyond cold war thinking on deterrence. we have gotten that same kind of push from stratcom. former commander -- rework deterrence theoretically. i think he went a little too far. we need to figure out how to apply it in a new situation. we are engaging in a wide community.

practitioners obviously but think tanks, academics, technical experts at the lab and elsewhere. tried to bridge the gap between policy and technical communities. . we are disseminating findings through briefings this. there we go. our work has been focused around the series of workshops. we have done four so far. i won't go through every one of these. focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in the u.s. strategy, on strategic stability, escalation management. two on escalation management. focus on capabilities and metrics. the next one coming up is on the future of arms-control. -- arms control. why resilience?

we alluded to this earlier. when you get the slide you will get my full deck. this is not even a quarter of it. why resilience? this is the highlights of what we have been dealing with, the changes and some geopolitical shocks we have been dealing with since the end of the cold war. this is not going to end. the most recent one, which is a new addition to this list, what we are seeing in the middle east today is a result of response to october 7, what israel had to deal with from hamas. the response. then escalation. vertical and horizontal, arguably. that had direct implications for

the united states. what is resilience? i am older than some of the folks around here. when i first heard about dsri, resilience, i thought back to that. takes a lickin'and keeps on ticking -- and keeps on tickin'. the ability to withstand a fight and cover quickly -- recover quickly from disruption. you think about resilience as the ability to absorb unpredictable threats and shocks. we like to predict things. we are not very good at it. nobody predicted october 7. nobody predicted 9/11. nobody predicted the end of the cold war. all these kinds of geopolitical

shocks are unexpected. we need to build resilience to withstand these kinds of challenges. leonor and her kickoff emphasized we need to think about strategic deterrence across the board. multi-domain. dsri is nuclear focused but not solely focused on nuclear, just like our panel isn't. we need to think about conventional strategic deterrence. space and cyber at the least. in addition to identifying what resilience is we have identify dimensions of resilience. the list keeps growing. it's about two pages on the slide. i will not walk through every one of these but you can see the kind of things we are thinking about. we keep adding to the dimensions

. some of these are obvious. national, political, strategic. strategic stability. attempting to identify or describe what these things actually mean -- there's the second one. escalation management is something quite a bit of time on -- we spend quite a bit of time on. it is not the same thing. our next worship will be on arms-control -- workshop will get arms-control. we had an hour on arms-control. we will be doing two days worth of thinking about arms control and bringing people together.

initially i would not have included alliance resilience as a result of our workshop on strategic stability. that made it to the list. organizational, operational, tactical. the emphasis on production and pit resilience up here, too. ok. just a few words about the topics we have covered thus far. we kicked this off asking what role for the beer weapons in u.s. strategy? by strategy, national security strategy, defense strategy. all the levels of strategy. you can take it down into doctrine and operations as well. what we have emphasized his different schools of thought o -- is different schools of thought on the role of nuclear weapons and strategy. different schools of thought for strategic stability. and for escalation management.

we have always developed concept papers. i wrote the first one. my colleague at texas a&m jason castillo to the next two on strategic stability and escalation management. i will be doing a fourth one on arms-control. we have always emphasized trade-offs for strategic stability. trade-offs among first strike arms ability and all that stability. for escalation management. we have emphasized this is a tough problem. it's not at all clear we have our arms wrapped around how to do escalation management. you have the obstacles listed here. schools of thought, traditional schools of thought, punishment, denial, damage limitation.

give us different answers. there are tensions among those answers. part of what we are trying to do a sort that out. identify capabilities and metrics to identify what capabilities might be most helpful. the problem is, a lot of denial on damage limitation tells us to try to do involving -- involve running experiments. most of us don't want to run them. one of the challenges in this business, the nuclear business is that we have no empirical data. we've never had a nuclear war. i for one don't want a lot of empirical data. i don't think i want any empirical data, but that increases the challenge because you are reduced -- you have to rely on theoretical arguments

about what needs to be done. how to think about strategic stability and escalation management. different approaches to accomplishing escalation management. i know i'm talking too long. how to think about innovation. this is very simple. we are usually preoccupied with the technology. that is what we always talk about. ai these days. hypersonics. what is the next big thing is almost always the question when it comes to innovation. no less important are doctrine and organization. the next slide, much more complicated but differ in categories of innovation.

sustaining innovation. that is sort of routine. we go through that virtually every day. that is most of what we see in the defense business, sustaining. we call it modernization in the nuclear business as well. that is where the program of record fits. there is discontinuous innovation. people are talking about when they talk about the next big thing. architectural innovation. that is organizational and doctrinal. that last box in the bottom right-hand corner is what most folks want. revolutions in military affairs. the old transformation business under rumsfeld. information technology revolution in military affairs.

we got big chunks of it and we are still talking about doing transformation. that is rare. incredibly rare. you look back over history. there are a dozen or so rma's you can identify. the nuclear revolution is one of them. that was relatively quick. it was built on decades of work. but in three years, we developed a bomb. discontinuous technological breakthroughs. fusion, fission diffusion, delivery systems, icbms, long-range bombers. all of that continued the nuclear revolution. there are architectural breakthroughs. the atomic energy commission. doe.

nsa. the doctrinal level. massive retaliation. more recently, integrated deterrence. for the lab, science-based stockpile stewardship is innovation. most of the program of record is sustaining innovation. is that enough given what some of our adversaries are up to? we have made the case for capability strategic resilience. i will not walk through all this but recognizing that we have incredible capabilities we have drawn on in the past and we need to harness that for the future. and the nuclear business specifically and defense business more generally. natural innovation system.

the previous pal we talked about emdi and the partners in that enterprise. one of the partners left out was universities. it certainly wasn't highlighted. we need to be thinking about our allies and partners in business as well. the bottom line for me, for capabilities-based strategic resilience, a complex nuclear enterprise with the ability to take on challenges on the order of the manhattan project. this is not up there but the timeline of the manhattan project. that is tough for us right now. his incredibly tough. that is demanding. -- it is incredibly tough. that is demeaning. i'm done. [laughter]

she has been trying to pull me. [applause] leonor: thank you. col. rasmussen: great to be here with this esteemed group for the summit. i want to thank nancy has we had a 6:00 a.m. call about how to navigate the schedule for me being at space operations command this morning and not breaking traffic laws coming down 66 to get here in time. excited to be here from the space development agency. i want to highlight our model on the lower left of that. except for -- the space development agency focuses on schedule. delivering on schedule is the most important thing we can do for our war fighters and for our nation. we are the constructive

disruptor and how we are going about tech development, acquisition, and livery. -- delivery. we will talk about that. here we go. our focus that brought the space development agency into existence and the focus of the proliferated war fighter space architecture was to close the sensor to shooter kill chain. to identify the threats worldwide, track them worldwide, and get that information anywhere in the world to terrestrial commanders for them to take actions against the enemy or against threats. that is our focus. identifying threats, advanced threats, hypersonic advanced threats, advanced missiles. getting that information anywhere in the world for commanders to respond. we are launching a proliferated consolation in low-earth orbit that does bring a lot of resiliency. we are not just about

satellites. we are a global weapons system to deliver capability to war fighters everywhere in multiple domains. a couple of things i will highlight as we have the transport layer. that will be 400 plus satellites in space. it has the mesh network, edge processing to bring data to war fighters anywhere on the ground whether it is maritime, army, aircraft. low latency anywhere in the world taking advantage of what we see in the commercial sector. we have the missile morning and missile tracking layer. that is what i am the chief of. that is to see targets anywhere in the world and get that target data to anyone at any time to take action on contact. we will talk about that. we have the navigation layer providing -- >> can we stop the arms race? [inaudible] col. rasmussen: sorry. we have a little disruption here. >> [indiscernible]

col. rasmussen: moving on. we have the navigation layer that is supporting war fighters worldwide for alternative navigation signals. thank you. >> [indiscernible] col. rasmussen: the other thing is we have a battle management layer that takes advantage of that edge processing. we have applications in orbit that upload applications and distribute data and other things. next slide. that's me. you probably hear about this on the news. we absolutely embrace it. we look to launch new capabilities every two years. new capabilities every two years. requirements with the war fighter counsel, with the services. very frank, candid discussions about where is the threat and where they are going with the mission and the state of technology.

we look at what we can do the next satellites. if we get it in, we do. if we can't, we only have to wait two more years. it's not an eight-year decision. we can take advantage of new tech coming online or respond to threats and provide what is needed for combat commanders worldwide. i will also highlight on this, with this consistent demand with industry and competition we can drive down costs. you will see t-0, the transport satellites. tranche two averaging about $13 billion for the outlaw variant -- $13 million for the outlaw variants. that is enabling us to drive down costs as well. our business model is the development that i just went about. it's opportunistic and responsive.

we have a competitive marketplace. every tranche we want to have new entrants if we can. we are all for the partners that have been with us for a long time but we want to provide opportunity for new approaches. every tranche, every transport layer and tracking layer is an opportunity for a business earner or industry or to join in the proliferating war fighter architecture. they are able to compete in the next tranche. we don't get into someone having this locked down for years or decades at a time. a great opportunity for competition with new entrants. we work with interoperability. we have standards with a heterogeneous constellation across tracking satellites. using oct's in orbit, tobacco of our -- the backbone of our data dissemination. we can use different oct's and providers can talk to each other. we have standards on the ground so our partners can plug into what we call a supernova that controls and distribute data.

lastly, we focus on affordability. we maximize the model to make trades for performance and cost so we can stay on schedule and budget. that so we can deliver to the war fighter and be good stewards of taxpayer money. this is a high-level schedule on how we work. pwsa deployment. we are in the requirements phase. we are always building satellites and always having something in orbit. that drives the spiral development. that informs what we are doing on the ground with the assembly of satellites. very important. we are not about satellites. we are about the ground and ultimately we are about the data. that is what matters. getting the data to the right people and the right format. you can see the ground operations and innovation. we have got to have the ground

in place before the satellites launched. you may have some scars of satellites in orbit. we don't have the ground in place. we also have the battle management layer. we will have the application factor where we can upload apps and take advantage of the edge processing in orbit. the bottom shows the satellites when we get to the full numbers. we will have tranche one, tranche two, and tranche three. later we will start tranche four. we will see that line of how many satellites we will have been orbit on any given time. this is a quick look at truong two -- tranche two. most of these were awarded in the last year. the average from solicitation going out to selection is somewhere around 100 days. we move very fast and very deliberate. very fast. from left to right we have the tranche two alpha layer. that is providing the backbone

to anywhere in the world to our forces and allies. we have t-2 beta. and for tracking we just awarded those a couple of weeks ago in january. that's near global stereo capability. we will have at least two satellites, maybe three or four depending where you are at in the world looking at the earth at any given place to give us really high fidelity and targeting data to provide to our partners. we are accelerating missile defense capabilities. this is basically hptsf. we worked tightly with nda to get the capability across the valley of death. we are working to provide some

other centers on our t-1. we are leveraging what nda has done for the missile defense/fire control arena. in a couple of weeks we have the last t-0 launch with four more tracking satellites that will launch with nda satellites. we will have a good opportunity to collaborate on the ground and on orbit as we get our sta satellites with the nda satellites to inform the spiral development for future tranches. great partnership with missile defense agency. i want to quickly say sda is not looking to go it alone. we work with fsc, space systems command. we have a war fighter counsel

that brings an army, navy, air force, others, space force. i had to get here in a hurry because i was meeting with space operations command. we are working across the community to inform the spiral development model and deliver on schedule. that is all i have left. sda is a joint organization. i would like to tell my space force partners the first organization the u.s. launched -- in the u.s. to launch a satellite was the army. thank you. [applause] leonor: over to steve. steve: is it ok if i just sit here? i have great news for all of you. i don't have any slides. that's a tender mercy reducing the cognitive load. in many ways i feel like i'm

coming full circle. before i get started, if anyone else has slogans or things they have read, you are welcome to avail yourself before i get rolling. i started my career, currently in venture capital and joining commissions as a living. i was involved in putting in gbi's, which is awful duty. locked myself in one of the telephone booths showing up too early in the morning. it's important to hammer your co -- to remember your code. i wrote as the lead author of nspd 21 and 43.

it is interesting. when i was talking to a panel about strategic deterrence, i like one of andy's slights -- slides showed about new innovation. it's usually very tactical. change this or change this. change the carpet. change the wallpaper. come up with a new army uniform. you sit and say howdy he -- how the hell innovation is relevant in this context? it's important to view it through the triad of icbms, bombers and subs. in some cases it is more relevant than others, at least within the threat envelope we currently face. this gets to the commission on defense innovation and adoption. i did not have any slides but

you can google it. atlantic council commission innovation. that will probably help. i'm afraid of what will come up. that will probably get you where you need to be. the focus we had was short-term. this was in the next three to five years. basically until 2029-2030. for those in the defense community, you know we have significant fall off in total available platforms and readiness of those platforms. that is not just tanks and strikers. but also includes bombers, short range attacker care -- attack aircraft, and don't get me started on submarines. it's a helpful conversation starter. the commission on defense innovation and adoption was launched by secretary of defense mark esper and secretary of the air force there really james.

-- deborah lee james. they were big name commissioners. you can google this and check the news as well. a bunch of very credible people. the endpoint was to only have people that had ground combat in this space. i don't want anyone talking authoritatively about this if they have not dealt with it directly. what resulted, and i will skip to the point, we had eight challenges identified, 10 recommendations. the report was only 14 pages. why? mark twain said i only had time to write you a long letter, and a short letter. it was so people would read it. of the 10 recommendations, 6.5 were in space force. we can round that to seven. seven recommendations have been adopted. we have a link inside the commission link that shows the

full laydown of the recommendations and specifically what happened. that means u.s. policy, either on the hill or the pentagon had to change. i will highlight one recommendation that relates to what ras said. one thing we call that was having more service -- the army, navy, air force -- service center focused on the sda model. that was a way of generating capability in the near-term. the recommendations we were putting out in the direction we got from secretary asper and secretary james was it has to be implement a bowl within the next two to three years -- implement ible in the next two to three years and cannot create new issues. fill in the blank. the department is not working so the solution to solving this

this coming out of the ic is create a new director of whatever or under for whatever that will solve all the things while we don't actually touch anything that is really the problem. we felt the sda recommendation, and i'm sure you guys can talk about this at q&a, the recommendation is very useful to extrapolate upon some of the successes of the department-like air force rapid capability office, softworks, things like that. i think i left everything on the field. i will stop talking. we have 19 minutes in one second for discussion and q&a. thank you. leonor: thank you so much, steve. before we turn to audience questions let me kick it off with one question.

you might treat this differently. are we going fast enough? andy, i liked one of your last charts. it showed hardware and software and how much change you can make. the bottom right quadrant. disruptive revolutionary innovation. as we look at new threats and new risks of escalation, new pathways towards escalation that can lead to nuclear war, are we going fast enough in looking at concepts and strategies given china and russia are certainly making rapid progress in adding nuclear capabilities, novel nuclear capabilities, but also making steady progress in new domains? that could rapidly lead to

escalation in space, cyber? csa's model is simper sidious. it's energy example of how to approach deterrence by adding resilience. buying time. if there is a conflict, being able to absorb and attack without leading to rapid escalation. are we moving fast enough in terms of culture and bureaucracy and rapid acquisition and moving to new models? steve, same but from the private sector perspective. i know you serve on the board of directors and advisor to very successful startup companies.

there's a lot of innovation in the private sector that should be leveraged for defense and to enhance deterrence. given the recommendations i think it's promising that almost seven have been implement it already. one of the remaining challenges and what is left to be done and are removing fast enough. we will start with andy. andrew: thanks. that's a really good question and a tough question. are we going fast enough? the slide i ended on i think was is the complex up to the task of doing something the equivalent of the manhattan project in that timeframe? from what i'm seeing now it is no. yeah. we are not currently facing the grand challenge on the order of what we were facing in the first

half of the 1940's, the grand challenge of world war ii. a two front war with an advanced industrial country, germany, pursuing its own nuclear capability. there were enormous pressures and enormous resources put to the manhattan project. in norma's talent, which -- and enormous talent, which emphasizes the importance of people. we have got the talent. i have spent time in livermore and sandia and los alamos. i have always been impressed by the scientific and engineering talent that is out there. there's a lot in this room. i have had a number of staffers from all three labs in classes

at this point. the talent is amazing. i suspect if we were in a situation like world war ii, a two front war, a lot of the bureaucratic constraints would go away. but i'm still not convinced that we could do it -- meet a new challenge on the order of the manhattan project in just three years. not long ago i saw a briefing on one of what we are calling a new capability we are developing. at the end there was a timeline. 14 years. arguably that capability is not as new as some people would like to think it is. we are doing this at a time when we are modernizing across the

board, across the triad. it's really incredible modernization efforts. when a key component has a 14-year timeline it is hard to think we are doing it fast enough. it isn't money. a lot of it are the bureaucratics of the work we do. it is tough. col. rasmussen: no, we are not going fast enough. we only go as the fast -- as fast as the rate we make decisions. we need to make decisions responsibly to adapt to a changing environment and the threat and opportunities from technology. hinting at the bureaucracy and other organizational things mentioned, we have to make decisions quickly. i had a mentor tell me technology is easy, people are hard. a lot of good people, a lot of

good capability and talent mentioned but not organized to make decisions quickly. the model we have is not easy in dod. we are working very hard to try to bring people along with us. it is not easy. we are fortunate right now. we have been empowered within a lot of authorities to make those decisions quickly. and deliver capability. we need to keep it that way and do that in other areas and other mission areas so they can make decisions and learn quickly and avoid capability -- ploy capabilities quickly. we need to make decisions faster. steve: razor hand if you are with the heritage defense industrial base. how many of you here are a start up or what you could call the startup? a couple. the key to innovation to include -- i realized this myself

through blunt-force trauma. the key to innovation and moving fast is super unsexy stuff, like modernizing budget documents. 100%. other supercool things like budget line items. god bless you if you know those are. consolidating budget line items and programming elements. that is how we go faster. building a hypersonic thing that idiots like me will sink hundreds of millions of dollars into. resetting programming authorities to their historical norms. reprogramming authority. it's a superpower that no one talks about. these are all recommendations we conveniently made in our commission report. reprogramming authorities is a great way to ensure your stuff is adopted. just tag it to what we used to

do not that long ago. our recommendation is remember 10 years ago when you did that thing? can you go back and do that thing again? they said we did that thing 10 years ago? yeah. we dealt with this 10 years ago. that is a great way. what is frustrating as an investor in a startup founder myself -- don't do that, by the way. in the think tank world, to feel like you are facing this faithless menace, this thing holding all of us back. we suck. we are not smart enough. our talent is terrible. we spent $800 billion plus on defense every year. how the hell does that happen? if anything, going through this -- i'm leaving a lot of breadcrumbs for the commission -- going through this process, and we have a new initiative we have launched, it

was helpful for me. it helped me identify very specifically and it's with the details -- explicit details what is holding us back. those are some of the things that kept us from being great again, shall i say. leonor: thank you. we have nine minutes. let me turn to the arguments and maybe we can take two questions at a time. >> [indiscernible] leonor: we have one back there. emily. >> how do you balance the need to modernize and integrate the deterrent for a more resilient response with the need to balance risk management, especially in the current arms-control community and potential for a world where the nuclear arsenals are constrained between the major powers? steve: i can touch a little on

that. to the new initiative we have launched called software defined warfare. the commission built around it is sdw going forward. how do you innovate without disrupting the capability and responsiveness? with the 82nd airborn you say fight tonight. at a strategic level identifying commercial and industrial based software, elite software technology. there is an elite software capability. insert that in the legacy hardware systems. new startups will do their own things. there's nothing any of us -- especially ras -- can do to make the things go faster. legacy hardware systems. it turns out 75% of major defense acquisition programs are

legacy hardware systems. despite being an innovative group, 75% of the big pots of money, the big programs are out there flying right now. this is a challenge. how do you transition from the legacy force to the objective force. it's not a binary solution. leonor: we heard about this yesterday on the arms control panel. leveraging new technology for verification monitoring. we need to leverage the private sector innovation that can help deterrence, including arms-control. i think the other piece is the uncertainty of whether we are going to continue to have legally binding nuclear arms control treaties going forward. mallory talked about this,

secretary mallory stewart talked about this in terms of looking at arms-control and the broader concept of threat reduction. i really see the new focus on resilience as part of threat reduction. if you can have systems that are designed with strategic ability in mind, the missile warning and missile tracking. if you have over 100 satellites, you are not vulnerable with just a handful of satellites where china could target us and lead to rapid escalation. we don't have formal arms-control. if you have resilience for stable architectures, that can reduce risks. col. rasmussen: i will added that question. building on stephen's comment. we are starting with using

existing data formats and existing networks to get the data to the legacy systems. we have the ability to work with those emerging programs and emerging capabilities with the battle management layer to get them the data in the format they are going to use, which is the way forward. using existing data formats and data pathways to enable our legacy force moving forward. andrew: building on steve's response, i will build on leonor 's response to the question. both of you, ras and leonor talked about technological resilience. we also need to build up policy and strategy resilience, especially arms-control resilience so that one country withdrawing from an accord does not kill it. one thing we got from the arms

control panel was the call for more creative approaches to arms-control. my quick to emily is asked me the same question after our arms-control workshop. you have been invited to come to that. hopefully we can give you a more complete answer. what is more resilient arms-control look like when you have two partners, russia and china, not terribly interested in engaging in traditional arms-control. how do we do that? my own thinking there is based on a space approach. there is responsible nuclear behavior that secdef has been using. that is one thing of want to try to do as part of that workshop.

leonor: one more question. >> [indiscernible] -- multidisciplinary back rent of the panel how do we increase cross-pollination within the national security community to bolster resiliency with respect to strategic deterrence? thank you. andrew: that's a great question. part of it is simply bringing people together from different backgrounds and in forums like this. one thing we have done is advertisement for the bush school at texas a&m. 12, 13 years now we had a national security affairs program. in the professional development program for the labs. before the graduate certificate program where you comfort two semesters to college station in the summer -- a great time to be down there.

we do it in june so it is not as bad as august. they do courses now on nuclear policy and deterrence. and on space and cyber. then they do courses later on operations, military operations in the fall. then they do a research project. all of which are taking the science and engineering talent we have seen at the labs that i think is amazing. teaching people how to think, to recognize how policymakers think through problems, and engage at that level. to develop a complete understanding of why they do what they do at the labs. we have had some nice success stories.

i can't take personal credit for this but can be dealt -- kim bud elle was one of the first people to go through that program. going through this program has changed the trajectory of my career. in this case it was livermore. efforts like that. we have got people from -- staffers from the labs which are in pony, a program i -- the program on nuclear issues. we have a new cohort that started last month. that is included traditional

security studies. it has had people from the services, people from the hill, people from elsewhere, government d.o.e.. folks from industry. people of all kinds of backgrounds. science and engineering and public policy. there are efforts like that. the labs have supported the program. we need to see more of those kinds of things i think. all of this is pipeline stuff. >> it is an important question. andrew: are we doing it enough? probably not. >> in closing this panel, i wanted to end in quote.

for the last panel of the conference at noon. here is a quote from the commission we did emphasize the need for incorporating new concepts of technology and innovation. effectively leveraging u.s. and allied innovation requires a cultural and bureaucratic shift in order to overcome legacy approaches not suited to leveraging new technologies. the u.s. must innovate in peacetime faster than ever before and by feeling to do so, it is eroding its ability to deter and fight and win the next word -- war. i would add the ability to prevent the risk -- the ability to reduce the risk of nuclear war. let me end on that note and please join me in thanking our panelists. thank you.