OPINION
SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, District Judge.
Petitioner Charmell Brown, proceeding pro se, has filed a Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (d/e 1), a Motion to File a Late Federal Habeas (d/e 2), and a corrected Petition (d/e 3). Respondent Jacqueline Lashbrook moves to dismiss the § 2254 Petition as time-barred. Because the § 2254 Petition is untimely, the Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8) is GRANTED. A certificate of appealability is GRANTED.
I. BACKGROUND
The Court takes the following information from Petitioner's § 2254 Petition
In December 2009, a Champaign County, Illinois jury found Petitioner guilty of first degree murder and aggravated battery with a firearm. On May 27, 2010, Petitioner was sentenced to 60 years' imprisonment for first degree murder and 30 years' imprisonment for aggravated battery with a firearm with the sentences to run consecutively. Petitioner appealed, and the appellate court affirmed.
On March 15, 2013, Petitioner filed a postconviction petition pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1
On October 11, 2016, Petitioner filed a successive postconviction petition, which the state trial court denied on February 8, 2017. Petitioner did not appeal.
On September 20, 2017, Petitioner filed his unsigned Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (d/e 1) in this Court. He also filed an unsigned Motion to File a Late Federal Habeas (d/e 2). On September 21, 2017, this Court directed Petitioner to pay the $5 filing fee or file a petition to proceed in forma pauperis. The Court also directed Petitioner to file a copy of his Petition signed under penalty of perjury. Petitioner has paid the filing fee and filed a signed copy of his Petition (d/e 3). The Court treats the corrected Petition as the operative § 2254 Petition.
On November 1, 2017, the Court found summary dismissal was not warranted and directed Respondent to respond to the Petition. Respondent has moved to dismiss Petitioner's § 2254 Petition as untimely. Petitioner has not filed a response to the Motion to Dismiss, despite the Court
II. ANALYSIS
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act provides for a one-year period of limitation for applications for writs of habeas corpus. Section 2244(d)(1) provides as follows:
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Section 2244(d)(2) further provides that "[t]he time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection." 28 U.S.C. §2244(d)(2).
Petitioner, having not responded to the Motion to Dismiss, does not assert that the State created an impediment to filing (§ 2244(d)(1)(B)), that the Supreme Court has recognized a right and made that new right retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review (§ 2244(d)(1)(C)), or that the factual predicate for the claims could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence (§ 2244(d)(1)(D)). Therefore, the Court will only address the calculation of the one-year period under § 2244(d)(1)(A).
Under 28 U.S.C § 2244(d)(1)(A), the relevant date for starting the limitation period is the date on which Petitioner's conviction became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review. Where, as here, certiorari was not sought, the statute of limitations imposed by § 2244(d)(1)(A) begins to run after the conclusion of all direct criminal appeals in the state court and the expiration of the 90-day period for filing a petition for writ of certiorari.
In this case, the Illinois Supreme Court denied leave to appeal on May 30, 2012. The 90-day period to file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court expired on August 28, 2012. Therefore, Petitioner's conviction became final on August 28, 2012.
The limitation period ran from August 28, 2012 until March 15, 2013, the date Petitioner filed his first state postconviction petition, a total of 199 days.
The statutory limitation contained in §2244(d) is subject to equitable tolling in appropriate cases.
Although Petitioner has not responded to the Motion to Dismiss, he filed a Motion to File Late Federal Habeas at the same time he filed his Petition. In the Motion, Petitioner asserts that he should be allowed to file his untimely § 2254 Petition because he spent a year in segregation starting on February 17, 2016. Petitioner claims that while he was in segregation, he sent his § 2254 Petition—which he had completed in October 2015—to the prison library to get copies and the Petition got lost. Petitioner also asserts he could not prepare his Petition while in segregation because he cannot read or write and he needed help to prepare the Petition.
To demonstrate diligence, Petitioner must show that he was reasonably diligent in pursuing his rights throughout the limitation period and until he finally filed his § 2254 Petition.
By February 17, 2016, when Petitioner was placed in segregation, he had only 26 days remaining in the limitation period. Despite claiming that he had completed his § 2254 Petition in October 2015, Petitioner did not attempt to make copies of the document until he was in segregation, at which time the document was purportedly lost by prison officials. Petitioner has not shown that he exercised diligence between October 2015 and February 2016, before the limitation period expired.
In addition, after being released from segregation, Petitioner still waited seven months to file his § 2254 Petition.
Finally, although Petitioner does not explicitly argue that equitable estoppel should apply, he does argue that prison officials lost his habeas petition when he was in segregation. Equitable estoppel can, in appropriate circumstances, apply to a statute of limitations in a habeas case.
Even assuming that prison officials intentionally lost Petitioner's § 2254 Petition to prevent him from filing it, Petitioner nonetheless waited seven months after being released from segregation to file his § 2254 Petition. Petitioner offers no explanation for this delay, only stating that he could not file while in segregation because he needed help to prepare the Petition.
III. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Pursuant to Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing § 2254 Proceedings, this Court denies a certificate of appealability in this case. AWhen the district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner's underlying constitutional claim," a certificate of appealability should issue only when the prisoner shows both Athat jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right
The Court concludes that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether Petitioner's Petition should be dismissed as untimely. Moreover, although the Court has only conducted a cursory review of Petitioner's claims, the Court finds that it appears that jurists of reason could differ as to the § 2254 Petition's merits, particularly with respect to Petitioner's ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
IV. CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, Respondent's Motion to Dismiss (d/e 8) is GRANTED, and Petitioner's Corrected Petition Under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus By a Person in State Custody (d/e 3) is DISMISSED. Petitioner's Motion to File a Late Federal Habeas (d/e 2) is DENIED. A certificate of appealability is GRANTED as to whether equitable tolling or equitable estoppel applies under the circumstances of Petitioner's case. CASE CLOSED.
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