JAMES C. HILL, Circuit Judge:
Appellant United States appeals a district court order dismissing its complaint for forfeiture in rem, brought under 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b). The district court held that the complaint failed to state a claim under 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b) because it did not allege that Robert Chemaly, the traveler who allegedly failed to report the currency in compliance with 31 U.S.C. § 5316, acted with knowledge of the currency reporting requirements. We affirm, holding that such knowledge is an element of a civil forfeiture action brought pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 5317(b).
FACTS
In 1982, the United States Customs Service seized $24,900 from Robert Chemaly at Miami International Airport. Chemaly,
A complaint for forfeiture in rem was filed against the defendant currency. Chemaly filed a claim of possession to the currency and a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it failed to allege that he acted with knowledge of the reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C. § 5316. The district court granted the motion. The United States filed notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
At the time the currency was seized, 31 U.S.C. § 5316 required, among other things, that a person file a currency transaction report when that person "knowingly ... transports ... monetary instruments of more than $5000 at one time ... from a place in the United States to or through a place outside the United States...."
The government argues that specific knowledge of the reporting requirement of section 5316 is not an element of a section 5317 civil forfeiture action. According to the government, the term "knowingly," as used in section 5316, applies only to transportation of the currency, not to the reporting requirements. The only knowledge requirement is that the traveler know he or she is importing the currency.
This is a question of first impression in our circuit. Not too long ago, the former Fifth Circuit, whose precedent binds us, faced a similar question in the context of a criminal prosecution for violation of the reporting requirements of former section 1101 (now section 5316). Under former 31 U.S.C. § 1058 (now 31 U.S.C. § 5322), a person is subject to criminal penalties for "willfully violating" the reporting requirements of section 1101 (now section 5316).
It is clear that the terms of a statute cannot have one meaning when a criminal prosecution is brought and another when a civil action is brought. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 63 S.Ct. 379, 87 L.Ed. 443 (1943). This would indicate that if the terms "knowingly transport," in section 5316, require knowledge of the reporting requirements in the context of a criminal action, they do so in the context of a forfeiture action as well. However, appellant United States argues that the decision in Granda and the other criminal cases is not controlling, or even applicable, because the criminal provision requires that the violation of the reporting requirements be a "willful" one, while the forfeiture provision has no such "willfulness" requirement. It requires only a failure to file a report.
This distinction, based on the "willfulness" requirement of the criminal statute, was rejected by the only other circuit court to address the issue we now face. In United States v. $48,595, 705 F.2d 909, 914 (7th Cir.1983) (emphasis in original), the Seventh Circuit stated, "[i]t is not clear that this distinction is warranted in light of the Fifth Circuit's reliance on the language of both Sections 1058 ["willfulness"] and 1101 [now 5316] ["knowingly"]". See, e.g., Granda, 565 F.2d at 925-26 (emphasis in original) ("We ... hold that the terms knowing and willful require proof of the defendant's knowledge of the reporting requirements and his specific intent to commit the crime"); Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d at 1211 ("This court [in Granda] ... held that since 31 U.S.C.A. § 1101 requires `knowing' transportation and since § 1058 requires a `willful' violation, there must be proof of the defendant's knowledge of the reporting requirement and his specific intent to commit the crime"). Relying on Granda, the Seventh Circuit indicated that knowledge of a reporting requirement is an element in a forfeiture case.
At least one court has suggested that, in Granda, the Fifth Circuit seemingly derived the knowledge requirement from the term "knowingly" in section 5316 and the specific intent requirement from the term
Appellant United States also argues that Granda and the other criminal cases are not controlling because the rationale of these decisions rested in large part on the fact that the statute being interpreted was a criminal statute. It is true that the court in Granda, 565 F.2d at 926, stated,
We do not find this passage or any other comments in Granda to indicate that involvement of a criminal statute was essential to the decision. The same rationale applied in Granda can be applied to the forfeiture statute, since the legislative history indicates that Congress intended for the reporting requirements of section 5316 and the forfeiture provisions of section 5317 to motivate travelers to file currency reports. See discussion infra pp. 1534-1535.
For the foregoing reasons, we find Granda and the other criminal cases probably controlling, and, at the very least, persuasive authority.
Section 5316 and the civil forfeiture provision are part of the Currency and Foreign Transactions Reporting Act of 1970. The purpose of the Act is to require reports of foreign transactions where such reports would be helpful in investigations of criminal, tax and regulatory violations. Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, S.Rep. No. 1139, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 7 (1970) (hereinafter cited as Senate Report); House Committee on Banking and Currency, H.R.Rep. No. 975, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1970 U.S.Code Cong. & Ad.News 4404-05 (hereinafter cited as House Report). The Act is aimed solely at obtaining reports of certain transactions. See id.; Senate Report at 7. There is
The legislative history also indicates that Congress did not intend for the reporting requirements to damage international trade and commerce or in any way prevent money from moving freely into and out of the United States. House Report at 13; Senate Report at 7-8. As the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency stated,
Id. at 7. See also Warren, 612 F.2d at 891 ("In enacting the currency reporting statutes, ... Congress sought to avoid damage to international trade and commerce. Incident to that concern was an appreciation that travelers are both a part of and creators of international trade and commerce"). In Warren, the Fifth Circuit, en banc, cited this portion of the legislative history as a reason for holding that knowledge of the reporting requirements is an element in a criminal prosecution. Id. at 890-91. This reasoning applies with equal force in the forfeiture context. Failure to require knowledge of the reporting requirements could well impede the mobility of international capital into and out of the United States. A signal would be sent that United States law may well be filled with booby-traps that spring without warning to grab the currency of unsuspecting travelers.
We are aware that some district courts have indicated that they would hold differently than we do here.
We note that our holding here will not place customs or other law enforcement officials under any greater burden than they already bear. Under Granda and the other criminal cases, they essentially have an affirmative duty to inform travelers of the currency reporting requirements. E.g., Granda, 565 F.2d at 926 ("Proof of the requisite knowledge and willfulness ... is almost impossible unless affirmative steps are taken by the government to make the laws' requirements known"). Nor do we expect our holding will cause there to be fewer forfeitures. As long as law enforcement officials take affirmative steps to make travelers aware of the reporting requirements, we would imagine that knowledge of the reporting requirements could be shown in virtually all cases.
For the foregoing reasons, the order of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
FootNotes
Because we find the legislative history to indicate that Congress intended knowledge of the reporting requirements to be an element of a forfeiture case, see infra pp. 1534-35 we do not agree with the Seventh Circuit's alternative holding based on judicial discretion. This, of course, is not to say that courts do not have discretion in forfeiture cases. Here we hold only that knowledge of the reporting requirements is an element of the forfeiture action, not a matter for judicial discretion.
$6,250, 706 F.2d at 1197 n. 2.
In Ivers v. United States, 413 F.Supp. 394, 401 n. 9 (N.D.Cal.1975), aff'd, in part and rev'd in part on other grounds, 581 F.2d 1362 (9th Cir.1978), the court indicated that lack of knowledge of the reporting requirements may be, at most, a ground for remission of the forfeiture by the Secretary of the Treasury. For the reasons previously stated in the text, particularly the legislative history, we reject this view.
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